Kamal Khata, J.

1) By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioners seek a writ of Mandamus directing the Respondents to record the name of Petitioner Nos.1 to 4 in the revenue records, as well as in the property card, as owners of the property bearing Old Survey No. 66, New Survey No.15, admeasuring 1 Acre and 35 Gunthas, corresponding C.T.S. No.31, admeasuring 8697.60 sq. mtrs. situated at Revenue Village Paspoli, Mumbai, Taluka Kurla, Mumbai Suburban (‘the subject property). Additionally, the Petitioners seek the demarcation of the subject property by metes and bounds.

Background facts:

2) The Petitioner Nos.1 to 4 are Private Family Trusts and Petitioner No.5 claims to be a Transferee or Assignee of their right, title and interest, claims and benefits in the subject property. The Petitioner Nos.1 to 4 (‘the Trusts’) hold interests in a larger Estate comprising of lands in the villages of Sankee, Tonguey, Compree, Powai, Tirandaz, Paspoli and Kanjur (‘the Estate’).

3) The subject property has devolved upon the Petitioners as more elaborately described in paragraph Nos.5 (a) to (aaa) of the Petition and briefly set out hereunder:

                   I. Indenture dated 15th February 1837, executed between East India Company and Framji Cowasji Banaji granting six freehold villages at Salsette namely Sankee, Tungwa, Kopri, Powai, Tirandaz and Paspoli to Framji Cowasji Banaji.

                   II. Order in the case of Nowroji Jahangir Framji Banaji and Others Vs. Manekbhai and Others passed on 18th October, 1919 by the Hon’ble High Court at Bombay in the matter of Indian Trustees Act XXVII of 1866 in Suit No.877 of 1870 declaring Mr. Vallabhdas Naranji Dalal as 3/4th holder and Mr. Amratlal Amarchand 1/4th holder of the 8 villages known as the Powai Estate.

                   III. The Estate along with village Vikhroli, was sold to Vallabhdas Naranji Dalal and Amratlal Amarchand, with the 3/4th share of Vallabhdas Naranji subsequently sold to Mulji Haridas, as confirmed under a Sale Certificate dated 7th December 1926 issued by the High Court.

                   IV. By an Indenture of Conveyance dated 28th October 1929, registered on 28th November 1929, Amratlal Amarchand conveyed his 1/4th share in six villages namely, Sankee, Tonguey, Compree, Powai, Tirandaz and Paspoli, which includes the subject property, to Mr. Mulji Haridas, mortgagor.

                   V. By an Indenture of Assignment dated 28th October 1929, registered on 28th November 1929, Amratlal Amarchand also conveyed his 1/4th share in Kanjur village to Mr. Mulji Haridas, mortgagor..

                   VI. By an Indenture dated 6th July 1938, the Central Bank of India (‘the mortgagee of the Estate’) conveyed the Estate to the Petitioners for a consideration of Rs.3,50,000/-. The said Indenture was registered on 16th August 1938, under Serial No.3375, Book No.1 was granted in favour of Petitioner No.1, Rabiabanu Mohamed Yusuf and Shahabanu Siddick. The share of the Estate belonging to Shairbanu Mohamed which was subsequently conveyed to the Petitioner Nos.2 to 4.

                   VII. In this manner, the mortgagee became the 100% owner of the entire Estate, which was thereafter conveyed to the Petitioners.

4) Under the Indenture dated 6th July 1938, the names of the Petitioner No.1, Shairbanu Mohamed, Rabiabanu Mohamed Yusuf and Shahbanu Siddick were mutated by a mutation entry, under the Letter of Rights in Form No.6 in respect of the Paspoli property. The above names were also reflected in the following documents:

                   I. 7/12 Extract.

                   II. Register of holding land, Village Form No.8-A.

                   III. Record/Register.

5) Under a Consent Decree dated 19th June 1963, passed in Suit No.316 of 1953, (annexed as Exhibit ‘H’ to the Petition) the Petitioners ownership rights to the subject properties were acknowledged and categorized as follows: (i) Schedule ‘A’ properties were declared to be waste lands vesting in Government, (ii) Schedule ‘B’ properties were declared to have been appropriated and thus continued to vest with the original land holders, namely, Sir Mohamed Yusuf Ismail Khot and others and (iii) the Schedule ‘C’ properties (mixed) were made subject to inquiry under Section 37(2) of the Land Revenue Code, 1879, read with Section 4 of the Salsette Act.

