(Prayer: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge at Chingleput in A.S.No.33 of 1991 dated 10.11.1993 on appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Chingleput in O.S.No.761 of 1987 dated 29.11.1990.

Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge at Chingleput in A.S.No.34 of 1991 dated 10.11.1993 on appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Chingleput in O.S.No.760 of 1987 dated 29.11.1990.

Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge at Chingleput in A.S.No.35 of 1991 dated 10.11.1993 on appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Chingleput in O.S.No.759 of 1987 dated 29.11.1990. WP No. 14246 of 2014

Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issue of Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the impugned order passed by the first respondent dated 18.03.2014 in R.P.No.89 of 2013 confirming the order of the second respondent in Pro.Rc.No.2683/2012/C1 dated 19.04.2013 and quash the same.)

Common Judgment

1. These three second appeals and writ petition have been clubbed together and listed before this court for final disposal, pursuant to the order passed by My Lord Hon’ble The Chief Justice on 01.09.2025.

2. The Writ Petition challenges the order passed by the Commissioner, HR & CE Department, Chennai. The said authority passed the impugned order on the basis of the judgment delivered in these appeals on 29.01.2007. The decision in the Second Appeals would form the basis for the decision in the Writ Petition. Hence, the second appeals are taken up for disposal first.

3. S.A.Nos. 543, 544 & 545 of 1994 arise out of the common judgment and decree passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge at Chengalpet in A.S.Nos.35, 34 & 33 of 1991 dated 10.11.1993 confirming the common judgment and decree of the court of District Munsif, Chengalpet in O.S.Nos.761, 760 & 759 of 1987 dated 29.11.1990, whereby dismissing the suit filed by the appellant for declaration of title and for delivery of possession.

4. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their ranks in the suit.

Brief facts of O.S.No.759 of 1987

5. The plaintiff presented O.S.No.759 of 1987 seeking relief of declaration of title, delivery of possession, future damages and for costs. The plaintiff is a temple. The plaintiff claimed that the suit schedule mentioned property belongs to it. The temple had been benefited with a patta in Patta No.1. It had been paying revenue demands for the properties. The suit property and other properties had been leased out by the temple to several lessees. The lessees, in addition to the payment of lease amounts to the temple, were also bound to perform certain charities during festival days. These



washing of the temple.

6. The plaintiff alleged that it was made aware that the defendant had acquired leasehold rights from several lessees. It pleaded that the lessees do not have the right to convey such rights in favour of the third parties. The defendant, being one such lessee, had defaulted in the payment of lease amounting to 50 marakkal per acre. Instead of paying the lease amount and rendering service, the defendant started claiming a right over the property. The plaintiff issued a notice on 03.03.1986 to the defendant, calling upon her to quit and deliver vacant possession. The defendant issued a reply setting forth false contentions. Hence, the suit.

7. Summons were served on the defendant. The defendant filed a written statement.

8. The defendant pleaded that, though four items are shown in the schedule, she is interested only in item Nos.1 and 2. She added that the description of property is not proper. She pleaded that item Nos.1 and 2 were in possession of one, Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal. He married one Sornammal. The couple did not have any issues. In due course, Sornammal passed away. Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal appointed one Seshadri Gurukkal for his assistance. Seshadri Gurukkal, at that time, was a lad aged about 11 years. Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal brought up Seshadri Gurukkal and got married him to the defendant, Padmavathy Ammal.

9. On 12.12.1973, Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal, while in a sound and disposing state of mind, had executed a “WILL” and registered the same. On the death of Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal, the defendant took possession of the property and had been in enjoyment of the same. She pleaded that she had conveyed suit item No.1 in favour of one Munusamy Naidu and as Munusamy Naidu had not been impleaded as a party to the suit, the suit is not maintainable.

10. Insofar as item No.1 is concerned, she urged that, as she, her predecessors and Munusamy Naidu are in possession and enjoyment of the property for several years, they have crystallised title to the property by adverse possession.

11. She urged that the plaintiff never received any lease amount for years together and that, as she is the absolute owner, she is paying kist for the same regularly. Kist was paid by her predecessors also. She denied the aspect of lease pleaded by the plaintiff and also the aspect of performance of services. She finally pleaded that, as the defendant had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession for more than the prescribed period, the suit is barred by limitation and there is no necessity for the defendant to hand over the suit properties to the plaintiff.

12. During the course of suit proceedings, the defendant filed an additional written statement. In this statement, the defendant pleaded that Tiruporur village is an “estate” village and the lands are ryotwari lands. She urged that Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal was in possession and enjoyment of the lands as a ryoti. She conceded that the plaintiff was the original owner of the property. It had given an enjoyment patta in recognition of Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal’s right and kist was being received from him. She pleaded that after the enactment of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act 26 of 1948’) by the then State of Madras, the plaintiff had lost whatever right, title and interest it had over the suit property.

13. The defendant urged that in and about 1960 – 1961, a notification was issued by the Government, taking over the estates in the State of Tamil Nadu. On and from the date of notification, the plaintiff did not have any right over the property. It did not collect any kist from persons in possession. As Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal was a ryoti, his legal heirs succeeded to the estate. She further pleaded that during the settlement proceedings under the Ryotwari Act, it would have been possible for the plaintiff to have obtained a patta, but for the mere reason that patta had been obtained, the plaintiff would not get any right, title or interest over the suit property. The defendant further urged that, since patta was issued to the plaintiff, the revenue officials did not receive any payment made by the persons in possession. As the defendant had enjoyment rights even before the proceedings under the Act 26 of 1948, the suit is absolutely frivolous.

14. The plaintiff filed a reply statement to the same. It denied that the Tiruporur village was acquired under Act 26 of 1948. It submitted that the said village had always been a ryotwari village but denied that the suit property was a ryoti land within the meaning of Madras Estates Land Act of 1908. It urged that the suit property was never acquired by the Government at any given point of time, nor had any patta been granted under any of the relevant Acts. The plaintiff further pleaded that the suit property had been given to the defendant only for the purpose of cultivation and that too, for consideration of the services to be rendered to the temple. The possession was given only by way of an authorisation letter and the authorised letter can never be considered as a patta.

15. On these pleadings, the following issues were framed by the trial court:

                     “1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as prayed in the plaint?

                     2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit property?

                     3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation for future damages?

                     4.To what other relief?”

Brief facts of O.S.No.760 of 1987

16. The plaint in O.S.No.760 of 1987 is similar to the plaint in O.S.No.759 of 1987. The defendant in this suit is one, Ramachandra Gramani. Ramachandra Gramani was served with summons. He filed a written statement.

17. The defendant urged that items 2 to 6 of ‘B’ schedule property was allotted to his father, one Manicka Gramani, by way of a registered partition deed dated 14.12.1935. Insofar as item No.1 is concerned, he pleaded that it was a self-acquisition of Manicka Gramani. Manicka Gramani and Ramachandran Gramani were in possession and enjoyment of the suit item Nos.1 to 6 and enjoying it as their joint family properties. After the death of Manicka Gramani, the defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the same. He too, urged that the defendant had perfected title by adverse possession. He pleaded that he is not interested with respect to item No.7 of the suit property.

18. It was pleaded that the defendant had sold item No.1 of the suit property to one Ramesh and item No.2 to one Ganesan. He urged that both properties were sold even before the presentation of the suit. As both of them had not been impleaded, the suit is not maintainable. He pleaded that as himself and his ancestors had been in possession and enjoyment of the property for more than 50 years, they had perfected their title by adverse possession. He denied the averment that the plaintiff was collecting lease amounts or any donation from him or his predecessors. The relationship of lessor and lessee was denied. On these pleadings, the defendant sought dismissal of the suit.

19. A similar additional written statement, as presented by Tmt.Padmavathy Ammal, claiming application of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 was urged by this defendant also.

20. On these pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:

                     “1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as prayed in the plaint?

                     2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit property?

                     3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation for future damages?

                     4.To what other relief?”

Brief facts of O.S.No.761 of 1987

21. The plaint in O.S.No.761 of 1987 is a replication of those in O.S.No.759 of 1987 and O.S.No.760 of 1987. The defendant in this case is one Kothandaraman. The plea of Kothandaraman is that he and before him, his father, grandfather and brother, were the ryotis of the suit properties. The plaintiff Temple had granted “Rokka Patta” in recognition of their rights. The defendant had sold item No.3 of the suit property to one Jagdambal, who is in possession and enjoyment of the same. The defendant’s grandfather, one Raghava Pillai, had mortgaged some of the lands mentioned in item Nos.1, 4 and 5 in favour of one Subramania Naicker.

22. The defendant’s grandfather, Raghava Pillai had purchased item Nos.4 and 6 from one Kandasamy Mudaliar through a registered sale deed dated 18.07.1898. He had purchased item Nos.2 and 4 from Kuppusamy Mudaliar by way of registered sale deeds on 31.10.1914 and 01.11.1924 respectively. Accepting the sale, the Temple had also granted “Rokka Patta” to Raghava Pillai. As the defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the property for over 75 years, the suit is barred by limitation. It was urged that the defendant was never a lessee of the property and that there was no necessity for him to render any service to the temple. It was claimed that the plaintiff had no right over the suit property on account of Act 26 of 1948. A similar additional written statement claiming that the right of the Temple stood extinguished by the virtue of Act 26 of 1948 was also presented.

23. On the basis of these pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:

                     “1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as prayed in the plaint?

                     2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of the suit property?

                     3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation for future damages?

                     4.To what other relief?”

Proceedings before the trial court

24. As the claims in all three suits and the defenses taken by the defendants were more or less identical, with the consent of the parties, the suits were clubbed together. Evidences in all suits were recorded in common.

25. On the side of the plaintiff, one Adimoolam entered the witness box as PW1. Ex.A1 to A21 were marked through him. On the side of the defendants, the defendant in O.S.No.759 of 1987 entered the witness box as DW1; one Shanmuga Chettiar was examined as DW2; the defendant in O.S.No.760 of 1987 was examined as DW3; and the defendant in O.S.No.761 of 1987 was examined as DW4. On the side of the defendants, Ex.B1 to Ex.B50 were marked.

26. During the pendency of the suits, the defendant in O.S.No.760 of 1987 died, and his legal heirs were impleaded as defendants 2 & 3.

27. The learned Trial Judge, by a common judgment dated 29.11.1990, came to the following conclusions:

                     (i) “Rokka Patta” had been issued by the temple in favour of the defendants and their predecessors;

                     (ii) The defendants have been in possession of the property for decades;

                     (iii) The plaintiff had not proved that the suit property belongs to it;

                     (iv) Patta No.1 said to have been issued to the plaintiff had not been filed by it;

                     (v) The plaintiff have not impleaded the parties in possession; and

                     (vi) By virtue of Section 3 of the Act 26 of 1948, the property has become Government property.

