1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties.

2. The petitioner is a person, who has raised objection before the Election Officer against the respondent No. 2, who has submitted a nomination form for the ensuing elections of respondent No.3. It was claimed in the objection that respondent No.2 is a Member of respondent No.4 Society, who is a defaulter, and therefore respondent No.2, being its member, cannot contest the elections. The petition thus prays for quashing the order dated 16.09.2026 passed by the respondent No.1 rejecting the objection of the petitioner.

3. Facts, as can be seen in the petition, are as under:

The petitioner is a representative of one Gram Vividh Karyakari Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit, while the respondent No.2 is a representative of one Vividh Karyakari Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit, Umari (Ijara). Both the petitioner and the respondent No.2 had filed nomination papers for contesting election for the seat to be elected from Arni Tahsil constituency. It is stated in the petition that apart from respondent No.2 being a Member of the said Vividh Karyakari Sanstha, he is also a Member of respondent No.4 Society. He is also elected as an Executive Committee Member of respondent No.4 Society for the term 2023 to 2028. Even at present, the respondent No.2 is an Executive Committee Member of respondent No. 4 Society.

4. In this scenario the petitioner raised an objection to the nomination of respondent No.2 on 15.09.2026. All these facts were pointed out in the said objection. The respondent No.1, who is a statutory authority, heard both the parties i.e. the petitioner and respondent No.2, and rejected the objection raised by the petitioner and thus accepted the nomination form of respondent No.2. The said order was passed on 16th September, 2026 and is impugned in the present petition.

5. I have heard Shri A.M.Ghare, learned counsel for the petitioner, as also Mr. Dabadgharo for the respondent No. 2.

6. It is the contention of Mr. A.M. Ghare, learned counsel for the petitioner that since respondent No.2 is an Executive Member of respondent No. 4, and the said respondent No.4 is a defaulter of respondent No.3, the petitioner has incurred disqualification. He submits that respondent No.1 has not taken into consideration the provisions of Section 73CA and more particularly clause (f)(ii) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as, “MCS Act”) and has therefore passed an incorrect order. He also draws my attention to Section 2(20) of the MCS Act, which defines the term "Officer". In nutshell, he submits that the impugned order is passed on total misreading of the provisions.

7. Per contra, Mr. Dabadgharo, appearing for the contesting respondent i.e. respondent No.2 whose nomination form is accepted, counters the submissions. He supports the impugned order and therefore submits that this Court would be loath to interfere in the ongoing election process. He also submits that there is an alternate remedy in the form of an election petition under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, and therefore the present petition is not maintainable. On merits, he submits that there was no material on record to show that the respondent No.2 was an office bearer of respondent No.4 and the respondent No.4 is a defaulter of respondent No.3.

8. I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsels for the respective parties and also gone through the record of the matter. The scope of interference in an ongoing election process is very minimal, as delineated by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment of Dattatray Genaba Lole and others vs. Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies and others, reported in (2021) 2 High Court Cases (Bom) 612, that as a matter of principle Courts are reluctant to interfere at an intermediate stage of an election process. The said reluctance to interfere stems from a strong public policy reason, since vital public interest in the elections being completed is involved in the matter. A liberal approach to interference at an intermediate stage would frequently result in election process being halted or become uncertain. However, in the same judgment, in paragraph 46, the learned Division Bench has stated that the only circumstance in which the Courts would be inclined to interfere in a challenge to an election process at an intermediate stage would be when the order or action under challenge is patently and demonstrably illegal, such as by applying a non-existent rule or provision to the election process or failing to adhere to mandatory provisions. Thus, in the opinion of the learned Division Bench, the intervention in such cases has been explained as enabling or assisting the process of the election rather than parting or stalling it.

9. The dictum of the Hon'ble Division Bench has been followed by the Aurangabad Bench of this Court in judgments reported in Writ Petition No.3142 of 2023 (Dhanraj Dattatray Patil and others vs. State Co-operative Elections Authority and others) and Writ Petition No.2688 of 2023 (Suresh Pannalal Sankhala vs. The Returning Officer and others). The controversy in the present matter is to be adjudicated looking at the narrow scope of interference.

