1. The case of the petitioner is that he worked as contract labour in the respondent-TGNPDCL from January, 1994 to March, 1999, and thereby became eligible for consideration for appointment to the post of LDC/Typist under B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997. His candidature was initially rejected on the allegation that the service certificates produced by him were not genuine, but this Court, in the earlier round of litigation, set aside the said rejection and directed the respondents to consider his case for appointment to JLM/LDC/Typist/Sub-Engineer or any other suitable post, subject to the conditions of the said B.P. It is his grievance that the respondents issued Proceedings dated 30.11.2015, without properly appreciating the material on record and despite the earlier judicial directions, and therefore seeks quashing of the impugned proceedings and also seeks a consequential direction to appoint him as LDC/Typist or in any other suitable post.

2. Heard Mr. K. Vasudeva Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. A. Chandra Shaker, learned Standing Counsel for TGNPDCL, appearing on behalf of the respondents. Perused the record.

3. Mr. K. Vasudeva Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was engaged as contract labour with the respondent-TGNPDCL from January, 1994 to 31.03.1999 and, having rendered the requisite service, was entitled to consideration for appointment to the post of LDC/Typist under B.P.(P&G-Per) Ms. No.36 dated 18.05.1997. The petitioner’s case, it is contended, is not for appointment dehors the scheme, but for implementation of the benefit specifically contemplated thereunder for eligible contract labour. The petitioner has been pursuing the claim since 1999, and despite repeated directions of this Court, his candidature has been rejected successively on different grounds.

               3.1. Initially, the petitioner’s claim was rejected on the ground that the service certificates produced by him were allegedly not genuine, based on a Vigilance Report dated 21.02.2002. The rejection proceedings dated 16.12.2002 and 07.01.2003 were challenged in W.P. No.19401 of 2003. This Court set aside the said proceedings and directed the respondents to consider the petitioner for appointment to JLM/LDC/Typist/Sub-Engineer or any other suitable post against existing or future vacancies, subject to fulfilment of the conditions under B.P.Ms. No.36 dated 18.05.1997 and without reference to the objection regarding the certificates. Learned counsel therefore contends that the said objection could not thereafter be revived directly or indirectly.

               3.2. The respondents again rejected the petitioner’s claim, leading to W.P. Nos.969/2005 and 23141/2005. By order dated 30.01.2006, this Court set aside the proceedings arising from the respondents’ letter dated 13.04.2005 and directed the 2nd respondent to pass a reasoned order specifying the grounds on which the petitioner’s proforma was treated as non-compliant with B.P.Ms. No.36. The exercise was to be completed within two months. The said order was not challenged and, therefore, became final.

               3.3. The petitioner thereafter submitted representations dated 21.06.2005 and 03.03.2006 seeking consideration of his candidature in accordance with B.P.Ms. No.36 and the orders of this Court. As no action was taken, he approached this Court in W.P. No.15137 of 2010. By order dated 30.06.2010 in W.P.M.P. No.19075 of2010, the respondents were directed to consider the representations and pass appropriate orders. Instead, the respondents relied upon the alleged non-traceability of the representations and contended that B.P.Ms. No.36 had been withdrawn on 15.09.2006, that the vacancies earmarked under the scheme had been filled, and that no vacancies were available in the Karimnagar Operation Circle. It is submitted that the respondents cannot defeat a claim by relying upon their own inability to trace departmental records.

               3.4. The rejection dated 18.10.2010 was thereafter challenged in W.P. No.21474 of 2012. During those proceedings, despite repeated opportunities, the respondents failed to produce the relevant records. In particular, by order dated 05.11.2014, this Court recorded the submission of the respondents’ Standing Counsel that the records were “not traceable”. Learned counsel contends that the respondents’ inability to produce the very records on which their earlier conclusions were purportedly based materially undermines the reliability of those conclusions.

               3.5. Following the order dated 05.11.2014, the respondents withdrew the earlier proceedings dated 04.05.2012 by Letterdated 29.11.2014 and called upon the petitioner to produce the records available with him. The petitioner complied and submitted the relevant certificates and documents on 05.12.2014. Thereafter, by order dated 01.10.2015, this Court directed the respondents to consider the said documents, permitted the petitioner to submit further material, and directed the respondents to pass appropriate orders within eight weeks.