Consequently, he dismissed the suit.

Proceedings before the first appellate court

28. The plaintiff carried the decrees in appeal to the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge at Chengalpet. This was, by way of three appeals, in A.S.No.35 of 1991, A.S.No.34 of 1991 and A.S.No.33 of 1991.

29. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the following conclusions:

                     (i) Patta No.1 had not been filed before the court;

                     (ii) Except the oral evidence of PW1, there is no proof that the defendants had ever paid kist amount;

                     (iii) The plaintiff did not implead the lessees as parties to the suit;

                     (iv) The defendants are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property for long years prior to the suit; and

                     (v) Act 26 of 1948 applied to Tiruporur Village. Consequently, dismissed the appeals on 10.11.1993.

                     Substantial questions of law

30. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees, the present second appeals were filed before this Court. These Second Appeals were admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

                     “1.Whether the finding that Tiruporur is an estate taken over under Act 26/48, is based on no evidence?

                     2. Whether patta holding under Ekabogam mirasdars can claim title to the lands?

                     3. Whether the defendants can claim title by prescription?”

31. During the pendency of these appeals, the defendant in O.S.No.759 of 1987 died and her legal heirs were impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 in S.A.No.545 of 1994.

Judgment of the High Court and the proceeding before the Supreme Court

32. Earlier in 2007, these appeals were heard by this Court. They were allowed by a common judgment and decree dated 29.01.2007.

33. A learned Single Judge held:

                     (i) The plaintiff is the Ekabhogam Mirasidar

                     (ii) The defendants failed to prove taking over of the Tiruporur Village under Act 26 of 1948.

                     (iii) The defendants have not proved adverse possession.

34. The defendants preferred three appeals to the Supreme Court. Leave was granted in all the appeals. In and by way of a judgment dated 10.03.2015, the appeals were allowed and the second appeals were restored onto this Court for a fresh decision.

35. It is pertinent to point out that in paragraph No.10 of the order of remand, the Supreme Court concluded that the existence of patta No.1 had been proved but called upon this court to decide on the nature of rights prescribed under the patta. It further directed that this court would have to see whether the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 and the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 are applicable to this case. Thus, these appeals are before this Court again.

36. I heard Mr.P.Wilson Topaz for M/s.A.S.Kailasam Associates for the appellant, Ms.Chitra Sampath for Mr.V.Nicholas, and Mr.S.Udhayakumar for the respondents in the Second Appeals. Mr.S.Sivashanmugam for Mr.Kempraj for the Writ Petitioner and Mr.S.Ravichandran, learned Additional Government Pleader for HR & CE Department for the respondents 1 to 3. Mr.B. Tamilnidhi learned Additional Government Pleader assisted this Court.

Submissions of the plaintiff

37. After narrating the facts, Mr.P.Wilson Topaz invited my attention to the “Rokka Patta” that had been relied upon by the courts below and pointed out that the same had not been properly appreciated. He urges that the trial court had not considered the



found in the document. He argued that the courts below, by ignoring these words, committed a crucial error, as they indicate that the temple is an “Ekabhogam mirasidar”. He pointed out from Ex.B4, Ex.B23 and Ex.B24 the right of the Temple as a mirasidar and the corresponding liability on the defendants to pay the amounts and render service to the temple stands established.

38. Mr.Wilson further states that “Rokka Patta” was not produced by the plaintiff but had been marked in the cross examination of the defendants. Failure to file Patta No.1, which has been adversely commented upon by the courts below, is irrelevant as the sale deed of Raghava Pillai under Ex.B43 to Ex.B47 indicates that the Temple had been issued with Patta No.1. He further argues that under Ex.B37, the “WILL” of Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal, it specifically speaks about the mirasi rights. He emphasised that the word “mirasidar” implies that both warams (i.e.), melwaram and kudivaram vest in the mirasidar.

39. Mr.Wilson points out that, having taken a plea of adverse possession, the defendants have admitted to the title of the plaintiff. Consequently, the plea that the tenancy is permanent cannot be entertained, as the burden to prove lies upon the defendants, and they had failed to discharge the same. He points out that the rent receipts and Rokka Patta had been issued much after the enactment of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948. To this effect, he points out Ex.B4, Ex.B21, Ex.B22, Ex.B34, Ex.B36 and Ex.B23. According to him, when rents were continued to be paid even after the enactment of Act 26 of 1948, the claim of the defendants that this Act is applicable is specious. He points out that at no point of time, a notification, taking over the lands, at Tiruporur, from the plaintiff Temple, had ever been issued by the Government under Act 26 of 1948. Referring to the District Memoir to the Chengalpet District, he states that this document points out that Tiruporur village is a “mirasi” belonging to the plaintiff Temple as Ekabhogam Mirasidar.

40. Mr.Wilson states that the plea of adverse possession should also fail as no hostility has been shown to exist between the owner and the tenants. As a corollary, he urges that, having pleaded adverse possession, the defendants cannot simultaneously plead that they are entitled to protection under Act 26 of 1948. He states that the plea of title and adverse possession are mutually destructive. In any event, he argues, by virtue of Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&CE) Act, 1959, the plea of adverse possession is not available to the defendants. Finally, he argues that the Temple has got title by virtue of the doctrine of lost grant and in any event, the existence of Patta No.1 stands proved by the very documents relied upon by the defendants.

Submissions of the defendants

41. Per contra, Ms.Chitra Sampath and Mr.Udhayakumar urged that the suits ought to fail for the lack of pleadings. They point out that the defendants were only paying “tunduvaram”. They state that Ex.A1 is a truncated document and no reliance can be placed upon the same. In addition, they argue that the parties had presumed as if the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 applies to them and consequently, the conduct of the party should be relied upon in such a case. They urge that there is a presumption in favour of the tenant and that, by virtue of the re-survey conducted in 1911, it should be presumed that Tiruporur village is an “estate” within the meaning of Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Additionally, the non-payment of rent to the Government is another indication that Tiruporur village is an “estate” within the meaning of Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. In fine, they urge that the temple has lost its right by virtue of Tiruporur Village having been taken over under Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948.

42. Apart from the above plea, Mr.Udhayakumar urges that the documents of sale executed by the defendants and their predecessors, in favour of third parties have not been challenged. This shows that the Temple had acquiesced in the right of those in possession. He states that the defendants have possessory title, which shows their pre-existing right to the property and that both the courts below had correctly come to the conclusion that by virtue of long possession, the suits ought to be dismissed. He points out that no earlier document had been produced by the Temple to assert their pre-existing title.

43. Mr.Wilson Topaz, in response, states that Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 saves the plaintiff and that no evidence has been filed to show that the Government had taken any action with respect to Tiruporur village, after the notification.

44. I have carefully perused the submissions of both sides. I have gone through the records.

Glossary of the terms used in the documents

45. Certain words used in the documents, filed as exhibits, require reference to a glossary. This is so because these terms would have been easily understood a century ago. This is not so anymore. I refer to a classic “A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms and of Useful Words Occurring in Official Documents relating to the Administrations of the Government of British India, from the Arabic, Persian, Hindustani, Sanskrit, Hindi, Bengali, Uriya, Marathi, Guzarathi, Telugu, Karnata, Tamil, Malayalam and Other Languages” 1885 edition, authored by Mr.H.H.Wilson, M.A. F.R.S. The definition and corresponding meaning of certain words are extracted hereunder

                     45(i). Mirasidar – (kpuhrpjhud;) The holder of hereditary lands, or offices in a village. In the Northern Sarkars, especially, a hereditary village officer or servant: In Sylhet, the holder of an estate, usually of very small extent, assessed in perpetuity; a petty landholder or cultivator.

                    Bhogam, fruition) The possession or tenure of village land by one person or family without any co-sharer. The appellation is continued in some instances where other parties have been admitted to hold portions under the original tenure as long as that remains unaltered.



right: the term, is used, especially in the south of India, to signify lands held by absolute hereditary proprietorship under one of three contingencies:

                     (i) Either as a joint coparcenary tenure in the lands of a village, and either cultivated in common, or allotted annually, or at some other stated period, among the proprietors;

                     (ii) As one of several parcels or lots in which the lands of the village are divided; or,

                     (iii) As a whole estate where all the lands of the village are the property of one proprietor.

In some parts of the erstwhile Madras provinces, especially north and south Arcot and Chinglepat, known in the native records as Tondamandalam, the term is also applied to certain hereditary privileges enjoyed by the holders of Miras lands, consisting sometimes of a right to hold portions of their estates exempt from assessment, and, in almost all, the privilege of receiving portions of the general produce, or fiscal compensation from the other members of the community. It also applies to the fees and perquisites receivable by the officers and servants of the community, who are not possessed of any share of the Miras Land, and to hereditary succession to various offices, privileges, and emoluments, as to the post of musician to a temple or the like – Ellis or Mirasi right. In Sylhet it applies to Talukas settled perpetually. Hereditary, any thing relating to Miras, also the same as Miras, (and the most usual form in the south) or hereditary lands or offices, also one holding land or office in a village by hereditary descent. In the Konkan it is applied especially to the resident Mhar, or sweeper, holding his office by succession, and entitled to a share of the crop.

                     45(iv).Swatantaram – Own will or purpose : In Tamil, in which it is in most common use with a modified acceptation, it is pronounced in the same manner, but is variously written as Sutantaram, or Sutandaran, erroneously, Swatantaram,

,

Swatantryam own or independent property, hereditary right, either to real or personal property, or to privileges, perquisites, or fees: also any fee or perquisite claimable by a proprietor from a hereditary or other cultivator of proprietary lands, either in his own right or in that of a coparcenary body of proprietors.”

                     45(v).Tunduvaram – corruptly, Tondoowarum, Tamil



temporary cultivators.

                     45(vi).Thundukuppatham – This Tamil word consists of two

.

Historical background: Revenue administration in Chingleput District

46. A historical analysis of the land holdings of Chengalpattu District is essential in order to arrive at a conclusion whether Tiruporur is an “estate” within the meaning of the Madras Estate Land Act.

47. Tiruporur village is situated in the Chengalpattu District. The revenue classification and the nature of tenure in this village have been the subject of several reports during the British period. In order to understand the system, this Court is referring to several colonial era materials. They are:

                     i. The Fifth Report of the Select Committee on the affairs of the East India Company of the year 1812;

                     ii. Mr. Lionel Place’s report on the Mirasi system and land revenue administration in Chingleput, written between 1795 and 1799;

                     iii. A Manual of the Madras Government Chingleput District, Government of Madras, 1879 by Charles Stewart Crole (hereinafter referred to as Crole’s manual).

