I. PETITIONER’S CASE

1. The petitioner joined Syndicate Bank as an Officer Trainee on 11.02.1971. During his service, he served at various branches of the Bank in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and also did an out-of-State posting at Kolkata in the State of West Bengal. In the year 1999, while he was serving as Senior Manager at Labbipet Branch of the Bank, Vijayawada, the Board of Directors of the Bank, by invoking Regulation 19(1) of the Syndicate Bank (Officer Employees) Regulations, 1979, issued proceedings prematurely retiring him from service on 05.08.1999.

               1.1. It is his grievance that he served for 28 years, and therefore he is eligible for additional notional weightage of five years for pension purposes. However, due to the denial of the Bank to give such additional notional weightage of five years, his retirement benefits reduced significantly, and he has been receiving lesser pension.

               1.2. The petitioner further states that he was also entitled to commutation of 1/3rdpension and that the Head Office supplied him with the relevant pension papers only in the last week of December 1999. He relies upon the Bank's letter dated 25.08.1999 and the Pension Regulations, under which an employee was required to submit the option for commutation within 1 year from cessation of service. Accordingly, he accordingly submitted the required papers on 04.08.2000, within the prescribed 1-year period, to Labbipet Branch and obtained an acknowledgement. It is stated that the Branch forwarded those papers to the Head Office on the same day, but the Bank nevertheless informed him that the papers reached the Competent Authority only on 11.08.2000 and, on that basis, required him to undergo a medical examination at his own expense for commutation. The petitioner contends that his repeated representations were routinely refused, prompting him to submit a further representation dated 26.02.2003 to the Executive Director seeking intervention.

               1.3. The petitioner specifically relies on Pension Regulation 41(5)(b), which provides that, in the case of an employee retiring on superannuation, voluntary retirement or premature retirement, where the employee applies for commutation after retirement but before completion of 1 year from the date of retirement, commutation becomes absolute on the date the application is received by the Competent Authority. His case is that submission of the papers to Labbipet Branch on 04.08.2000 constituted submission to the Bank itself, because the Branch is an extended arm of the Bank, and that the Regulation does not state that the papers must physically reach the Competent Authority within 1 year. He therefore argues that even if the Competent Authority actually received the papers on 11.08.2000, the request became absolute on that date because he had submitted the application to the Branch of the Bank on 04.08.2000 (i.e., before expiry of one year), and therefore refusal of his commutation application on the ground of delay is illegal and arbitrary.

2. Heard Mr. K. Laxmi Narayana, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. A. Krishnam Raju, learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record.

II. CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER’s COUNSEL

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitionerwas chosen for a Reward Scheme whereunder the employees who had 25 years of unblemished, sincere and committed service were honoured with a pair of wrist watches, and the petitioner being honoured just months prior to the retirement, the Board ought not to have retired him prematurely.

               3.1. It is contended that the petitioner subsequently made repeated efforts to obtain the additional weightage, submitting representations dated 02.02.2013 and 25.04.2013 and legal notices dated 17.12.2016 and 21.01.2017, seeking addition of notional weightage of 5 years. According to the petitioner, the Bank rejected these requests on the ground that officials who were prematurely retired were not entitled to the additional 5 years' notional weightage. It is the contention of the petitioner that the position taken by the Bank is erroneous, illegal and contrary to the spirit and express scheme of the Pension Regulations.

               3.2. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. Radhey Shyam Pandey ((2020) 6 SCC 438), and contends that a bank could not discriminate between different classes of retirees for computation of terminal benefits. According to the petitioner, the case in Radhey Shyam Pandey (supra) involved an employee who had opted for voluntary retirement under a Golden Handshake Scheme and had been denied the benefit of additional 5 years, and the Supreme Court directed that such discrimination was impermissible. He further relies on the judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 9069 of 2011, wherein it was held that the word "retiree" in generic terms includes all categories of retirees and that applying the relevant Circular only to some categories would lead to creation of two classes of retirees, contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

               3.3. Learned counsel also relies on Regulation 2(y) of the Pension Regulations, which defines "Retirement" as cessation from Bank service and expressly includes cessation on attaining superannuation age, voluntary retirement under Regulation 29, and "premature retirement" by the Bank before attaining the age of superannuation. On that basis, he argues that his premature retirement falls expressly within the regulatory definition of retirement and that the Bank consequently had no discretion to exclude him from the 5 years' notional weightage.

