Indrajeet Shukla, J.

1. Heard Mr. Vijan Rathore, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Chaudhary Niyaz, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Irfan Raza Khan, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. This first appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for brevity, ‘the Act, 1984’) has been preferred by the appellant/plaintiff-husband, assailing the judgment and decree dated 30th May, 2019, passed by the Additional District Judge/Additional Family Court Judge-II, Banda in Petition No. 265 of 2018, titled as Brijesh Kumar Tiwari Vs. Smt. Shivani alias Neelu, whereby the petition instituted by the appellant under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for brevity, ‘the Act, 1955’), seeking a decree of divorce, came to be dismissed.

3. Before adverting to the submissions advanced by the respective parties, it would be appropriate to briefly summarize the factual matrix of the case hereinbelow:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

                  3.1. The marriage between the appellant-petitioner and the respondent, Smt. Shivani alias Neelu, was solemnized on 19.11.2013, according to Hindu rites, rituals and customs.

                  3.2. The appellant/petitioner pleaded that, after the marriage, the respondent moved over to his residence at Atarra and the marriage was consumated. It was further pleaded that the appellant duly discharged his matrimonial obligations; however, the respondent frequently created unnecessary disputes and usually misbehaved not only with the appellant but also his family members. The respondent also exerted undue pressure upon the appellant to live separately from his old parents, but the demand could not be acceded to.

                  3.3. The appellant further pleaded that, despite best efforts on his part to restore the matrimonial relationship, the respondent did not cooperate and deserted the matrimonial home. According to the appellant, the respondent left the matrimonial home without his consent or willingness.

                  3.4. He further pleaded that all his efforts to restore matrimonial ties proved futile, and consequently, he was constrained to institute Case No. 43 of 2017 under Section 9 of the Act, 1955. However, the said case was subsequently withdrawn, as the respondent refused to resume her matrimonial obligations. Thereafter, the present petition under Section 13 of the Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of marriage, came to be instituted.

                  3.5. It was further pleaded that all efforts made by the appellant for restitution of conjugal rights went in vain and that the respondent threatened him with criminal prosecution and sending him behind bars by lodging false criminal cases, which, according to the appellant, constituted mental cruelty.

                  3.6. The appellant has referred to the criminal case lodged by the respondent vide FIR No. 93 of 2015, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Seepri Bazar, District Jhansi.

                  3.7. The respondent contested the proceedings by filing her written statement. She admitted the factum of marriage but refuted the allegations carried in the petition. It was pleaded in defence by the respondent that the appellant himself failed to discharge his matrimonial responsibilities and made efforts to drive her out of the matrimonial home. Thus, he is not entitled to place any premium on his own wrong. She further alleged that she had been subjected to harassment and cruelty on account of demand for dowry, including a car, amongst other things.

                  3.8. The respondent further pleaded in her written statement that she had resided with the appellant until 15.11.2015. During this period, a complaint was made before police and on account of settlement, the parties resumed their marital ties.

                  3.9. It has further been pleaded that the appellant’s decent job with a Nationalized Bank that yields a handsome salary the meagre amount of maintenance i.e. Rs. 10,000/- is also not being paid, which is nothing less than harrasment. The respondent’s willingness to resume marital ties subject to certain conditions about her security, such as the recording of her name in the appellant’s service book and the payment or deposit or investment Rs. 25,00,000/- as social security, cannot be termed unreasonable.

                  3.10. The Family Court, on the basis of the pleadings of parties, framed two issues: firstly, whether the respondent/defendant-wife had treated the appellant-husband with cruelty, so as to cause him physical or mental suffering; and secondly, whether the respondent/defendant-wife had deserted the appellant/plaintiff-husband ?

