Nitin B. Suryawanshi, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.

2. The Petitioner, by this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeks following reliefs;

                    “B. This Hon’ble Court by issuing Writ of certiorari or any other writ in the like nature may kindly, quash and set aside the impugned notice dated 01/06/2026 issued by the Presiding officer and Tahsildar, Kinwat convening a special meeting of no-confidence against the Petitioner;

                    C. This Hon’ble Court by issuing Writ of certiorari or any other writ in the like nature may kindly, quash and set aside the impugned order dated 27/05/2026 passed by the Ld. District Collector, Nanded appointing the Tahsildar, Kinwat as Presiding Officer for convening a special meeting of no-confidence and for that purpose kindly pass appropriate order.

                    D. This Hon’ble Court by issuing Writ of mandamus or any other writ in the like nature may kindly, hold and declare that, the impugned notice dated 01/06/2026 issued by the Presiding officer and Tahsildar, Kinwat convening a special meeting of no-confidence against the Petitioner is illegal and without the authority of law.”

3. The Petitioner has approached this Court in the following facts:

Elections of Board of Directors of Respondent No. 6-APMC were conducted on 11.10.2023 and results were declared on 12.10.2023. Petitioner and Respondents No. 7 to 20 were elected as directors of Market Committee. Thereafter, in the meeting held on 02.11.2024 for the election of Chairman and Vice Chairman of Respondent No. 6, Petitioner was unanimously elected as Chairman and Respondent No. 7 was elected as Vice Chairman.

According to the Petitioner, though he was conducting affairs of the Market Committee and discharging his duties honestly and efficiently and was taking all the decisions with the consent of Board of Directors, on 25.05.2026, Respondents No. 7 to 20/Directors submitted a requisition for bringing no confidence motion against the Petitioner to the District Deputy Registrar-Respondent No. 3. He forwarded the said requisition to the District Collector/Respondent No. 2 vide communication dated 27.05.2026. The District Collector on the same day passed an order and appointed Dr. Sharda Chondekar, Tahsildar, Kinwat as a presiding officer to conduct the meeting of no confidence. The Presiding Officer issued notice dated 01.06.2026, convening a special meeting for considering requisition of no confidence motion and scheduled the meeting on 10.06.2026 at 11.00 am, at APMC Kinwat.

4. The petitioner has challenged the notice dated 01.06.2026, mainly on the ground that as per sub section (2) of Section 23A of the Maharashtra Agricultural Produce Marketing (Development and Regulation) Act, 1963 (for short ‘APMC Act’), the requisition for bringing no-confidence motion has to be addressed to the Collector. Since, the requisition in the present case is not so addressed, the same is violative of sub section (2) of Section 23A of the APMC Act.

This court on 09.06.2026, observed that notice for bringing no-confidence motion against the Chairman has to be addressed to the Collector and on receiving such notice, the Collector has to convene a special meeting, either by himself or through any officer appointed by him, by giving prior intimation to the Chairman and Directors. By observing that the meeting to be held on 10.06.2026 appears to be convened by giving a go-bye to the legal provisions under Section 23A of the APMC Act, this Court granted stay to the impugned notice dated 01.06.2026.

5. We have heard learned Advocate for the Petitioner, learned AGP for State, learned Advocate for Respondent No. 6 and learned Advocate for Respondents No. 7 to 20 at length.

6. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner by placing reliance on Section 23 of the said Act submitted that requisition is not filed as prescribed under Section 23-A of the APMC Act. The Collector has no authority to delegate his powers to convene a meeting and since the meeting is convened on 16th day from 25.05.2026 the notice itself is vitiated and same is liable to be quashed and set aside. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on Dinesh Sheshrao Thakre vs. Collector, Nagpur District, Nagpur and Others, 2014 (1) Mh.L.J. 460.

7. Learned AGP, by relying on the affidavit in reply filed, submitted that the requisition was in fact moved to the Collector and the Collector has rightly delegated powers to the Tahsildar to convene and preside over the meeting.

Learned advocate for the respondents also argued on the similar lines and placed reliance on the decision of this Court at Nagpur Bench in Writ Petition No. 3350 of 2024 (Shivchandra Tejrao Tayade vs. The Collector Buldhana & Others).

8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to submissions advanced at bar. We have perused the grounds raised in the writ petition, annexures thereto, reply affidavits filed by Respondents No. 2 and 3 and citations relied upon by the Parties.