               3.6. It is the petitioner’s principal contention that the respondents failed to comply with the substance of the said direction. Instead of objectively considering the material, they rejected his claim by proceedings dated 30.11.2015 on three grounds: (i) the service certificates were not check-measured and countersigned by the AE/AAE/DE; (ii) the works relied upon related to a chit agreement; and (iii) B.P.Ms. No.36 had been withdrawn on 30.08.2006. Learned counsel submits that these grounds are untenable and, in substance, amount to revival or introduction of objections without properly considering the material placed before the authorities pursuant to the order dated 01.10.2015.

               3.7. As regards the service certificates, it is contended that the petitioner produced contemporaneous departmental material establishing the work actually performed by him, including cheque measurements and K2 agreements countersigned by the competent departmental officers. Such official records, according to the petitioner, corroborate his engagement and performance of work and could not have been disregarded merely because the service certificate itself did not bear a particular countersignature. The respondents were required to assess the documents cumulatively rather than adopt an unduly technical approach.

               3.8. With regard to the alleged chit agreement, learned counsel submits that the petitioner in fact performed work for the respondent organization and that the relevant work records were measured and countersigned by departmental officers. The mere description of the contractual arrangement as a “chit agreement”, without examining the actual work performed and the official records evidencing it, could not constitute a valid basis for rejection.

               3.9. The petitioner also disputes reliance upon the subsequent withdrawal of B.P.Ms. No.36. According to learned counsel, the petitioner’s claim arose when the scheme was in force and had already been subjected to judicial consideration and repeated directions before its withdrawal. The subsequent withdrawal, it is contended, could not retrospectively defeat a claim which was already pending consideration pursuant to binding orders of this Court, nor could it cure earlier defective consideration. The relevant issue was whether the petitioner satisfied the conditions of the scheme and whether his candidature had been lawfully and fairly considered.

               3.10. Learned counsel further alleges discriminatory treatment, pointing out that, notwithstanding the respondents’ reliance upon withdrawal of the scheme on 30.08.2006, persons similarly situated were allegedly appointed in CPDCL on 16.11.2011. This circumstance, according to the petitioner, requires the respondents to explain the basis for such appointments and whether comparable contract labour was treated differently, thereby attracting the petitioner’s plea under Article 14.

                3.11. It is contended that the respondents having admitted that the records were not traceable and having called upon the petitioner to produce the documents available with him, the respondents, could not thereafter place the entire burden upon the petitioner or disregard the documentary material produced by him. The petitioner also relies upon his efforts under the Right to Information Act, including his letter dated 27.01.2012 and the Information Officer’s response dated 28.02.2012 seeking additional time to collect the information, to demonstrate that he had been making bona fide efforts to obtain the relevant records.

               3.12. Learned counsel would therefore submit that the impugned proceedings constitute a continuing failure to comply with the substance of the earlier judicial directions. According to the petitioner, instead of undertaking a genuine, reasoned and objective reconsideration, the respondents have successively relied upon grounds already raised, records which they themselves could not produce, and new technical objections. The impugned order dated 30.11.2015 is therefore alleged to be arbitrary and not the result of a proper consideration of the petitioner’s claim.

               3.13. It is further contended that the impugned order violates the principles of natural justice, since a meaningful opportunity to submit documents necessarily required proper consideration of the cheque measurements, K2 agreements, departmental countersignatures and other material produced by the petitioner. The failure to reconcile such material with the objections raised against the service certificates is alleged to constitute inadequate consideration.

               3.14. The petitioner invokes Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. Article 14 is relied upon on the ground of alleged inconsistent treatment of similarly situated persons; Article 16 on the ground that, once a scheme for consideration of eligible contract labour was framed and the petitioner’s case was repeatedly directed to be considered, he was entitled to fair and non-arbitrary consideration; and Article 21 in the context of the prolonged pendency of the claim and repeated rounds of litigation affecting his livelihood and dignity.

               3.15. The respondents’ contention that the petitioner has no locus standi following withdrawal of B.P.Ms. No.36 is also disputed. It is submitted that the petitioner’s claim had already been brought before this Court and repeatedly remitted for consideration while the scheme and the petitioner’s underlying service were in issue. The subsequent withdrawal of the scheme, according to the petitioner, could not retrospectively validate defective consideration or nullify binding judicial directions.

               3.16. On the above premises, learned counsel would pray that the impugned proceedings dated 30.11.2015 be quashed as illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, and that the respondents be directed to appoint the petitioner as LDC/Typist or in any other suitable post.

