(Prayer: Criminal Appeal is filed under Section 14A(2) of the Scheduled Caste/Schedule Tribes Act, 1989 as amended by Act 1 of 2016, seeking to call for the records relating to the order dated 27.05.2026 made in Crl.M.P.No.64 of 2025 in S.C.No.04 of 2025 on the file of the Special Court for Trial of Cases under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil, set aside the said order and allow the discharge petition filed by the appellant/Accused and discharge the appellant from S.C.No.4 of 2025.)

1. This Criminal Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court for Trial of Cases under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Kanyakumari District at Nagarcoil in S.C.No.4 of 2025 in Crl.M.P.No.64 of 2026, dated 27.05.2026.

2. The appellant herein is arrayed as sole Accused in Crime No.14 of 2024 on the file of the second respondent police. The case was registered based on the complaint given by the third respondent. On completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed before the learned Sessions Judge, Special Court for Trial of Cases under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil, and the same was taken cognizance in S.C.No.4 of 2025 for the offences under Sections 376, 323 and 506(i) of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. The sole Accused has preferred a discharge petition in Crl.M.P.No.64 of 2025. However, the trial Court has declined to discharge the Accused/appellant herein and dismissed the petition filed by him by order dated 27.05.2026. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the appellant herein is before this Court under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant is heard. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) is heard for the State.

4. Point for determination:

Whether the order declining discharge passed by the learned Trial Court as against the appellant herein is sustainable?

Answer:

5. The appellant herein has approached the trial Court by filing an application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. seeking for discharge for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 323 and 506(i) of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1) (w)(i), 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. According to the appellant, the said case was lodged with an intention to wreak vengeance as against the appellant herein. The First Information Report does not disclose the ingredients relating to the offences alleged. There is no prima facie case made out for the offences alleged. There is no witness for the offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. No independent witness was cited to prove the said case. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Section 376 of IPC is nothing but an exaggeration. Further, no material to frame charges for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. The appellant was falsely implicated in those offences. The SC/ST (PoA) Act was abused. Therefore, if the appellant was directed to face the trial it would cause prejudice to the cause of justice. The complaint was lodged belatedly and there is no explanation for the inordinate delay. The place in which the occurrence is said to have happened does not invite the case itself. No document is produced to connect the appellant with the offences alleged. The final report, the documents produced and relied on by the prosecution are not sufficient to frame charges against the Accused. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant is to be discharged from the case.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2008) 14 SCC 763 in Vijayan vs. State of Kerala to say in cases where the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is available, it is very dangerous to convict the Accused, specially when the prosecutrix could venture to wait for seven months for filing the FIR for rape. This leaves the Accused totally defenceless. Had the prosecutrix lodged the complaint soon after the incident, there would have been some supporting evidence like the medical report or any other injury on the body of the prosecutrix so as to show the sign of rape. If the prosecutrix has willingly submitted herself to sexual intercourse and waited for seven months for filing the FIR it will be very hazardous to convict on such sole oral testimony. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that in this case, the complaint was lodged after eight months and there is no evidence except the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the case in hand is similar to that of the decision relied on and therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant prays to extend the benefit of the said judgment in favour of the appellant.

7. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in High Court of Karnataka vs. C.M.Manjunath and others to say under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. there is a power vesting in High Court to exercise the power suo motu. The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Popular Muthiah vs. State reported in (2006) 7 SCC 296 held that there is nothing in Section 482 which suggests that the suo motu power of the High Court can be exercised only in public interest. Assuming that it could be exercised only in public interest, there is definitely an element of public interest involved in the present petition. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Popular Muthiah vs. State by Inspector of Police (cited supra) to say the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be invoked even at the stage of appeal. The relevant paragraph in the said decision is extracted herein below for better appreciation:

                     “27. While exercising its appellate power, the jurisdiction of the High Court although is limited but, in our opinion, there exists a distinction but a significant one being that the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction and/ or inherent jurisdiction not only when an application therefor is filed but also suo motu. It is not in dispute that suo motu power can be exercised by the High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. There may not, therefore, be an embargo for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary inherent jurisdiction while exercising other jurisdictions in the matter. Keeping in view the intention of the Parliament, while making the new law the emphasis of the Parliament being 'a case before the court' in contradistinction from 'a person who is arrayed as an Accused before it' when the High Court is seized with the entire case although would exercise a limited jurisdiction in terms of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same, in our considered view, cannot be held to limit its other powers and in particular that of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the matter which is not before it.”

Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even in this appeal, the charge sheet filed by the second respondent police can be quashed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Vishnu Kumar Shukla and another vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2023 Livelaw (SC) 1019 to say the protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution and from being unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a criminal proceedings into oblivion, either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal against an order rejecting discharge or by any other illegally permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is duty cast on the High Courts. Therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the vexatious and unwarranted prosecution can be curtailed by exercising the power of discharge by allowing the appeal against the order against discharge. Hence, he prays for allowing the appeal and discharge the appellant from the charges alleged.