                  3.11. Both sides, produced one witness of fact alone who entered the witness box. The appellant himself appeared as P.W.1, whereas the respondent herself appeared as D.W.1. Certain documentary evidence was also produced and exhibited before the Trial Court.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the judgment and order under challenge is contrary to the weight of evidence on record. It is contended that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the pleadings and evidence led by the parties in the correct perspective. Despite various instances of cruelty having been pleaded and proved through reliable and cogent evidence, the same were erroneously brushed aside by the Trial Judge, resulting in dismissal of the petition seeking the decree of divorce. Learned counsel, with vehemence, submitted that the appellant was insulted and humiliated on several occasions in the presence of his family members.

5. It was further contended that the respondent's insistence upon the appellant living separately from his old ailing parents, in itself, constituted an act of cruelty; however, the learned Trial Judge failed to examine the said aspect in the light of the statutory mandate contained in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, 1955.

6. It was further submitted that the respondent had levelled allegations constituting character assassination of the appellant, including having illicit relationships with other women, particularly, in the absence of any material particulars or supporting evidence. It was contended that such unfounded allegations constituted mental cruelty and caused considerable mental agony to the appellant.

7. Learned counsel further submitted that the Trial Court completely failed to consider mental cruelty in the factual context of this case. It was also contended that the conduct of the respondent, including her tendency to make scandalous allegations against the appellant/husband and his parents, resulted in their being subjected to the mental trauma. According to learned counsel, such criminal proceedings were initiated without any justifiable basis or cause.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the holding of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Subbaiah Vs. Saraswati Paliraman, (2015) 8 SCC 336, to contend that repeated abuse and false complaints to the police may constitute cruelty and cannot be treated as mere ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life. It was submitted that the principles laid down in the said authority squarely apply to the facts of the present case.

9. The next submission of learned counsel is that the respondent had voluntarily deserted the company of the appellant for almost three years, thereby depriving him of his right to cohabitation. According to learned counsel, such deprivation of the right of cohabitation, coupled with the respondent's conduct of demanding abandonment of his old parents, constituted an act of cruelty and established her wilful desertion as well.

10. It was further submitted that the pleadings and evidence of the respondent unequivocally demonstrate that she had demanded a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- for resuming the matrimonial relationship, besides insisting upon recording her name in the service book. It was also pointed out that, in the alternative, the respondent/defendant had claimed Rs.50,00,000/- as permanent alimony in the event of a decree of divorce being passed. According to learned counsel, these circumstances singly and cumulatively indicate that the respondent was primarily interested in the appellant's financial resources rather than restoration of the matrimonial relationship and family life.

11. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Family Court, in dismissing the petition seeking dissolution of marriage, failed to properly appreciate the material evidence available on record and thereby committed a manifest error of law. It was, therefore, prayed that the judgment and order under challenge be set aside and a decree of divorce granted in favour of the appellant by this Court in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction.

Contention advanced on behalf of the respondent- defendant

12. Learned Counsel for respondent vehemently argued that respondents-wife always tried to play her part in the matrimonial ties. She proved herself to be a good wife by giving primacy to the family which is more than an institution for her. The instances of cruelty pleaded and tried to be established through evidence are vague, generic and without any details of the instances. Thus, it was impossible for respondent-defendant to rebut the pleadings in relation to cruelty. No amount of evidence can be adduced in absence of pleading, since pleading itself was scant with respect to charges of matrimonial cruelty. As such, the evidence led by the only witness i.e. appellant has rightly been discarded by the Trial Court.

13. The next contention is that neither any physical abuse nor mental cruelty has been caused on the part of respondent-wife, and as such, the conclusion drawn by the Trial Court is based on appreciation of material evidence and the pleadings of parties, which does not require interference, in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The respondent never denied cohabitation with the appellant. Rather he was not interested in the respondent for the reasons best known to him. Particularly, on many occasions he uttered that he had relations with other women and expressed in so many words that he wants to break the matrimonial ties.