9. It is a matter of record that respondents No. 7 to 20 moved a requisition for no confidence against the petitioner to the Collector on 27.05.2026. In the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of Collector, it is specifically averred that “notice of motion of no confidence was in fact submitted at the office of Collector, Nanded on 27.05.2026 by the Respondents as per acknowledgment dated 27.05.2026 bearing No. 9055843.” Copy of the requisition and the acknowledgment is annexed to the affidavit. Respondents/Directors who have moved said requisition have also placed the said requisition and the acknowledgment on record at page no. 84 and 83 respectively. Thus, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that since requisition was addressed to the District Deputy Registrar and not to the Collector as contemplated by Section 23A of the APMC Act, the same is illegal and cannot be acted upon.

10. For the aforementioned reasons, decision in Dinesh Thakre (supra) is of no assistance to the case of the Petitioner as in that case requisition was addressed to the District Deputy Registrar, who forwarded it to the Collector and thereafter notice to convene a special meeting was issued by the Collector. In these facts, this Court held that, Collector has without jurisdiction acted upon the requisition not addressed to him, but to the District Deputy Registrar. Hence, it was held that notice is not in accordance with provisions of Section 23-A. Therefore, it was quashed and set aside. Such are not the facts of the present case.

11. Petitioner then contended that under Sub Section 3, since word ‘shall’ is used the Collector alone has the power to convene the special meeting and therefore Tahsildar has no authority to convene the meeting, hence notice dated 01.06.2026 issued by Tahsildar is illegal.

12. For considering this submission it is apt to consider Section 23-A of the APMC Act;

                    “23A. Motion of no-confidence against Chairman or Vice-Chairman

                    (1) A Chairman or a Vice-Chairman shall cease forthwith to be Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, if the Market Committee by a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members (excluding the members who have no right to vote) at a special meeting so decides.

                    (2) The requisition for such special meeting shall be signed by not less than one-half of the total number of members (excluding the members who have no right to vote) and shall be sent to the Collector under intimation to the Director.

                    (3) The Collector shall, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the requisition under sub-section (2), convene a special meeting of the Committee:

                    Provided that, when the Collector convenes such special meeting of the Committee, he shall give intimation thereof to the Chairman, or as the case may be Vice-Chairman and also to the Director.

                    (4) (a) A special meeting to consider a resolution under sub-section (1) shall be presided over by the Collector or the officer authorised by him in this behalf, but the Collector or such officer or the Director (if present) shall have no right to vote at such meeting.

                    (b) The members of the Committee who have no right to vote may take part in the discussions but shall not vote.

                    (5) If the motion of no confidence is not carried as aforesaid or if the meeting could not be held for want of quorum, no such requisition for considering a fresh such motion expressing want of confidence in the same Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall be made until after the expiry of six months from the date of such meeting.”

13. Section 23-A was inserted by Maharashtra Act No. X of 1984 as there was no provision in the APMC Act for removal of Chairman or Vice Chairman on a motion of no confidence. This section stipulates that Chairman or Vice Chairman shall cease forthwith to be Chairman or Vice Chairman if a resolution is passed by the majority of not less than 2/3rd of total number of members at the special meeting so decides. Such requisition has to be signed by not less than one half of the total number of members and has to be sent to the Collector under intimation to the Directors.

Sub section (3) of section 23A provides that the Collector has to convene a special meeting of the committee within 15 days from the date of receipt of requisition. The proviso stipulates that when the Collector convenes such special meeting of the committee, he shall give an intimation thereof to the Chairman, or as the case may be the Vice-Chairman, and also to the directors.

Sub section (4)(a) provides that, the special meeting for considering a resolution of no confidence shall be presided over by Collector or the officer authorized by him in this behalf.

14. Upon reading Section 23-A it is clear that said section is inserted with an object to make a provision for removal of Chairman or Vice Chairman on a motion of no confidence and it lays down the procedure in that behalf. It is well settled that procedural provisions are directory unless any consequence is provided for not following the same.

15. It is well settled by catena of decisions of the Apex Court that merely because word ‘shall’ is used, the same does not in all cases make the provision mandatory. The Apex Court in State of U.P. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 has held;

                    "When a statute uses the word 'shall', prima facie, it is mandatory, but the court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature the court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered."

16. In re Presidential Poll, (1974) 2 SCC 33, seven judges bench of the Apex Court has observed;

                    “In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the import of the provision, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory. It is the duty of the courts to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the provision to be construed. The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law-maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole.”