Petitioners Submissions:

6) Ms. Singhania, learned counsel for the Petitioners, reiterates the aforesaid facts regarding title to the property and submits that, despite the Consent Decree and existing Revenue Entries, pursuant to a City Survey inquiry conducted at Village Paspoli, the City Survey Inquiry Officer passed Order No. CTS/Enquiry/Paspoli recording the name of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (‘MCGM’) as the holder of CTS No.31, the subject property, without issuing Notice to the Petitioners or their predecessors and without any acquisition proceedings having been undertaken.

                   6.1) She submitted that, in 2004 the Petitioner No.1, through its constituted Attorney (CA), applied for the Property Card and discovered the Mutation Entry in favour of MCGM. Upon this discovery, the CA filed an Appeal before the Superintendent of Land Records, which was dismissed by Order dated 29th November 2004. Learned counsel points out that this Order categorically records that MCGM had not produced any documentary evidence of their title or rights existing prior to the City Survey Inquiry, as against the Petitioners who had produced documents such as the 7/12 extracts.

                   6.2) The Order of the Superintendent was challenged before the Deputy Director of Land Records under Appeal No.882 of 2007. The Deputy Director (Konkan Region) partly allowed the Petitioners Appeal, by setting aside the Order dated 29th November 2004 and directed the City Survey Officer to inspect the site and re-examine the records pertaining to the subject property without reliance on the earlier records. Learned counsel Ms. Singhania points out that, this Order of the Deputy Director also records that, although MCGM claimed to have acquired the said property, it had not produced any documents relating to such acquisition. She submits that, during the City Survey Inquiry, the Inquiry Officer merely relied upon the MCGM’s reply and declared MCGM as the right holder of the said property. Therefore, the MCGM, without producing any formal documents of acquisition, claimed the subject property solely on the basis of possession.

                   6.3) Ms. Singhania submitted that, aggrieved by the Order of the Deputy Director of Land Records, the MCGM filed a Revision Application No.851 of 2008 before the Hon’ble Revenue Minister, who allowed the Revision Application and set aside the Order dated 5th May 2008. She submits that, even this Order records that, MCGM had not provided any proof of the acquisition and claimed the property only on the basis of possession and that it ignored the Petitioners’ name on the 7/12 extract and the Mutation Entry dated 2nd September 1959.

                   6.4) Ms. Singhania submitted that, the Petitioner No.1 thereafter preferred Writ Petition No.6270 of 2014 before the Single Judge Bench of this Court, which was disposed of on 17th February 2015, granting Petitioner No.1 liberty to file a Civil Suit regarding title to the subject property. Pursuant to this liberty, Petitioner No.1, through his constituted attorney, filed L.C. Suit No.650 of 2016 before the City Civil Court under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, inter alia seeking a declaration of its right, title and interest in the subject property. Ms. Singhania submits that, the Suit is pending. That the reliefs sought therein are materially different and it does not challenge the City Survey Inquiry Order dated 5th January 1968. She further submits that the Petitioner’s addressed letters to the concerned Authorities during 11th March 2023 and 12th June 2023, and thereafter, filed Writ Petition No. 1793 of 2025 in this Court on 20th January 2024. MCGM filed its reply, to which the Petitioners filed a Rejoinder. However, the Writ Petition was withdrawn on 18th June 2026, with liberty to file a fresh Petition on the same cause of action. Pursuant to this liberty, the Petitioners have filed the present Petition. Ms. Singhania therefore submitted that, in view of the above the Petition may be allowed.

Respondent No.2’s Submissions:

7) Mr. Girish Godbole learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2 opposed the Petition on the following grounds.