9. As it is an appeal against the order of discharge, notice was issued to the third respondent/victim and the victim represented by a counsel.

10. The learned counsel for the third respondent/victim submitted that the third respondent is a resident of Elangamanipuram, Kulasekaram Post, Kanyakumari District. She belongs to Hindu Vannar community, a scheduled caste. Her husband is doing mason work. She has two children. For the last two years, she had acquaintance with her neighbours Amalraj @ Karuppasamy and his wife Manjammal Devi. The appellant is running a fruit stall under the name and style of Venkatachalapathy at Vazhukkamparai and is also running a grocery shop at Elangamanipuram along with his house. In the first week of July, 2022, the wife of the appellant asked her to come and work in her shop. Due to family situation, she has gone for the work in the said grocery shop.

11. While so, on 05.08.2023 at around 1.00 p.m. when the third respondent was working at the grocery shop, the appellant came there and asked for water. When she has gone to kitchen to bring water the appellant followed her, locked the door and hugged her near the dining table. The third respondent brushed aside him. However, he demanded sexual favour and pulled her nighty and torn it. When she attempted to run away, the appellant herein pushed her down and forcibly committed rape on her. Further, he made her to do oral sex. When she refused to do that, he fisted on her mouth and caused blood injuries. Thereafter, he thrown his chain in the sofa and asked her to take it. She obliged. He asked her to show it to him. When she has shown the chain, he had taken photograph of the same.

12. He asked her about her caste. She informed her caste. He has given out his caste and asked her to call him as “Nadar Ayya”. Further, he threatened her that she should not reveal that incident to any one and if she revealed, he would show the photograph and the video taken at the time of intercourse. Further, he threatened her by saying that he would say that he had beaten up her only because she has thieved the chain. She was returned to her house and on the day at around 11.00 p.m. she reported the incident to the wife of the appellant. But the wife of the appellant asked her as to whether she has committed any mistake with her husband. When she refused, she had stated that she can be kept at the place where she deserves.

13. Further, due to the injuries she suffered, the third respondent had taken leave for two days and taken bed rest. The wife of the appellant came and taken her to Sahaya Matha Temple Hospital at Vazhukkamparai. She reported the Doctor that the husband of the third respondent has beaten her. She has torn the nighty and inskirt and made that become unusable. Thereafter, she stopped reporting to the said shop. Since the appellant has the support of men and material, she has not revealed the said incident to any one.

14. Thereafter, whenever the appellant came in front of the house, he used to abuse her by saying, won’t she come when she has called and abused her in filthy language. Therefore, since the appellant is an influential person in that locality, though the occurrence was happened on 05.08.2023, she has lodged complaint on 10.05.2024 with the All Women Police Station, Kanyakumari. The respondent police has conducted investigation and found the incident true, filed final report before the Court.

15. According to the learned counsel for the prosecutrix, the statement of the third respondent and other materials collected during the investigation clearly implicates the appellant herein. At the time of framing charges, the Court need to go only into the prosecution materials and the Court should not go into the defence materials. According to the learned counsel for the third respondent, there are sufficient materials as against the appellant herein to proceed with the trial. The delay alone would not defeat the justice. Hence, he prays for dismissal of the appeal.

16. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) who appeared for the State submitted that based on the complaint given by the third respondent a case in Crime No.14 of 2024 was registered by the All Women Police Station, Kanyakumari on 10.05.2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 323 and 506(i) of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(va) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, as per the proceedings of the Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari District, conducted investigation and laid final report before the trial Court. The victim has given statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and further she has given statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The Investigation Officer has collected various materials and recorded the statements of the witnesses. The statement of victim and other witnesses had clearly established the offence and the complicity of the Accused. There are sufficient materials to proceed against the appellant. The delay by itself is not fatal to the case of the prosecution but an unexplained delay alone would fatal to the case of the prosecution. Whether the delay is explained or remained unexplained is a matter for trial. Therefore, on the question of delay, a discharge should not be given. It is well established principle of law that at the time of framing of charge, the trial Court ought to have gone into the materials relied on by the prosecution and either the defence or the defence material should not be looked into. Therefore, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submitted that it is not a fit case for invoking inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and hence, he prays for dismissal of the above appeal.