The Fifth Report of Select Committee: Wars, Devastation and the Jaghire of Chingleput

48. As per the Fifth Report of the Select Committee, “Chingleput”. now known as Chengalpattu, was known as Jaghire. It was obtained in the year 1760-1763 from the British East India Company by the Nawab of Arcot. It was in return for the services rendered by the latter to the former. Soon thereafter, this Jaghire was invaded by the troops of Hyder Ali of Mysore, on two occasions, one in 1768 and another in 1780. Hyder Ali died of cancer in December, 1782. His son Tipu Sultan continued the war. Both the parties signed a treaty called the “Treaty of Mangalore” in 1784. As per this treaty, both parties agreed to return all conquered lands, reverting the boundaries to status quo ante bellum – the state before the war. Tipu Sultan agreed not to claim or attack territories belonging to the British East India Company and its allies in the Carnatic region. To complete the narration, the Treaty of Mangalore broke down after the 3rd Anglo-Mysore War.

49. The Fifth Report of the Select Committee points out that when a survey of the Jaghire (Chingleput) was made in 1784, hardly any signs were left in many parts of that country of it having been inhabited by human beings, than the bodies that had been massacred, or the naked walls of the houses, choultries and temples, which had been burnt. On account of the war, its sister, famine soon followed. Both these effectively depopulated the district. It was in those circumstances that the Privy Council commented in T.P. Srinivasa Chariar v. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 20 that “it is too much to expect that anything definite can be obtained prior to the devastation of the district by Hyder Ali.”

Colonel Place and the making of the Mirasi System

50. Walter Hamilton, in his work “A Geographical, Statistical, and Historical Description of Hindostan, and the Adjacent Counties” records that in the 17th century, the Carnatic areas, namely Nellore in the north, Chittoor in the south, the principality of Arcot, Fort St. George, Jaghire of Chingleput, Tanjore principality, and the smaller principalities of Ramnad, Tinnevelly, and Madura fell under the Mughal Suba of Haidarabad. The Mughal Suba, in turn, fell under the jurisdiction of the Subadar of the Deccan. On the death of the Aurangzeb in 1707, fragmentation of the territories commenced. Two claimants, Saadat Ali Khan (1651– 1732) and Anwaruddin Khan (c. 1674–1749) tied their interest to the Colonial French and the English.

51. During the Carnatic wars between 1746-1763, Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan Wallajah (1717–1795) supported the British against Anwaruddin Khan, who was in the French camp.

52. The British East India Company won a decisive victory in the battle of Wandiwash in 1760 and that of Pondicherry in 1761. This led to the Treaty of Paris in 1763. This Treaty established the claims of the British and recognized Muhammad Ali of the Wallajah dynasty and descendant of Anwaruddin Khan as the Nawab of the Carnatic. Unfortunately, for the Nawab, the support of the British did not come free of cost. They raised a bill running into several millions of pagodas. In order to clear the debts, the Nawab signed a Sanad, officially ceding the Chingleput region as a Jaghire, meaning, a permanent revenue yielding grant of a land to the British.

53. The British did not have an administrative set-up to collect taxes from the hundreds of villages in the region. Hence, they leased the Jaghire back to the Nawab on payment of annual charges. The Nawab collected taxes, retained a certain percentage of this fee for himself and paid a fixed rental amount to the British. This was the period when the Nawab fell into a debt trap, popularly known as the “Carnatic Debts”. In order to maintain his lavish lifestyle and pay the East India Company its lease dues, the Nawab borrowed from the British merchants and the East India Company officials at rates exceeding 30% interest. It even attracted the attention of the British Parliament, leading to the famous speech of Edmund Burke on the motion made for papers relative to the directions for charging the Nabob of Arcot's private debts to Europeans, on the revenues of the Carnatic. [Refer, “The Works of Right Hon’ble Edmund Burke, Vol IV, Pg- 183”].

54. By 1780, the Nawab was rendered bankrupt, resulting in the mismanagement of lands. The East India Company cancelled the lease granted to him and took over direct management of the Chingleput district. While the Jaghire granted the British the control over revenue, the sovereignty, established under the Treaty of Paris, continued to remain with the Nawab. As to how the British took it over is another story.

55. It is alleged that the British established correspondences between Muhammad Ali Khan Wallajah and Umdat ul-Umara with Tipu Sultan. These letters disclosed that while the Nawab and his family were overtly in support of the British, they were covertly sympathising with Tipu. Using these letters, the British approached Nawab Husain Ali Khan, the son of Umdat ul-Umara to sign a treaty and hand over the Carnatic territory. Husain Ali Khan refused. Hence, the British installed his cousin, Azim-ud- Daula on the Carnatic throne. In exchange for this installation, the British took over the Arcot state integrating the districts of North Arcot, South Arcot, Trichy, Madurai and Tirunelveli into the British-Madras Presidency. The British government took over the whole possession of Nawab, gave a small portion reserved for the needs of himself and his family.

56. Though the East India Company assumed the Chingleput Jaghire from the Nawab and appointed several district collectors, they were not able to make much of a progress in revenue administration. In the late 1790s, the district came under the administrative control of Colonel Lionel Place. He was the District Collector between 1794-1799. After a detailed study of the revenue system, he was directed to introduce a streamlined revenue system. He is credited for having established the post of sheristadar and clerks to formalise the local administrative hierarchy. He reduced the role of dubashes – interpreters. He also integrated nattars, the traditional village leaders, into the revenue system. With respect to the revenue administration, he formalised the mirasi system. This recognised the hereditary use of land by local farmers.

57. Colonel Place submitted his Final Report to the East India Company on 06.06.1799. He had the following to state on the mirasi system:

                     “He had become convinced that the mirasdars had an undoubted hereditary property in the soil; that he derived this right originally from the Sovereign to whom he acknowledged obedience, and the rendering of a stated proportion of the produce, as the tenure by which held it; that he sold, mortgaged, gave away, and left his lands to his posterity.”

58. The Privy Council in T.P. Srinivasa Chariar’s case (cited supra) notes the following from Mr. Place’s Final Report:-

                     “702. The following definition, therefore, of meerassee, or property in land, seems to deducible from the discussions that have passed on it.

                     703. That it is a right to the use and substance of the soil, vested in the present proprietor, his heirs and successors, so long as he does or can cultivate it, and pays the dues of Government and is obedient to its authority; and that when he does not, or cannot, cultivate his lands, when he withholds the dues of Government, or is disobedient to its authority, such part as he neglects, or in the latter case the whole, escheats to Government, who may confer it on whom it pleases.”

These two extracts show the extent of the right of the Mirasidar and the jurisdiction of the Government.

Crole’s Manual: the fees and payments under the Mirasi System

59. We will now turn to the Crole’s Manual to understand about the Mirasi system and the manner of holding of the Tiruporur village itself. Charles Stewart Crole was the Sub- Collector in Chingleput. He published “The Chingleput, Late Madras, District: A Manual Compiled Under the Orders of the Madras Government” in 1879.

60. The Crole’s Manual records that the mirasidars collected kappatam-money payment from the actual tillers. When the contract is for a waram or payment in kind, the tiller having met all the cultivation expenses and supplies for the farm stock, the mirasidars paid the Government kist. It was only when the mirasdars paid the cultivation expenses, the under-tenants or the payakaris got a share of the produce and the straw (வைகோல்) went to the mirasidars. In both cases, swatantaram was due to the village artisans. Crole’s Manual also extracts in detail the report of Colonel Place with respect to the various fees collected in the revenue settlement. The four kinds of fees then prevailing were as follows:

                     i. Grama or Kaniyadsi Maniyam, rent-free land belonging to the mirasdars body;

                     ii. Swatantarams derived from the Sanskrit word ‘Swa’- own and ‘Tantram’ -will. This was a fees receivable by the mirasdars in the straw before thrashing;

                     iii. Kappatams and Mercis taken in grain after the crop is threshed;

                     iv. Tunduvaram, a fixed percentage of the Kudivaram paid under agreement or custom by payakaris to the mirasdars.

61. This Court noted the introduction of the mirasi system in Chingleput District in Chinnanand v. Konadama Naidu, (1914) 1 LW 41. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar noted that Adanda, the illegitimate son of the Chola King Kulothunga, brought in the mirasi system to Chingleput. The mirasis were grantees from Adanda and belonged to the Vellala community. The mirasis were directed to bring the lands under cultivation through their own exertion or through the exertions of payakaris. This period was known as Kaniakshikar period.

62. What was obtained by the mirasidars from the sovereign was not melwaram but only kudiwaram. In pursuance to this kudiwaram right, the mirasidars were entitled to demand swatantaram and tunduvaram. Useful reference on this aspect can also be referred to Mr. William. H. Bayley and W. Hudleston’s Compilation of Papers titled “Paper on Mirasi Right selected from records of the government” as well as from Crole’s Manual.

Tillers without title: Payakaris

63. While the mirasidar were the landlords, they required persons to till the land. This now takes us to the meaning of the word “payakari.” Payakaris were temporary, non-resident cultivators in the agrarian system in South India. They did not own the land they tilled. Instead, they cultivated the land on behalf of the mirasidars or local temples for a stipulated time frame. In exchange for their agricultural labour, they received a specific and pre-determined share of the produce. The payakaris themselves were divided into two categories. The first category of payakaris were Ulkudis or the resident tenants. Ulkudis were outsiders of the village but had moved and resided therein permanently. The second category of payakaris were Purakudis. They were temporary or migratory labourers who travelled from one village to the other. They cultivated the lands for a specific period without gaining any long-term land occupancy rights.

The dittam and darkhast system in Chingelput

64. The mirasidars, in order to reduce the tax payment to the State, cultivated less and less of good land and would take on poor lands for cultivation. By this, they reduced the tax base for the future as it was based on productivity. Lower produce meant lower taxes. Crole’s Manual, in Page No. 392, extracted the proceedings of the Board of Revenue dated 12.02.1875. It records the discussion of R.W.Barlow, Governor of Chingleput and Secretary to the Board of Revenue in a correspondence dated 11.11.1874. Barlow undertook a detailed survey on the reasons that led to the fall of revenue from the Chingleput District. According to him, the cause for backwardness of Chingleput district was on the account of large lands being uncultivated. This was on account of the dittam system.

65. Prior to 1856, the British government adopted a revenue system called the dittam system/plan system. This was in vogue between 1815-1820. Under this system, at the beginning of every agricultural season, the Tahsildar and his subordinates would inspect a village. They created an aggregated estimate of land revenue by recording what specific land parcels each ryot held and the proposed crop they intend to cultivate. On this basis, they arrived at the estimated cultivated output. The revenue from the land was estimated accordingly. The system miserably failed on account of corruption and coercion it led to.