4. Mr. A. Chandra Shaker, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, based on the counter affidavit and also the additional counter affidavit, would submit that the writ petition is devoid of merit, as the petitioner does not satisfy the mandatory conditions prescribed under B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997 for appointment to the post of LDC/Typist. It is contended that the said proceedings contemplated filling up the vacant posts in the initial recruitment cadre, including Sub- Engineer/LDC/Typist/JLMs, available as on 18.05.1997, by Ex-Casual Labour/Village Electricity Workers and contract labour, subject to fulfilment of the conditions stipulated therein. The respondents would submit that the petitioner’s claim was examined pursuant to the orders of this Court in W.P. No. 19401 of 2003 dated 22.10.2003, and upon verification of the records furnished by the contractor, it was found that the petitioner’s name did not exist on the establishment rolls of the contractor as on 18.05.1997. Consequently, a speaking order was issued through Letter dated 09.09.2004, rejecting his claim for appointment as LDC/Typist on the ground that he did not fulfil all the conditions of B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997. 4.1. With regard to the alleged representations dated 03.03.2006 and 21.06.2006, it is contended that, pursuant to the interim order dated 30.06.2010 in W.P.M.P.No. 19075 of 2010 in W.P. No. 15137 of 2010, the respondents verified their records and found that no such representations had been submitted by the petitioner to the respondent company. Since the very representations which the Court directed the respondents to consider were not available in the official records, the respondents issued speaking orders through Letter dated 18.10.2010. It is contended that the respondents complied with the directions passed by this Court, and considered the matter on the basis of the records actually available with them.

               4.2. Learned Standing Counsel would submit that the respondents subsequently issued speaking orders dated 04.05.2012, rejecting the petitioner’s claim because he did not fulfil the conditions prescribed under B.P. Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997 and the clarification issued thereunder. Although the petitioner challenged those proceedings in W.P. No. 21474 of 2012, this Court, by order dated 05.11.2014, recorded the submission that the relevant records were not traceable and directed reconsideration. In compliance with that order, the respondents withdrew the earlier proceedings through Letterdated 29.11.2014 and called upon the petitioner to produce the requisite qualification and service records in support of his claim under B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997.

               4.3. Learned Standing Counsel would emphasize that the petitioner thereafter submitted documents on 05.12.2014, and those documents were duly examined in accordance with the subsequent order of this Court dated 01.10.2015.It is contended that the order dated 01.10.2015 passed by this Court did not direct automatic appointment or regularization of the petitioner, but the Order directed the respondents to consider the certificates and other documents submitted by him on 05.12.2014, together with any further relevant material, and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with the applicable rules within 8 weeks.

               4.4. It is contended that after cross-checking the material produced by the petitioner, the competent authority found specific deficiencies which independently disentitled him from appointment. The first and principal deficiency was that the service certificates produced by the petitioner were notcheck-measured and countersigned by the AE/AAE/DE, as required by Para 6 of Circular Memo No. Addl. Secy/DGM(IR)/AS(IR)/PO.II/A1/1170/99 dated 03.12.1999, read with B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997.

               4.5. Learned Standing Counsel would contend that the work relied upon by the petitioner was stated to have been performed under a chit agreement, which, according to the applicable departmental instructions, was not permissible for the purpose of granting employment under B.P.Ms. No. 36. Reliance would be placed upon Circular Memo No. DP/DIR/DM(IR)/PO.II/131/96 dated 28.08.1997. Thus, even independently of the defect in the service certificates, the nature of the agreement under which the petitioner claimed to have worked constituted another substantive reason for rejecting his candidature.

               4.6. The respondents would further contend that the entire scheme itself had subsequently ceased to operate. Learned Standing Counsel would rely upon T.O.O. (Addl. Secy.-Per) Ms. No. 179 dated 30.08.2006, by which A.P. TRANSCO withdrew the applicability of B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997. It is therefore submitted that, by the time of the petitioner’s subsequent claim, there was no subsisting scheme under which a fresh right to appointment could be asserted. The respondents would further state that there were no vacancies of LDC or any other post available for appointment under the withdrawn scheme. Consequently, the petitioner could not claim appointment as a matter of right merely because he had previously sought consideration under B.P.Ms. No. 36.