               3.4. The petitioner further relies on the Bank's own stance that premature retirement is not a punishment. It is contended that the HR Department, in Board Notes dated 14.08.1999 and 01.10.1999 prepared in response to his appeal to the Board, repeatedly advised that premature retirement was "not a punishment" and that principles of natural justice had not been violated, while asserting that the Bank was exercising its discretion under the applicable regulation.

               3.5. It is contended that, if his premature retirement was not punitive, there was no legitimate basis for imposing the financial consequence of denying him the additional 5 years' service weightage. He states that the denial caused him heavy financial suffering for 17 years. He further contends that even officers removed from service through the imposition of the penalty of compulsory retirement were, according to the judgments on which he relies, entitled to pension including the 5 years' weightage. He therefore characterizes the denial of that benefit to him, when his retirement was allegedly not imposed as a punishment, as arbitrary, illegal, unlawful and contrary to the spirit of the Regulations, and alleges that the Bank continued to reject his representations through an arbitrary and unilateral interpretation of the governing provisions.

               3.6. It is contended that the respondent Bank acted mala fide in two respects; first, by denying him the additional 5 years' service weightage in computing his pension despite his premature retirement being expressly covered by the Pension Regulations and despite the judicial decisions upon which he relies; and second, by denying him the benefit of commutation on the ground that his request was allegedly received late, even though he had submitted the papers to the Bank's Labbipet Branch on 04.08.2000, within 1 year of his retirement on 05.08.1999.

               3.7. The petitioner therefore seeks a declaration that the Bank's letters dated 21.01.2016, 05.01.2017 and 15.03.2017 refusing the 5 years' notional weightage are illegal and arbitrary and consequentially seeks payment of all retirement benefits by adding 5 years notional weightage. He further seeks arrears of gratuity and pension calculated on the basis of revised pay scales brought into force retrospectively from 01.04.1998, as well as quashing of the Bank's letter dated 19.04.2003, rejecting his commutation claim.

               3.8. The petitioner also seeks a direction requiring the Bank to pay him 28 months' salary as ex gratia under the VRS 2000 Scheme in the context of the judgment in Radhey Shyam Pandey (supra). In addition, he seeks interest at 18% per annum from 05.08.1999 on the arrears of gratuity, pension and commuted pension, together with costs of Rs 25,000 for alleged deliberate and wanton harassment for more than 2 decades.

III. CONTENTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT-BANK

4. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, based on the counter affidavit, would contend that the present writ petition is misconceived and that the petitioner seeks to reopen the issues which have already attained finality; that the Petitioner was prematurely retired on 05.08.1999 under Regulation 19(1) of the Syndicate Bank Officers Service Regulations, 1979, pursuant to the recommendations of the Special Committee; that he had earlier challenged the said retirement in W.P. No. 16240 of 1999, which was dismissed on 11.06.2013 after the Court found that the Committee had considered the petitioner's efficiency, competence and utility and that there was no basis to hold the decision arbitrary or unsupported by evidence; that subsequently the petitioner filed an appeal i.e., W.A. No. 1157 of 2017, which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court on 22.08.2017; that the petitioner is barred by res judicata and estoppel from re-agitating the validity or alleged mala fides of his premature retirement.

               4.1. It is also contended that the retirement was not voluntary retirement, and that when the VRS/Golden Handshake scheme was introduced he was already out of service and could not have opted for it; that the petitioner is not entitled to the five-year notional/additional qualifying-service weightage under Regulation 29(5) of the Syndicate Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995, as that benefit is available only to employees retiring voluntarily, subject to the prescribed conditions; that the pension and retirement gratuity were correctly calculated on his actual qualifying service, and only the additional weightage was denied.