66. The Tahsildar and the village headman had the power to assess and they used this process to extort bribes. The coercion part was calling upon the farmers to take on more lands than what they could cultivate or pay high tax on crops against their will. Being an annual forecasting system, the revenue which the British East India Company expected drastically fluctuated from year to year. The mirasidars and payakaris beat the system by abandoning or adjusting the land holdings just before the harvest, leaving the tax collectors with unpredictable revenues.

67. Added to this system, was the introduction of the darkhast system. By this system, any person could petition the Revenue Department seeking its permission for acquisition of an unassigned government land. It was initiated by way of a petition to the Tahsildar or the Collector. Upon receiving the application, the revenue authorities published a notice in the village, calling for objections from persons, with respect to the proposed assignment. If no valid objection was made, the land was granted under individual patta.

68. The mirasidars claimed that all the lands within their village boundaries belonged to them. This includes forest and waste lands. Therefore, they protested against the proposed action stating that the Revenue administration does not have the right to grant lands to anyone, as the land already belonged to them. This did not cut ice with the British, as they were only interested in maximizing their revenue. Another advantage for the British was that, by granting lands to payakaris, apart from getting revenue directly from them, it helped to break the stranglehold of the mirasidars. The dittam system, which created unrest among agriculturalists, was formally given up pursuant to an order of the Board of Revenue in Resolution No. 285 dated 11.03.1856 [Refer, Crole’s Manual, pp 392-93].

69. With the abolition of the dittam system, the government introduced the settlement proceedings. Under this system, the government directly gave patta to whomsoever they desired, including the tillers and started collecting rent directly from them.

70. This discussion is relevant here because the 1877 record is clear that patta was granted to the then mirasidar, Sri Kandasamiyar Devasthanam. Useful reference may also be made to the work written by Tsukasa Mizushima in “From mirasidar to pattadar: South India in the late nineteenth century.” For a detailed discussion on these aspects, reference can be made to the case of G. Sathyanarayana v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 (3) ALT 473.

Structure and shares in a mirasi tenure

71. A cumulative reading of the three reports set forth above indicates that under the pre-colonial system, mirasidars were the hereditary co-sharers of the village. They held absolute ownership (miras) of the land. This ownership extended to the village waste as well as to the communal resources. The payakaris did not have any ownership rights but were merely labourers. The relationship between the mirasidars and payakaris was only of sharing the kudiwaram. It was the duty of the mirasidars to collect the melwaram or the King’s or the State’s share and remit the same to the State treasury. Insofar as the kudiwaram or cultivator’s share is concerned, the mirasidars retained a portion of this and paid a fixed smaller, fixed fraction to the payakaris for having rendered their labour. The payakaris effectively utilised their contribution of labour for tilling of the lands to ensure that the mirasidars did not become oppressive.

The Architecture of shared tenure: Ekabhogam and Palabhogam

72. The class of mirasidars themselves were divided into two categories. The first category is Ekabhogam mirasidars. They were either single individuals or families in possession of lands held under the mirasi tenure in the village, without sharing them with any other person. This term was the subject matter of interpretation in the case of Ramalinga Mudali v. T.S. Ramaswami Iyyer, AIR 1929 Mad 529. Justice Vepa Ramesam observed that if one mirasdar was the sole tenant of the land in the village, he would be known as Ekabhogam mirasidar. If the mirasi lands in the village were shared with other mirasdars, then the mirasi tenure was called as Palabhogam mirasdars. This was because the village itself was divided into several pangus. Each pangu consisted of lands yielding an equal amount of produce, including a proportionate share of all benefits from common property, such as village waste, mines, quarries, fisheries, forests and pastures. The village itself was divided into karays, consisting of many pangus. The pangus were not situated in one place forming a compact core, but were distributed throughout the village, having regard to the superiority and inferiority of the soil and facilities for irrigation.

Rights and occupancy status of the Mirasidars

73. The right of a mirasdar over the land was the subject matter of consideration by a Full Bench of this Court in Seshachala Chetty v. Para Chinnasami, ILR (1917) 40 Mad 410. This judgment was heavily relied upon by Mr. Wilson.

74. Justice Ayling, after an analysis of the entire position of law, came to the following conclusion:

                     “Whatever view is taken of the origin of mirasi tenure (which is entirely a matter of speculation) and the privileges it confers, there are undoubtedly certain incidents, which have been claimed as attaching to it from ancient times and have to some extent been recognized. They are:—

                     (a) The right to hold his manyam lands free of all payment of land revenue;

                     (b) The right to hold his patta lands in absolute ownership subject to the payment of such assessment as the State may impose;

                     (c) A preferential right to cultivation of all lands, which have been brought under, but have gone out of, cultivation (seykal-karambu);

                     (d) The right to certain fees (thunduvaram) on lands granted for cultivation to non-mirasi cultivators (paikaris);

                     (e) Certain rights over immemorial waste;

                     (f) Certain rights over lands set apart for various communal or public purposes; e.g., tanks, village-site, threshing floor, etc.”

75. This view expressed by Justice Ayling was applied by a Division Bench of this Court in C.N. Varadappan v. State of Madras, (1963) 1 Mad LJ 405. Justice Ramachandra Iyer (as he then was) held that :-

                     “Mirasdars themselves should be regarded as occupancy tenants, and their under tenants, known as Payakaris had in general no occupancy rights.”

It will not be out of place to point out that C.N.Varadappan’s case was approved by the Supreme Court in the order of remand in this case (Paragraph No.11 of the order of remand). This Court has to see is whether the plaintiff Temple is a mirasidar, and if so, what was the relationship between the Temple and the defendants.

Status of Sri Kandasamiyar Temple

76. It is here that I will refer to the Descriptive Memoir of Tiruporur Village of the Chingleput Taluk. A perusal of the same shows that Tiruporur village is an Ekabhogam village. It also points out all mirasi lands have been entered in the name of Sri Kandasamiyar. It adds that the government has recognised the mirasdars’ claim of swatantaram on the basis of tharam assessment. Insofar as the pangu lands are concerned, it was found that the mirasidar, namely Sri Kandasamiyar Temple, was holding the land themselves according to their respective shares.

77. The issue that arises is whether this Court can rely on the Descriptive Memoir for the purpose of deciding the mirasi of Tiruporur is an Ekabogam mirasdar.

78. While remanding the matter to this Court, the Supreme Court pointed out that, while the existence of Patta No. 1 in favour of the Sri Kandasamiyar Devasthanam is not in dispute, this Court ought not to have concluded that the plaintiff is an Ekabhogam Mirasidar only on the basis of the rent receipts.

79. Though the parties were permitted to let in evidence post the remand, an application under Order XLI Rule 27 was filed only by the appellant Temple to record certain revenue proceedings, which have come into force after the remand by the Supreme Court. Revenue records of the year 2024 cannot be used by this Court to come to the conclusion as to whether the plaintiff Temple is an Ekabhogam mirasidar or otherwise. Hence, the application, insofar as it seeks to receive the revenue records are concerned, stands rejected.

80. As to the nature and admissibility of a Memoir, the position of law is settled in T.P. Srinivasa Chariar v. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar, (1922) SCC OnLine PC 20. The Privy Council has pointed out that great weight must be attached to such memoirs and to the survey and re-settlement registers. In fact, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Aluru Kondayya & others v. Singaraju Rama Rao & others, AIR 1966 SC 681 held that descriptive memoirs are public records and can be referred by the Court for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion.

81. Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines public records. Section 74(1) holds that “documents forming the acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority; of official bodies and tribunals; and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India, are public documents.” Section 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act permits secondary evidence of existence, condition or contents of a public document within the meaning of Section 74. Public documents carry with them a statutory presumption of genuineness. By receipt of a public document, the respondents are not taken by surprise. A combined reading of Sections 65, 74(1) and 77 of the Indian Evidence Act persuade this Court to accept the Resettlement register of the year 1911 and the Memoir of the year 1877.

82. I should point out here that the copies produced before this Court are certified copies of the documents issued by The Research Officer, Tamil Nadu Archives, Egmore, Chennai – 600008. Being certified copies issued by the Officer having custody of the documents, a production of the same is sufficient to prove the contents of the public record. There is no necessity to call witnesses to prove the execution thereof. In addition, the respondents have also not filed a counter to the said application. They also did not oppose the receipt of the certified copies. Ms.Chitra Sampath only opposed the receipt of the documents in Sl. Nos. 2 and 4. Finding the objection was well founded, this Court rejects them as they are post litem motam documents.

83. Apart from the revenue documents, the plaintiff has produced the Descriptive Memoir of the village as well as the Survey and Resettlement register for the village revised during the year 1911. In terms of Paragraph No. 13 of the order of remand, the Supreme Court has permitted this Court to receive additional evidence for the purpose of full and complete adjudication of the issues indicated in that order. Therefore, the Resettlement register of the year 1911 and the Memoir of the year 1877 are received as additional evidences and marked as Ex.A22 & Ex.A23. The other two documents submitted by the Appellant stand rejected. C.M.P No. 23512 of 2025 is allowed only with respect to Document Nos. 1 and 3 and it stands rejected with respect to Document Nos. 2 and 4.

84. A reading of the Memoir shows that the suit lands are Ekabhogam mirasi lands of Sri Kandasamiyar Temple, being an Ekabhogam mirasidar. By applying the principle in C.N. Varadappan’s case (as extracted above), Sri Kandasamiyar Temple being an Ekabhogam Mirasidar, the conclusion that this Court arrives at is that it was the Temple, which had the kudiwaram rights to the land, and all the persons who were tilling the land under the Temple were mere under-tenants or payakaris.

The Historical background of the Zamindari System in Bengal

85. Before we embark into the second portion of the judgment, namely, the history of settlement proceedings adopted by the British colonial regime has to be considered.

86. The concept of zamindars commenced under the Mughal Empire. The word zamindar is a combination of two Persian letters – ‘zamin’ and ‘dar’. ‘Zamin’ means land and ‘dar’ means holder. The Mughals appointed persons to the office of the zamindar and conferred on them the responsibility to collect land revenue from cultivators. During that time, the land belonged to the Mughal state and the peasants held occupancy rights. The zamindars, appointed by the Mughals, did not own the land. The law administered by the Mughals empowered the zamindars to retain a specific percentage from the revenue collected from the peasants as remuneration. Normally, it was 10%. This was towards the expenses that the zamindars had incurred during their administrative and police activities.

87. The East India Company approached the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam, and entered into the “Treaty of Allahabad.” This treaty had been signed after Shah Alam had lost the Battle of Buxar in 1764. As per this treaty, he granted the British East India the deewani rights or the right to collect taxes in areas, covered by present day Bengal, Bihar and Odisha. On assumption of this power, the British evolved a policy granting the zamindars the right to collect revenue. Subsequently, Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786, with specific instructions to introduce a permanent revenue settlement for the areas under the control of the British. As per the permanent settlement, lands were given to the zamindars, who were in turn called upon to pay a fixed revenue to the East India Company.

