(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. (MD) No.15503 of 2017 dated 06.12.2021.)

M. Dhandapani, J.

1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single Judge in and by which the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with all monetary benefits along with interest at 6% p.a., the present writ appeal has been filed.

2. For brevity, the appellant and the respondent will be referred to as ‘Department’ and ‘employee’.

3. The brief facts, as could be culled out from the order passed by the learned single Judge are as under :-

The petitioner was appointed as a Supervisor in the respondent / Corporation on 05.12.2013. Upon transfer to Orathanadu Taluk, the petitioner was posted in Shop No. 7861 and additional duty was assigned in Shop No. 8033 from 05.03.2012. An inspection was conducted in Shop No. 7861 and 8033 on 12.11.2014, at 11.30 a.m., by the Senior Regional Manager, Trichy. After completion of the inspection, report was filed in which it was stated that the petitioner along with salesmen, Pandian and Anbarasan and two private persons were inside the shop premises, when the flying squad along with District Manager namely Mr. Mohanarajan visited the premises and on their arrival the three employees fled away and one person, viz., Suresh Kumar was also available inside the premises. Various discrepancies in the maintenance of the shop as also the accounts were noted and on the report being filed, a charge memo came to be issued to the petitioner and explanation was called for. Parallely, FIR was registered by Prohibition of Enforcement Wing, Pattukkottai in Crime No.756 of 2014 for the offences under Sections 4(1)(a) and Section 24-A of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act r/w. Sect. 272 and 420 IPC, wherein the petitioner, two salesmen and one private party were shown as accused. But, on verification the police subsequently, dropped the investigation in Crime No. 756 as “action dropped”.

4. Pending the explanation from the petitioner, he was kept under suspension by order dated 12.11.2014, which was challenged before this Court in W.P(MD).No. 5720/2015 and this Court, vide order dated 17.04.2015 directed the respondents to complete the enquiry within the stipulated time and directed the respondents to grant subsistence allowance to the petitioner.

5. Another criminal case was registered in Crime No.260 of 2014 for the offences under Sections 409 and 420 IPC alleging that while the petitioner was employed as Supervisor in the Shop No.8033, an audit was conducted on 13.11.2014 and on verification of stocks and cash there was shortage of Rs.1,80,684/- and the petitioner has paid the shortage of Rs. 376/- which is shortage of sale proceeds and there was misappropriation of sale proceeds to the tune of Rs.1,80,684/-.

6. Charge memo dated 22.12.2014 was issued to the petitioner on the basis of the inspection report containing seven charges. The petitioner submitted an explanation on 05.05.2016 denying all the charges. Not being satisfied with the explanation, enquiry officer was appointed. During the enquiry, the department marked only the FIR before the Enquiry Officer. On the side of the department while no witness was examined, however, Exs.M-1 to M-6 were marked. The employee did not examine any witness but marked one document showing a challan towards deposit of a sum of Rs.376/=.

7. As far as charges 6 and 7 are concerned it is the claim of the petitioner that there was no shortage of sale proceeds in Shop No.8033 at all. The petitioner submitted 29 documents and the same was not taken into consideration by the enquiry officer at all. Based on the report of the enquiry, tfurther explanation was called for from the employee and not being satisfied with the same, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. Aggrieved by the same, though an appellate remedy challenging the order of dismissal was available, however, the employee had come before this Court by filing W.P. (MD) No. 15503/2017.

8. Learned single Judge, pointing out the fallacy in the evidence, disbelieved the evidence available on record, more particularly based on the investigation report in the crime numbers registered against the employee, in which, during investigation, the witnesses had deposed u/s 161 Cr.P.C. and which evidence, was found to be contradictory with the inspection report, which formed the basis for the enquiry report and, therefore, held that the evidence is not sufficient to prove the delinquency against the employee and, therefore, set aside the order of dismissal and ordered reinstatement along with backwages and interest. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ appeal has been filed at the instance of the Department.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned single Judge got carried away by the evidence tendered by the witnesses during the investigation u/s 161 Cr.P.C., which evidence cannot form the basis for the deciding the delinquency in the disciplinary proceedings.

10. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that the degree of proof required in a disciplinary enquiry is not akin to the degree of proof required in a criminal case as in the disciplinary enquiry, the evidence rests on preponderance of probabilities, whereas in a criminal case, it is on the basis of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, it is the submission of the learned counsel that there are no convincing materials placed by the employee to show that he had handed over the amount of sale proceeds to the tune of Rs.1,80,684/- to the District Manager, as claimed by him. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that the collection of the sale proceeds by the employee is admitted and, therefore, it is incumbent on him to show that he had handed over the collection to the District Manager, as the rules prescribe that if the banks are not functioning, the amount so collected should be kept in the chest. In the absence of any substantive material, the reliance placed on the 161 statement by the learned single Judge is wholly flawed.

11. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that this Court is only exercising its revisional jurisdiction where this Court is not required to go into the merits of each and every evidence except to find out whether, on the materials available before the disciplinary authority, the order passed is arbitrary and perverse. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that this Court, sitting under Article 226 shall not sit in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority unless it is shown to be perverse and illegal. However, no such recording has been made by the learned single Judge except showing that the evidence recorded at the time of investigation of the criminal case paints a different picture and, therefore, the employee could not be mulcted with the responsibility, which legal finding is grossly unreasonable and erroneous and the same requires to be set aside.

12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the employee submits that the presence of the employee in the shop or the employee taking away the attendance register has not been properly established by the department. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that gravity of the offence is one relating to misappropriation which has resulted in dismissal, however, the said charge has not been conclusively proved by the department. In this regard, learned counsel for the employee, pointing out to the infirmities in the evidence of the witnesses, who have been examined at the time of investigation and their statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C., which was taken note of by the learned single Judge, submitted that there is variations in the evidence tendered during investigation and the report, which weighed more with the learned single Judge while interfering with the punishment.

13. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that it is the specific case of the employee that he had handed over the amount collected to the District Manager, since the banks were not functioning on the said date. However, the District Manager has not been examined to controvert the claim of the employee and this fallacy strikes at the root of the department case and necessitated an adverse finding from the one recorded at the time of enquiry, which has been properly done by the learned single Judge overturning the order of dismissal from service, which does not warrant any interference at the hands of this Court and, accordingly, prays for dismissal of the appeal.

14. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following decisions :-

                     (i)K.Sampath – Vs – The Managing Director, TASMAC & Ors. (W.P. No.10557/2013 – Dated 24.11.2016);

                     (ii)S.Sengottaiyan – Vs – The Senior Regional Manager, TASMAC & Anr. (W.P. No.32814/2018 – Dated 17.12.2019);

                     (iii)A.Paramasivam – Vs – The Managing Director, TASMAC & Ors. (MANU/TN/6296/2020);

                     (iv)M.Vijayakumar – Vs – The District Manager, TASMAC (W.P. No.36479/2015);

                     (v)TASMAC Oozhiyar Manila Sammelanam (CITU) – Vs – The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (MANU/TN/1827/2025);

                     (vi)Nand Kishore Prasad – Vs – State of Bihar & Ors. (1978 (3) SCC 366);

                     (vii)M.V.Bijlani – Vs – Union of India & Ors. (2006 (5) SCC 88);

                     (viii)Moni Shankar – Vs – Union of India & Anr. (2008 (3) SCC 484);

                     (ix)Roop Singh Negi – Vs – Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009 (2) SCC 570); and

                     (x)Jai Prakash Saini – Vs – Managing Director, UP Co-op. Federation Ltd. & Ors. (2026 Live L:aw (SC) 315)

15. This Court gave its careful consideration to the submission advanced by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in B.C. Chaturvedi – Vs - Union of India, (1995 (6) SCC 749), while dealing with the issue pertaining to the power of the Court relating to judicial review of the order passed by the disciplinary authority, held as under :

                     “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

                     13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.”

                     (Emphasis Supplied)

17. The above view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Principal Secy. Govt. of A.P. - Vs - M. Adinarayana, (2004 (12) SCC 579), wherein, it has been held as under :-

                     “23. We have read this charge in the light of allegations in support thereof. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the respondent has neither supplied any prior information on the Government nor did he send any prior intimation to the Government. By not doing this, he has contravened the provisions of Rule 9. The Tribunal has also categorically held that the respondent has not applied for prior information before he purchased the items from the competent authority nor he intimated to the competent authority forthwith soon after the purchase of the several items. Therefore, in our view, the charged officer has violated Rule 9 of the Conduct Rules and thus is guilty of misconduct within Rule 2-H (sic) of the Andhra Pradesh Disciplinary Amendment Act, 1993. In view of the abovesaid finding we hold that respondent is guilty of both the charges framed against him within Rule 2 (b) of the Conduct Rules of 1961 framed under the Amendment Act, 1993.