               4.7. Learned Standing Counsel would strongly dispute the petitioner’s allegation that the respondents repeatedly relied upon grounds which had already been rejected by this Court. It is contended that the earlier orders of this Court did not declare the petitioner to be eligible for appointment, nor did they direct his automatic absorption or regularization. Rather, the earlier orders required the respondents to reconsider his case in accordance with the governing scheme and applicable conditions. In particular, reliance would be placed upon the order in W.P. No. 23141 of 2005 dated 04.01.2006, whereby the earlier proceedings were set aside and the petitioner was permitted to submit material in his possession, with a direction that the respondents consider the case on its own merits. Learned Standing Counsel would also rely upon the judgment in W.P. No. 25554/2003 dated 12.08.2004, under which the respondents were directed to verify the service certificates issued by the contractors and countersigned by the officials of the company with reference to the relevant agreements and then consider the cases in accordance with B.P.Ms. No. 36. It is contended that the impugned Proceedings have complied with the directions of this Court vide Order dated 12.08.2004, and verified the service certificates, the relevant agreements, and with B.P.Ms. No. 36, and therefore there is no illegality in the impugned Proceedings.

               4.8. Learned Standing Counsel would further submit that the respondents’ factual conclusions are supported by an independent vigilance enquiry, and the conclusions are not based merely upon assumptions or presumptions. It is stated that the Inspector of Police, Vigilance, AP Transco, Karimnagar, conducted an enquiry and submitted a report to the Joint Managing Director (D&S), AP Transco, Vidyuth Soudha, Hyderabad, on 21.02.2002 concerning the petitioner and other candidates who had sought appointment on the strength of service certificates. During the enquiry, the petitioner was examined and stated that he had worked parttime at Gokul Workshop since 1994, providing details of his alleged workplace and period of work. The contractor, Sri P. Thejavardhan Rao, who was stated to have issued the certificate, was also examined. According to the respondents, the contractor admitted that he had not maintained a GPF register, attendance register or acquittance register, though he possessed labourlicences, and stated that service certificates had been issued to a number of persons on their request, including to the petitioner.

               4.9. The respondents rely upon this vigilance material to submit that the service certificates relied upon by the petitioner lacked the contemporaneous documentary basis necessary for establishing actual service. The contractor’s alleged admission that he had not maintained attendance, acquaintance or GPF records is relied upon to demonstrate that the certificates could not be independently verified from the contractor’s records. Learned Standing Counsel would therefore contend that the respondents were justified in declining to treat such certificates as sufficient proof of qualifying service, particularly when the governing scheme and departmental clarification required verification and authentication of the service claimed.

               4.10. Learned Standing Counsel would also specifically dispute the petitioner’s contention that the work records relied upon by him conclusively establish his eligibility. It is submitted that the experience certificate dated 22.01.1999 allegedly issued by the contractor did not bear the signatures of the concerned departmental officials in the manner required by Memo dated 03.12.1999. It is further contended that even the proforma certificate produced by the petitioner did not bear the signature of the contractor, and therefore the documentary material produced by the petitioner suffers from fundamental defects of authentication and cannot constitute the basis for appointment under the scheme.

               4.11. With regard to the petitioner’s representation dated 30.10.2015, learned Standing Counsel would submit that although this Court had granted liberty to the petitioner to produce further relevant documents, the petitioner did not submit any additional supporting documents along with that representation. The respondents nevertheless examined the material already available, including the documents submitted on 05.12.2014, and found that those certificates had not been countersigned by the AE/AAE/DE as required under Para 6 of the departmental memo dated 03.12.1999. It is therefore submitted that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity and that the rejection was reached only after consideration of the material that he himself had placed before the authorities.

               4.12. Learned Standing Counsel would accordingly contend that the impugned proceedings dated 30.11.2015constitute a lawful decision taken in compliance with the directions of this Court. The respondents would submit that the impugned order was not based upon the earlier allegation that the certificates were simply “not genuine”, but upon specific deficiencies identified after verification, namely, the absence of the mandatory departmental countersignatures, the nature of the agreements under which the work was allegedly performed, and the withdrawal of the governing scheme.

               4.13. The respondents would also reject the petitioner’s allegation that they had deliberately suppressed or withheld records. Learned Standing Counsel would submit that the inability to trace certain records at the stage of the proceedings in W.P. No. 21474 of 2012 did not prevent subsequent reconsideration, particularly because the respondents withdrew the earlier order and invited the petitioner to produce the documents in his possession. The respondents thereafter considered the material furnished by the petitioner and passed a fresh speaking order. Thus, the respondents’ case is that the procedural history demonstrates compliance with, rather than disregard of, the successive orders of this Court.