From Zamindari to Ryotwari: The Madras Experiment

88. An attempt to replicate the zamindari system in Bengal in the Madras Presidency, the system was introduced by Lord Edward Clive, the then Governor of Madras. He did so under the directions of Lord Wellesley, the then Governor-General. Lord Clive implemented the policy by designating the local chieftains, namely the polygars or palaiyakkarars, as zamindars. The polygars trace their origin to the setup introduced by Viswanatha Nayak, the ruler of Madurai, and his minister, Ariyanatha Mudaliyar in 1529. Each polygar was granted a palayam, a small domain, in lieu of rendering military services to the Vijayanagara Kingdom.

89. Apart from the polygars, lands that vested with the British, were divided by Lord Clive and was auctioned to the highest bidder. Unlike the fertile Gangetic plains of Bengal, which had a year-round agricultural output, the areas in Madras Presidency were and are dependent on rainfall. Failure of this natural resource led to a fluctuating agricultural output. The polygars and the zamindars were not able to pay the fixed revenue as required under the permanent settlement. This led to auctioning their holdings and also denudation of income of the East India Company. To rectify this situation, a new approach was adopted. It was the introduction of the ryotwari settlement by Colonel Alexander Reed and thereafter, by Sir Thomas Munro and Lord William Bentick.

The Adoption of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal and the Evolution of the Tenancy Law

90. It is pertinent to discuss the difference between the revenue system established by Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor General in Bengal and that introduced by Colonel Alexander Reed and Sir Thomas Munro in the Madras Presidency. This is because the applicability of the Tamil Nadu Estate Lands Act, 1908 and the consequential Tamil Nadu Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 depend on the manner in which the lands were held.

91. Initially, the East India Company adopted annual and five years’ auction of the revenue collection rights. This resulted in revenue fluctuation, widespread corruption and to a near total collapse of Bengal’s agrarian economy. The East India Company could not predict its annual revenue. It had a direct impact on preparation of military budgets, trade purchases and administrative expenses. Lord Cornwallis realised that being an occupational force, it was facing constant resistance from its natives. Hence, he adopted the permanent settlement in 1793.

92. By the virtue of the Cornwallis Code of 1793, the rate of taxation that the British charged was locked in perpetuity. This guaranteed a stable and minimum income to the British colonial administration, while shifting all risks, including those arising from crop failure and drought, onto the locals. The immediate political benefit that the British obtained was the creation of a class called zamindars. The power, wealth and influence of the zamindars were entirely dependent on the British. Therefore, while granting a permanent income to the British, it also ensured a class of wealthy and powerful natives, who were loyal to the British colonials.

93. By outsourcing the revenue collection to the zamindars, the Cornwallis Code ensured that the British need not maintain a bureaucratic setup for revenue collection and could exclusively concentrate on territorial expansion. Another benefit was that with the zamindars collecting the taxes, bribery amongst the British revenue officials reduced. Cornwallis expected that, like the English esquires, the zamindars would indulge in developmental activities like improving the irrigation systems, which would consequently increase the areas under agriculture and consequently, income. Unfortunately, his expectation that the zamindars would behave like their English counterparts was belied.

94. As the British could alter the state tax rate, coercive steps were introduced by the East India Company. Regulation XIV was introduced, whereunder, if a zamindar did not clear the debts by the specified date, the estates were immediately confiscated and publicly auctioned. To modify the prevailing system, Regulation VII of 1799 was enacted, allowing the zamindars to seize the tenant’s property and arrest the tenants for non-payment of revenue dues. By 1859, this absolute power given to the zamindars under 1799 Regulation was abused to the hilt. This resulted in the enactment of the Bengal Rent Act of 1859. The peasants were granted occupancy rights if they could prove that they had been in occupation of the same property for twelve consecutive years. It also barred the zamindars from increasing the rents on occupancy tenants, unless approved by the jurisdictional civil courts.

95. The zamindars were clever. Side-stepping this restriction, they did not permit the peasants to occupy the same plot for twelve consecutive years, but started rotating the tenants and thereby, preventing their claim for occupancy rights. This forced the British to enact another regulation namely, the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. The rule for occupancy rights was revised. The said right was granted, if the tenant has been in occupation for any piece of land in the same village for the period of twelve years. Furthermore, the zamindars were prevented from arbitrary eviction of peasants, unless the eviction was duly authorised by an order of the court. The law also ensured that a zamindar could not hike rents more than once in 15 years, which when raised could not exceed a cap of 12.5% over the previous rate.

Ryotwari settlement in Madras Presidency: Genesis and Administrative Framework

96. In the Madras Presidency, there was no such concept of zamindars as found in Bengal Presidency. The British annexed the Baramahal region at the conclusion of the Anglo-Mysore War in 1792. Baramahal region is today’s Salem, Dharmapuri and Krishnagiri districts. It was called the Baramahal region on account of the twelve strategically constructed forts during the Vijayanagara Kingdom by the local chieftain, Jagadevaraya. These forts acted as a barrier between the Deccan Plateau and the Southern Plains. They served as a Northern gateway before one entered the heartland of the present Tamil Nadu.

97. The East India Company appointed Captain Alexander Reed to administer the area. Captain Reed evolved the system of ryotwari settlement in the Madras Presidency. By this system, land revenue was assessed and collected directly from the ryots. Ryots is the anglicisation of the Arabic word “raiyyah”, meaning a peasant or cultivator. Under Reed’s system, each ryot was recognised as the owner of the land. A Ryot was entitled to continue in possession as long as he paid the assessed revenue. As a proof of their cultivation, extent, assessment and permitted remissions, the East India Company issued a document titled “Patta”.

98. After the introduction of this settlement in the Baramahal region, Reed slowly attempted to extend this system to other parts of the Madras Presidency. He was assisted by Sir Thomas Munro. In the fourth Anglo-Mysore war, the British defeated Tipu Sultan. The British East India Company annexed the Canara region, then under the control of Tipu. Simultaneously, it transferred Munro to take over as the Collector of Canara.

99. Munro introduced the ryotwari land revenue system in Canara. Subsequently, the Nizam of Hyderabad ceded control of Bellary, Anantapur, Kadappa and Kurnool regions to the British. These areas were called “ceded districts.” Munro took control of these ceded districts and introduced the ryotwari system thereto. In the ryotwari settlement system, the entire region was surveyed field by field and assessed individually. Though he proposed a permanent ryotwari settlement, it was rejected by the directors of the East India Company. With the zamindari system not taking off in the Madras Presidency, unlike in Calcutta Presidency, the directors of the East India Company accepted the ryotwari system as the applicable system to the Madras Presidency. Munro, who had resigned as the administrator of the ceded districts, was brought back as the Governor of the Madras Presidency in 1820. On his return, he introduced this system across the Presidency with full vigour.

100. Under this system, every land was measured and categorised on the basis of the quality of soil and its location. The lands were registered in the name of the ryots and revenue was determined on the basis of productivity and nature of the soil. Once this was done, each ryot received a patta. The previous practice of collecting revenue through “kind” was jettisoned. Instead, revenue demands had to be satisfied by cash. Initially, the rate of revenue was fixed at one-half of the gross produce. This resulted in agitation amongst the peasants / ryots as they found it excessive. Consequently, Munro reduced the revenue payable to one-third. Disagreeing with the Cornwallis system of a permanently fixed rate, the settlement mechanism was worked annually. The ryots had the right to increase or decrease their cultivated holdings annually. Annual settlements determined the revenue payable for that year. If there were no changes in the ryot’s holdings, no fresh patta was issued.

101. Munro came up with this system, as this brought a larger revenue to the East India Company. This was because there was no intermediaries like the zamindari system and whatever was paid by the cultivators directly went to the coffers of the British administrators. Further, higher the agricultural yield, higher the revenue to the British. The attempt of the British to introduce the same system as followed by Cornwallis in Bengal failed, since the polygars and other existing landholding classes did not pay the amounts in time. Furthermore, while zamindars had deep roots in Calcutta, the Madras Presidency lacked a comparable class of landholders.

102. The ryotwari system was influenced by David Ricardo’s Theory of Rents. This theory postulated that the economic rent belongs to the State and not to the intermediaries, who did not personally till the land. The political aspect being, the Madras Presidency faced several rebellions from the polygars. By directly collecting the revenue from the ryots, the British starved the polygars of their finances and established a direct control over the peasantry. By granting a ryot a patta, it also provided security to the peasants and thus, ensuring a sense of loyalty to the British amongst the agriculturists.

103. The oppressive nature of the earlier landlords was replaced by the universal landlord, the State. The evil of corruption that Cornwallis sought to do away with in Bengal reared its head in the Madras Presidency. With no power to grant remission, the subordinate revenue officials who were in charge of land field survey and assessment turned corrupt. This resulted in the reduction of revenue and also in the tools of torture being adopted by the revenue officials. Such actions resulted in the constitution of the Torture Commission of 1855. The direct consequence of the above was being the enactment of the Police Act of 1861 and the removal of police powers from the tax collectors. The ryotwari system was also amended to include the revision of revenue fixation, once in every 20 to 30 years.

Distinction between the Ryotwari and Inam Settlements

104. Having noticed the difference between the two systems, there is another aspect to be considered as to the difference between the ryotwari system and the Inam settlements. The key difference between the two is as to who owns the land and how much revenue was paid to the colonial masters. We have seen that under the ryotwari system, revenue payments were directly paid to the British government while under the Inam settlements, lands were held tax free / quit rent or at a highly discounted fixed rate or jodi. Under the ryotwari system, the State was the owner, whereas under the Inam settlement, the grantee was the owner as the grantor was a Hindu or Muslim ruler.

The Madras Inam Commission and the Enfranchisement of Inam Lands

105. Finding that one-third of the total agricultural land in the Madras Presidency was being held as an Inam and not yielding revenue to the British, the Madras Inam Commission was established. This Commission was formed in 1858. It was entrusted with the task of investigating all the grants previously granted.

106. The Inam Commissions issued proclamations informing all Inamdars in a particular area that their title was to be scrutinised. Inamdars had to appear before designated Inam Commissioners or Deputy Inam Commissioners. The said authority scrutinized the legitimacy of the grant and in addition, the unbroken hereditary succession of the current occupant from the original grantee had to be proved. Historical title was proved by production of Sanad, or Dumbala, issued by the Cholas, Vijayanagara Kings, Marathas or Nawabs of Arcot. The Tharapada records or the village accounts that categorised the lands as taxexempt were utilised along with Karnam or Village Accounts Register. Once these proofs were offered, the Commissioner crossverified the claims with the official records that were in their custody. In addition, surveyors marked the physical boundaries of the estates. If it was found that the Inamdar has expanded his holdings than what was granted, the excess holdings were either taxed heavily or confiscated.