               4.2. It is contended that the judgment in Radhey Shyam Pandey (supra) relied upon by the Petitioner is distinguishable, as that case concerned a VRS retiree, whereas the Petitioner was prematurely retired under Regulation 19(1).

               4.3. It is also contended that the Petitioner applied for commutation of pension after the prescribed one-year period and was consequently required to furnish the requisite medical certificate, and therefore the refusal of the Bank to permit commutation on account of nonfurnishing of medical certificate by the petitioner cannot be termed illegal or arbitrary. Further, the Bank denies liability under the 7th Bipartite Settlement asserting that the relevant ad hoc benefits were not payable to officers who had ceased to be in service, and the Petitioner had retired on 05.08.1999.

               4.4. It is contended that there are no mala fides, or discrimination or improper handling of the petitioner's representations, and that the prescribed procedure was followed and that the retirement decision had already been upheld in the earlier proceedings.

               4.5. It is therefore contended that the petitioner cannot introduce new or additional reliefs after nearly 25 years from his retirement, and that such belated claims are not maintainable.

IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

5. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, the following issues arise for consideration:

               (i) Whether the present writ petition is hit by res judicata and estoppel, on account of the dismissal of earlier W.P. No. 16240 of 1999 and W.A. No. 1157 of 2017?

               (ii) Whether the petitioner, who was prematurely retired from service by the respondent-Bank, exercising powers under Regulation 19(1) of the Syndicate Bank Officers Service Regulations, 1979, is entitled to addition of five years notional weightage while calculating his pension and retirement benefits?

               (iii) Whether the Competent Authority unduly directedthe petitioner to undergo medical examination?

               (iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief of arrears of gratuity and pension, as per Revised Pay Scales of 1998?

               (v) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for, and if so, to what extent?

V. CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT

6. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the petitioner earlier approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 16240 of 1999, challenging the letter dated 23.04.1999 issued by the Bank proposing to prematurely retire him from service. The petitioner had prayed the Court to direct the respondent-Bank to continue him in service. This Court, by Order dated 11.06.2013, dismissed the writ petition, by observing as follows:

               "14. As seen from the proceedings, the Special Committee constituted has reviewed cases of officers who completed 55 years of age and / or 30 years of service on 26.2.1999 and finally observed as follows:"

               "After studying the individual cases, with reference to the charge sheets, vigilance cases existing or otherwise in respect of the Officers whose names figure in the enclosure, and in accordance with the provision under regulation No.19(1) and 19(2) of Syndicate Bank Officers Service Regulation 1979, it is decided that they shall continue in the services of the Bank till superannuation subject to good work and sound health except the following Officers.

               (1) Mr. B.Ksthirvelu, Emp.No.087285

               (2) Mr. M.V.Appa Rao, Emp.No.110073

               15. Though it is not specifically mentioned that the committee has perused the records of the petitioner, but the committee specifically stated that after studying the individual cases with reference to the charge sheets, vigilance cases existing, it has taken a decision. It is true that the particulars of the records perused by the Committee have not been referred in the said order. It would have been better had the committee referred to the records at least in respect of those officers who were asked to retire prematurely. But, this Court can interfere only in case where malafies are attributed or where there is no evidence or the decision is arbitrary.

               16. Now it has to be seen whether it is a case of no evidence. If it is a case of no evidence than it can be said that the impugned order is arbitrary and issued with mala fide intention. If the record shows that the competency, efficiency and utility of the officer was concerned basing on some material then, this Court cannot interfere with the impugned proceedings.

               17. Sri Deepak Battacharjee, learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the proceedings dated 21.06.1994, which indicated that the petitioner was censured. He has also referred to the proceedings dated 01.10.1994, wherein it is observed that the petitioner failed to discharge the duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and exhibited conduct which is unbecoming of a bank officer and thus contravened Regulation No.3(1) read with Regulation No.24 of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulation, 1976. Issuing of above referred proceedings are not in dispute. Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondents has also referred to the several confidential reports.