               4.14. As regards the petitioner’s reliance upon the alleged appointment of similarly situated persons in CPDCL on 16.11.2011, learned Standing Counsel would submit that such an assertion, by itself, does not establish that those persons were identically situated or appointed under the same factual and legal circumstances as the petitioner. Unless the petitioner establishes parity of service, qualifications, documentary compliance, applicable scheme and vacancy position, the alleged appointment of other persons cannot create an enforceable right in his favour. The respondents would therefore contend that the petitioner cannot seek appointment merely by referring to alleged appointments of third parties.

               4.15. Learned Standing Counsel would further submit that the petitioner has no vested or continuing right to appointment merely because he was a contract labourer during the period from January, 1994 to 31.03.1999. The scheme under B.P.Ms. No. 36 was conditional and did not confer automatic absorption upon every person who claimed to have worked as contract labour. Eligibility depended upon strict compliance with the conditions prescribed by the scheme and the subsequent clarifications. According to the respondents, the petitioner failed to establish those foundational requirements, and consequently no enforceable right to appointment arose in his favour.

               4.16. Learned Standing Counsel therefore contends that the petitioner was repeatedly given opportunities to establish his claim, his documents were examined, the relevant departmental instructions were applied, and speaking orders were passed. The mere fact that the petitioner disagrees with the conclusions reached by the competent authority does not render the decision arbitrary or mala fide. It is contended that theimpugned order is supported by cogent documentary material and was issued by competent authority in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it.

               4.17. It is contended that the petitioner cannot convert the writ jurisdiction of this Court into a direction for appointment when he has failed to establish eligibility under the governing scheme. The earlier orders of this Court required consideration of his case in accordance with the applicable rules; they did not adjudicate that he was entitled to appointment. It is contended that since the respondents have undertaken the required verification and have recorded specific reasons in the impugned Proceedings dated 30.11.2015, the same does not warrant interference, and accordingly prayed for dismissed of the writ petition.

               4.18. Learned Standing Counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Y.V. Subramanya Kumar v. Southern Power Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd (2007 (6) ALT 147 (D.B.)), wherein it was held as follows:

               “9. The appellants claim for appointment as Junior Lineman deserves to be rejected on the short ground that all the 50% vacancies in that cadre had already been filled. If, at this stage, the court recommends the respondents to absorb he petitioner as Junior Lineman, then they may have to dispense with the service of one of the employees whose services had been regularized in terms of the policy contained in B.P.Ms. No.36 dated 18.5.1997. and we do not see any reason to adopt that course ignoring the fact that none of the absorbed employee was a party to the writ petition. We also do not find any valid reason or justification to issue a mandamus to the respondents to create additional or supernumerary post for accommodating the appellant because that would necessarily result in amendment of the policy contained in B.P. Ms. No.36 dated 18.5.1997.

               10. The plea of discrimination raised by the appellant cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Article 14 does not comprehend negative equality.

               14. In State of Haryana vs Ram Kumar Mann ((1997) 3 SUPREME 110), the Supreme Court ruled that the High Court was not right in issuing a mandamus to the State to allow the petitioner to withdraw his resignation merely because in another case such a course was adopted. Some of the observations made in that case, which are quite instructive, are extracted below:

               “The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination in meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate an employee, after committing misappropriation of money, is dismissed form service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for reinstatement? The answer is obviously “No”. In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right.”

               4.19. Learned Standing Counsel also relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in M. Srinivas v. The Chairman & Managing Director, AP Transco (Writ Appeal No. 958 of 2008). It is contended that in the said appeal, the Hon’ble Division Bench had dismissed the case of the appellants/petitioners therein, who sought regularization under the same scheme of B.P.Ms. No. 36, dated 18.07.1995, on the ground that there was no reliable evidence on the part of the petitioners that they had worked under the Contractor therein, and that the case involved disputed questions of fact, and thereby upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petition.

               4.20. Learned Standing Counsel would contend that in the instant writ petition also, the vigilance report dated 21.02.2002 revealed that there is no reliable documentary evidence, like attendance registers, acquittance registers, PF receipts etc., on the part of the petitioner, and the vigilance enquiry revealed that the Contractor’s evidence would go to show that the Contractor had issued certificates as requested by several individuals, including the petitioner, and therefore such certificates obtained without any basis of documentary evidence or proper records, lack evidentiary value and lack credibility and they cannot be considered of any worth for the purpose of absorbing in public employment. It is contended that, in the present writ petition also, the assertions made by the petitioner and the multiple litigation seeking regularization under B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.07.1995, all stem merely from such assertions, and therefore there is no merit in the instant writ petition and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, it may be noted that, the controversy in the present writ petition essentially concerns the petitioner’s claim for appointment to the post of LDC/Typist under B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997 and the legality of the speaking order dated 30.11.2015 passed by the 3rdrespondent upon reconsideration of his documents submitted on 05.12.2014, and in pursuance of the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No. 21474 of 2012, dated 01.10.2015.