14. The further submission is that the demand of Rs. 25 lacs cannot be treated unreasonable for the reason that the said demand is infact a social security, which being the wife, the respondent demanded. Getting registered as a nominee in the service record is the right of a wife. Thus, respondent had not put forward any unreasonable demand. It was the respondent who is a victim of cruelty but she did not come forward to break the marital bond.

15. Learned Counsel for the respondent lastly submitted that the attending circumstances demonstrate that it was appellant who made breach of his obligations in the matrimonial ties and he lacked affection towards the respondent. Thus, cruelty is not attributable to the respondent. Rather, the converse is true.

Point for determination

16. Firstly whether the pleadings and evidence of the appellant are sufficient to establish cruelty, particularly mental cruelty, as a ground for dissolution of marriage?

And, secondly, if this Court concludes that the marriage between the parties is liable to be dissolved by a decree of divorce, what amount of permanent alimony, if any, the respondent would be entitled to, under Section 25 of the Act, 1955?

Analysis

17. The evidence led by the appellant concerning the factum and date of marriage is not in dispute between the parties.

18. The statement-in-chief of the appellant demonstrates that, in January, 2014, the respondent went to attend a festival and promised to return after Makar Sankranti, but did not as promised. The pleadings and evidence of the appellant allege various instances of cruel behaviour on the part of the respondent, including her insistence, upon living separately from the appellant's aged parents.

19. The evidence of the appellant further indicates that the respondent was unwilling to reside at the remote place of Atarra and, therefore, the appellant permitted her to accompany him even to the places of his postings. Despite the same, according to the appellant, the conduct of the respondent remained non-cooperative.

20. The appellant has also referred to the institution of criminal proceedings arising out of Case Crime No. 93 of 2015, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Seepri Bazar, District Jhansi. The said proceedings appear to have arisen out of the matrimonial discord between parties. However, there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the competent criminal court tried the case and passed judgment determining veracity of the prosecution case.

21. Mere institution of criminal proceedings, by itself, cannot invariably be treated as an act of cruelty against the spouse unless the proceedings are shown to have been maliciously instituted or the allegations are ultimately found to be false and baseless. The withdrawal of the proceedings instituted under Section 9 of the Act, 1955, after filing of the written statement therein, is also admitted by the parties.

22. As has often been observed, cross-examination is an important means of testing the truthfulness of a witness. In the cross-examination of the appellant/P.W.1, it has emerged that, from April, 2014, the respondent accompanied him to Mahoba and, after his transfer on 28th June, 2014, she also accompanied him to Burhanpur. Thereafter, when the appellant was transferred to Pansemal, District Barwani, Madhya Pradesh, in February, 2015, the respondent continued to reside with him there till November, 2015 but thereafter abandoned the appellant(husband), making him file for restitution of conjugal rights.

                  These admissions in the cross-examination are relevant to assess the allegation that the respondent had continuously refused to reside with the appellant or had completely withdrawn from the matrimonial relationship.

23. It is not in dispute that the parties have been litigating against each other. Proceedings under Section 125 CrPC have also been decided in favour of the respondent, against which an appeal is stated to be pending before this Court.

24. In contrast, the respondent pleaded and deposed that the proceedings under Section 9 of the Act, 1955, were initially instituted by the appellant only with a view to avoid the liability to pay maintenance, and thereafter, the present proceedings for dissolution of marriage were instituted with a premediated mind by making the withdrawal of the petition under Section 9 of the Act, 1955 as a bed rock. The conciliation proceedings between parties held on 15.11.2015 also failed.

25. Not only in her pleadings but also in her evidence, the respondent expressed her willingness to continue the matrimonial relationship, subject to recording her name in the service book. According to her, the demand for a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- was also one made towards social security. In the alternative, she pleaded that, if the Court were to arrive at the conclusion that restoration of the matrimonial relationship was not possible, she would be entitled to permanent alimony of Rs.50,00,000/-.