He submits that, Vehar Water Works was established by the British Government in 1860, pursuant to which all the lands appurtenant to Vehar lake in Mumbai, including the subject property were acquired to safeguard the quality of water in the Vehar lake, as per the old acquisition records of 1885.

                   7.1) With effect from 1st July 1863, the Vehar lake, together with all the lands appurtenant thereto, was allotted to the Respondent No.2-Corporation under a perpetual lease of 99 years i.e. upto 30th June 1962, and the Corporation has since remained in continuous possession thereof. Following the City Survey Inquiry conducted on 5th August 1967, the name of the Municipal Corporation was recorded in the Property Register Card on 5th January 1968 in respect of the subject property and this entry remained unchallenged for several decades. He submits that, the subject property lies within approximately 200 meters of the Vehar lake and therefore belongs to the Corporation. Upon the expiry of original lease, the Vehar Water Works and all lands appurtenant thereto vested absolutely in the Municipal Corporation by virtue of Section 89 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, thereby continuing Corporation’s ownership and possession in respect of the subject property. He draws our attention to a pleaded date of 28th October 1977 and submits that the subject property vested in the Government, and thereafter in MCGM, well prior to the execution of the documents relied upon by the Petitioners. He submitted that MCGM had specifically pleaded that the Corporation has been in lawful ownership and uninterrupted possession of the suit property since 1863, and that the Petitioners have no right title, interest and/or possession in respect of the subject property. He emphasized that none of the documents relied upon by the Petitioners specifically mentions the subject property. He drew our attention to the fact that several third parties have attempted to intervene in the Civil Suit by filing proceedings claiming independent rights over the subject property. He submitted that Rabiabanu Mohamed Trust (Petitioner No.2) and Shabanu Siddick Trust (Petitioner No.3) through their constituted Attorney Ramasubbu Chandrasekaran, have sought impleadment as Defendants in the Civil Suit and the same is pending consideration.

                   7.2) Mr. Godbole submits that one Mr. Chandrasekaran Subbaiya Nayakar had earlier filed the Writ Petition No.1793 or 2025, which was withdrawn with liberty to institute a fresh Petition and that the present Petition is filed by one Mr. Praveen Bansilal Bhoi, Petitioner No.5, who claims for the first time that the subject property has been transferred/assigned in his favour. However, this claim is not supported by any documents. Despite the correspondence seeking inspection of documents, the Petitioners’ Advocates have failed to disclose the documents substantiating Petitioner No.5’s claimed rights in the subject property. He submits that the present Writ Petition seeks substantially the same reliefs as those claimed in the pending Civil Suit. He further lays emphasis on suppression of several material and vital facts in the present Petition, on which ground alone he seeks dismissal of the Petition.

                   7.3) Mr. Godbole further submits that, Sir Mohamed Yusuf Trust appears to have assigned the subject property to at least four to five different individuals under unregistered documents, without the permission of the Hon’ble Charity Commissioner or a resolution of the Trust permitting the transfer of the subject property. He further submits that, the Petitioners have offered no explanation for the delay in filing the present Writ Petition, notwithstanding that the Mutation Entry in the name of the Corporation was effected as early as in the year 1968. He accordingly submits that the present Writ Petition is hopelessly time-barred and deserves to be dismissed.

                   7.4) Mr. Godbole relies upon the following judgments in support of his submission.

                   I. K. Jayaram & Ors. vs. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. reported in (2022) 12 SCC 815.

                   II. Udayami Evam Khadi Gamudyog Welfare Sanstha vs. State of U.P. reported in (2008) 1 SCC 560.

                   III. K. D. Sharma vs. SAIL reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481.

                   7.5) Mr. Godbole submits that, this Petition involves disputed questions of fact relating to the title of the property, which cannot be adjudicated by this Court in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and which would have to be determined only by a Court of competent jurisdiction, namely, the Civil Court. In support of this contention, he relies upon the following Judgments:

                   I. Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2015) 16 SCC 689.