17. In Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Others, (1975)2 SCC 482 the Apex Court has held as follows:

                    “11. Maxwell, Crawford and Craies abound in illustrations where the words "shall" and "may" are treated as interchangeable. "Shall be liable to pay interest" does not mean "must be made liable to pay interest", and "may not drive on the wrong side of the road" must mean "shall not drive on the wrong side of the road". But the problem which the use of the language of command poses is: intend that its command shall at all events be performed? Or is it enough Does the Legislature to comply with the command in substance? In other words, the question is: is the provision mandatory or directory?

                    12. Plainly, "shall" must normally be construed to mean "shall" and not "may", for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one who intends to leave a leeway will use the language of command in the performance of an act. But since, even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words.

                    13. Crawford on Statutory Construction (Ed. 1940, Article 261, p. 516) sets out the following passage from an American case approvingly: The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other.

                    Thus, the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the Legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the Legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word ‘shall’ or ‘may’ is not conclusive on the questions whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory.”

18. In Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu vs. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 the Apex Court has held that, “the rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.”

19. “Law casts a duty and obligation on the Court to interpret a provision in the light of the language used in the enactment while considering the facts of the case, in such a way, that the interpretation of any clause should not lead to nullifying or neutralizing the intent and the object of the Legislature, by considering the applicable provisions. A harmonious interpretation is the golden rule.” [See Suman Kacharu Garje and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2024 (2) Mh.L.J. 490].

20. Applying aforesaid principles of interpretation of statute and harmonious reading of Sub Section (3) and (4)(a) of Section 23-A of APMC Act and taking into consideration the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted and keeping in mind intention of legislature, we are of the considered view that sub section (3) of Section 23-A of APMC Act has to be construed as directory.

21. If we interpret word ‘shall’ as mandatory, the same in our view would be contrary to the legislative intent of enacting Section 23A of the APMC Act. Admittedly, Section 23-A does not provide any contingency for non compliance of sub section (3). Therefore, if the said provision is held to be mandatory, the same would defeat the very object of making the said provision.

Fact remains that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner if the meeting is convened by Tahsildar and not by the Collector.

22. The Division Bench of this Court at Nagpur had an occasion to consider Section 23-A of the APMC Act in Writ Petition No. 3350 of 2024. Therein, the Collector in exercise of powers under sub section 3 and (4) (a) of Section 23A authorized the Sub Divisional Officer to conduct the meeting of no confidence motion. The Sub Divisional Officer issued notice dated 22.05.2024 to all the private respondents and members of the committee, thereby convening the special general body meeting on 31.05.2024. The meeting was in fact presided over by the Tahsildar. Therefore, proceedings of the meeting and no confidence motion passed in the said meeting were challenged by the Chairman.

23. While considering the said challenge, by taking into consideration the arguments of learned AGP that “no doubt power to convene the meeting and for that purpose giving authorization vests in the Collector and accordingly the Sub Divisional Officer was authorized by the Collector to convene and preside over the meeting”, this Court while holding that Section 23A is a complete code in itself, proceeded to observe;

                    “23. As far as the factual matrix of the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the motion of no-confidence was passed against the Chairman, i.e. the petitioner, by more than two-thirds of the total number of members. It is also not in dispute that the requisition was duly submitted to the Collector, who, in turn, authorized the Sub-Divisional Officer to preside over the meeting.

                    24. ---

                    25. --- The fact remains that the Collector, under clause (4)(a) of Section 23A, inserted by amendment of 1984 in the statute book, delegated the power to the Sub-Divisional Officer. The fact remains that the Sub-Divisional Officer proceeded on leave and as such the respondent-Collector has approved the charge of the Sub-Divisional Officer to be given to the Tahsildar and sanctioned the leave of the Sub-Divisional Officer.”

24. This Court dismissed the challenge raised by the Chairman holding that there is no illegality or procedural impropriety in passing of the no confidence motion in the meeting presided over by the Tahsildar. Thus, this Court has impliedly upheld the delegation of powers by the Collector for convening a special meeting.

