| |
CDJ 2026 MHC 1038
|
| Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras |
| Case No : W.P. No. 27007 of 2022 & WMP. No. 26229 of 2022 & WMP. No. 2087 of 2023 |
| Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C. KUMARAPPAN |
| Parties : A. Subramani Versus The Deputy Director, Fire & Rescue Service Department, Western Region, Vellore |
| Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: K. Ravi Anantha Padmanaban, Senior Counsel for M/s. P. Rajalakshmi, Advocate. For the Respondent: S. Ilamvaludhi, Special Government Pleader. |
| Date of Judgment : 24-09-2026 |
| Head Note :- |
Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Case Refered:
P.V.Mahadevan Vs. MD.TN. Housing Board reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636
State of Madhya pradesh Vs. Bani Singh and another reported 1990 Supp SCC 738
Comparative Citation:
2026 MHC 3972,
|
| Summary :- |
1. Statutes / Acts / Rules / Orders / Regulations, and Sections Mentioned:
- Article 226 of the Constitution of India
- Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1973
- Prevention of Corruption Act
2. Catch Words:
- limitation
- prejudice
- disciplinary proceedings
- quashing
- charge memo
- criminal prosecution
- conviction
- departmental proceedings
3. Summary:
The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari‑mandamus under Article 226 to quash a charge memo issued under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1973, alleging that disciplinary action was initiated more than ten years after the alleged corrupt act and after his superannuation. The petitioner argued that the delay caused prejudice, especially given his advanced age and the pendency of a criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The respondent contended that departmental proceedings are not barred by concurrent criminal prosecution. The Court examined precedent, noting that no absolute rule exists for quashing delayed disciplinary actions and that each case must be assessed on facts, including any condonation or prejudice. It found that the department had not condoned the alleged misconduct, that the petitioner was convicted in criminal court in 2026, and that no material showed prejudice from the delay. Consequently, the Court held there was no merit in the petition.
4. Conclusion:
Petition Dismissed |
| Judgment :- |
|
(Prayer: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records and quashing the impugned charge memo issued by the respondent vide Ku.Pa.No.02/2022 dated 25.04.2022 directing the petitioner to face disciplinary proceedings after 11 years of attaining the age of his superannuation under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1973.)
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records and quashing the impugned charge memo issued by the respondent vide Ku.Pa.No.02/2022, dated 25.04.2022, directing the petitioner to face disciplinary proceedings after 11 years of attaining the age of superannuation, under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1973.
2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of the present Writ Petition are that a case was registered against the petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the Vigilance and Anti- Corruption Wing in Spl.S.C.No.1 of 2023. According to the said case, the occurrence took place on 07.07.2011. Thereafter, the charge sheet was filed and the case was taken cognizance of as Spl.S.C.No.1 of 2023, and the same is now at the advanced stage of defence evidence. It is the further case of the petitioner that, though the occurrence took place in the year 2011 and the petitioner retired from service in the year 2012, the impugned charge memo came to be issued after a lapse of more than 10 years.
3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that, in the criminal proceedings, the complainant has not supported the case of the prosecution. It is the further submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that, having faced the criminal prosecution for more than 10 years, and when the complainant has not supported the prosecution case, the initiation of the present disciplinary proceedings after a lapse of more than 10 years would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner, if the same is allowed to continue. It is also the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that, at this distance of time, it would be difficult for the petitioner to effectively defend the proceedings, particularly when he is aged about 70 years. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:-
(i) P.V.Mahadevan Vs. MD.TN. Housing Board reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636;
(ii) P.Shankar Vs. The Chairman (W.A.No.2346 of 2019 dated 16.04.2021);
(iii) B.Maximus Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (W.P.No.34197 of 2016 dated 12.04.2022); and
(iv) V.D.Selvaraj Vs. Deputy Inspector General of Police (W.P.No.34538 of 2019 dated 01.08.2024).
(v) State of Madhya pradesh Vs. Bani Singh and another reported 1990 Supp SCC 738.
4. Though the respondent has not filed any counter-affidavit, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondent would contend that there is no bar for proceeding departmentally as well as before the Criminal Court. The mere pendency of criminal prosecution does not debar the Department from proceeding with the departmental disciplinary proceedings. It is the further submission of the learned Special Government Pleader that there is no prejudice caused to the petitioner, since the criminal prosecution is still pending and the petitioner has been effectively contesting the same. Therefore, the question of prejudice raised by the petitioner is only a self-serving defence. Hence, the learned Special Government Pleader would contend that there are no grounds to quash the charge memo. Accordingly, he prayed to dismiss the present Writ Petition.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side.
6. On a perusal of the facts of the case, it is seen that a charge of corruption was levelled against the petitioner and, pursuant thereto, an FIR was registered in the year 2009 in Crime No.11/AC/2009/KM. Consequently, the impugned charge memorandum was issued against the petitioner on 25.04.2022. Though the petitioner contended that he had been kept under the hanging Damocles’ sword on account of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, he cannot deny the fact that he has been facing criminal prosecution since 2009. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bani Singh’s case (cited supra) and P.V. Mahadevan’s case (cited supra).
7. Though the above cases constitute the Magna Carta for deciding similar issues, they have not laid down any absolute rule and have made it clear that quashing disciplinary proceedings on the ground of delay depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Government of A.P. and others v. V. Appala Swamy, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 49, has held that there are no hard and fast rules with regard to quashing delayed disciplinary proceedings. It has further been held that each case must be determined on its own facts, taking into consideration, inter alia, the following criteria:-
(i) Whether, by reason of the delay, the employer had condoned the lapses on the part of the employee; and
(ii) Whether the delay had caused prejudice to the employee.
8. In the case in hand, admittedly, the conduct of the respondents clearly demonstrates that they had never condoned the lapses on the part of the petitioner, as is evident from the registration of the FIR against him. In fact, pursuant to the registration of the FIR, after a full-fledged trial, the petitioner was found guilty vide judgment dated 25.02.2026 in Special C.C.No.17 of 2025, and was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.30,000/-.
9. From the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, this Court is unable to identify any material demonstrating that the petitioner had suffered prejudice on account of the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. As already stated, in the judgments relied upon by the petitioner in Bani Singh’s case (cited supra) and P.V. Mahadevan’s case (cited supra), there were no criminal proceedings involved. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of those cases, an inference was drawn that the Department had condoned the lapses.
10. In the present case, there are no materials to establish any such condonation. Therefore, notwithstanding the delay, this Court is unable to find that the petitioner has suffered any prejudice. Furthermore, there is justification for initiating disciplinary proceedings at a belated stage, as the initiation of such proceedings immediately after the registration of the FIR could have jeopardised the petitioner’s defence in the criminal case. This may also have been a reason for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings.
11. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner also relied upon various other judgments, including the judgment in P. Shankar’s case (cited supra). However, the said judgment would not come to the aid of the petitioner, as it recognises that, where there is justification for initiating departmental proceedings after the conclusion of the criminal case, there is no impediment to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed in accordance with law.
12. In the case on hand, since the allegations relate to a corruption case, the initiation of departmental proceedings during the pendency of the criminal trial could potentially have jeopardised the petitioner’s defence. Further, the criminal proceedings culminated in a conviction only in the year 2026. Therefore, the aforesaid judgment is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
13. In view of the above circumstances, this Court does not find any merit in the present Writ Petition. Accordingly, the present Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs.
|
| |