1. WP.No.5581 of 2006 (CNR.No.HBHC010211562006) Reserved on 31.078.2026 Pronounced on 15.09.2026 Uploaded on 15.09.2026 Between Anand Pad Kumar ….Petitioner And The Chairman, Telangana Grameena Bank, Hyderabad and two others. This Writ Petition is filed to issue a Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of respondent in seeking to recover an amount of Rs.10.78 lakhs from the petitioner’s salary as illegal, arbitrary and to set aside the proceedings No.F/DP/CVO/F3/50 dated 13.12.2005 and to direct the respondents to refund the already recovered amounts in terms of the impugned proceedings.

2. Heard Sri Vasudeva Reddy, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri Mujib Kumar Sadasivuni, learned Standing Counsel for respondents.

3. The brief facts, as averred in the writ petition, are that the petitioner was working as Officer, MMGS-II, Sri Satavahana Grameena Bank, Choppadandi, Karimnagar District; that he was issued with a charge sheet dated 08.05.2000 alleging certain irregularities; that the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation denying the charges; that thereafter, a departmental enquiry was conducted; and that, by proceedings dated 08.06.2005, the petitioner was imposed with the punsihment of reduction of increment for a period of three years without cumulative effect, which, according to the petitioner, had attained finality.

               3.1. It is further averred that, thereafter, the respondent issued proceedings No.F/DP/CVO/F3/50 dated 13.12.2005 proposing to revise the punishment by recovering an amount of Rs.10.78 lakhs from the salary of the petitioner; that the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 21.12.2005 opposing the proposed recovery; and that, without passing any order on the said explanation, the respondent commenced recovery of an amount of Rs.2,480/- per month from the petitioner’s salary with effect from February, 2006; and that aggrieved by the same, petitioner has filed this Writ Petition.

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the charge sheet dated 08.05.2000 had culminated in the order dated 08.06.2005, whereby the punishment of reduction of increment for a period of three years without cumulative effect was imposed; that the respondent-appellate authority could not impose a fresh punishment by directing recovery of Rs.10.78 lakhs from the petitioner’s salary in respect of the very same disciplinary proceedings after the earlier punishment had attained finality, and such an action would amount to imposing a second punishment for the same misconduct and would offend the principle against double jeopardy.

               4.1. He further submitted that the proceedings dated 13.12.2005, though styled as a show-cause notice, demonstrated that the respondent had already arrived at a conclusion that Rs.10.78 lakhs was liable to be recovered from the salary of the petitioner; and that the proceedings were, therefore, predetermined and arbitrary; that there was no allegation of misappropriation against the petitioner in the charge sheet dated 08.05.2000 and, therefore, there was no justification for ordering to recover Rs.10.78 lakhs from the salary of the petitioner.

               4.2. He further submitted that under the applicable Service Regulations, recovery from the emoluments of an employee towards the loss caused to the Bank and reduction to a lower grade are distinct forms of major penalty; that once the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, vide order dated 08.06.2005, had attained finality, respondent No.1 could not subsequently propose to revise the penalty imposed on the petitioner by the disciplinary authority, for recovery of Rs.10.78 lakhs, vide notice dated 13.12.2005; that the reply submitted by the petitioner on 21.12.2005, but, without considering/ignoring the same, respondent No.1 had commenced recovery from the salary of the petitioner from the month of February, 2006; and that arrears of revised salary due on 01.04.2006 were also ordered to be withheld. Learned counsel finally submitted that impugned proceedings dated 13.12.2005 and consequential recoveries are, therefore, illegal and arbitrary and are liable to be set aside.

               4.3. He further submitted that the Board of Directors were required to demonstrate independent application of mind to the petitioner’s defence, particularly when a separate punishment of recovery was sought to be imposed and prayed to allow the Writ Petition.

5. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for petitioner relied on the following judgments:-

               a) D.Subhash Chandra Bose Babu v. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board and Another (1995 SCC Online AP 738):

Wherein the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh has held as under:

               “As far as the appellate authority passing an order of dismissal in an appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the disciplinary authority, the law is very clear in this regard as laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision cited (vide supra), which says that the appellate authority cannot exercise its review powers in an appeal filed by the aggrieved party and impose a higher punishment than that of the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority.”

               b) Makeshwar Nath Srivastava v. State of Bihar and Others (1971 (1) SCC 662): Wherein the High Court of Patna has held as under:

               “In the absence of any other provision of law or any rule, conferring on the State Government the power to pass an order of dismissal in exercise of its revisional power or power of general superintendence, the general principle must prevail, namely, that an appellate authority in an appeal by an aggrieved party may either dismiss his appeal or allow it either wholly or partly and uphold or set aside or modify the order challenged in such appeal. It cannot surely impose on such an appellant a higher penalty and condemn him to a position worse than the one he would be in if he had not hazarded to file an appeal.”

               c) Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd and Others ((2003) 2 SCC 111):

               Wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:

               “The statutory interdict of use and enjoyment of the property must be strictly construed. It is well settled that when a statutory authority is required to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof.”

               d) Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of M.P. ((2004) 2 SCC 56):

               Wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:

               “Though there cannot be any quarrel with the general principle highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if a thing is required to be done in a particular way it should be done in that way, the position here is different in view of our conclusions that the requirements of Section 50 of the Act were sufficiently complied with.”

               e) Chandra Singh and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Another ((2003) 6 SCC 545):

               Wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:

               “Compliance with prerequisites of such a rule, it is well-settled, is mandatory and not directory. Such a plea has expressly been negatived by this Court. (See Rajat Baran Roy case, paras 13 to 16.). It is fairly well settled that the legality or otherwise of an order passed by a statutory authority must be judged on the face thereof as the reasons contained therein and cannot be supplemented by an affidavit. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Comm).