               18. In the light of above material, it cannot be said that it is the case of no evidence or mala fides have been attributed against the Special Committee. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned order is arbitrary. It appears that, the Committee having considered the efficiency, competence and utility of the petitioner has taken a decision.

               19. In the light of above discussion, it is clear that this Court need not interfere with the impugned proceedings.

               Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs."

7. Challenging the dismissal of the writ petition, he filed an appeal before this Court in W.A. No. 1157 of 2017, and along with the appeal, the petitioner filed an application seeking condonation of delay of 1481 days in filing the appeal. The Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, while dismissing the appeal by Judgment dated 22.08.2017, observed as follows:

               "3. On a careful consideration of the explanation offered by the appellant, we do not feel convinced that the appellant was diligent in pursuing his cause. Even on merits also, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the learned single judge who declined to set aside order dated 23-04-1999, prematurely retiring the appellant from service while reviewing his performance along with other officers. From the findings of the learned single judge, it is evident that the record of the appellant was not satisfactory, in that he was censured on 21-06-1994 and suffered adverse remarks on 01-10-1994, that he failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence…"

8. The principles governing res judicata and constructive res judicata are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra ((1990) 2 SCC 715), and in Union of India v. Punnilal ((1996) 11 SCC 112), has held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to successive writ petitions where the matter in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in the former proceeding, and has been heard and finally decided by a competent court.

9. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata operates only in respect of the same cause of action or matters directly and substantially in issue in the earlier proceeding. However, it does not bar a subsequent proceeding where the cause of action is different, or where the relief sought is distinct and based on a separate legal right, even if it arises from the same factual matrix. The test is whether the matter in issue in the subsequent proceeding was directly and substantially in issue in the former proceeding, and whether it was necessary to decide it for the disposal of the former proceeding.

10. In the present case, the grievance in the present writ petition is distinct from the grievance in the earlier writ proceedings (W.P. No. 16240 of 1999 and W.A. No. 1157 of 2017). In the earlier proceedings, the petitioner challenged the validity of the order of premature retirement dated 23.04.1999 and sought continuation in service.

               10.1. In the present writ petition,the petitioner challenges the denial of (i)five years' notional weightage for pension purposes, and (ii) the benefit of commutation. The causes of action are distinct. Therefore, the present writ petition is not hit by res judicata or constructive res judicata. The bar of estoppel also does not apply, as estoppel operates only in respect of a representation or promise made by one party and acted upon by the other; and no such representation or promise is pleaded or established in the instant case.The issue No. 5(i) is answered accordingly, in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent-Bank.

11. Coming to the issue of addition of five years' notional weightage for the purpose of pensionary benefits, it is the contention of the petitioner that voluntary retired persons, and even personnel retired as a measure of punishment (compulsory retirement), are also given the benefit of five years' notional weightage for pension purposes, and therefore such notional weightage addition of five years ought to have been extended to him as well.

12. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the Regulations governing Voluntary Retirement, Premature Retirement, and Compulsory Retirement. The same read as follows:

"REGULATION 29: PENSION ON VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT:

               (1) On or after the 1st day of November, 1993 at any time after an employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority retire from service;

               (5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under this regulation shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty-three years and it does not take him beyond the date of superannuation.

REGULATION 32. PREMATURE RETIREMENT PENSION:

               Premature Retirement Pension may be granted to an employee who:

               (a) has rendered minimum ten years of service; and

               (b) retires from service on account of orders of the Bank to retire prematurely in the public interest or for any other reason specified in service regulations or settlement, if otherwise he was entitled to such pension on superannuation on that date.

REGULATION 33: COMPULSORY RETIREMENT PENSION:

               1) An employee compulsorily retired from service as a penalty on or after 1st day of November, 1993 in term of Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 or awards/settlements may be granted by the Authority higher than the Authority competent to impose such penalty, pension at a rate not less than two thirds and not more than full pension admissible to him on the date of his compulsory retirement if otherwise he was entitled to such pension on superannuation on that date.