6. The petitioner’s main grievance is that the respondents did not properly comply with the directions in W.P. No. 21474 of 2012, dated 01.10.2015. Instead, by proceedings dated 30.11.2015, they again rejected his claim on three grounds:

               a) The service certificates were not check-measured and countersigned by the AE/AAE/DE.

               b) The work relied upon by the petitioner was under a “chit agreement”.

               c) B.P.Ms. No.36 dated 18.05.1997 had been withdrawn on 30.08.2006.

7. The petitioner disputes all three grounds. Regarding the service certificates, the petitioner’s contention is that he produced other departmental records showing that he had actually performed the work. The check measurements and K2 agreements were countersigned by the departmental officers such as the AE/ADE. These records support his claim that he actually worked for the respondent organization. Therefore, the respondents should not have rejected his claim merely because the service certificate itself did not contain a particular countersignature. According to the petitioner, all the documents should have been considered together.

               7.1. Regarding the “chit agreement”, the petitioner contends that he actually performed the work and that the work was measured and verified by departmental officers. Therefore, merely describing the agreement as a “chit agreement” should not be sufficient to reject his claim.

               7.2. The petitioner also disputes the ground urged with regard to withdrawal of B.P.Ms. No.36. His case is that his claim arose when the scheme was in force and that his claim had already been brought before this Court and repeatedly directed to be considered. Therefore, the subsequent withdrawal of the scheme could not retrospectively defeat his pending claim or nullify the earlier orders of this Court.

8. At the outset, it is necessary to appreciate the limited nature of the right claimed by the petitioner under B.P. Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997. The scheme contemplated filling specified vacant posts from among identified categories of persons, including contract labour, subject to fulfilment of the conditions stipulated therein. Consequently, the petitioner was required to establish, through authenticated material, that his engagement and service satisfied the conditions of the scheme. The clarification contained in the circular dated 03.12.1999 assumed significance in that regard, since the respondents’ case is that the service certificates issued by contractors were required to be check-measured and countersigned by the concerned AE/AAE/DE.

9. It is to be noted that this Court, vide Order dated 22.10.2003 in W.P. No. 19401 of 2003, directed as follows:

               “The subject matter of this writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in writ Petition No. 629 of 2003, dated 16.4.2003. Following the same, the impugned orders dated 16.12.2002 and 7.1.2003 are set aside and respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioners for appointment to the post of Junior Lineman/L.D.C./Typist/Sub-Engineer or any other suitable post in the existing or future vacancies, without reference to the objections raised in the impugned proceedings. However, said consideration shall be subject to compliance of all other conditions as notified in B.P.M.S. No. 36 dated 18.5.1997.

10. It is the specific contention of the respondents, upon examination of the records submitted by the contractor, the petitioner’s name was not found on the contractor’s establishment rolls as on 18.05.1997. On that basis, a speaking order was issued through Letter dated 09.09.2004. Even assuming that the earlier order was subsequently set aside in further proceedings, the setting aside did not amount to a declaration that the petitioner had conclusively established eligibility for appointment. The subsequent judicial directions required reconsideration on merits and permitted the petitioner to place additional material before the authorities. They did not dispense with the substantive eligibility conditions prescribed by the scheme.

11. It is to be noted that this Court in W.P. No. 25554 of 2003, by order dated 12.08.2004, and subsequently in W.P. No. 969 of 2005, by order dated 18.03.2005, directed the authorities to verify the service certificates issued by contractors and countersigned by officials of the company with reference to the agreements under which contract labour had been engaged as on 18.05.1997, and consider the cases under B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997.Likewise, in W.P. No. 23141 of 2005, dated 04.01.2006, this Court permitted the petitioner to submit material in his possession and the respondents were directed to consider the case on its own merits.

12. With regard to the alleged representations dated 03.03.2006 and 21.06.2006, it is the petitioner’s case that he submitted those representations, however, upon verification by the respondents, pursuant to direction of this Court in W.P.M.P. No. 19075 of 2010 in W.P. No. 15137 of 2010, dated 30.06.2010, no such representations were found in the records.