26. A bare perusal of the petition reveals that the appellant sought dissolution of the marriage solemnized on 19.11.2013 by instituting a petition under Section 13 of the Act, 1955. Section 13 of the Act, 1955, provides for dissolution of marriage on the statutory grounds specified therein, including adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, mental disorder, venereal disease, renunciation of the world and presumption of death. If the petition filed by the appellant is examined carefully, it appears that an attempt has been made to plead cruelty as a ground for dissolution of marriage but in relief clause annulment of marriage has been sought.

27. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that annulment of marriage is governed by Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which operates on distinct and different grounds. Under Section 12, a decree of nullity may be sought, inter alia, on the ground that (a) the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the respondent; (b) the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in clause (ii) of Section 5; (c) the consent of the petitioner, or of the guardian where applicable under the law as it stood immediately before the commencement of the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act, 1978, was obtained by force or fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or as to any material fact or circumstance concerning the respondent; or (d) the respondent was, at the time of the marriage, pregnant by a person other than the petitioner.

28. Thus, the grounds for annulment under Section 12 are distinct from the grounds for dissolution of marriage under Section 13 of the Act, 1955. In the present case, therefore, the pleadings have to be examined with reference to the specific statutory ground of cruelty pleaded by the appellant and the evidence adduced in support thereof for the moulded relief of a decree for divorce.

29. None of the grounds contemplated under Section 12 of the Act, 1955, is attracted on the facts pleaded in the petition. Consequently, in view of the relief sought therein, the petition, insofar as it seeks annulment of marriage, would not be maintainable. However, taking a holistic view of the pleadings and the material available on record, this Court proceeds to examine the allegation of cruelty by treating the relief sought as one for dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty.

30. The evidence, pleadings and submissions of the respective parties qua “cruelty” as a ground for a decree of divorce, are considered hereinafter.

31. The expression ‘cruelty’ has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their way of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status.

32. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act. It is quite possible that a particular conduct may amount to cruelty in one case, but the same conduct necessarily may not amount to cruelty due to changes in various factors and circumstances in another. Therefore, it is essential for the appellant, who claims relief, to prove that a particular conduct or part of such conduct or behaviour resulted in cruelty to him. No assumptions can be made in such matters. This means that it cannot be assumed that a particular conduct will, under all circumstances, amount to cruelty, vis-a-vis the other party.

33. It is settled law that instances of cruelty are not to be taken in isolation but the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and a fair inference has to be drawn whether the party applying has been subjected to cruelty, particularly mental cruelty due to conduct of the other spouse.

34. As observed by the Supreme Court in Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh, AirOnline 2007 SC 347, prolonged separation and the continued denial of matrimonial companionship, when considered in the facts and circumstances of the case, may constitute mental cruelty. In the present case, the prolonged separation of parties, the failure of the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights to restore matrimonial cohabitation, and the other circumstances noticed hereinabove are required to be considered cumulatively while determining whether the appellant has been subjected to mental cruelty. In Samar Ghosh (supra) the relevant remarks read:

                  “80. On proper analysis and scrutiny of the judgments of this Court and other Courts, we have come to the definite conclusion that there cannot be any comprehensive definition of the concept of 'mental cruelty' within which all kinds of cases of mental cruelty can be covered. No court in our considered view should even attempt to give a comprehensive definition of mental cruelty.

                  81. Human mind is extremely complex and human behaviour is equally complicated. Similarly human ingenuity has no bound, therefore, to assimilate the entire human behaviour in one definition is almost impossible. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in other case. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person depending upon his upbringing, level of sensitivity, educational, family and cultural background, financial position, social status, customs, traditions, religious beliefs, human values and their value system.

                  82. Apart from this, the concept of mental cruelty cannot remain static; it is bound to change with the passage of time, impact of modern culture through print and electronic media and value system etc. etc. What may be mental cruelty now may not remain a mental cruelty after a passage of time or vice versa. There can never be any strait-jacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking aforementioned factors in consideration.