6. Per Contra, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-Bank submitted that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of proper and necessary parties; that the Board of Directors of the erstwhile Sri Satavahana Grameena Bank, which was issued the impugned proceedings order dated 13.12.2005 were not made as parties to the Writ Petition and hence, no relief can be sought against them.

               6.1. He further submitted that the Board of Directors have suo motto taken up the case and issued the impugned proceedings dated 13.12.2005, proposing to enhance the punishment by imposed by the disciplinary Authority.

               6.2. He further submitted that the Board of Directors, are empowered to exercise their discretion to reconsider the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority and to confirm, reduce or enhance the same; that the subsequent direction for recovery of the fraud amount was part of the enhanced punishment and could not be characterised as a second punishment so as to attract the principle of double jeopardy.

               6.3. He further submitted that the fact that the petitioner’s explanation was not considered would not, by itself, render the proposed enhancement of punishment not executable; that the contention of the petitioner that the show-cause notice was predetermined merely because it referred to the proposed recovery was untenable; that the notice was intended to afford the petitioner an opportunity to explain why the proposed action should not be taken, and such opportunity was in fact availed by him and therefore, there was no violation of principles of natural justice.

               6.4. He further submitted that the petitioner’s assertion that there was no basis for recovery in the absence of a specific charge of misappropriation was also incorrect; that the charges and the material forming part of the disciplinary proceedings related to the fraudulent transactions, including the relevant vouchers and cheques, and the petitioner’s misconduct had been established in the enquiry; that the recovery was therefore, consequential to the loss attributable to the misconduct proved against him.

               6.5. He further submitted that the gravity of the misconduct was required to be viewed in the context of the petitioner being a bank officer dealing with public money and occupying a position of trust; that the punishment of recovery from the salary of the petitioner commensurates with the misconduct proved and therefore, does not warrant interference merely on the ground of proportionality. Learned counsel finally submitted that the Writ Petition is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed.

7. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material available on record.

8. The material available on record discloses that subsequent to imposition of punishment by the disciplinary authority on conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the matter was suo motto reopened by the Board of Directors, who in the meeting held on 07.12.2005, unanimously decided to recover the fraud amount from the petitioner. In pursuance of the resolution passed in the meeting, proceedings dated 13.12.2005, was issued proposing to recover the amount of Rs.10.78 lakhs from the petitioner.

9. It is pertinent to note that it is the specific case of the petitioner that he submitted a reply on 21.12.2005 to the proceedings dated 13.12.2005, but, the respondents without considering the same, and without passing any speaking orders thereon, have commenced recovery from the salary of the petitioner from the month of February, 2005 itself.

10. Merely because the Board of Directors are empowered to act in their discretion, they cannot proceed to implement the proposed punishment imposed on the petitioner in an arbitrary manner, that too, even without passing any orders thereon.

11. The power to impose or enhance a penalty must necessarily flow from the applicable statutory or regulatory framework and must be exercised in accordance with such provisions.

12. In this regard it is pertinent to refer to D. Subhash Chandra Bose Babu’s case (cited supra) and Makeshwar Nath Srivastava’s case (cited supra), which emphasises the principle that an authority hearing an appeal preferred by an aggrieved employee cannot, in the absence of an enabling provision, place the employee in a position worse than the one in which he stood before preferring the appeal.

13. In the present case, admittedly, no appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the order passed by the disciplinary authority. While the things stood thus, the Board of Directors of respondent-Bank suo motu taken up the matter and proposed to enhance the punishment imposed on the petitioner, and in support of their said action, they failed to place any material or any specific provision empowering them to enhance the punishment imposed on delinquent employee. Even assuming that the Board of Directors possessed the power to enhance the punishment, such power was required to be exercised by application of mind and the reasons therefore, required to be recorded. Once the Disciplinary Authority had imposed a particular penalty after conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, the Board of Directors of the respondent- Bank, while exercising their suo motu powers to substantially enhance the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, were required to indicate why the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority was inadequate and why the circumstances of the case warranted the enhanced punishment. Without compliance of the said requirement and that too, even without passing orders pursuant to the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the proceedings, dated 13.12.2005, the respondents commenced recovery from the salary of the petitioner from the month of February, 2005. This prima facie amounts to abuse of powers vested in the Board of Directors.

14. More particularly, when the proposed action involved not merely enhancement of the existing punishment but also recovery of substantial amounts allegedly representing the loss caused to the Bank, the authority was required to record cogent reasons for such action.The requirement of recording reasons assumes greater significance where an authority proposes to enhance a punishment already imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The decision-making process must disclose that the authority has independently considered the defence of the delinquent employee and has arrived at the conclusion that the original punishment was inadequate. Mere proceeding in pursuance of the proceedings dated 13.12.2005, without disclosing the reasons which justify enhancement, cannot be treated as sufficient application of mind.

15. The contention of the respondents that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity by way of the show-cause notice dated 13.12.2005 cannot, by itself, negate the defect in the final order.

16. The opportunity of submitting an explanation is meaningful only when the authority considers the explanation and records reasons for accepting or rejecting the material submissions raised therein. In the instant case, this Court finds that there is no such independent consideration in a manner sufficient to sustain the enhanced punishment.

17. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that the proceedings dated 13.12.2005, enhancing the punishment and directing recovery cannot be sustained.

18. Accordingly, the writ petition is partly allowed, the proceedings No.F/DP/CVO/F3/50 dated 13.12.2005, are hereby set aside. Consequently, the amounts, if any, recovered from the salary of the petitioner shall be refunded to him.

19. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.