13. Be that as it may, when the respondents initially rejected the petitioner’s case through Letter dated 04.05.2012 on the ground that the conditions of B.P. Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997 and the subsequent clarification had not been satisfied, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 21474 of 2012, and this Court, by order dated 05.11.2014, took note of the submission that the relevant records were not traceable and directed further action in the circumstances noticed by the Court; and accordingly the respondents issued letter dated 29.11.2014, withdrawing the earlier rejection proceedings, and called upon the petitioner to produce the relevant certificates and documents. Therefore, by issuance of Letter dated 29.11.2014, withdrawing earlier rejection proceedings dated 04.05.2012, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to substantiate his claim afresh.

14. Thereafter, by order dated 01.10.2015 in W.P. No. 21474 of 2012, this Court directed the respondents to consider the certificates and other documents submitted by the petitioner on 05.12.2014, and permitted him to file further relevant documents, and directed the respondents to pass appropriate orders within 8 weeks from receipt of the order. It is in consequence of this exercise that the impugned speaking order dated 30.11.2015 came to be issued.

15. The sequence of events therefore materially establish that the respondent authorities have not mechanically passed the impugned orders, but rather they have reconsidered the matter afresh, by calling upon the petitioner to furnish whatever documentary material was available with the petitioner, so as to consider his case as per the scheme under B.P.Ms. No. 36, dated 18.05.1997. And, accordingly, the petitioner submitted the documents on 05.12.2014, and the same were considered while passing the impugned speaking order.

16. Now, the question is whether the reasons recorded in the impugned order are supported by material on record. On this aspect, it is to be noted that the respondents raised three distinct deficiencies: (i) that the service certificates were not check-measured and countersigned by the AE/AAE/DE as required by the clarification dated 03.12.1999 read with B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997; (ii) that the works relied upon by the petitioner related to a chit agreement whichcould not be treated as qualifying engagement under the governing scheme and Circular Memo dated 28.08.1997; and (iii) that T.O.O. (Addl. Secy.-Per) Ms. No. 179 dated 30.08.2006 had withdrawn the applicability of B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997.

17. The first ground for rejection of the petitioner’s case relates to countersignature on check measurements and K2 agreements. The petitioner places reliance upon the assertion that cheque measurements and K2 agreements were countersigned by AE/ADE officials. However, the respondents’ contention is that the service certificates, which constituted the petitioner’s evidence of qualifying contract labour service, submitted on 05.12.2014, were not countersigned by the AE/AAE/DE in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Memo dated 03.12.1999. It is also stated in the additional counter-affidavit that the experience certificate dated 22.01.1999 did not bear the signatures of the officials required under the clarification, and further the proforma certificate relied upon by the petitioner did not bear the signature of the contractor. The specific findings of the respondents with regard to these facts stand unrebutted.

18. Further, the respondents have also relied upon the vigilance inquiry as independent corroboration for their conclusion that the petitioner’s documentary claim could not be accepted. It is stated in the additional counter-affidavit, that the Inspector of Police, Vigilance, AP Transco, Karimnagar, conducted an inquiry and submitted a report to the Joint Managing Director (D&S), AP Transco, Vidyuth Soudha, Hyderabad, on 21.02.2002. During that inquiry, the statements of the petitioner and the contractor, P. Thejavardhan Rao, S/o Laxmipathi, were recorded. It is the specific contention of the respondents, borne out by the record, as per the Vigilance Report dated 21.02.2002, that the petitioner has informed the inquiry officer that he worked part-time at Gokul Workshop since 1994, and that the contractoradmitted that he had not maintained GPF, attendance or acquittance registers and had issued service certificates to various persons, including the petitioner, at the request of workers. The statement of the Contractor, P. Thejavardhan Rao, reads as follows:

               “5) Statement of P. Thejavardhan Rao, S/o laxmipathi Rao, Age: 39 yrs, Caste: Kamma, Occ: Contractor, Laxminagar, K. Nagar.

               He states that since 1989 he is doing electricity contract works of HT, LT lines erection, sub-station constructions etc., he contracting only labour portion of workings completing in 1 month or more. After completion of the work he paid the labour charges to his workers and moved the workers to another place. As such he has not maintained G.P.F. attendance register, acquittance register and he got labourlicence. On request of his workers he issued service certificates to the following candidates, G.Ravi, K. Mallaiah, Narsaiah, Khaseem, S.P Raju, Kumar, Srinivas Reddy, Sunil, Sadanandam, Sampath, Srinivas, Thirupathi, Hyder khani, Sunil, Ramashekar, Chitharanjan, Navab, Praveen and others.”