25. Indisputably, conducting of a special meeting is an administrative and ministerial act. Upon harmonious reading of sub Section (3) and (4)(a), we are of the considered view that once the Collector arrives at a decision that special meeting is required to be held then he can delegate his powers to convene the meeting to the officer authorized by him. In this behalf profitable reference of the decision of the Apex Court in Sidhartha Sarawgi vs. Board of Trustees For the Port of Kolkata and Others, (2014) 16 SCC 248 can be made, wherein it is held;

                    “5. Regarding delegation of non-legislative/administrative powers on a person or a body to do certain things, whether the delegate himself is to perform such functions or whether after taking decision as per the terms of the delegation, the said agency can authorize the implementation of the same on somebody else, is the question to be considered. Once the power is conferred, after exercising the said power, how to implement the decision taken in the process, is a matter of procedure. The Legislature may, after laying down the legislative policy, confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the framework of that policy. So long as the essential functions of decision making is performed by the delegate, the burden of performing the ancillary and clerical task need not be shouldered by the primary delegate. It is not necessary that the primary delegate himself should perform the ministerial acts as well. In furtherance of the implementation of the decision already taken by the primary delegate as per the delegation, ministerial or clerical tasks may be performed by authorized officers. The complexity of modern day administration and the expansion of functions of the State to the economic and social spheres have made it necessary that the Legislature gives wide powers to various authorities when the situation requires it. Today’s governmental functions are a lot more complex and the need for delegation of powers has become more compelling. It cannot be expected that the head of the administrative body performs each and every task himself.

                    6. ---

                    7. Practical necessities or exigencies of administration require that the decision making authority who has been conferred with statutory power, be able to delegate tasks when the situation so requires. Thus, the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, gives way in the performance of administrative or ministerial tasks by subordinate authorities in furtherance of the exercise of the delegated power by an authority.”

26. In the light of aforesaid ratio and in the light of above discussion we hold that word ‘shall’ used in sub section (3) of Section 23-A is directory and not mandatory and Collector is empowered to delegate his powers to convene and preside over the meeting to officer authorized by him.

27. We, therefore, reject the argument of the petitioner that since meeting is convened by the Tahsildar, notice of meeting dated 01.06.2026 issued by the Tahsildar is contrary to sub Section (3) of Section 23-A of the APMC Act and hence it is illegal.

28. The Petitioner has also argued that the meeting was not convened within 15 days from the date of requisition is also devoid of merit as the same is contrary to the record. The requisition was submitted to the Collector on 27.05.2026 and the Collector on the same day, by exercising powers under Section 23A of the APMC Act, authorized the Tahsildar to convene the special meeting of the members of the Committee. Tahsildar has issued notice on 01.06.2026 to convene a special meeting on 10.06.2026. Therefore, said meeting is well within 15 days from the date of receipt of requisition. Therefore, said argument of the petitioner is unacceptable.

29. “The removal of an elected officer bearer on the loss of confidence is an essential feature of representative democracy. In a democratic institution, confidence is the foundation on which the superstructure of democracy is built. The bedrock of democratic accountability rests on the confidence of the electorate. If the representative body does not have confidence in the office-bearer whom they selected, democracy demands such an officer to be removed democratically. A cooperative society is registered on cooperative principles of democracy, equity, equality, and solidarity. Democratic accountability, mutual trust, fairness, impartiality, unity of agreement of feeling among the delegates, cooperativeness, etc. are some of the cardinal dimensions of the cooperative principles. A body built on such principles cannot be led by a captain in whom the co-sailors have no confidence. If a person has been selected to an office through a democratic process, and when that person loses the confidence of the representatives who selected him, those representatives should necessarily have a democratic right to remove such an office-bearer in whom they do not have confidence, in case those institutions are viewed under the Constitution/statutes as democratic institutions.” [See Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited, (2015) 8 SCC 1].

30. Applying aforesaid ratio to the facts of the present case it is evident that petitioner has lost confidence of the majority, as 14 out of 18 directors have moved requisition for no confidence against him. Obviously, this petition is nothing but a feeble attempt on the part of the petitioner to avoid facing of no confidence motion.

31. For the aforestated reasons, we find no fault in the procedure adopted by the Respondents-Authorities while dealing with the requisition of no confidence and subsequent notice issued for convening the meeting. There is no infraction of provision of Section 23A of the APMC Act. We are of the considered view that, no confidence motion moved against the petitioner and the procedure followed pursuant to it is just, legal and proper and there is no merit in the challenge raised by the petitioner to it.

32. In the result, writ petition is dismissed. Interim relief stands vacated.

33. Respondent No. 4 shall issue fresh notice convening a special meeting on the basis of same requisition dated 27.05.2026 in terms of Section 23-A of the said Act.

34. In view of disposal of writ petition, pending civil application, stands disposed of.

Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.