                  83. No uniform standard can ever be laid down for guidance, yet we deem it appropriate to enumerate some instances of human behaviour which may be relevant in dealing with the cases of 'mental cruelty'. The instances indicated in the succeeding paragraphs are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

                  (i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty.

                  (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party.

                  (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.

                  (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty.

                  (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse.

                  (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behaviour of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty.

                  (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty.

                  (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

                  (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

                  (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behaviour of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty.

                  (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty.

                  (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty.

                  (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty.

                  (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.

35. The respondent, in paragraph 19 of the additional pleas contained in her written statement, has made a bald and general allegation that the appellant was carrying on with another woman and that the marriage was solemnized merely to fulfill the lust for dowry.

36. A perusal of written statement filed by the respondent-wife reflects that there is bald and generic allegation of illicit relationship against appellant without giving the name and details of the woman involved. No instances of establishment of the illicit relationship, even imaginary have not been disclosed in the written statement, a fact that simply shows that the pleadings in the written statement have not been made with any responsibility. The same effort has been repeated while adducing evidence on her part by the respondent as D.W.-1. The height is when leaving an application for permanent alimony, and then filing a rejoinder, in support of application for permanent alimony, it has been averred that “from very beginning the appellant was detached with the respondent and was living with her second dream girl.” Though this statement had come through a lawyer but the crux of the matter is that such a statement cannot be placed before the Court in writing, unless instructions are given on the part of respondent-wife. At no point of time the name of any woman has been disclosed, rendering the allegations not only vague but ones that do not inspire confidence. These are not anything less than character assassination of the appellant.

37. We are also cognizant of the law, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, that the conduct of the respondent in exerting persistent pressure upon the appellant to abandon his aged parents and establish a separate household, if proved from the evidence on record, would constitute mental cruelty.

38. The pleading and evidence of appellant(husband) clearly establishes that filthy words were hurled, and the appellant deprived of cohabitation and a threat extended by the respondent-wife that appellant may lose his job or get demoted, if she filed a complaint. Sowing such seed, in the mind of a person itself may destabilize an average man and would definitely constitute a cruelty, if the imputations were found correct. In his cross-examination nothing could be elicited to show that the evidence of appellant was not credit worthy. The statement-in chief that it was respondent-wife who exerted pressure upon the appellant to abandon his old parents could not be impeached in the cross-examination. Thus, the part of evidence that for the abandonment of his parents the appellant was pressurized by his wife is worthy of credence and ought to be believed.

39. The aforesaid view finds support from the holding of the Supreme Court in Narendra Vs. K. Meena, (2016) 9 SCC 455, where the Supreme Court, while considering a similar situation, held that persistent efforts by a spouse to compel the other spouse to separate from his parents and family members, without any justifiable reason, may constitute an act of mental cruelty. The Supreme Court further held that unsubstantiated and reckless allegations regarding an extra-marital relationship, in the absence of reliable evidence to substantiate the same, are serious in nature and may constitute mental cruelty. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

                  “11……If a wife makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and normal custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that and in this case, we do not find any justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the Respondent wife. In our opinion, normally, no husband would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are also dependent upon his income. The persistent effort of the Respondent wife to constrain the Appellant to be separated from the family would be torturous for the husband and in our opinion, the trial Court was right when it came to the conclusion that this constitutes an act of ‘cruelty’.

                  12. With regard to the allegations about an extra-marital affair with maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of the evidence by the High Court does not appear to be correct. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that there was no maid named Kamla working at the residence of the Appellant. Some averment with regard to some relative has been relied upon by the High Court to come to a conclusion that there was a lady named Kamla but the High Court has ignored the fact that the Respondent wife had levelled allegations with regard to an extra-marital affair of the Appellant with the maid and not with someone else. Even if there was some relative named Kamla, who might have visited the Appellant, there is nothing to substantiate the allegations levelled by the Respondent with regard to an extra-marital affair. True, it is very difficult to establish such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true that to suffer an allegation pertaining to one’s character of having an extra-marital affair is quite torturous for any person – be it a husband or a wife. We have carefully gone through the evidence but we could not find any reliable evidence to show that the Appellant had an extra-marital affair with someone. Except for the baseless and reckless allegations, there is not even the slightest evidence that would suggest that there was something like an affair of the Appellant with the maid named by the Respondent. We consider levelling of absolutely false allegations and that too, with regard to an extra-marital life to be quite serious and that can surely be a cause for metal cruelty.

