1. This Writ Petition is filed to issue a writ of Mandamus declaring the continuance of proceedings No.HAL/HD/3157/E/LC dated 29.05.2004 of the 2nd respondent, even after the petitioner’s superannuation, as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction and for consequential relief.

2. Heard Dr. P.B.Vijaya Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt. V. Uma Devi, learned counsel for the respondents.

3. Brief facts of the case as averred in the writ affidavit are that the petitioner joined the respondent company in the year 1975 claiming to be Scheduled Tribe (valmiki caste) on the basis of a Caste Certificate given by a local MLA; that there has been a lot of debate in the Government and various proceedings were pending in various forums with regard to categorization of the status of valmiki caste under Scheduled Tribe. Later, the respondent company issued a charge memo bearing No.HAL/HD/3157/ E/PD dated 26.05.1988; that after conducting a detail domestic enquiry, the disciplinary authority dropped the proceedings against the petitioner by taking a lenient view of the matter, vide proceedings No.HAL/HD/3157/LC dated 26.09.1998, and also issued proceedings considering the petitioner under general category with effect from 02.12.1987; that subsequent thereto, the petitioner made representations dated 06.10.1998, 16.06.1999 and 25.02.2000 to regulate his promotion as a general candidate, since all promotions have been denied during the interregnum period of enquiry; that vide proceedings dated 29.03.2000, the promotion of the petitioner has been regulated by granting notional benefits for the period during which disciplinary proceedings were pending; that on 07.05.2000, petitioner was promoted as Senior Master Technician (Welding) with effect from 01.04.1998 and was confirmed in the said cadre, vide proceedings dated 13.12.2000.

4. It is further averred that while the matter stood thus, the respondent-company issued a fresh charge memo No.HAL/HD/3157/LC dated 29.05.2004 for the same charge; that challenging the said memo, the petitioner filed a writ petition vide W.P.No.9889 of 2004 before this Court and this Court vide interim order dated 18.06.2004, granted interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the said charge memo. That the petitioner attained superannuation on 31.05.2012, however, his terminal benefits were unpaid; and that, on the assurance given by the respondent-Company that they would close the matter and settle the benefits, if he withdraws the writ petition, the petitioner withdrew the said Writ Petition and the respondent corporation has settled all the benefits except payment of leave salary for 271 days on the ground that enquiry in pursuance of the above charge sheet was pending. Aggrieved by the same, the present Writ Petition is filed.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the earlier charge memo was closed/dropped, and therefore, it is not open to a subordinate authority to initiate fresh proceedings against the petitioner on the same set of facts and circumstances, that too, after a lapse of long period, and hence, the impugned proceedings are illegal, arbitrary and are impermissible under law.

               5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the issue raised in the present writ petition is squarely covered by order passed by the erstwhile High Court of A.P. in K.S.Chalam vs. Bank of India (1998 (2) ALD 298). He also he relied on the judgment dated 10.03.1998 in Writ Appeal No.249 of 1998.

               5.2. He further submitted that continuance of disciplinary proceedings after superannuation of an employee, in the absence of any specific provision to that effect in the Rules, is illegal and impermissible under law and the said issue is no longer res-integra. In support of his submission, he relied upon decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagirathi Jena vs. Board of Directors, OSFC ((1999) 3 SCC 666).

6. By contending as above, learned counsel for the petitioner finally prayed to allow the Writ Petition and to order for payment of leave salary together with interest @ 24% p.a. to the petitioner.

7. Learned counsel for respondents, by referring to counter affidavit, submitted that the Director of Tribal Welfare, Hyderabad vide its letter Rc.No.5009/87-TRI-VC-6, dated 02.12.1987 intimated that “Valmiki” sub-caste was declared as Scheduled Tribe only in the Agency Tracts of Andhra Pradesh and Chittoor District, from where the petitioner hails, has never been declared as Agency Tract and as such, even if he belongs to Valmiki sub-caste, the same cannot be treated as Scheduled Tribe and hence, the Caste certificate issued by the MLA is void.

               7.1. She further submitted that the petitioner produced Andhra Pradesh Government Order dated 02.08.1968, which was contradictory to the report of Director of Tribal Welfare. In response to the charge memo dated 29.05.2004, the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 14.06.2004, challenging the maintainability of the charge memo and sought one month time to file detail explanation. However, instead of filing detail explanation, the petitioner filed a writ petition-WPNo.9889 of 2004 before this Court and this Court granted interim stay initially for four weeks. During the pendency of Writ Petition, the petitioner superannuated from the service of the respondent company on 31.05.2012. For final settlement of his retirement benefits, the petitioner withdrew the said Writ Petition with a liberty to raise the issue before the respondent administration for release of his pensionary benefits. Subsequently, PF and Gratuity amount were paid to the petitioner.