107. If the documentations were to the satisfaction of the Inam Commissioner, the grant was confirmed. On confirmation, the Inamdar was given an option to purchase the government’s right to reclaim the land. This was done by the imposition of “quit rent”, namely, a permanent fixed annual tax. Once the terms of the quit rent were fixed, the Inam Commissioner issued an Inam title deed. That is to say, on enfranchisement, that is, surrendering the State’s future rights to re-claim in exchange for payment of jodi, a title deed was issued by the British Government.

108. In case, the Inamdar could not produce the Sanad or prove the genealogy from the grantee, the Inam Commissioner invoked the reversionary right attached with the original grant of the grantor running the land, and re-assuming the land to the State. On such re-assumption, the lands were converted into ordinary ryotwari lands. Thereafter, ryotwari settlement norms were applied and pattas were granted. The result of this exercise, which the Privy Council and the Supreme Court found as the “Great act of the State”, was that the Inamdar transformed his Inam into an entry in the Inam Fair Register. The purpose of this discussion is to point out the fundamental differences between ryotwari settlement and Inam settlement.

The 1911 Survey and the Re-settlement Register

109. The British followed the ryotwari settlement with a Resettlement procedure in 1911. The additional document filed is the Survey and Re-settlement Register of the year 1911. Resettlement operations were conducted once in every 30 years to re-evaluate the land and adjust the taxes. At the time of resettlement, the ‘A’ register was updated and new division numbers were issued. Several columns were drawn up in the register to distinguish between Inam lands and Ryotwari lands. Inam lands were shown as “I” and Ryotwari lands were shown as “G” or “Government.” This register also contained the number of patta or the Inam title deed, together with the name of the Pattadar or the Inamdar or the Manager of the institution to which the land belongs.

Classification of Ryotwari and Inam Lands

110. The 1911 Register for Tiruporur village was finalised by Mr. J. Grey, the Special Settlement Officer, Revenue Settlement Office, Party No.1, Saidapet. It was confirmed by Mr. P. McQueen, ICS, Collector of Madras, Chengalpattu District.

111. Column No. 14 of the 1911 Register for Tiruporur Village No. 111, shows revenue classification for the land as “G” or “Government” and Patta no. 1 having been granted in the name of Singaravelu Mudali, Manager for the time being of Sri Kandasamiyar Devasthanam.

112. This discussion brings us to the question as to whether the ryoti lands classified as Government lands or ryotwari lands during survey and resettlement were covered under the Madras Estate Land Act, 1908.

The scope of the 1908 Act and its consequential effect on the 1948 Act

113. The Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “1908 Act”) was enacted for the purpose of the lands located within an ‘estate’, such as zamindari estates, jaghires or Inam villages. In all the three categories, the landlord stood between the actual tiller and the Government. In the earlier portion of the judgment we have noticed that the Temple was an Ekabhogam mirasidar. An Ekabhogam mirasidar held occupancy rights and did not have melwaram rights. The nature of possession by the Ekabhogam mirasidar is that of kudiwaram. The 1908 Act applied where the Zamindar or the Inamdar held the melwaram right and the cultivator held the kudiwaram right. If the lands had been surveyed and classified as ryotwari lands under the direct control of the State, it fell outside the scope of the 1908 Act. For the 1908 Act to apply, there should have been an intermediary between the Government and the tiller. In mirasi lands in Tiruporur, as the Ekabhogam mirasidars were paying rents directly to the government and since there were no intermediaries, the 1908 Act does not apply.

114. If and only if the 1908 Act applied, the question of applying the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 arises. The defendants have sought to take advantage of the usage of the word ‘ryot’ in both the systems to raise an untenable plea. As seen from the 1877 Memoir as well as the 1911 Register, Patta no. 1 relates to ryotis under the Government ryotwari tenure. Under this system, the occupant was directly recognised by the Government and there was no intermediary. Under 1908 Act, a ryoti was classified as a tenant inside the private landlord’s estate. When there is no estate involved in this present case, the issue of applying the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 or the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 does not arise at all. The effect of the 1948 legislation was to acquire all historical ryoti lands under the 1908 legislation and classify them as Government ryotwari lands.

115. We have already noticed under the Ryotwari system that the Government was the absolute proprietor and the ryots held the property from the Government by paying revenue. The 1908 Act applied only to semi-feudal estates where the intermediaries were sandwiched between the cultivator and the Government. In the ryotwari areas, there were no such intermediaries. Hence, the 1908 Act itself does not apply. Insofar as this case is concerned, the Memoir and the Reesettlement Register indicate that, Tiruporur village was classified as a government land and not as an Inam. This shows that to the ryotis of Tiruporur village too, the 1908 Act does not apply. A ryoti land is governed by the Madras Estate Land Act, 1908 while a ryotwari land is owned by the State.

116. The 1948 Act does not apply to ryotwari lands. This is because the purpose for which the legislation was brought about is to do away with the Zamindari/Inamdar/Jaghirdari system and convert the lands into Ryotwari settlement. Therefore, when the Tiruporur village fall under the Ryotwari settlement, the 1948 Act will not apply.

117. It is here that I will consider the plea of Ms.Chitra Sampath and Mr.Udhayakumar that the parties had agreed that the Madras Estates Land Act applies to them. First, the application of the Act depends upon certain facts as set forth by the legislation. An Act cannot be made applicable by consent of parties. The jurisdictional fact in this case is that the lands are ryotwari lands covered by the ryotwari settlement proceedings. The jurisdictional fact required for the Madras Estates Land Act to apply is that the land must be an “estate” within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 and the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act of 1948.

118. As much as consent cannot confer jurisdiction on the court, by consent, an inapplicable Act cannot be made applicable. Application of laws enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not at the mercy or consent of the persons on whom they apply. Enactment of laws are an exercise of sovereign power of the State and they apply for the situations contemplated by the legislation and not by the consent of the parties. Furthermore, this plea ignores the specific stand taken by the plaintiff in the pleadings that title is claimed through the settlement patta No.1 (which has been found to exist in the name of the plaintiff in the order of remand by the Supreme Court) and that the lands are ryotwari lands. Hence, this argument stands rejected.

The Notification under the 1948 Act

119. The learned Government Pleader produced a copy of the Notification issued by the then Government of Madras in G.O. No. 2302 - Revenue dated 01.09.1951. This Notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. The Schedule to G.O. No. 2302 contains the list of Inam estates taken over by the Government with effect from 01.10.1951. Insofar as Thiruvallur Taluk is concerned, a list of about 40 villages have been given. Tiruporur village is conspicuously absent in the list. Whereas, the Notification in Sl. No. 184 shows that Thandalam village was taken over by the Government. Hence, it becomes clear that the Government had never considered the village of Tiruporur as an “estate” and had not issued any notification to that effect.

Scope and applicability of Section 62 of the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948

120. Ms.Chitra Sampath referred to Section 62 of Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948 to argue that it covers all properties situated in the erstwhile Chengalpattu District and therefore, would cover the properties concerned in this appeal. I am not in a position to agree with the said submission for several reasons.

121. First, the plea on application of Section 62 had not been raised any time before the Trial Court or the Lower Appellate Court. A new plea cannot be raised for the first time in a second appeal. Secondly, even assuming that it is a mere question of law and can be raised in a second appeal, even then, this plea has to fail. Section 62 explicitly deals with removal of doubts in regards to certain estates in Chengalpattu. By the very texture of the section, it covers only “estates” in Chengalpattu district. The aforesaid discussion points that the lands covered under Patta no. 1 of No. 111 Tiruporur village are not Inam, jaghire or an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 but were ryotwari holdings. Hence, this section does not apply.

122. Section 62 gives the government the statutory authority to hold whether a piece of land qualifies as an ‘estate’ under the Act. I have referred to G.O. No. 2302 dated 01.09.1951 to point that the Government did not consider the village of Tiruporur as an estate. Hence, the said section cannot be made applicable to a ryotwari land covered under the ryotwari settlement. Section 62 would apply only when the lands were held by intermediaries like the zamindars, inamdars or jaghirdars.

123. The existence of Patta no. 1 has been conclusively found by the Supreme Court in the order of remand. In Paragraph No. 10 of the order, the Court has held as the existence of Patta no.1 has been proved, this Court has to decide the nature of right under the Patta on the basis of documents other than the rent receipts. As seen above, the Memoir and Resettlement Register confirm that Patta no. 1 was granted as government ryoti land in the name of Sri Kandasamiar Temple, through the then manager, Singaravelu Mudali.

Nature and legal effect of the Rokka Pattas

124. Apart from the above, I will now turn my attention to the admitted documents, namely the Rokka Patta filed by the defendants during the cross examination of the Plaintiff. Ex. B1 – Ex.B4 are the Rokka Pattas granted by the Temple to Muthukumaraswamy Gurukkal, the predecessor-in-title of the defendant in OS No. 759/1987. Ex. B23 is the Rokka Patta issued in favour of Manicka Gramani, the predecessor-in-title of the original defendant, Ramachandra Gramani, the defendant in OS No. 760/1987. Similarly, Ex. B24 is the Rokka Patta granted in favour of Raghava Pillai, the predecessor-in-title of the defendant in OS No. 761/1987. In all these documents, it is specifically mentioned that the plaintiff is the Ekabhogam mirasidar for the lands for which the Patta No.1 under the ryotwari settlement had been granted.

125. Rokka Patta is not a document of title. It is a document to prove prima facie possession and cultivation during the specific Fasli years enumerated therein. The primary purpose of the Rokka Patta is administrative. It enables the person issuing a Rokka Patta to collect land revenue from the cultivator. Going by the Rokka Patta, it is clear that Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal, Ramachandra Gramani and Munia Pillai were to pay thundukuppatam and beraj, apart from swatantaram to the temple and undertenants. We have already seen what is thundukuppatam. Rokka Pattas talk about madippu and beraj. Madippu means valuation or estimated assessment value. It refers to the calculated worth or the economic value assigned to the share of the land or produce. Beraj implies the total gross assessment of land revenue. When these words are associated with thundukuppatam and swatantaram and refers to the mirasi rights of Sri Kandasamiar Devasthanam, it shows the relationship between the predecessors of the defendants and the plaintiff as mirasidars having kudiwaram right superseded by Patta No.1 granted under the ryotwari settlement and Payakaris in possession of the property for the purpose of utilising the land by expending their labour.

126. These documents also call upon the aforesaid persons to perform services to the Temple. The payment of the aforesaid amounts together with service indicates that the plaintiff was the mirasidar and the defendants and their predecessors-in-interest were mere Payakaris. That being the position, they could not have set up a plea that they were entitled to the benefit of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 and the consequent Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.