17. This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the rival submission put forth by either side.

18. On careful perusal of the materials available on record, it is found that the appellant herein is the sole Accused before the trial Court. The appellant herein is facing allegations with regard to Sections 376, 323 and 506(i) of IPC and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(w)(i), 3(2)(va) and 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. On a careful perusal of the records it is found that the third respondent herein had lodged a written complaint before the All Women Police Station, Kanyakumari which was registered in Crime No.14 of 2024. According to the victim, she was working under the appellant herein in the grocery shop attached to his house. On 05.08.2023 at around 1.00 p.m. when she was working in the said grocery shop, the appellant herein asked her water and when she gone into the kitchen for bringing water the appellant herein intercepted her and ravished her. Further, he fisted on her mouth and caused blood injuries. Apart from that, since the victim belongs to Schedule Caste and he belongs to a caste which is neither a Schedule Caste nor a Schedule Tribe, he abused her, humiliated her and intimidated her and asked undue sexual favours.

19. However, on perusal of the records, it is found that the victim has given a statement before the Investigation Officer. Further, except the statement of the victim, nothing is available on record to substantiate the allegations levelled against him. Even according to the victim/third respondent, he has torn her nighty and inskirt which she worn at the time of occurrence as unusual. Therefore, except the statement of the victim, nothing is available on record to prove the occurrence. The victim has given a statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. which was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CBI vs. Sajjan Kumar wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has elaborated the principles governing the framing of charge and discharge as below:

                     “17) Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 & 228 of Cr.P.C. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:-

                     (i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

                     ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

                     iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

                     iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

                     v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

                     vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

                     vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

20. On a careful reading of the complaint, Section 161 statement and Section 164 statement, it is found that the occurrence was stated to have happened on 05.08.2023, however, the third respondent has not given any complaint until 10.05.2024. The column No.8 of the First Information Report merely state the delay by the de facto complainant. The delay in lodging the complaint was not at all recorded in First Information Report. Except the statement of the third respondent/prosecutrix that the appellant herein is highly influential in terms of men and material, nothing was collected during investigation to show that he is highly influential in that locality to instil fear in the mind of the third respondent. The delay assumes much significance in this case since the third respondent herself in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. stated that she has given a complaint only at the instance of one Baghavathi of Vazhukkamparai as the appellant herein had borrowed a sum of Rs.12,00,000/- from her and cheated her.

21. In the complaint also, the third respondent has stated that the said Papin Stella @ Baghavathi is living with the appellant herein at his house with the consent of his wife Manjammal Devi. From the statement of the third respondent, it is found that it is the said Papin Stella @ Baghavathi had written the complaint and she was also cited as witness in the final report. Therefore, the false implication due to financial motive cannot be ruled out.

22. As per Section 53A of Cr.P.C., when a person is arrested on a charge of committing an offence of rape and there are reasonable grounds for believing that an examination of his person will afford evidence as to the commission of such offence, it shall be lawful for the registered medical petitioner employed in a hospital run by the government or by the local authority and in the absence of any such a practitioner within the radius of sixteen kilometres from the place where the offence has been committed, by any other registered medical practitioner acting at the request of a police officer not below the rank of a Sub- Inspector, and for any person acting in good faith in his aid and under his direction, to make such and examination of the arrested person and to use such force as is reasonably necessary for that purpose.

23. The object behind bringing in Section 53A of Cr.P.C. is to find out and collect evidences from the body of the Accused in respect of the offence of rape. This Section not only provides for examination of the Accused to collect materials but by way of the medical examination, the false charge of rape can also be found out. Had the complaint been given immediately after the occurrence, there would have been a chance for medical examination of the victim as well as the medical examination of the Accused to collect materials and medical evidences in order to substantiate the case of rape. However, in this case, though the occurrence was said to have happened on 05.08.2023, the complaint was lodged only on 10.05.2024 nearly after nine months. Therefore, the Investigating Agency was completely deprived of conducting a medical examination on the appellant as well as the victim.

24. Had the medical evidence been collected to corroborate the evidence of the victim and if the medical evidence were inconsistent, then it would have proven the innocence of the Accused. Now that due to the delay, the chance of conducting medical examination on the appellant and on the third respondent has become redundant. Further, from the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is found that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vijayan vs. State of Kerala (cited supra) at paragraph 5 had observed as follows:

                     “5. The present case wholly depends upon the testimony of the prosecutrix. The incident in the present case took place 7 months prior to the date of lodging the complaint. At a realization drawn upon her that she has been subjected to rape by the Accused-Appellant. No complaint or grievance was made either to the police or the parents prior thereto. The explanation for delay in lodging the FIR is that the Accused-Appellant promised her to marry therefore the FIR was not filed.