                   II. Rajinder Singh vs. State of Jammu Kashmir & Ors. reported in (2008) 9 SCC 368.

                   7.6) Mr. Godbole submits that, there are sufficient documents to prove the acquisition, and relies upon the following :

                   1. A letter dated 22nd April 1885, regarding the Government Resolution for a Notice to be published under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1870, for acquisition of the larger lands appurtenant to Vehar lake, issued by the then Under Secretary of the Revenue Department Mr. J. Monit, to the Commissioner North Division, Collector of Thane District (as it then was), and the Municipal Commissioner for the city of Bombay;

                   2. A letter dated 23rd July 1887 issued by the then Collector of Thane, Mr Alfred Esquire to the Municipal Commissioner of the city of Bombay, requesting him to remit the amounts of compensation to be paid to the proprietor of Powai as awarded by the office of the Collector of Thane, pursuant to the Government Resolution No. 2085 dated 11th March 1885, sanctioning the acquisition of the said lands;

                   3. A statement dated 27th July 1897, from the Office of the Collector of Thane, showing the lands from various villages proposed to be acquired and compensation payable to the persons named therein and particularly to the lands from village Paspoli shown against the amount of compensation payable to the proprietor of Powai.

                   4. A Letter dated 27th July 1887 issued by the then Collector of Thane, Mr. Alfred Esquire to the Municipal Commissioner of the city of Bombay, forwarding a statement of compensation payable to the expropriated landowners and showing the dates on which possession of the various lands was taken and handed over to the Municipality with the lands in village Paspoli recorded as having been handed over on 16th June 1885.

                   7.7) Mr. Godbole submits that since the lands were unsurveyed at that time no survey numbers were mentioned in the statement. He submits that these documents sufficiently establish that the acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act, 1870, was initiated and concluded by the respective Authority and the possession was taken at the same time. He further submits that, the subject land has since been put to the use for which it was acquired and now there are underground pipelines of fresh water supply at the site.

                   7.8) Mr. Godbole relies upon the decision in Abhay V. Khinvasara vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 621, particularly paragraphs 41 to 44, to submit that it is not possible for the State Government to preserve documents of hundreds of acquisitions and the mere inability of the Government to produce documents evidencing compensation paid to the expropriated parties does not, by itself warrant an inference that no acquisition took place; nor can the non-availability of documents be permitted to reopen concluded acquisitions.

                   7.9) With regard to the Consent Decree in Suit No. 316 of 1953, he submitted that the question before this Court in that suit was confined to the operation and application of Section 4 of The Salsette Estates (Land Revenue Exemption Abolition) Act, 1951 and did not extend to a determination of ownership in rem, or of whether the land had been acquired by the Municipality of Bombay; the Decree therefore, cannot undo a legally concluded acquisition. He submitted that, the question of acquisition could not have been raised in that suit, as the Municipality of Bombay was not a party to it and that the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) is a separate corporation and a distinct legal entity created by a statute, separate from the State of Maharashtra. He accordingly submits that the Consent Decree passed between the Petitioner and the State of Maharashtra does not bind the MCGM, particularly as the acquisition was undertaken independently and prior to the Decree. He further submits that the Consent Decree, being unregistered, is also not binding on the Respondent No. 2.

8) We have heard Ms. Singhania for the Petitioners, Mr. Godbole for Respondent No.2 and Mr. Mohit Jadhav, Additional G.P. for Respondents 1 and 3 to 7, and have carefully examined the entire record.

Reasons and Conclusion:

9) At first blush, we did find merit in the submissions of Mr. Godbole. However, on a careful examination of the record, we are unable to accept any of his contentions. We are also constrained to note that the State has adopted stances more befitting a private litigant than a sovereign authority, a course that not only impermissible but wholly unacceptable.

10) Mr. Godbole's contention that, the subject lands were acquired, is unacceptable. Because if, with effect from 1st July 1863, the Vehar lake, together with all the lands appurtenant thereto, was allotted to the Respondent No. 2, the Municipal Corporation, under a perpetual lease of 99 years, (i.e., up to 30th June 1962), and the lands had already vested in the Government, there was clearly no reason to acquire the very same lands thereafter. The correspondence relied upon, viz. letters dated 22nd April 1885, 23rd July 1887 etc., in fact shows that the Government itself acknowledged the lands to be under private ownership, which renders baseless the assertion that, the Government continued to be in possession since 1st July 1863 on account of vesting.