                  14. Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, we are inclined to hold that the unsubstantiated allegations levelled by the Respondent wife and the threats and attempt to commit suicide by her amounted to mental cruelty and therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.”

                  (emphasis added)

40. The principle laid down in the aforesaid authority is attracted to the facts of the present case, particularly in view of the respondent’s insistence upon the appellant separating from his aged parents and the unsubstantiated allegations regarding his alleged illicit relationship with another woman.

41. The respondent, by not permitting the appellant to resume cohabitation for a prolonged period of about three years, compelled him to institute proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights. However, the said proceedings did not result in restoration of the matrimonial relationship. Equally important is the fact that no serious efforts were made on part of the respondent towards restitution of conjugal rights. The prolonged and continuous separation of the parties, coupled with the failure of the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights to bring about any meaningful resumption of matrimonial life, is a relevant circumstance while determining whether the conduct of the respondent has caused mental cruelty to the appellant.

42. The respondent, in her written statement, subsequently sought to shift the stand by stating that it was the appellant himself who had disclosed that he had lived with other women. However, no name, particulars or other material in support of that allegation has been disclosed. Such an allegation, made without any supporting particulars, amounts to an unwarranted imputation against the character of the appellant. The attempt on the part of the respondent to attribute such statements to the appellant, without any basis on record, cannot be countenanced and, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, constitutes an act of mental cruelty.

43. In K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226, the Supreme Court has held that false, scurrilous and defamatory allegations made by one spouse against the other, including allegations contained in complaints and pleadings, may constitute mental cruelty. The Court emphasised that such allegations, when found to be unfounded and of a nature causing mental anguish and humiliation, cannot be treated as mere ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial life.

44. In the present case also, the attempt on part of the respondent to attribute infidelity to the appellant saying that had carnal relations with other women, without disclosing any particulars or placing or material in support thereof, constitutes an unwarranted insinuation upon his character. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, such conduct constitutes mental cruelty.

45. Once we have decide point of determination no.1 in favour of appellant and against the respondent that leads to a decree of divorce, we proceed to decide point of determination no. 2 qua entitlement of permanent alimony hereinafter.

46. The respondent has also filed a separate application, bearing Application No. 19 of 2026, in the present proceedings, seeking a permanent alimony of Rs.40,00,000/-, supported by an affidavit. It has further been pleaded that Original Suit No. 43 of 2014, instituted by the appellant/plaintiff, was withdrawn on 01.05.2018 with costs of Rs.4,000/-, which, according to the respondent/defendant, have not been paid till date.

47. The respondent has further pleaded that the appellant is working as a Manager in the Bank of India and is drawing a monthly salary of Rs.1,56,582/-. It has also been alleged that the appellant has no liability towards the maintenance of his parents and that the maintenance of Rs.2,500/- per month, allegedly being paid to his parents, is the result of a collusive arrangement.

