1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State, aggrieved by the Judgment dated 20.02.2015 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, in S.C.No.492 of 2013, whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondentsaccused of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code.

02. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the accused No.1 and, at the time of marriage, her parents gave cash of Rs.30,000/- and one tola of gold as dowry. For a few months, the deceased and the accused No.1 led a peaceful conjugal life. Subsequently, the accused Nos.1 to 3 started harassing her for additional dowry. The grandfather of the deceased advised the accused Nos.1 to 3 on several occasions to look after the deceased properly and not to harass her. However, the accused Nos.1 to 3 did not change their attitude and continued to harass her. About 15 days prior to 18.04.2013, the accused Nos.1 to 3 allegedly harassed the deceased both physically and mentally and drove her out of the house, demanding an additional dowry of Rs.50,000/-. Consequently, the deceased went to her parents' house. On 17.04.2013, the deceased was taken to her in-laws' house at Khanjamalpur Village by her paternal uncle, who advised the accused Nos.1 to 3 not to harass her. Unable to bear the alleged harassment by the accused Nos.1 to 3, the deceased, being distressed, committed suicide on 18.04.2013 at about 11:30 a.m. by pouring kerosene over herself and setting herself on fire. She sustained burn injuries and was initially shifted to the Government Area Hospital, Zaheerabad, and thereafter referred to the Government District Hospital, Bidar, Karnataka State, for better treatment. While undergoing treatment, she succumbed to burn injuries on 29.04.2013 at about 5:30 p.m. at the Government District Hospital, Bidar.

03. Heard Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant/State. There is no representation for the respondents/accused. Hence, respondents/accused are treated as heard. Perused the material on record.

04.1. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Sessions Judge, without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, erroneously acquitted the respondents/accused. He contended that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the respondents/accused beyond all reasonable doubt.

               04.2. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have considered that PW.12, the Judicial Officer, had recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, wherein she stated that the accused were suspecting her fidelity, alleging that she had become pregnant through another person, and had beaten her and asked her to leave the house. He further submitted that the dying declaration of the deceased clearly establishes that she was subjected to harassment and humiliation and, unable to bear the same, committed suicide.

               04.3. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further contended that the learned Sessions Judge, without properly appreciating the ingredients of the aforesaid offence and the evidence available on record, erroneously passed the impugned Judgment acquitting the respondents-accused, contrary to the settled principles of law. Therefore, he prayed that the impugned Judgment be set aside and that the respondents-accused be convicted for the offences alleged against them.

05.1. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents-accused vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge, after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record and after hearing the parties, rightly acquitted the respondents-accused for the alleged offence and given specific findings. He further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged offence against the respondents-accused beyond reasonable doubt.

               05.2. It is further contended that as seen from the crossexamination of the witnesses, the deceased disliked to live with the accused No.1 and left the house, the accused No.1 intimated the Police, Chiragpally and also her elders about missing of the deceased and on 17.04.2013, when the deceased returned to her parents house, the said fact was intimated by the accused to the Sub Inspector of Police, PS Chiragpally and the Sub Inspector of Police called for the deceased without registering the criminal case about missing of the deceased and forcibly sent her to the house of the accused against her wish, due to which the deceased committed suicide. Therefore, it is a fit case to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused.

               05.3. It is further contended that as seen from the crossexamination of the witnesses, the deceased was unwilling to live with the accused No.1 and left the house. The accused No.1 informed the Police of Chiragpally and her elders about the deceased having left the house. On 17.04.2013, when the deceased returned to her parents' house, the said fact was also intimated by the accused No.1 to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Police Station, Chiragpally. The Sub-Inspector of Police called the deceased and, without registering any case regarding her having left the house, forcibly sent her to the house of the accused against her wishes, due to which the deceased committed suicide. Therefore, it is contended that this is a fit case to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused.

06. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and upon perusal of the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, it is evident that, on behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 17 were examined, Exs.P1 to P18 and M.O.1 were marked, and Ex.D1 was marked on behalf of the defence. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Sessions Judge arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the respondents/accused beyond reasonable doubt.

07. Further, the learned Sessions Judge recorded cogent and well-reasoned findings in paragraphs 14 to 21 of the impugned Judgment. The learned Sessions Judge observed that, except the close relatives of the deceased, the other neighbours of the accused, who were examined as PWs.3, 4, 5 and 7 as independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution case regarding the harassment of the deceased by the accused persons in connection with the demand for additional dowry. The learned Sessions Judge further observed that the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 6 regarding the harassment of the deceased for additional dowry was not corroborated by the deceased herself in her dying declaration, which was recorded and marked as Ex.P13. When the deceased was specifically questioned by the Magistrate as to whether she had been harassed for dowry, she stated that her husband and inlaws disliked her, but did not state anything against the accused with regard to any demand for additional dowry.

08. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded on 18.04.2013 at 1:35 p.m., whereas she had allegedly immolated herself at about 11:30 a.m. on the same day. Thus, the dying declaration was recorded shortly after her admission to the hospital. If there had been any demand for additional dowry or harassment on that account by the accused persons, the deceased would ordinarily have been expected to disclose the same before the Magistrate, particularly when her statement was recorded shortly after the incident. However, she stated an altogether different reason for her self-immolation. The deceased stated that she had become pregnant and was carrying a three-month pregnancy and that her husband was suspecting her fidelity, believing that her pregnancy was the result of an illicit relationship with another person. She further stated that her husband sent her away from the house, forced her to affix her signatures on some papers and threatened her, due to which she poured kerosene over herself and set herself on fire. She also stated that her husband had beaten her about one month prior to the incident, following which she went to her parents' house. However, the fact that the deceased was pregnant and that the accused No.1 was suspecting her fidelity was not stated by any of her close relatives, namely, PWs.1, 2 and 6. If the deceased had been driven out of the house by the accused No.1 on the ground that he suspected her fidelity, and if she was pregnant at that time, PWs.1, 2 and 6 would have had no reason to suppress such a material fact and depose differently. Thus, the allegations made by the deceased against the accused No.1 were not supported by PWs.1, 2 and 6, whereas the allegations made by PWs.1, 2 and 6 against the accused Nos.1 to 3 were not supported by the deceased in her dying declaration.

09. In cases of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another ((2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536), held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellant Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.

10. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 450) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows:

               “70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal.”

               1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so.

               A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when:

               i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong:

               ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law;

               iii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”;

               iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;

               v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable;

               vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.

               vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

               2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.

               3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.”

11. For the foregoing reasons as well as the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Judgments cited supra, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly acquitted the respondents/accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC. Hence, this Court does not find any grounds to interfere with the well reasoned Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge.

12. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.