                     In cases where the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is available, it is very dangerous to convict the Accused, specially when the prosecutrix could venture to wait for 7 months for filing the FIR for rape. This leaves the Accused totally defenseless. Had the prosecutrix lodged the complaint soon after the incident, there would have been some supporting evidence like the medical report or any other injury on the body of the prosecutrix so as to show the sign of rape. If the prosecutrix has willingly submitted herself to sexual intercourse and waited for 7 months for filing the FIR it will be very hazardous to convict on such sole oral testimony. Moreover, no DNA test was conducted to find out whether the child was borne out of the said incident of rape and that the Accused Appellant was responsible for the said child. In the face of lack of any other evidence, it is unsafe to convict the Accused. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Trial Court and the Learned Single Judge of the High Court in convicting the Accused-Appellant under Section 376 Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained. Consequently, we set aside the judgment and order of the Trial Court as also of the High Court and quash the conviction and sentence of the Accused-Appellant under Section 376 Indian Penal Code. The Accused may be released forthwith from custody if not required in any other case.”

In the above decision, the Apex Court has found that it is very dangerous to convict the Accused, especially when the prosecutrix could venture to wait for seven months for filing the FIR for rape. Further, except the sole testimony of the prosecutrix nothing was available on record to prove the offence of rape.

25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vishnu Kumar Shukla and another vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another (cited supra) had observed as below:

                     “23. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum, juxtaposed with our view on the facts and merits expressed hereinbefore, we are satisfied that there is no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants are guilty of the offence alleged. It would be unjustified to make the appellants face a full-fledged criminal trial in this backdrop. In an appeal dealing with the refusal of the High Court to quash an FIR under Section 482, CrPC albeit, this Court, in Priyanka Mishra v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 INSC 729 | 2023 SCC OnLine SC 978, while setting aside the judgment impugned therein and quashing that FIR, took the view that ‘…the Appellants are to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an eventual trial.’

                     15 The protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution and from being unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a criminal proceeding into oblivion, either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High Courts. The High Court should have intervened and discharged the appellants. But this Court will intervene, being the sentinel on the qui vive.”

From the above decisions, it is clear that the present case is fit for quash for want of materials substantive as well as corroborative.

26. Now, the pertinent question is whether this Court in an appeal under Section 14A(2) of SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989 can venture to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.. The said question is no more res integra, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Popular Muthiah vs. State by Inspector of Police (cited supra) held as below:

                     “While exercising its appellate power, the jurisdiction of the High Court although is limited but, in our opinion, there exists a distinction but a significant one being that the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction and/ or inherent jurisdiction not only when an application therefor is filed but also suo motu. It is not in dispute that suo motu power can be exercised by the High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. There may not, therefore, be an embargo for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary inherent jurisdiction while exercising other jurisdictions in the matter. Keeping in view the intention of the Parliament, while making the new law the emphasis of the Parliament being 'a case before the court' in contradistinction from 'a person who is arrayed as an accused before it' when the High Court is seized with the entire case although would exercise a limited jurisdiction in terms of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same, in our considered view, cannot be held to limit its other powers and in particular that of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the matter which is not before it.

                     ....

                     The High Court while, thus, exercising its revisional or appellate power, may exercise its inherent powers. Inherent power of the High Court can be exercised, it is trite, both in relation to substantive as also procedural matters.

                     In respect of the incidental or supplemental power, evidently, the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction irrespective of the nature of the proceedings. It is not trammeled by procedural restrictions in that

                     (i) power can be exercised suo motu in the interest of justice. If such a power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice to an accused.

                     (ii) Such a power can be exercised concurrently with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction and no formal application is required to be filed therefor.

                      (iii) It is, however, beyond any doubt that the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not unlimited. It can inter alia be exercised where the Code is silent where the power of the court is not treated as exhaustive, or there is a specific provision in the Code; or the statute does not fall within the purview of the Code because it involves application of a special law. It acts ex debito justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice for which alone it exists.

Therefore, in view of the above decision, it is clear that this court while exercising its appellate power can incidentally exercise its inherent jurisdiction also.

27. Further, the High Court of Karnataka by following the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Popular Muthiah (cited supra), held that the suo motu power of revision can be exercised in appropriate matters. Therefore, even in an appeal preferred under Section 14A(2) of SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989 in appropriate cases, this Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

28. Apart from that, the Apex Court in CBI vs. Sajjankumar (cited supra) has categorically held that this Court has the power of sifting the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether there are materials to proceed further or not. Further, the Apex Court has categorically held that if the materials are discloses only suspicion as against grave suspicion then the Court shall discharge the Accused. By applying the above standard if we look at the materials placed before the trial Court, it is found that the materials though creates a small suspicion but would not be grave enough to proceed further as against the appellant herein.

29. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the trial Court, after dismissal of the discharge petition, has framed charges against the appellant. Therefore, this Court is inclined to quash the charges framed against the appellant herein and discharge him from the offences alleged.

30. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The order dated 27.05.2026 passed in Crl.M.P.No.64 of 2025 in S.C.No.04 of 2025 by the learned Sessions Judge (FAC), Special Court for Trial of Cases under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil, is set aside. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.