Rokka Pattas relating to Tiruporur Village

127. The Rokka Patta had been printed by the Temple for two villages namely, Tiruporur village bearing No. 111 and for Thandalam village bearing No. 120. The corresponding receipts that have been filed refers to Patta No. 15 for Muthukumaraswamy Gurukkal, Patta No. 85 for Manicka Gramani and Patta No. 36 for Raghava Pillai. The Rokka Pattas are issued for individual Fasli years. Though in the Rokka Patta, Thandalam village has not been struck out, in the corresponding receipts, it is clear that it is issued for Village No. 111 of Tiruporur. In this appeal, we are not concerned with Thandalam village. All the properties are situated in No. 111 Tiruporur village. A combined reading of Rokka Patta with the receipts issued shows that the defendants had been occupying the lands situated in No. 111 Tiruporur village. That not being an “estate” within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, for the mere fact that a receipt had been printed and issued for both the Village nos. 111 and 120, would not improve the case of the defendants. Through these receipts, ryoti lands under ryotwari settlement will not get converted to estate lands under the 1908 and 1948 Acts.

The effect of alienation

128. Much reliance has been placed upon by the courts on the alienation that had been made by the lessees in favour of the third parties. In none of the sale deeds, the trustees of the plaintiff are a party. It is a settled position of law that no one can give what they do not have – nemo dat quod non habet. The purpose of introduction of this rule in real property jurisprudence is three fold :-

                     i. Protection of rightful owner;

                     ii. Risk to innocent buyer;

                     iii. Derivative title.

This rule protects the original or true owner from losing their property to a third party, by virtue of an unauthorised sale or misappropriation. A person who purchases the property without knowing the lack of the vendor’s title gains no title at all. If the true owner demands the same, it is the duty of the purchaser to return the property to the actual owner. This is because the purchaser’s right and title are derived from and are limited by his vendor’s title.

129. If Muthukumarasamy Gurukkal, Ramachandra Gramani and Munia Pillai did not have any title to the property, any document entered into by them cannot grant the purchaser or the allottee under a partition deed a better title than the Temple. The test in suits for title is preponderance of probabilities. This test means a fact is proven, if the evidence shows that it is more likely to be true than not. The party with more convincing and believable evidence on title is to succeed. Since the Temple has a better title, it necessarily has to succeed.

130. Finally, with respect to the plea that the defendant in O.S.No.759 of 1987 has alienated the property in favour of one Munuswamy Naidu is concerned, a perusal of the documents in this case shows that it had been alienated under Ex.B39. The date of alienation is 30.03.1988. In other words, the sale has come about pending the lis. Munuswamy Naidu, being a lis pendens purchaser, is bound by the decree. Insofar as the other alienees are concerned, none of the documents of alienation have been presented.

The plea of adverse possession

131. I will now turn to the last point urged by the defendants that they have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, and thus, they have crystallised their right over the property by adverse possession. In order to claim adverse possession, the defendants will have to show that they have been in open, hostile and continuous possession of the property over the statutory period. The Rokka Pattas and the receipts that have been filed by the defendants themselves indicate that they have been in occupation, while accepting the title of the Temple. In fact, the very plea of adverse possession indicates that the defendants concede to the title of the plaintiff and plead hostility as a ground to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Mere possession over a long period of time will not crystallise into adverse possession [See, Chatti Konati Rao & Ors., v. Palle Venkata Subba Rao, 2010 (14) SCC 316 @ 14]. Physical presence on the land is entirely different from holding the land with an animus for adverse possession. Unless the person in possession asserts a hostile title by denying the true owner’s rights to their face, they remain permissive or unauthorised user, regardless of how many years have passed. [See, Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah, (2019) 15 SCC 756].

132. The receipts filed by the defendants during the cross examination of plaintiff show that accepting the title of the plaintiff, they have been making payments to the Temple. The receipts have been issued at least till 1956. With the advent of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&CE) Act, 1959, Section 109 of the said legislation prevents the person in occupation to claim adverse possession against the Temple. Hence, the plea of Mr.Udhayakumar that, in any event, the tenants have crystallised their right by adverse possession is absolutely untenable and deserves to be rejected.

133. The courts below have gone about applying the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 to a ryotwari holding without considering the crucial aspect that the property involved is not an “estate” in the first place for the 1908 and 1948 Acts to apply. They have also been swayed by the long possession of the defendants and their predecessors. The discussion aforesaid points out that the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 does not apply to the present case and that mere possession is not sufficient to defeat the claim of the rightful owner. As a wrong law has been applied to the right facts, the judgments of the courts below are perverse and must be interfered with. I am supported in this view by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hero Vinoth (Minor) vs Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545.

Discussion on the authorities relied upon by the appellant

134. Let me now turn my attention to the judgments cited by both counsel.

135. Mr. Wilson placed reliance on the Division Bench decision in Ramalinga Mudali & Ors. v. T.S. Ramasami Ayyar, (1929) XXIX LW 760. The appeal arose out of a suit for ejectment filed by the appellant with respect to Puliampatti village, Chingleput District. The issue that the Court had to deal with was whether the lands in dispute constituted a jaghire or an Inam within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The appeal on hand does not relate to either category of land. Yet, this precedent is relevant as that Court, after an analysis of the history of the mirasi tenure in Chingleput District, defined what is meant by swatantaram, Tunduvaram and swanubhogam muchalikas. The Bench held that swatantaram is a special fee that the original mirasidars and their descendants are entitled to receive from the Payakaris or under-tenants. The Bench also noted that Payakaris have, in general, no occupancy right and that the share paid by the Payakaris to the mirasidars is called Tunduvaram. This judgment also captures Ekabhogam mirasidar as the sole tenant of all the lands in the village. Though this was a case which arose under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, this judgment is relevant for the purpose of understanding the aforesaid concepts.

136. Mr. Wilson proceeded to rely upon the judgment in C.N. Varadappan v. The State of Madras, (1963) 76 LW 316. This case arose under the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) and the Madras Estates Supplementary Act XXX of 1956. It dealt with an Inam village called Nazarathpet, Sriperumbudur Taluk, Chingleput District. Despite the fact that I am not dealing with an Inam village, I can usefully refer to it, as it confirms the view laid down by Justice Vepa Ramesem in Ramalinga Mudali’s case (cited supra). Chief Justice Ramachandra Iyer, speaking for the Bench, quoted with approval and affirmed the view taken in Ramalinga Mudali’s case. He also held that an Ekabhogam mirasidar owns the kudiwaram right in the village and the under-tenants under him do not have any occupancy right. Applying the position of law laid in this judgment in the context of this case, it is clear that the defendants cannot claim any occupancy right. Hence, they are not entitled to claim permanent occupancy in terms of Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.

137. The next decision cited by Mr. Wilson is the Full Bench judgment in Seshachala Chetty v. Para Chinnasami, ILR (1917) 40 Mad 410. This judgment is a landmark judgment on land tenures and the specific legal character of village house sites called gramanattam. The issue presented before the Full Bench was whether the mirasidars could recover possession of an unoccupied village site, patta for which had been granted by the Government, to a third party. The dispute was whether the right of the mirasidars was superior to that of the Government with respect to such lands. The Full Bench, after a detailed survey of the reports maintained by the British India administrations and the earlier precedents, concluded that a nattam property is secured by a lawful occupation and residential use, rather than a sovereign grant or a commercial land revenue lease. This judgment has laid down the rights of the mirasidars to hold their patta lands in absolute ownership, subject to the payment of such assessment, as the State may impose. This judgment is also relevant as it holds that a mirasidar is entitled to tunduvaram on lands granted for cultivation to non-mirasi cultivators or Payakaris.

138. In this case, as seen from Ex. B1-B4, Ex. B23 and Ex. B24, the defendants and their predecessors were called upon to pay thundhukuppatam and swatantaram to the Plaintiff Temple. Thundukuppatam, as seen from the definition above, were payments made by the under-tenants to the mirasidars. I rely on this verdict for concluding on the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants.

139. Kumarappa Reddi v. Manavala Goundan, ILR (1918) 41 Mad 374 is another Full Bench judgment. This judgment analyses the mirasi system and the right of a mirasidar to claim swatantaram. The Full Bench held that an Ekabhogam mirasidar must specifically prove a custom requiring the tenant to pay the said amounts. In this appeal, the Rokka Patta as well as the receipts issued by the plaintiff to the defendants conclusively prove the right of the plaintiff to claim thundhukuppatam, beraj and services that the defendants had to perform for the Plaintiff Temple. This judgment is crucial for understanding the ryotwari system that was brought in by the British and also for an insight into the mirasi system during the British Raj.

140. In T.P. Srinivasa Chariar v. C.N. Evalappa Mudaliar, (1922) Madras Series XLV 565, the Court held that the memoirs maintained by the British government and the survey and settlement registers are public documents, which are important for the purpose of coming to a conclusion on the character of properties and the nature of relationship. Additional documents Nos. 1 and 3, which have been received by this Court, pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court given in the order of remand, are the Memoir of 1877 and the Resettlement Register of 1911. By virtue of this judgment, this Court is entitled to receive the same as an additional evidence.

141. Mr.Wilson also drew support from the case of State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (since deceased) through his Lrs, 2024 INSC 875, for the proposition that, in order to prove adverse possession, all the three elements of continuity, openness and hostility must be present. Factually, this Court has found that the defendants have proved mere possession, but not possession adverse to the plaintiff. Hence, applying this judgment, the plea of adverse possession deserves to be rejected.

142. The next authority relied upon by Mr. Wilson is Monohar Das Mohanta v. Charu Chandra Pal and Ors., (1954) 2 SCC 978 to urge that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree on the ground of title by lost grant. I do not find this judgment relevant to the facts of this case for several reasons.

143. The specific case of plaintiff is that the land is a ryoti land and it had been granted with a patta in Patta No. 1. At no point of time, the plaintiff has urged that it had title by lost grant. On the contrary, the plea is that it has derived title through the patta granted by the British government. A new plea on title by lost grant cannot be raised in a second appeal.

144. Furthermore, whatever might have been the position before the settlement proceedings, once patta has been granted under the ryotwari settlement, the patta holder becomes a taxpaying entity to the Government. When the Memoir of 1877 and the Resettlement Register of 1911 point out that the plaintiff is an Ekabhogam mirasidar who has been granted a patta in the ryotwari settlement, the question of relying upon this judgment to hold that the plaintiff has an antecedent title before the grant of Patta No.1 is absolutely irrelevant.