               2) Whenever in the case of a bank employee the Competent Authority passes an order (whether original; appellate or in exercise of power of reviews) awarding a pension less than the full compensation pension admissible under these regulations, the Board of Directors shall be consulted before such order is passed.

               3) A pension granted or awarded under Sub-regulation (1) or as the case may be, under Sub-regulation (2), shall not be less than the amount of rupees three hundred and seventy five per mensem."

13. From a perusal of the above Regulations, it reveals that Regulation 29(5) expressly provides that the qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under Regulation 29 shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years, subject to the conditions stipulated therein. Likewise, Regulation 32, which governs premature retirement pension, does not provide for any such addition to qualifying service. Equally, Regulation 33, which specifically deals with compulsory retirement imposed as a penalty, provides only for grant of pension at a rate not less than two-thirds and not more than the full pension admissible on the date of compulsory retirement, provided the employee was otherwise entitled to pension on superannuation on that date. Regulation 33 contains no provision incorporating the benefit of Regulation 29(5), nor does it provide for any notional addition of five years to qualifying service.

14. The mere fact that an employee retiring voluntarily under Regulation 29, an employee prematurely retired by the Bank under Regulation 32, and an employee compulsorily retired by the Bank as a measure of punishment under Regulation 33, may all cease to be in service before the normal date of superannuation. However, such early cessation from service does not, by itself, render the statutory consequences of the three provisions identical.

15. The three Regulations (i.e., Regulation 29, 32, and 33) operate in distinct fields and are governed by distinct considerations:

               (i)Regulation 29 (Voluntary Retirement) is a voluntary act of the employee, and the five-year weightage is a statutory incentive to encourage voluntary retirement.

               (ii)Regulation 32 (Premature Retirement) is an involuntary act of the Bank, exercised in the public interest or for other reasons specified in the service regulations, under Regulation 19(1) of the Service Regulations, and is not punitive in nature. The Regulation does not provide for any addition of notional weightage to the service.

               (iii)Regulation 33 (Compulsory Retirement) is a penal consequence imposed as a measure of punishment under the Discipline and Appeal Regulations, and the pension is regulated by the penal provision itself.

16. The benefit under Regulation 29(5) being a specific benefit attached to voluntary retirement, such benefit cannot be extended to personnel retiring under Regulation 32 or Regulation 33. The Regulations are separate, and the provisions under one Regulation cannot be automatically imported into another. The legal maxim “Expressiounius est exclusioalterius”(the express mention of one thing excludes all others) applies to the present case. In statutory interpretation, it means that if a law or rule explicitly lists specific items, scenarios, or conditions, it implies a deliberate legislative intent to exclude anything not listed. Therefore, in the present case, the express mention of the five-year weightage in Regulation 29(5), and its absence in Regulations 32 and 33, indicates that the framers of the Regulations intended the benefit of 5-year notional weightage addition to be confined to voluntary retirement and not to any other forms of retirement.

17. It is to be noted that Regulation 2(y) of the Pension Regulations, which defines "Retirement" to include premature retirement, is the definition clause the same is a general provision intended to bring all categories of cessation within the fold of the Pension Regulations for the purpose of eligibility to pension. General provision cannot override the specific provisions of Regulations 29, 32, and 33, which govern the “quantum” and “computation” of pension for each category. A general definition cannot be used to import a specific benefit that the legislature has consciously confined to one category of retirement. The specificprovisionprevails over the general definition.

18. The petitioner's entitlement to pension arises under Regulation 32, which does not provide for additional of 5 years notional weightage. The fact that premature retirement is not punitive does not entitle the petitioner to a benefit that the Regulations have not conferred on him.

19. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Pandey (supra), relied upon by the petitioner, is distinguishable. In that case, the employee had opted for voluntary retirement under a Golden Handshake Scheme, and the question was whether the benefit of additional five years' weightage under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme could be denied to him. The Supreme Court held that discrimination between different classes of voluntary retirees was impermissible. Radhey Shyam Pandey was not a case concerning premature retirement under Regulation 32, nor did it lay down any principle that the five-year weightage under Regulation 29(5) must be extended to all categories of retirees. The judgment of this Court in W.P. No. 9069 of 2011, similarly, dealt with the interpretation of the word "retiree" in the context of a Circular, and does not assist the petitioner in the present case, where the question is one of entitlement under specific Regulations.

20. Further, the petitioner's contention that even compulsory retirees (a penal measure) are also entitled to five years' weightage and so he being a premature retiree (not a penal measure) cannot be put to disadvantage by denying the five-year notional addition, is factually incorrect interpretation. It is to be noted that the Regulation 33 expressly provides for pension at a rate not less than two-thirds and not more than the full pension admissible on the date of compulsory retirement, and contains no provision for weightage. Except the contention that compulsory retirees (as a penal measure) are also provided five-year addition, the petitioner has not placed any material before this Court to substantiate his contention that compulsory retirees are granted such additional notional service weightage.

21. In view of the above, the claim of the petitioner that he is entitled to addition of five years' notional weightage to his qualifying service for pension purposes is misconceived and liable to be rejected. The issue No. 5(ii) is answered accordingly, against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent-Bank.

22. Now, coming to the aspect of the commutation application of the petitioner, it is relevant to note Regulation 41 under Chapter VIII of the Pension Regulations, dealing with Commutation.

REGULATION 41 (CHAPTER VIII): COMMUTATION

               (7) In the case of a pensioner eligible for superannuation pension or pension on voluntary retirement or premature retirement pension, no medical examination shall be necessary, if the application for commutation is made within one year from the date of retirement. However, if such a pensioner applies for commutation of pension after one year from the date of his retirement, the same will be permitted subject to medical examination.

               (9) The commutation of pension shall become absolute in the case of an employee:

               (a) retiring on superannuation or voluntary retirement who submits an application for commutation of pension before the date of retirement, on the date following the date of retirement:

               Provided that the employee governed by subregulation (3) of regulation 29 shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the notice of three months and the commutation of pension shall become absolute only on the expiry of the period of notice referred to in sub-regulation (1) of regulation 29;

               (b) retiring on superannuation or on voluntary retirement or on premature retirement, if he applies for commutation of pension after the date of retirement but before the completion of one year from the date of retirement, on the date the application for commutation is received by the Competent Authority;

               (c) retiring on superannuation or on voluntary retirement or on premature retirement, if he applies for commutation of pension after one year from the date of retirement, on the date of medical certificate given by a medical officer approved by the Bank."

23. From a perusal of Regulation 41(9)(b) and 41(9)(c), it reveals that the date of receipt of the commutation application by the Competent Authority is pivotal for determining whether the medical examination is necessary or not. If the commutation application of the petitioner reaches the Competent Authority within one year of his retirement, then no medical certificate is necessary; otherwise, a medical certificate from the medical officer approved by the Bank is mandatory.

24. In the instant case, it is to be noted that the petitioner retired from service on 05.08.1999, and therefore as per the provisions under Regulation 41, his commutation application should have reached the Competent Authority by 04.08.2000. However, even considering that the Head Office supplied him with the relevant pension papers only in the last week of December 1999, there was ample time for the petitioner to submit his commutation application well in advance to ensure that it reached the Competent Authority by 04.08.2000. However, the petitioner, for reasons not forthcoming in the affidavit, submitted the required papers on 04.08.2000, which is the last day by which the application should have already reached the Competent Authority.

25. Regulation 41(9)(b) specifically states that the commutation application has to reach the Competent Authority within one year from the date of retirement, and if it fails to reach, the retiree has to furnish the medical certificate from the medical officer approved by the Bank.

26. It is to be noted that when a Regulation under the Service Rules expressly stipulates a particular action to be performed within a specific timeframe, then any action that negates or circumvents such Regulation, thereby ultimately defeating the Regulation, cannot be upheld.