48. The appellant filed his objections to the aforesaid application on 15.01.2026. In reply to paragraph 8 of the affidavit, particularly with regard to his monthly salary of Rs.1,56,582/-, the appellant has disclosed his monthly expenditures, which read as under:

                  “That in reply to the contents of paragraph nos. 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is submitted that though his monthly salary is Rs. 1,56,582/- per month but after paying income tax Rs. 23 ,930/- , Court attachment Rs. 10000 /- , rent recovery Rs. 226.87, housing lone (one) Rs. 9778/-, Professional Tax Rs. 200/-, Festival advance Rs. 15 ,500/- , Vehicle loan (one) Rs. 4 ,834/- Term Clean OD Rs. 9056 /- , Bank of India Officers Association Rs. 300 /- DCPS Rs. 12,308.73, Furniture Fixture Deduction Rs. 48.62, DCPS Bank contribution Rs. 17,232/-, Rs. 10,000/- to father and mother, Rs. 12,000/- house rent and Rs. 20,000/- per month for visiting court, total of Rs. 1,45,000/-thereafter appellant is left with only Rs. 10,000/- for his livelihood.”

49. The break-up of expenditure given in paragraph no. 8 of the affidavit filed by the plaintiff-appellant demonstrating various heads thereof do not inspire confidence in asmuch as despite a decree of maintenance in favour of respondent-wife the money towards maintenance is not being paid. This attitude of appellant (husband) is inhuman. This Court cannot embark on the truthfulness of various heads given under the heading of expenditure, but at the same time, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that if a man is earning a handsome salary of Rs.1,56,582, it is almost one third of the salary which should be parted with in favour of his wife. If one third of salary is parted with in favour of the wife who is just 37 years and the average biological life in India is almost 70 years, she has almost 35 years more to live. If one third of the salary that would come around Rs. 50,000/- is multiplied by 12 months, and, further, by 35 years, it would work out to a lump sum of Rs. 2 crores, 10 lacs on the other hand that the appellant-husband would continue to receive salary indicated in the coming days, months and years, of-course subject to the addition of dearness allowance and other allowances which might be admissible to him in the discharge of his duties with the Nationalized Bank besides further promotional avenues.

50. So far as the question of grant of permanent alimony is concerned, in the present case, an application has been moved by the respondent-wife seeking maintenance/permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Act, 1955. In matrimonial causes, the Court has to ascertain the financial capacity/status of the parties depending upon the source of income and expenditure to determine the amount of maintenance/permanent alimony going by the holding of the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324. 52.The Trial Court while determining the amount of interim maintenance payable to the respondent analysed the assets, liabilities and income of the appellant, and upon considering the overall source of his income, the amount of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) per month was fixed as maintenance, though in separate proceedings under Section of 125 CrPC. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and overlapping maintenance orders under different statutes, it would be appropriate to convert the monthly maintenance into permanent alimony or one time settlement of financial claims between the parties, with an intention to secure a long term financial stability in one consolidated determination.

51. In Vinny Parmar vs Paramvir Parmar 2011 (13) SCC 112, the Supreme Court has considered various facets of the law while granting permanent alimony as contemplated under Section 25 of the Act, 1955. Elucidating the concept of permanent alimony, the Supreme Court has observed that while granting permanent alimony, the Court is required to take note of the fact that the amount of maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as may enable her to live in reasonable comfort, considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when living with her husband. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot be excessive or affect the living conditions of the other party.

52. Looking to the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice, we consider it to be just and proper to allow permanent alimony to the tune of Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs) in favour of respondent-wife, which shall be payable to respondent by the appellant-husband either by way of Demand Draft or any other mode within a period of six months from the date of this judgment.

53. The respondent has now reached an advanced stage of life, and a considerable period of her matrimonial life has been spent in litigation. Taking a holistic view of the facts and circumstances of the case, ande long period for which the parties have remained in litigation, particularly th having regard to the long period for which the parties have remained in litigation, particularly the monthly salary of Rs. 1,56,582/- received by the appellant which has not been disputed, we have deemed it appropriate to award a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- to the respondent towards permanent alimony.

54. Accordingly, the appellant has succeeded in establishing the ground of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, 1955. The petition seeking dissolution of marriage is, accordingly, allowed. The respondent would be entitled to permanent alimony as ordered by this judgment and decree.

55. The Registry is directed to draw up the decree accordingly and transmit a copy of this judgment along with the decree to the concerned Family Court.

56. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.