11) The contention that, the Petition involves disputed questions of fact is equally without substance. There is no challenge to the Consent Decree passed by this Court as early as 19th June 1963. The mere fact that the Municipal Corporation was not a party to that decree cannot be a ground to disregard it. In our view, the claim of the Respondent No.2 under the perpetual lease of 99 years from 1st July 1863 would be of no avail, given that the Consent Decree of 19th June, 1963, clearly recorded and declared the subject properties were appropriated by, and vested in the original landowners. There is absolutely no evidence on record to show the basis on which the City Survey Officer registered the name of the Bombay Municipal Water Works in the register. In our view, the entry was itself incorrectly recorded, being based on an inquiry that failed to consider the Consent Decree against the State of Bombay dated 19th June 1963.

12) We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Godbole that, the correspondence relied upon would, by itself, establish that the acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act was initiated and concluded by the concerned Authority, and that possession was consequently taken by the Municipal Corporation. Even assuming that the land was put to the avowed use and that underground pipelines for fresh water supply now exist at site, this would not by itself, entitle the Municipal Corporation to claim ownership by acquisition. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the decision in Abhay V. Khinvasara (supra) does not assist the Respondents. We cannot presume that the property was acquired by the Government on the basis of correspondence predating the Decree of 19th June 1963 having declared in the Consent Decree of 19th June 1963, that the subject property vested in the Petitioners, the Respondents cannot now take shield of a presumption to defeat the decree passed by this Court and inter alia the Petitioners’ title to the subject property.

13) The rival submissions bring forth a fundamental question, as to whether a Decree passed in favour of a party against the State of Bombay can effectively be rendered nugatory by a decision of City Survey Inquiry Officer, affirmed by the Superintendent of Land Records and the Revenue Minister. In our view, the answer is clearly in the negative.

14) A careful examination of the record indicates that, the name of the Bombay Municipal Water Works was entered into the Inquiry Register entirely disregarding the Decree dated 19th June 1963. A Decree passed against the State of Bombay cannot be disregarded by the Municipal Corporation, which is a creature of the State of Bombay under a statute, on the ground that it was not a party to the proceedings. The State of Bombay must be taken to encompass all the statutory bodies constituted under it. A Consent Decree passed against the State of Bombay cannot, therefore, be entirely disregarded and said to be unenforceable or not binding against the statutory bodies. In this regard, Ms. Singhania’s reliance on the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in Meena A Rizvi v State of Maharashtra & Ors reported in 2026 BHC-OS:3317 which held that a consent decree, until set aside in appropriate proceedings, continues to operate in law and must be reflected in revenue records for fiscal and administrative purposes does assist her contention. A Consent Decree by which the State, or any Statutory Authority, grants a declaration in respect of the subject matter operates in rem, and not merely in personam.

15) In the present case, the State of Bombay (as it then was) deemed to have had knowledge of all the actions of its statutory bodies and the converse holds equally true. Nothing prevented the State of Bombay from seeking impleadment of the Municipal Corporation, had it considered that title had vested in the Municipal Corporation by virtue of acquisition, vesting, or otherwise at the relevant time. We take support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of A.P., reported in (2005) 6 SCC 292 : (2005) 142 STC 76 : 2005 SCC OnLine SC 1118 at page 299, where it is held that the State, acting through its several departments, can speak only with one voice. The Municipal Corporation, being a body constituted by and under the State, cannot adopt a position at odds with it.

16) Pertinently, the State of Bombay as it then was, now being the State Government, has not taken a stand that the subject property was acquired and thereafter has vested in the Municipal Corporation, in the present Writ Petition.

17) As regards Mr. Godbole’s contention concerning the locus of the Petitioner No.5 to file the present Petition, we find it unimportant and irrelevant, inasmuch as the prayer seeks only the recording of the names of the Petitioner Nos.1 to 4 in the records of the concerned Authorities. Had the Petitioner No.5 sought correction of the records to insert his own name, Mr. Godbole’s submission would have had relevance.