27. In the instant case, the action of the petitioner in submitting his commutation application on the very last day i.e., 04.08.2000, that too in a Branch of the Bank, when it was supposed to reach the Competent Authority by 04.08.2000, and further raising a contention that a Branch is an extended arm of the Bank and that he was informed his application has been forwarded on the same day, cannot be countenanced.

28. Moreover, except the contention that the petitioner submitted his commutation application within one year (i.e., in the last minute on 04.08.2000, which is the very last day for expiry of one year), there are no reasons furnished by the petitioner as to what prevented him from filing his commutation application well in advance to ensure it reaches the Competent Authority before expiry of one year, when admittedly he got relevant papers from the Head Office in December 1999 itself.

29. The petitioner had almost seven clear months (even if August being the last month is discounted) to file his commutation application. Even assuming that the Branch office had received and acknowledged the application on 04.08.2000 itself, and even assuming the Branch had taken swift action to forward it to the Competent Authority on the very same day, the time taken for the official procedures for recording inward/outward mail and transmitting/forwarding them to the relevant desk, cannot be ruled out. The petitioner cannot assume and be complacent that the entire Bank machinery and the Competent Authority are solely on the job of receiving and processing his commutation application merely because the petitioner filed it in the Branch office on the last day i.e., 04.08.2000.

30. In the instant case, it is a matter of record that the Competent Authority received the commutation application on 11.08.2000, which is one week after the submission of application by the petitioner in the Branch on 04.08.2000; and the time of one week that occasioned in receipt by the Competent Authority of the Bank, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be categorized as undue delay. As the commutation application reached the Competent Authority after expiry of one year, the Competent Authority has asked the petitioner to submit a medical certificate, which is in tune with Regulation 41(9)(c) of the Regulations.

31. With regard to the commutation benefit, this Court deems it appropriate to refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause v. Union of India (1987 (1) SCC 142), wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:

               "4. As the position now stands, when a pensioner commutes any part of his pension up to the authorised limit, his pension is reduced for the remaining part of his life by deducting the commuted portion from the monthly pension.

               5. The petitioners have contended that the commuted portion out of the pension is ordinarily recovered within about 12 years and, therefore, there is no justification for fixing the period at 15 years. Commutation brings about certain advantages. The commuting pensioner gets a lump-sum amount which ordinarily he would have received in course of a spread over period subject to his continuing to live. Thus, two advantages are certainly forthcoming out of commutation — (1) availability of a lump sum amount, and (2) the risk factor.Again many of the State Governments have already formulated schemes accepting the 15 year rule. In this background, we do not think we would be justified in disturbing the 15-year formula so far as civilian pensioners are concerned.

               6. The age of superannuation used to be 55 until it was raised to 58. It is not necessary to refer to the age of the commuting pensioner when the benefit would be restored. It is sufficient to indicate that on the expiry of fifteen years from the period of retirement such restoration would take place."

32. From the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause(supra), it is relevant to note that "commutation of pension" is a lump-sum monetary benefit availed of by a retiree in advance by forgoing a portion of the monthly pension for a specified period. Normally, onethird (or 40% in some cases, depending on the applicable service rules) of the monthly pension is surrendered for 15 years; in exchange, the retiree receives a lump-sum amount that they would have otherwise received progressively over that 15-year period. Although the retiree receives a reduced monthly pension for 15 years due to commutation, the scheme overall tilts to the benefit of the employee. This is because the employer bears the inherent risk pertaining to the continuity of the retiree's life before the total instalments for the 15-year period are adjusted and the full pension is restored.

33. In the instant case, the Bank undertakes that risk by permitting commutation within one year without a medical certificate, and thereafter only upon obtaining a medical certificate. Therefore, the timeline within which a commutation application must be submitted assumes great significance. The application window cannot be kept open indefinitely for the petitioner, merely because the Regulation does not explicitly specify final deadline for commutation application, except stating that the application submitted after one year should be accompanied by a medical certificate from the Bank-approved medical doctor.

