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CDJ 2026 MHC 7332 print Preview print Next print
Court : Before the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Case No : WA. (MD) No. 1594 of 2026 & CMP. (MD) Nos. 13538 & 13539 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.V. KARTHIKEYAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. SAKTHIVEL
Parties : P. Periya Karuppan Versus The Tahsildar/Tenancy Record Officer, Madurai & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: S. Meenakshi Sundaram, Senior Counsel for H. Thayumanaswamy, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1, S.I. Muthiah, Additional Government Pleader, R2, P.M. Subramaniyan, for M/s. Kanimozhi Mathi, Advocates.
Date of Judgment : 29-09-2026
Head Note :-
Letters Patent - Clause 15 -
Summary :-
1. Statutes / Acts / Rules Mentioned:
- Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955
- Clause 15 of Letters Patent

2. Catch Words:
- injunction
- cultivating tenant
- possession
- costs
- eviction
- consent

3. Summary:
The writ appeal challenges a Single Judge’s order directing the petitioner to surrender possession of land to the second respondent and pay costs. The petitioner had earlier obtained an injunction in a civil suit, which the Court held was improperly based on possession rather than a claim as a cultivating tenant, rendering the civil court’s jurisdiction barred by Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The petitioner also sought recognition as a cultivating tenant before the Tahsildar, but the Court found that he failed to present evidence or objections during the proceedings, indicating a deliberate attempt to delay. The Tahsildar’s record of consent was disputed, but the Court held that the petitioner had ample opportunity to contest it. The Court observed that the petitioner had remained in possession without paying rent or lease and had constructed a house, undermining his claim of agricultural use. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petitioner's arguments and upheld the lower court’s order.

4. Conclusion:
Appeal Dismissed
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, against the order dated 09.07.2026 passed in W.P.(MD)No.15672 / 2018 on the file of this Honourable Court.)

C.V. Karthikeyan, J.

1. The writ appeal has been filed questioning the order of the learned Single Judge dated 09.07.2026 in W.P.(MD)No.15672 of 2018, by which order, the writ petition was dismissed and a direction was given that the writ petitioner should hand over possession of the property under his possession to the 2nd respondent within a period of three months and also to pay Rs.10,000/- as costs.

2. The writ appellant has been represented by learned Senior Counsel Mr.S.Meenakshi Sundaram and the 2nd respondent who is on caveat, is represented by learned Senior Counsel Mr.P.M.Subramaniyan. We have heard them and also Mr.S.I.Muthiah, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent. The appeal came up for admission on 24.09.2026 and we had listed the matter again today. By consent, the main appeal itself is taken up for consideration.

3. The appellant/writ petitioner has taken two separate stands in his locus to claim. Possession of lands admittedly belonging to the 2nd respondent.

4. The appellant had filed O.S.No.7 of 1999 before the District Munsif Court at Melur seeking injunction to protect his possession. It is trite in law to point out that if the appellant claims right as a cultivating tenant, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is specifically barred under Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. It is, therefore, very evident that the appellant had not claimed that of possession as a cultivating tenant when he instituted the suit before the Civil Court. On the basis that he was in possession, injunction had been granted and that was also affirmed by the first appellate court. The matter is now pending before this Court in the second appeal. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant pointed out this fact and stated that there has been no suspension of the order of injunction.

5. However, taking an entirely contrary view and seeking rights as a cultivating tenant and seeking a direction to record his name as a cultivating tenant in the records, the appellant herein had approached the 1st respondent/Tahsildar/Tenancy Record Officer, Madurai North Taluk, Madurai, in the year 2013. The matter had been pending before the said official from the year 2013 to the year 2016. After prolonged hearing, the following endorsement had been made by the Tahsildar. This had been noted by the learned Single Judge who had the benefit of examining the original records. The said noting is as follows:

                   “On 26.05.2016, today the petitioner Periyakaruppan, the respondent Vasudevan and the respondent’s advocate Mr. Kumaran – all three appeared in person and signed expressing their consent for the issuance of the order in this case. Based on the fact that both the petitioner and the respondent expressed their consent and signed in the presence, I order to prepare the final order.”

It had been further recorded as follows:

                   “Since the order has been issued, no further action is required. The file may be closed as Ni.Mu. (Permanent Disposal) – Ni.Mu.3804/2013/E3 – T.R.04/2013/E3. Signature of Tahsildar. 23.06.2016”

6. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant stated that there was no such consent given by the appellant herein and that the appellant was not granted any opportunity of tendering evidence by the 1st respondent.

7. However, the matter had been pending before the Tahsildar for nearly three years. It is not the case of the appellant that the appellant wanted to graze the witness box, but was prevented from grazing the witness box and from tendering the evidence. The appellant should have taken up this opportunity during the hearing dates before the Tahsildar and should have adduced oral and documentary evidence. Having failed to take up that opportunity, it does not bode well to turn around and complain that opportunity was not granted after the conclusion of the proceedings. Opportunity would only be in granting hearing dates and by providing necessary avenues for the party who approaches the official to tender oral and documentary evidence. If evidence is not tendered, then the 1st respondent/Tahsildar cannot be blamed for not granting opportunity. We hold that this plea had been taken more to drag on the matter than otherwise.

8. The learned Single Judge who had the benefit of examining the records had also noted that at the fag end of the proceedings in the year 2016, the appellant filed an impleading petition to implead the sisters of the 2nd respondent and had observed that this was done only to drag on the proceedings.

9. All these facts are evidence that there had been a concerted approach by the appellant not to conclude the proceedings before the Tahsildar and to simultaneously lay a claim on the basis of the order of injunction granted by the Civil Court. This order of injunction does not survive to the scrutiny of this Court particularly since it had been obtained only on the basis of possession, and not under the claim of cultivating talent. To repeat, if it had been obtained on the basis of possession as a cultivating tenant, the Civil Court could never have acquired jurisdiction.

10. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that specific consent had not been given and that written arguments had not been filed as stated by the 1st respondent/Tahsildar. Again, we would only state that filing of the written arguments is an opportunity to be taken up during the course of hearing. If consciously the arguments are not advanced or evidence is not tendered or written arguments are not filed before the authority, thereafter, it cannot be complained about the alleged non grant of opportunity. This only exposes the concerted effort to drag the proceedings. The learned Single Judge was not impressed with the said representation.

11. Quite interestingly, it was also noted by the learned Single Judge that independent of the travails of the 2nd respondent, another individual, a cousin of the 2nd respondent one Neethirajan had also suffered at the hands of the appellant against whom also, a civil suit was filed and finally that suit ended in a compromise. While claiming to be a cultivating tenant, the appellant appears to have constructed a palatial house in that particular place. We are unable to fathom as to how agriculture could be done in the middle of a house. It is just not possible.

12. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant repeatedly stated that opportunity should be granted and also sought that the matter should be remitted back to the appellate authority/Revenue Divisional Officer and complained that the learned Single Judge had taken up the role of the appellate authority and had directed eviction, we are not impressed with that line of argument, particularly because the appellant herein was never prevented from approaching the Revenue Divisional Officer in the first instance. He had chosen the Writ Court as the forum to express his grievances and seeking redress. The Writ Court had examined the records and has negatived his claims. The appellant has been in possession at least from the year 2013 to the year 2026, without paying any rent, without paying any lease amount and without being affirmed as a cultivating tenant. We are not inclined to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge.

13. The Writ Appeal stands dismissed. Though we are not imposing costs, we confirm the costs imposed by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

 
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