10. In the backdrop of these facts, I have gone through the impugned order. The said order, while rejecting the objection of the petitioner takes into consideration the fact that respondent No.2 herein may be elected on the Executive Committee of the respondent No.4, but it does not necessarily mean that he is an office bearer of the said Society. However, respondent No.1 lost sight of an important aspect i.e. the definition of "Officer" as provided in sub-section (20) of Section 2, which is reproduced as under:

                   “Section 2(20) :

                   "officer" means a person elected or appointed by a society to any office of such society according to its bye-laws; and includes [any office bearer such as a chairperson, vice-chairperson, president, vice-president, managing director, manager, secretary, treasurer, member of the committee and any other person, by whatever name called,] elected or appointed under this Act, the rules or the bye-laws, to give directions in regard to the business of such society;”

11. It is thus clear that the said definition is inclusive in nature and defines an officer meaning a person elected or appointed by a society to any office of such society according to its bye-laws and includes any office bearer such as a chairperson, vice-chairperson, etc. It is noteworthy to mention that the words beginning from “any office bearer….…...” onwards have been amended with effect from 14.02.2013. Prior to the amendment, the words were reading as “a chairman, vice-chairman…….”. Now, at present, the amended provision of "Officer" takes into its sweep not only any office bearer such as chairperson, vice-chairperson, but also adds the term “any other person, by whatsoever name called”. The legislative intent is thus clear that the legislature always intended that the term "Officer" would mean and include every such person by whatsoever name called and therefore the amendment is consciously made.

12. If the order is perused in the touchstone of such a wide definition of the term "Officer", the said order does not take into consideration the true purport and wide amplitude of the said definition. It erroneously records that even though the respondent No.2 is elected on the management committee, it does not necessarily imply that he is the office bearer. In my considered opinion, in the backdrop of the wide definition of the term "Officer" reproduced supra, the finding is erroneous and as a result of gross misreading of the provision.

13. As far as the second ground is concerned, the same pertains to the respondent No.4 being a defaulter, and therefore the respondent No.2, being an office bearer, cannot contest the election. In this regard, Section 73CA, sub-clause (f)(ii), clearly states that in the case of a District Central Co-operative Bank or the State Co-operative Bank, a person is deemed to be a defaulter if he is an office bearer of a defaulting Primary Agricultural Credit Co-operative Society. As far as the aspect regarding respondent No.4 being a defaulter of respondent No.3, incorrect findings have been recorded by respondent No.1.

14. The counsel for respondent No.2 has relied on Judgment delivered by this Court dated 18th December, 2020, Sadashiv Ganpatrao Mahajan Vs. Stae of Maharashtra, through its Secretary, Ministry of Co-operation, Mantralaya, Mumbai and others. However, the said judgment is on unamended provision of the MCS Act (73-EA of MCS Act) and states that there is no question of prospectively/retrospectively of said provision. It does not take the case of respondent any further. In addition to this in the said matter facts are totally different than the present one.

15. As can be seen from the objection filed by the petitioner herein, it was specifically averred that the respondent No.4 herein is a defaulter of respondent No. 3. In fact, Mr. A.M. Ghare has tendered across the Bar a copy of communication issued by the respondent No.3 Bank to one Vividh Karyakari Sahkari Sanstha, Maryadit/respondent No.4 that the said respondent i.e. respondent No. 4, is in default list and is in the list of Non-Performing Assets (NPA). It is thus clear that there was document on record to show that respondent No.4 was a defaulter of respondent No.3 and respondent No.2, being an office bearer of the said defaulter respondent No.4, had incurred disqualification. The impugned order is a result of grave misreading of the provision of Section 73CA and the definition of Section 2(20), as stated supra. The said order, therefore, cannot be said to be sustainable.

16. In that view of the matter, following order is passed:

ORDER

(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.

(ii) The Order dated 16.09.2026 passed by respondent No.1, thereby rejecting the objection of the petitioner, is quashed and set aside.

(iii) The objection of the petitioner is upheld. It is declared that respondent No.2 has incurred disqualification for contesting elections of respondent No.3.

(iv) The Writ Petition is disposed of.

(v) Rule is made absolute in abovestated terms.