34. Even if the final deadline is not explicitly specified under the pension regulations of the Bank, an employee cannot sleep over his alleged rights, and the question of delay and laches assumes significance in Service jurisprudence. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh ((2008) 8 SCC 648), wherein it was observed as follows:

               4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A “continuing wrong” refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. “Recurring/successive wrongs” are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798] explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963): (AIR p. 807, para 31)

               “31. … It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.”

               6. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India, [(2007) 9 SCC 274 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 395] this Court held: (SCC p. 277, paras 8 & 10)

               10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. … If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.”

               7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury.

35. A perusal of the judgments in Tarsem Singh (supra) and Shiv Dass (supra) reveals that even a “continuous” cause of action does not justify condoning of delay or laches on the part of aggrieved person. Furthermore, in the instant case, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition in 2017, with the grievance relating to his Commutation Application of the year 2000, and stating that he has been making representations before the departmental authorities and the same were refused. Even considering the averments of the petitioner, the latest representation stated to have been submitted before the Executive Director of the Bank, as per the record, is of the year 2003.So, there is inordinate delay of 14 years, and the petitionermust first explain the inordinate delay of 14 years.

36. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court inThe Depot Manager, Karimnagar District v. P. Kantaiah (Writ Appeal No. 736 of 2009, dated 17.02.2022 (Telangana High Court)).In the said case, the petitioner (P. Kantaiah) approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 19710 of 2007. The grievance of the petitioner therein pertained to the punishment of stoppage of an annual increment, which was challenged after a delay of 13 years in filing the writ petition. The learned Single Judge, by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court inKulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab (1991 Supp (1) SCC 504) , granted the relief prayed for vide Order dated 13.04.2007.

               36.1. Challenging the said order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Department (APSRTC) preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 736 of 2009. The Hon’ble Division Bench, by placing reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court inP.V. Narayana v. APSRTC, Hyderabad (2013 SCC Online AP 729), held as follows:

               “The delay of 5 to 18 years was held to be inordinatedelay in preferring awrit petition under Article 226 of theConstitution of India.In the considered opinion of this Court, on the issue ofdelay and laches, as has been considered by the Full Bench,as there was certainly an inordinate delay of13 years inapproaching this Court, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside.”

37. Commutation is a one-time, lump-sum benefit granted upon an employee's retirement. The employer (the Bank herein) recovers this amount in monthly installments spread over a 15-year period. In the unfortunate event of the retiree's death during this 15-year window, the Bank stops the recovery forthwith. Therefore, recovery is contingent upon the retiree surviving the 15-year term.Consequently, given the risk borne by the employer and the one-time, lump-sum benefit enjoyed by the employee, the sanctity of the one-year window from the date of retirement stipulated under the applicable rules must be respected; and in case of delayed receipt of application, the retiree has to comply with the additional regulatory requirements as directed by the Competent Authority of the Department.

38. In light of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Common Cause (supra), and keeping in view the timeline specified under Regulation No. 41, and also the inordinate delay of 14 years in filing the present writ petition, and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in P. Kantaiah (supra) holding that 5 years and above constitutes an inordinate delay, this Court is of the considered opinion that the grievance regarding commutation ishopelessly time-barred and liable to be rejected on the grounds of laches. Likewise, the grievance with regard to alleged arrears of gratuity and pension based on revised payscales of 1998, also suffers from inordinate delay of 14 years, and therefore considering the law laid down in Shiv Dass (supra), and also the judgment of this Court in W.A. No. 736 of 2009, dated 17.02.2022, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in that regard as well.Accordingly, IssuesNos. 5(iii) and 5(iv)are answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent-Bank.

39. In view of the findings on Issues 5(i), 5(ii), 5(iii), and 5(iv) the petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this writ petition.

Accordingly, the issue No. 5(v) is answeredagainst the petitioner and in favour of the respondent-Bank.

VI. CONCLUSION

40. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.