                     * * * * * * *

                     26. In our opinion, judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness of the charges as it is not an appeal but only a review of the manner in which the decision was made. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court for reasons stated (supra). The order passed by the Government removing the respondent from service is in order and, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant State stands allowed. Further, there will be no order as to costs.”

                     (Emphasis Supplied)

18. In Director General of Police, RPF & Ors. - Vs – Rajendra Kumar Dubey (C.A. No.3820/2020 dated 25.11.20), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, adverting to the various decisions of the Apex Court relating to the interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings, including the decision in Chaturvedi's case (supra), held as under :-

                     “12.1 ...... It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer.

                     We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant.

                     In State of Andhra Pradesh v S.Sree Rama Rao, a three judge bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If however the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition.

                     These principles were further reiterated in the State of Andhra Pradesh v Chitra Venkata Rao. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal.

                     In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v T.T. Murali, Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, these principles have been consistently followed.

                     In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court has summed up the law in following words :

                     “33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.”

                     In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether : (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

                     In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held that :

                     “13.Under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not :

                     (i) re-appreciate the evidence;

                     (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

                     (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

                     (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;

                     (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

                     (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

                     (Emphasis Supplied)

19. From the ratio laid down above, it is abundantly clear that the Courts, in exercise of its power of judicial review, cannot extend the examination to the correctness of the act of the disciplinary authority, but only limit itself to the manner in which the decision has been arrived at by the authority and whether the same is in accordance with law. This Court is to test only the correctness of the decision arrived at by the authority, and not proceed with the case as if it is an appeal against the order of punishment.

20. It has been further held in the said decisions that so long as the enquiry is not defective the Court has to only see whether there was a prima facie case for dismissal and whether the employer had come to the bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty of misconduct. What is further to be seen is that the conclusion arrived at by the employer is bona fide as to the guilt of the employee and that there was no unfair labour practice or victimization involved and to satisfy itself with regard to the punishment imposed. However, if the enquiry is found to be defective for any reason, the Court would also have to consider for itself, on the evidence adduced before it, whether the dismissal was justified.

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Rajendra Kumar Dubey's case (supra), following the ratio laid down in Gunasekaran's case has held that the High Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution, while determining its scope of interference in a departmental proceedings is only bound to determine whether (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

22. In the light of the above, it is to be stressed that the Court in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court. It has been the consistent view of the Courts that the nature of evidence required in a disciplinary proceeding is not on the same level as required in a criminal trial, as in the disciplinary proceedings, the finding is arrived at on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. In such a scenario, it is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. If the enquiry is properly held within the four boundaries of legal necessities, then the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence and further the Supreme Court has also codified the circumstances under which re-appreciation of evidence is permissible.

23. Therefore, what is to be seen is that was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. From the above, it would be evident that sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny.

24. Bearing the first test principles in mind, this Court would now proceed to analyse the impugned order to find out whether it passes the principles laid down therein.

25. Even a cursory perusal of the order as also the stand of the employee reveals that the employee has not questioned about the manner in which the enquiry has been conducted or has contended that it was not in accordance with law or that it lacked the jurisdiction. The whole case of the employee is predicated upon the non-examination of witnesses and the marking of documents and the inadequate materials placed at the enquiry.

26. Even at the very outset, this Court is bound to point out that the contention on behalf of the employee that the act of misappropriation should be proved through direct evidence and the non-examination of witnesses is fatal to the department, is wholly erroneous, as it has been the consistent view of the courts that insofar as domestic enquiry is concerned, the degree of proof relating to the allegation in a domestic enquiry is not akin to the degree of evidence, which is required in a criminal trial, as in a criminal trial, the standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in a domestic enquiry, the standard of proof is on preponderance of probability and, therefore, there arises no necessity for direct evidence to be placed, so long as the documentary evidence probabilises the allegation.

27. A perusal of the impugned order reveals that the writ court has gone extensively into the statements recorded from the witnesses u/s 161 Cr.P.C. on the basis of the FIR lodged against the employee. The deposition of the witnesses during investigation, which reveals a different picture, is sought to be taken into account by the writ court while holding in favour of the employee.

28. The whole case of the employee rests on his submission that on the day of the audit, the entire amount to the tune of Rs.1,80,684/- was handed over to the District Manager and whatever the shortfall, viz., to the tune o fRs.376/-, which was found out, the employee has paid the same and, therefore, the non-examination of the District Manager is fatal to the case of the department.