145. The Supreme Court, while remanding the appeal had confirmed the finding that Patta No.1 exists. It had remitted the matter to this Court only to find out the nature of the land and whether the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 would apply. When the title deed has been found to exist, reference to the doctrine of lost grant does not arise. During the course of discussion, it is already seen that the records relating to Chingleput had been destroyed during the time of Hyder Ali. Therefore, this judgment is not germane to the facts of this case.

146. The judgment in Chinnanand v. Kondama Naidu, AIR 1915 Madras 698 has extensively analysed the land tenure system and the interaction between mirasi rights and shrotriem inam grants. The Court held that a mirasidar owns the kudiwaram right in the village, and the relationship between the mirasi and payakari is subject to the payment of swatantaram and tunduvaram. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar further held that a tenant of a person owning a kudiwaram right cannot claim the power of alienation, unless and until he gives up the said claim. This judgment is a proposition for the point that a village under Moksha tenure does not fall within the scope of an estate under Section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The view rendered by the Division Bench is relevant in this case as, by applying this judgment, this Court can conclude that the suit lands do not fall within the definition of an “estate” under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908.

147. In continuation of his submissions, Mr. Wilson invited the Court's attention to Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, (1923) Madras Series XLVII 337. The pronouncement of the Board in this case is relevant, as it has categorically laid down that no tenant of land in India can obtain any right to permanent tenancy by prescription in them against the landlord from whom he holds the lands. This verdict puts an end to the plea of adverse possession raised by the respondents.

148. I should point out that this view found acceptance by the Board in Kumbham Lakshmanna & Ors. v. Tangirala Venkateswaralu & Ors., 1949 SCC Online PC 26, subject to certain modifications on burden of proof. It clarified that if the landlord’s ownership to land and revenue interest is admitted or fully proven by the landlord, then the rule in Nainapillai’s case applies. Yet again, I have to refer to Ex. B1-B4, Ex. B23 and Ex. B24 and the receipts issued by the Temple to the defendants and their predecessors-in-interest. It is crucial to note here that these documents had not been produced by the plaintiff but by the defendants during the cross examination by PW1. This shows that the documents are admitted by both sides and proves the nature of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendants.

Discussion on the authorities relied upon by the respondents

149. I now turn to the only judgment cited by Ms.Chitra Sampath, learned Senior Counsel for respondents. She referred to M.C. Perumal Chettiar v. The Estate Abolition Tribunal (District Judge) & Ors., (1968) 2 MLJ 157. She urged that the learned Judge had held that, even in mirasi tenures, the tenants have occupancy rights and the Government should recognise the kudiwaram rights of the tenants and collect land revenue from them, and grant mohini allowance to the Devasthanam. A perusal of Paragraph No. 2 of the judgment shows that the properties involved in the said case were an Inam estate under the Madras Act XXVI of 1948. It was a case of an intermediary existing between the Government and the tiller. It was not a case of a ryotwari settlement, as is being dealt with presently, whereunder an Ekabhogam mirasidar had been granted patta under the ryotwari settlement by the Government directly. Hence, the judgment is inapplicable to the present case.

150. The judgments cited by Mr.Udhayakumar are as follows:

                     (i) Dhulipalla Ramayaa & Anr v. Kota Brahmayya & Ors., AIR 1958 AP 100;

                     (ii) T. Munuswami Naidu (died) & Ors. v. R. Venkata Reddi & Ors., AIR 1978 AP 200;

                     (iii) State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10;

                     (iv) T. K. Ramanujam Kavirayar & Ors. v. Sri La- Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal, Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam, (1988) 2 LW 513;

                     (v) Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu & Ors., (1991) Supp. (2) SCC 228;

                     (vi) Srinivasan & six Ors. v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Tiruchirapalli District, (1998) 2 LW 189 (FB);

                     (vii) Muslim Wakf by its President, Lalgudi & Anr. v. L.K. Annasamy & Ors., (2007) 5 MLJ 503;

                     (viii) P. Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, District Collector, Salem, (2011) 2 MLJ 388.

151. The decision in Dhulipalla Ramayaa & Anr v. Kota Brahmayya & Ors., AIR 1958 AP 100, dealt with Anadheenam lands, i.e., lands over which no claim had been made during settlement proceedings. This single factor is sufficient to show that it is inapplicable to the present case. Furthermore, the issue involved in that case was whether a suit for partition was maintainable when the estate had been taken over by the Government under Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Rytowari) Act of 1948. The Learned Single Judge held that the suit is maintainable as the special forum under the 1948 legislation cannot decide a dispute with respect to the holdings. I do not find any relevancy of this judgment to the facts of the present case.

152. Mr. Udhayakumar next relied upon the judgment in T. Munuswami Naidu (died) & Ors. v. R. Venkata Reddi & Ors., AIR 1978 AP 200. This case also relates to the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer under the Andhra Pradesh Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Rytowari) Act of 1948. When this Court has come to the conclusion that the properties which are the subject matter of this litigation are not “estate” within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, then the Act 26 of 1948 also does not apply. Hence, this judgment is absolutely irrelevant.

153. Mr.Udhayakumar further drew support from State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10. The case dealt with the issue of whether a civil court has the jurisdiction to go into the issue of title, after a patta had been grant by the Settlement Officer in terms of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Rytowari) Act of 1948. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the real nature of the land, despite an order of the Settlement Officer under Section 64 of the Act 26 of 1948. It is nobody’s case that the civil court has no jurisdiction. It is also not the case as pleaded by Mr.Udhayakumar’s client that they had been benefitted with a patta under the provisions of Act 26 of 1948. Hence, this judgment is irrelevant to the facts of the present case. For the same reason, T. K. Ramanujam Kavirayar & Ors. v. Sri La- Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal, Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam, (1988) 2 LW 513 is, too, irrelevant to the facts of the present case.

154. Turning to the next authority relied upon by Mr. Udhayakumar is Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu & Ors., (1991) Supp. (2) SCC 228. I should point out that in the next judgment relied upon by Mr.Udhayakumar, namely, Srinivasan & six Ors. v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Tiruchirapalli District, (1998) 2 LW 189 (FB), it was held, after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.Manickanaicker v. E.Elumalainaicker, 1995 (4) SCC 156, that the principle laid in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat’s case does not apply to the State of Tamil Nadu [Paragraph No. 16 of the Full Bench judgment]. When the Supreme Court itself has declared that Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat’s case does not apply to Tamil Nadu, I need not refer the same here.

155. Mr.Udhayakumar drew support from the judgment in Srinivasan & six Ors. v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami, Pattavaithalai, Tiruchirapalli District, (1998) 2 LW 189 (FB). This judgment, too, answered the question whether the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for declaration of title and injunction, or is barred by the reason of grant of patta under the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963. The Full Bench answered that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration of title and injunction, and the same is not barred by the reason of grant of patta under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963. None of the questions involved in that case arise for consideration in the present case. Same is the situation with respect to Muslim Wakf by its President, Lalgudi & Anr. v. L.K. Annasamy & Ors., (2007) 5 MLJ 503.

156. I am not discussing the judgment of the Learned Single Judge in P. Kumar v. State of Tamil Nadu, District Collector, Salem, (2011) 2 MLJ 388 as the same was reversed by the Supreme Court in Salem Municipality v. P. Kumar And Others, 2018 INSC 1058.

157. The second volume filed by Mr.Udhayakumar contains the following judgments:

                     (i) Ramalinga Mudali & Anr. v. T.S. Ramaswami Iyyer, AIR 1929 Mad 529;

                     (ii) C. N. Varadappan v. State of Madras, (1963) 1 Mad LJ 405;

                     (iii) Arulmighu Thiru Kandasamy Thirukoil v. Kothandaraman, (2007) 2 Mad LJ 919;

                     (iv) Ambikapathi Ammal & Anr v. Kandasamy Koil, (2015) 4 SCC 573.

158. Among these, I have already discussed the applicability of Ramalinga Mudali’s case and C. N. Varadappan’s case. Those judgments, as discussed above, go in favour of the appellant rather than the respondents. The other two judgments in Volume II of the Typed Set filed by Mr.Udhayakumar are the judgments pronounced in this appeal by the Learned Single judge in the previous occasion and the judgment of the Supreme Court which reversed that judgment.

159. Before concluding, this court places on record, its appreciation for the historical materials, books and manuals that were supplied by Mr.S.Sivashanmugam, counsel for the petitioner in the writ petition.

Answers to the questions of law

160. The questions of law framed as answered as follows:-

                     1. Whether the finding that Tiruporur is an Estate taken over under Act 26 of 1948 is based on no evidence? And

                     2. Whether Patta holders under Ekabhogam mirasidars can claim title to the lands?

                     Answers: Tiruporur is not an “estate” within the meaning of Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 or the Tamil Nadu Act 26 of 1948. The lands which are the subject matter of the suit are Government ryoti lands. They were not held by the plaintiff as an intermediary for the aforesaid legislations to apply. The plaintiff was an Ekabhogam mirasidar as seen from the Memoir of 1877 and the Resettlement Register of 1911 as well as the Rokka Pattas under Ex. B1 - B4, Ex. B23 and Ex. B24. And hence, the plaintiff has a better title than the defendants. These questions of law are answered in favour of Appellant and against the Respondents.

                     3. Whether the defendants are entitled to adverse possession?

                     Answer: As defendants have not proved open, hostile and continuous possession of the property and since Section 109 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (HR&CE) Act, 1959 prevents the application of Limitation Act to religious institutions, they are not entitled to adverse possession.

161. Insofar as the writ petition is concerned, the petitioner is the purchaser of the property lis pendens. Pending the suit, the defendant in O.S.No.759 of 1987 sold the property to one Munuswamy Naidu. Munuswamy Naidu had sold the property to one Balasubramanian. Balasubramanian, in turn, had sold the property to the writ petitioner. As seen earlier, Munuswamy Naidu himself purchased the property in the year 1988, when the suit for title had been presented in 1987. The petitioner, being a lis pendens purchaser, would be bound by the result of this litigation. Since this court has come to the conclusion that Padmavathy Ammal is liable to hand over possession to the plaintiff, the said decree would be binding on the writ petitioner also.

162. In fine, the second appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge at Chingleput in A.S.Nos.33 to 35 of 1991 dated 10.11.1993 in confirming the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif at Chingleput in OS Nos. 759 to 761 of 1987 dated 29.11.1990 are set aside. O.S.No.759 of 1987, O.S.No.760 of 1987 and OS No. 761 of 1987 are decreed as prayed for. It is open to the plaintiff to take separate steps for determination and fixation of mesne profits under Order XX Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code. The plaintiff will be entitled for costs throughout.

163. As the Second Appeals have been allowed and since the order impugned in the Writ Petition is dependent on the order of Second Appeals, the Writ Petition stands dismissed. I should add here that the dismissal of this writ petition will not stand in the way of the writ petitioner to attorn the tenancy in favour of the plaintiff. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.