18) As regards the contention of suppression of material facts, and the averments in the present Petition, we agree that the Petition is not very happily worded. However, we find that this has not, in any manner, prejudiced the Respondents. In this regard, when we asked Mr. Godbole, in terms, as to whether the alleged suppression had given the Petitioners any undue advantage, or caused any prejudice to the Respondents, he very fairly conceded that the alleged suppressions could not be said to have caused any prejudice to the Respondents. Nor do we find that the alleged suppressions gave any undue advantage to the Petitioners. The contention of suppression, and the judgements in K Jayaram (supra) Udyami Sanstha (supra) and K D Sharma (supra), therefore, do not assist the Respondents.

19) We take support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Arunima Baruah v Union of India reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 where it held that suppression only disentitles a party to discretionary relief if it concerns a fact material to the determination of the lis, if the suppressed fact is not material to that determination, the Court need not refuse relief on that ground.

20) Upon a query by this Court, as to whether State includes MMC, the learned AGP Mr. Jadhav fairly replied in the affirmative. We are in agreement with the submission of learned AGP. He very fairly conceded that the Consent Decree concerned the subject property and that the other Statutory Authorities including the Municipal Corporation certainly cannot disregard or disclaim it.

21) In view of the above, we conclude that the pendency of the Suit claiming right, title and interest before the Civil Court, in respect of the same subject property, was an entirely unnecessary exercise, which the Petitioners were directed to undertake on the mere assertion of disputed questions. An assertion which does not, by itself, establish that the disputed question of fact exists. We are satisfied that no evidence is required to be led in the present case for the Petitioners to establish their ownership rights to the subject property, in the face of the Consent Decree of this Court, which declared that the subject lands specified in the list annexed thereto that were appropriated prior to 14th August 1947 were not vested with the Government, which remains unchallenged till date.

22) The State cannot now disown its role and rightly has not sought to, nor can the Municipal Corporation feign ignorance of this Court’s Judgment, whether on the ground that it was not a party thereto, or that the Consent Decree was unregistered. The State must be taken to have communicated the Orders of this Court to all concerned Authorities and those Authorities cannot feign ignorance thereof. Any objection, on this score ought to have been raised by the State of Bombay before the Court passing the Decree, had it considered that the Municipal Corporation needed to be joined in respect of any matter concerning it. The State cannot claim ignorance of the vesting or the lease. A party cannot take advantage of its own wrong.

23) In our view, going forward preferably at the earliest, the State must devise a mechanism, such as a shared portal or a website, for instance, by which all its statutory authorities and departments that function under its umbrella, are simultaneously apprised of all matters concerning them, such as land acquisitions, perpetual leases granted over State lands and judgments passed in favour or against it. For these decisions, once conclusive, are binding on all Statutory Authorities and are unquestionably and undisputedly required to be implemented forthwith.

24) In our view, the Decree of a Court, whether passed by consent of parties or upon final adjudication, cannot be thwarted or rendered nugatory or disregarded or frustrated in any manner or form, save and except being set aside by a superior Court. Particularly, a Decree declaring title in favour of a party cannot be rendered infructuous on the ground of limitation, or for want of seeking execution for recording their names on the Property Card or any Government record. Once such decree is confirmed by the Court or remains unchallenged, it attains finality and must be implemented.

25) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the Petition in terms of prayer clauses (i), (ii) and (iii). Additionally, the Respondent Nos. 4 to 7 are directed to demarcate the subject property by metes and bounds within a period of six weeks from the date of uploading of this order on the official website of High Court of Bombay.

26) The Petition is accordingly allowed, with no order as to costs.

27) At this stage, learned Advocate Mr. Vyas appearing for the Respondent No.2, requested this Court to grant stay to the effect and implementation of the present judgment as his client intends to question its correctness before the Hon’ble Apex Court.

28) Learned Advocate for the Petitioner opposes the request for stay.

29) For the reasons stated in the Judgment, the request made by learned Advocate for the Respondent No.2 is rejected.