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CDJ 2026 MHC 6174
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| Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras |
| Case No : WP. No. 30703 of 2026 & WMP. Nos. 33726 & 33727 of 2026 |
| Judges: THE HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE P.T. ASHA |
| Parties : S. Senthilkumaran Versus The State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by its Principal Secretary to Government, Home (Police-XVII) Department, Chennai & Others |
| Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: G. Sankaran, Senior Counsel, for S. Nedunchezhiyan, Advocate. For the Respondents: S. Srinivasan, AGP. |
| Date of Judgment : 04-08-2026 |
| Head Note :- |
Constitution of India - Article 226 -
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| Summary :- |
Statutes / Acts / Rules / Orders Mentioned:
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- Section 109 of the IPC
- G.O.(Ms.) No. 66, Human Resources Management (N) Department, dated 06.07.2022
- Clause (21) of G.O.(Ms.) No. 66, Human Resources Management (N) Department, dated 06.07.2022
- Article 226 of the Constitution of India
Catch Words:
Delay, Quash, Departmental proceedings, Criminal case, Disproportionate assets, Natural justice
Summary:
The petitioner, a senior fire service officer, challenged departmental notices issued long after the alleged misconduct period, contending that identical facts underlie a pending criminal case under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC. He argued that the delay in issuing the charge memo violated natural justice and that the Government Order’s Clause 21 permits staying disciplinary action when complex questions of fact arise. The Court noted the inordinate, unexplained delay—over a decade—and its prejudice to the petitioner’s defence. Citing precedent, the Court held that such delay vitiates the charge memo and warrants quashing the departmental orders. However, the Court left open the possibility of reviving disciplinary proceedings if the criminal case ends unfavourably. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed.
Conclusion:
Petition Allowed |
| Judgment :- |
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(Prayer: Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India praying to issue a writ of Certioraified mandamus call for the records relating to the impugned order issued by the 3rd Respondent in Na.Ka.No.3515/Aa/2025 dated 13.01.2026 and the subsequent impugned notice issued by the 4th Respondent in Na.Ka.No.3515/Aa/2024 dated 06.07.2026 and to QUASH the same and consequently directing the Respondents to defer the enquiry proceedings based on the charge memo issued by the 3rd Respondent in Ku.Pa.No.01/2025 Na.Ka.No.3515/Aa/2024 dt.21.11.2025 till the conclusion of the criminal case in FIR No.2/AC/2018/CC-III dt.25.01.2018.)
1. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:
“call for the records relating to the impugned order issued by the 3rd Respondent in Na.Ka.No.3515/Aa/2025 dated 13.01.2026 and the subsequent impugned notice issued by the 4th Respondent in Na.Ka.No.3515/Aa/2024 dated 06.07.2026 and to QUASH the same and consequently directing the Respondents to defer the enquiry proceedings based on the charge memo issued by the 3rd Respondent in Ku.Pa.No.01/2025 Na.Ka.No.3515/Aa/2024 dt.21.11.2025 till the conclusion of the criminal case in FIR No.2/AC/2018/CC-III dt.25.01.2018.”
2. The petitioner would submit that he was initially appointed as a Station Officer through the TNPSC in the Tamil Nadu Fire and Rescue Services Department in the year 2001. Subsequently, based on his seniority and eligibility, he was promoted as an Assistant District Officer in the year 2023.
3. The petitioner would submit that, based on an anonymous complaint, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner by the V&AC Department, Chennai City-III Unit, in FIR No.2/AC/2018/CC-III, dated 25.01.2018, for the alleged offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, read with Section 109 of the IPC, alleging possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of income for the check period from 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2015. The petitioner would submit that, after enquiry, no acquisition of assets beyond the permissible limit was found during the said check period. However, a second Final Opportunity Notice dated 10.04.2023 was issued by extending the check period up to 31.03.2017. Thereafter, a Final Report was filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kancheepuram, in S.F.No.2 of 2025, dated 28.05.2025, alleging that the petitioner had acquired movable and immovable assets worth Rs.39,51,377/- disproportionate to his known sources of income.
4. The petitioner would submit that, even as per the records, there was no acquisition of any immovable property by the petitioner during the period from 2014 to 2017 so as to substantiate the allegation of acquisition of disproportionate assets.
5. The petitioner would submit that, while the aforesaid criminal proceedings are pending against the petitioner in respect of the very same allegations, the 1st respondent, by proceedings dated 30.06.2025, directed the 2nd respondent to initiate departmental proceedings against the petitioner on the very same set of allegations, as contained in Part-III(a) under the heading “Main Allegation” of the report of the investigating authority.
6. The petitioner would submit that, pursuant thereto, the 3rd respondent issued a charge memo dated 21.11.2025, framing charges against the petitioner alleging acquisition of assets worth Rs.39,51,377/- disproportionate to his known sources of income during the check period from 01.04.2011 to 31.03.2017. Thus, the charges framed in the departmental proceedings are identical to the allegations forming the subject matter of the pending criminal case. The 3rd respondent, by the said charge memo, called upon the petitioner to submit his explanation within a period of 15 days. The petitioner would further submit that the witnesses cited in Annexure-III to the charge memo are the very same witnesses cited in the criminal case, and the documents listed in Annexure- IV to the charge memo are also the same documents relied upon in the criminal proceedings.