29. Though such a stand has been taken by the employee, which has been accepted by the learned single Judge, moreso, on the basis of the deposition of the District Manager during investigation, however, the said 161 statement cannot form the basis for absolving the employee from the said act. It is the stand of the employee that on 11.11.2014 and 12.11.2014, since it was bank holiday, the amount was not deposited in the bank; rather it was kept in the office and on 13.11.2014 when the audit was conducted, the said amount was handed over to the District Manager. If really such an act was done by the employee in handing over the amount, which was kept in the office to the District Manager on 13.11.2014 when audit had taken place, nothing stopped the employee from calling the District Manager as his witness to prove the said handing over of the amount. Further, it really any amount to the extent of Rs.1,80,684/-, which has been alleged to have been misappropriated by the employee, necessary during audit, if the said amount, as claimed by the employee, was in the office, the audit team would have recorded the said amount as receivable in the audit report. In such a case, the employee could have requisitioned the audit report and pointed out the entrustment of cash to the tune of Rs.1,80,684/- to the District Manager, or could have atleast pointed out the availability of the aforesaid amount in the office, when audit took place. Merely on the stand of the employee that he has given the said amount, which was kept in the office to the District Manager and the District Manager has not revealed the same would not absolve the employee of the delinquency on the basis of certain statements given by the said District Manager during the investigation of the criminal case.

30. Further, the employee has not shown any reason for the District Manager not speaking about the receipt of the amount from the employee if really the employee had paid the amount. In such a scenario, the employee ought to have questioned the said District Manager by calling him as his witness. Merely claiming payment of the amount to the said authority, without placing any proof thereof, will not transfer the burden on the department to prove otherwise. Therefore, the statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. cannot be taken in aid of either by the employee or by the writ court to enable the employee to wriggle out of the delinquency. In the case on hand, act of misappropriation on the part of the delinquent is sought to be proved through documentary evidence, which cannot be said to be insufficient and absence of ocular testimony would not in any way advance the case of the employee.

31. Further, the whole trajectory of the order of the writ court reveals that the writ court has heavily shifted the burden on the department to prove its case forgetting the fact that the extent of proof is only on preponderance of probabilities and not on proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. The writ court ought not have gone into the evidence to find out whether the appreciation is legally sustainable or flawed. The duty of the writ court sitting in revisional jurisdiction is not to appreciate the entire evidence; rather it is only to find out whether the disciplinary enquiry has been conducted in accordance with law and whether the findings recorded, on the facts and evidence in the case is perverse. However, the writ court has gone beyond its jurisdiction and sat as an appellate authority by dissecting the evidence and giving a finding, which is impermissible and legally unsustainable.

32. Further, the finding is based on the contentions of the employee that no witnesses were examined, which would vitiate the enquiry also cannot be accepted for the reason that it is within the purview of the department to table oral and documentary evidence and if at all the employee wants to establish anything, the employee ought to have summoned the witnesses and the employee cannot put the onus on the department to produce witnesses of his liking, which is not within the choice of the employee.

33. Further, it is to be noted that the employee was provided with sufficient opportunity to establish his case which is in due compliance of principles of natural justice and such being the case and in the absence of any claim by the employee that he was denied opportunity, the manner in which the enquiry has been conducted cannot be faulted.

34. In the entirety of the case, the employee has not spoken about the enquiry not having been conducted in accordance with law or that the disciplinary authority lacked jurisdiction to initiate the enquiry or that the findings recorded, on the materials available, are perverse. The employee has merely based his case on non-examination of witnesses and appreciation of documents and in the absence of any bias or mala fides attributed to the enquiry or to the enquiring authority, the writ court cannot go into the merits of the claim to overturn either the findings in the enquiry or the punishment imposed on the employee.

35. It is to be noted that the allegation levelled against the employee is of a very grave nature. The employee, who is entrusted with the task of handling government money, highest standards of probity is expected of the said individual. However, without adhering and maintaining the highest standards of probity, the employee had indulged in acts by misappropriating the amount. Persons employed in governmental organisation, which handle government money, should exhibit highest standards of probity and purity and should maintain themselves with utmost integrity and honesty, even if their employment is in the department, which indulges in marketing liquor.

36. When there is no contention with regard to the perversity in the findings recorded by the enquiry officer nor is there any contention claiming that the enquiry was not conducted in a fair and transparent manner, the appreciation of evidence is within the domain of the disciplinary authority and the authority, considering the gravity of the offence in relation to the delinquencies mulcted on the employee has concurred with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the said act cannot be found fault with.

37. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ petition stands allowed and the order passed by the learned single Judge stands set aside and the order of the department dismissing the employee from service stands confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.