               7.2. She further submitted that pending enquiry proceedings, the present Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner to declare the enquiry proceedings as illegal and seeking payment of leave salary together with interest @ 24% p.a. from the date of amount payable till the date of actual payment. She further submitted that the reliefs sought for in the Writ Petition are wholly misconceived, since the petitioner has submitted a false caste certificate to secure appointment.

               7.3. Learned counsel for respondents has vehemently contended that the Rules are very clear with regard to false claim of a person who seeks employment in Government Undertaking against the vacancies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, etc. The presidential Directives issued in this regard laid down that any claim of a person as belonging to SC/ST if proved to be false, his services should be terminated forthwith and criminal proceedings should be initiated against such person. She further submitted that terminal benefits cannot be given in a case where the appointment was found to have been obtained fraudulently and based on false caste certificate and hence, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition.

8. In support of her contentions, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commissioner (1994 SCC (6) 241), wherein, it is held as under:-

               “As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee holding that the certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation and confiscation simultaneously, it should be communicated to the educational institution concerned or the appointing authority by registered post with acknowledgement due with a request to cancel the admission or the appointment. The Principal, etc., of the educational institution responsible for making the admission or the appointing authority, should cancel the admission/ appointment without any further notice to the candidate and debar the candidate from further study or continue in office in a post.”

9. Learned counsel for respondents also relied upon judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dayaram vs. Sudhir Batham & Ors (2012 (1) SCC 333), wherein it was held as under:-

               “Having regard to the scheme for verification formulated by this Court in Madhuri Patil [(1994) 6 SCC 241], the Scrutiny Committees carry out verification of caste certificates issued without prior enquiry, as for example, the caste certificates issued by Tahsildars or other officers of the departments of Revenue/Social Welfare/Tribal Welfare, without any enquiry or on the basis of selfaffidavits about caste. If there were to be a legislation governing or regulating grant of caste certificates, and if caste certificates are issued after due and proper inquiry, such caste certificates will not call for verification by the Scrutiny Committees. Madhuri Patil ((1994) 6 SCC 241) provides for verification only to avoid false and bogus claims. The said scheme and the directions therein have been satisfactorily functioning for the last one-and-a-half decades. If there are any shortcomings, the Government can always come up with an appropriate legislation to substitute the said scheme. We see no reason why the procedure laid down in Madhuri Patil [(1994) 6 SCC 241] should not continue in the absence of any legislation governing the matter.”

10. This Court has considered the submissions advanced on behalf of learned counsel appearing for both the parties and perused the entire material available on record.

11. It is evident from record that initially, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner in the year 1988 and later, the said proceedings were dropped and subsequently, again charge memo dated 29.05.2004 was issued to the petitioner during the course of his employment, however, the enquiry was not concluded during his service and it continued even after his superannuation.

12. It is appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagirathi Jena (cited supra), wherein it is observed as under:-

               “It will be noticed from the above said regulations that no specific provision was made for deducting any amount from the provident fund consequent to any misconduct determined in the departmental enquiry nor was any provision made for continuance of the departmental enquiry after superannuation.

               In view of the absence of such a provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30-6-1995, there was no authority vested in the Corporation for continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such an authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement.”

13. In the present case, though the disciplinary proceedings are pending, the respondent company paid all the benefits to the petitioner except the leave salary for 271 days.

14. In the instant case, in the counter affidavit of respondent company, there is no reference whatsoever to the Disciplinary Rules or Regulations enabling the respondent company to continue the proceedings against the petitioner post retirement.

15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagirathi Jena’s case (cited supra) held that the right to leave encashment is not merely a statutory entitlement but also carries the imprimatur of a constitutional right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Article 300-A mandates that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law. Consequently, any attempt by an employer to withhold or deny any part of the retiral benefits, leave encashment in the present case without the backing of an enabling statutory provision, is impermissible and unsustainable in law.

16. It is also pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jitendra Kumar Srivastava’s case (cited supra), wherein it is observed that it is not open to the State Government to take away a part of the pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any statutory provision to that effect.

17. In the considered opinion of this Court the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner could not have been continued post retirement in the absence of Rules permitting therefor. Therefore, the respondent company has committed an error in withholding the payment of leave salary for 271 days.

18. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the respondents company is directed to release the payment of leave salary for 271 days to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the petitioner shall be entitled to interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of this writ petition till the date of payment. No order as to costs.

19. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand dismissed.