7. The petitioner would submit that it has been consistently held in a catena of decisions, including the judgment of this Court in Indian Overseas Bank v. P. Ganesan and others, reported in 2006 (1) CTC 689, that where the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar sets of facts, and the criminal charges are grave in nature involving complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings until the conclusion of the criminal case.
8. In these circumstances, the petitioner had submitted his representation the respondents to defer all further proceedings of the charge memo till the conclusion of the criminal case. However, the same has not been considered by the respondents. Therefore, the petitioner had filed WP.No.48222 of 2025. This Court by order dated 10.12.2025, directed the respondents to consider and pass orders on the representation of the petitioner.
9. Pursuant to the directions of this Hon’ble Court, the 3rd respondent passed the impugned order dated 13.01.2026, rejecting the petitioner’s request and directing him to submit his explanation to the charge memo.
10. The petitioner would submit that the respondents have erroneously construed G.O.(Ms.) No.66, Human Resources Management (N) Department, dated 06.07.2022, as mandating continuation of departmental proceedings in every vigilance case, without considering the exception under Clause (21) thereof, which permits keeping the proceedings in abeyance where complicated questions of fact and law arise or continuation is likely to prejudice the defence in the criminal case.
11. The petitioner would submit that the allegations involve determination of disproportionate assets based on various financial transactions over a prolonged check period, involving complicated questions of fact and law, and therefore fall within the exception under Clause (21) of the above said Government Order.
12. The petitioner would further submit that the witnesses and documents in the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are identical, and continuation of the departmental proceedings would prejudice the petitioner’s defence in the criminal case.
13. The petitioner would submit that the respondents have failed to consider the above aspects and has mechanically directed continuation of the departmental proceedings.
14. The petitioner would submit that, thereafter, the 4th respondent issued the impugned notice dated 06.07.2026, calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation to the charge memo dated 21.11.2025 within three days, failing which orders would be passed on the available materials.
15. The petitioner would submit that the criminal case is still pending and that the impugned orders dated 13.01.2026 and 06.07.2026 have been passed after a lapse of more than a decade from the date of the alleged occurrence, that too without properly considering the petitioner’s representation, the relevant judgments, and the applicable Government Orders. Therefore, challenging the impugned orders, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking the aforesaid reliefs.
16. Heard both sides and perused the materials available on record.
17. For an alleged offence said to have occurred during the period from 2011 to 2015, in respect of which a criminal case has been filed against the petitioner and a final report has been filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kancheepuram, in S.F.No.02/2025, the impugned notices dated 13.01.2026 and 06.07.2026 have been issued by the 3rd and 4th respondents respectively nearly a decade after the date of the alleged offence. The criminal case has not been concluded to date. Further proceedings pursuant to the charge memo would be harsh upon the petitioner particularly when the criminal case arising out of the very same set of facts is pending consideration. Admittedly, disciplinary proceedings which is on the very same set of facts as those in the criminal case can be proceeded with only after the criminal case is disposed of. However, in the instant case, the charge memo itself was issued on 21.11.2025, nearly a decade after the date of the alleged offence.
18. The issue of delay in issuing the charge memo has been considered by a learned Judge of this Court in the decision reported in 2000 (4) CTC 517 – C.P.Harish Vs. The Central Warehousing Corporation. In the aforesaid case, the charge memo had been issued nearly 13 years after the incident. The learned Judge had observed as follows:-
“17.This Court is conscious of the fact that it would not be open to the Tribunal or Court to quash the charges even at the threshold. However, I have already stated that the alleged irregularities or lapses had taken place in the year 1982 and 1991 respectively and action was taken only in the year 1995 and 1998 respectively. I have already held that the inordinate and unexplained delay vitiates the charge memos and the same are liable to be quashed. The disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after a lapse of considerable time. Such delay makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. As observed earlier, delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. Here, in our cases, the petitioner has raised a plea that the delay is likely to cause prejudice to him in defending himself. If such plea is raised, the Court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. After the delay of 13 years and 8 years, it would be impossible for the petitioner to remember the identity of the witnesses whom he could summon to appear before the enquiry authority to support his case. Even if he could summon their presence, it would be a doubtful proposition whether they would be in a position to remember that happened more than 13/8 years back and help him in his defence. Further more, the petitioner may not be in a position to effectively cross – examine the witnesses to be examined on the side of the corporation. Practically, it would be a doubtful proposition that either the prosecution witnesses or the defence witnesses would be in a position to remember the facts of the case and advance the case of either the Corporation or the petitioner. Under these circumstances and on the facts and circumstances disclosed, I hold that the inordinate delay will constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself that it would amount to violation of principles of natural justice and as such, the impugned charge memorandum must be struck down. By weighing all the factors both for and against the petitioner / delinquent officer. I hold that quashing the charge memorandum is just and proper in the circumstances”.
19. By reason of the delay, the petitioner would also not be able to effectively defend himself. The dicta laid down in the above judgment is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.
20. Therefore, considering the efflux of time, it would be in the interest of justice to quash the impugned orders. However, considering the fact that the criminal case is yet to reach the finality, it is open to the respondents to revive the disciplinary proceedings, in accordance with law, if the criminal case is decided against the petitioner. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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