19. The respondents consequently contend that the certificates were not supported by the alleged employment records.Therefore, the conclusion of the respondents that the certificates furnished by the petitioner could not establish qualifying service, has an evidentiary basis through Vigilance Report dated 21.02.2002, and hence, the conclusion of the respondents cannot be brushed aside. There is no reliable supporting material furnished by the petitioner to rebut or negate the vigilance findings. In particular, it does not identify contemporaneous attendance records, wage records, GPF records, muster rolls, authenticated contractor records or other independent material capable of establishing that the petitioner wason the contractor’s establishmentas on 18.05.1997 ascontemplated by the scheme. In light of the particular findings of fact recorded during the vigilance enquiry by the respondents, the petitioner’s general contra-allegation that the respondents have not considered his case, cannot survive.

20. The respondents, by way of additional counter-affidavit, placed the vigilance report, the B.P.Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997, the clarification dated 03.12.1999, T.O.O. Ms. No. 179 dated 30.08.2006, the petitioner’s representations dated 05.12.2014 and 30.10.2015, and the experience certificate dated 22.01.1999. The impugned proceedings are therefore issued after due consideration and verification of the petitioner’s credentials and after due enquiry as contemplated under the scheme.

21. The contention of the petitioner that similarly situated persons were appointed in CPDCL on 16.11.2011 despite the withdrawal of B.P.Ms. No. 36, has no evidentiary basis to say that such alleged appointments, if any, were on the same documentary basis, to entertain a contention with regard to allege violation of invokeArticle 14 of the Constitution. Neither an asserted instance of appointment, without material similarity/identity of circumstances, nor an alleged irregular benefit granted to another person, create a legal entitlement in favour of the petitioner.

22. The record shows that the petitioner was given repeated opportunities over the course of the proceedings. His case was reconsidered after the order dated 22.10.2003; he pursued further proceedings after the order dated 09.09.2004; the representations referred to in the proceedings of 30.06.2010 were considered; the initial rejection order dated 04.05.2012 was subsequently withdrawn following the Order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 21474 of 2012, dated 05.11.2014; the petitioner was called upon to produce relevant documents through the letter dated 29.11.2014; documents were submitted on 05.12.2014; and this Court thereafter granted liberty to the petitioner to submit further relevant material by order dated 01.10.2015. The petitioner also submitted a further representation dated 30.10.2015. The impugned order dated 30.11.2015 was consequently made after an opportunity to produce and rely upon documentary material. The mere fact that the ultimate conclusion was adverse to the petitioner does not constitute a violation of natural justice. Since the respondents have demonstrated a rational basis for concluding that the petitioner failed to satisfy the prescribed eligibility conditions under the scheme contemplated under B.P. Ms. No. 36, date 18.05.1997, and such conclusion having stood unrebutted with a reliable contrary evidence, mere disagreement with the conclusion of the respondents under the impugned Proceedings dated 30.11.2015, cannot form a ground for challenge under Article 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution. The present dispute concerns appointment/regularization under B.P. Ms. No. 36 dated 18.05.1997, verification of contract labour service, departmental circulars and the legality of the respondent’s administrative decision. There is nothing in the material placed before the Court to suggest that the impugned order was made under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 or that Section 10 of that enactment governs the petitioner’s claim. The applicable procedural question is whether the respondents complied with the directions of this Court and afforded the petitioner an opportunity to substantiate his eligibility, and therefore, no question under the provisions of Trade Unions Act, would arise for consideration in the facts of the present case.

23. Further, with regard to jurisdiction, the impugned order was issued by the 3rdrespondent-Superintending Engineer. There is no material on record to show that the 3rdrespondent lacked authority to undertake the reconsideration of petitioner’s case or to issue the impugned speaking order dated 30.11.2015. Indeed, the order was passed after the earlier proceedings had been withdrawn and after the petitioner was directed to submit the requisite material. The challenge therefore discloses no jurisdictional defect warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

24. The scope of judicial reviewis limited, and judicial review of administrative action is not to substitute the Court’s opinion for that of the competent administrative authority, with regard to employment records,particularly where the authority has undertaken verification, considered the material produced by the claimant, recorded reasons, and acted pursuant to the directions of this Court. Interference would be justified if the conclusion were shown to be wholly unsupported by material, based on irrelevant considerations, perverse, mala fide, or in breach of natural justice. The material placed before this Court does not establish any such infirmity.

25. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 30.11.2015 does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference.

26. Accordingly, the writ petitionis dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.