1.The above writ petition is filed seeking the following reliefs:

                  “i. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent to consider and dispose of Exhibit-P5 representation submitted by the petitioner taking into account the nature of allegations within a time frame to be fixed by this Hon’ble Court;

                  ii. Declare that the inaction on the part of the respondent in not considering Exhibit-P5 is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice;

                  iii. Issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate direction directing the respondent to permit the petitioner to join duty as "Assistant Manager (Engineer - Fire)" pursuant to Exhibit-P1 selection, notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal case, subject to the outcome of the same;

                  iv. To direct the respondent to provisionally permit the petitioner to join duty as "Assistant Manager (Engineer - Fire)" pursuant to Exhibit-P1, subject to the result of the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 35/2026 To dispense with the English translation of vernacular documents.

                  v. Grant such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

2. Petitioner, a native of Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, was provisionally selected by the respondent Bank to the post of “Assistant Manager (Engineer – Fire) Specialist Officer in Junior Management Grade Scale – I”. Petitioner was arrayed as the 1st accused in Crime No.519 of 2025 of Peroorkada Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram for the offences punishable under Section 85 of BNS, which is now pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court – IV, Thiruvananthapuram as C.C.No.35 of 2026, on a complaint preferred by the wife of the petitioner. Petitioner submits that he is falsely implicated in the above crime and was granted anticipatory bail by the Additional Sessions Court - VII, Thiruvananthapuram in Crl. M.C. No.1170 of 2025 as per Ext.P2 order dated 27.05.2025. On account of the registration of the aforesaid case, the respondent Bank is not inclined to proceed with the appointment of the petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner has submitted Ext.P3 written request, seeking an extension of six months’ time to join duty. Respondent Bank, vide Ext.P4 reply dated 27.02.2026 issued to the petitioner through Speed Post in the address of the petitioner at Thiruvanathapuram, though granted an extension of time up to 18.05.2026, made it clear that no further extension will be granted and the candidature will be cancelled. Thereafter, another representation was filed as Ext.P5, requesting the respondents to permit him to join duty notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal case. As no action was taken on Ext.P5, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking a direction to permit him to join duty as Assistant Manager (Engineer – Fire) pursuant to Ext.P1 selection notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal case, subject to the outcome of the same.

3. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by respondents, raising various contentions including the maintainability of the writ petition before this Court for want of territorial jurisdiction. It is submitted that no cause of action for filing the writ petition has arisen in the State of Kerala, so as to enable the petitioner to file the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To substantiate the said contention, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner was shortlisted and participated in the interview at Mumbai, Maharashtra and was provisionally called to report for duty at State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Bangalore, Karnataka and further that none of the respondents arrayed in the writ petition is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Further, as per Clause P(xv) of “General Information” in Ext.RI(A) Advertisement dated 22.11.2024, any legal proceedings in respect of any matter of claim or dispute arising out of the advertisement and/or an application in response thereto can be instituted only in Mumbai and Courts/Tribunals/Forums at Mumbai alone shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to try and entertain any cause/dispute. In the counter affidavit, it is admitted that the petitioner was shortlisted and called for interview to the post of Assistant Manager (Engineer – Fire) and was provisionally selected and was advised to complete the medical test and to report for document verification and other pre-joining formalities. It is also admitted in the counter affidavit that it is after the interview of the petitioner that the respondents received a complaint from one Mr. Vijayakrishnan, the father-in-law of the petitioner, that a crime has been registered as FIR No.519 of 2025 on 14.04.2025 against the petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner submitted an application for extension of six months' time for joining duty so that he could settle the criminal case against him and filed a cases as Crl.M.C.No.3766 of 2026 before this Court to quash the criminal case. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank relied on Clause P(xix) of the “General Information” in Ext.R1(A), which provided that at the time of interview, the candidate will be required to provide details regarding criminal cases pending against him/her, if any and suppression of material facts will result in cancellation/termination of candidature at any point, even if the candidate is selected and his/her selection will be cancelled in such circumstances. It is further provided in the said Clause that the Bank may also conduct independent verification, inter alia, including verification of police records, etc., and the Bank reserves the right to deny the appointment depending upon such disclosure and/or independent verification. It is further stated that as part of the independent verification process, the respondents have sent a letter to the Commissioner of Police, Thiruvananthapuram seeking report regarding the character and antecedents of the petitioner and a reply has been received from Assistant Commissioner of Police, District Special Branch, Thiruvananthapuram City, intimating that Crime No.519 of 2025 alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 85 of BNS is pending against the petitioner and that the same is under investigation. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank further submits that as per Clause 12 of “Important Instructions” in Ext.R1(A) Advertisement, candidates against whom there is/are adverse reports regarding character and antecedents, moral turpitude are not eligible to apply for the post. It is further provided that if there is any such adverse order/report against the shortlisted/selected candidates, their candidature/services will be rejected. Therefore, it is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the Bank that the instruction that the appointment will be cancelled, cannot be branded as illegal, unjust or arbitrary. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned counsel for the respondents sought dismissal of the writ petition. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the respondents relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in Anil Bhardwaj v. Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh and others [AIR 2020 SC 4971] and also the judgment of the Patna High Court in Ravi Kumar Choudhary S/o.Shri Dukhi Chand Choudhary v. Chairman-Cum-Managing [2012 SCC OnLine Pat 1826].

4. I have heard the rival contentions on both sides.

5. Since the question of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the above writ petition is raised by the respondents, this Court has to first decide on the aforesaid issue of territorial jurisdiction. It is relevant to refer to Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which provides as follows:

                  "226 Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

                  (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

………………...”  (underline supplied)

                  Therefore, this Court can entertain the writ petition only if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial jurisdiction. The stand of the respondents is that the petitioner was shortlisted and participated in the interview at Mumbai and was directed to report for duty at State Bank of India, Local Head Office, Bangalore, Karnataka and none of the respondents are situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and further that as per Clause P(xv) of General Information in Ext.R1(A) Advertisement, any legal proceedings in respect of any matter of claim or dispute arising out of that advertisement can be instituted only in the courts in Mumbai. In Ravi Kumar Choudhary’s case cited Supra, the Allahabad Bank invited application online from eligible candidates for appointment to the post of Clerk through a common written examination to be conducted in 25 States and Union Territories against 1100 sanctioned posts and vacant posts and the petitioner being eligible on all counts applied for West Bengal where vacancies for Scheduled Caste category were maximum and since the petitioner belonged to that category, he was under the impression that he would have more probability of selection from that zone. Taking into consideration the marks obtained by him in the interview, he was not considered for appointment. Petitioner challenged the same before the Patna High Court, and the respondents raised a preliminary objection challenging the maintainability of the writ petition before the Patna High Court since the petitioner had applied for the West Bengal category and the advertisement, examination, interview and result were all held/issued at Calcutta. The Patna High Court taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner had chosen West Bengal since the vacancies of the Scheduled Caste category were maximum there and had participated in the selection process at West Bengal, held that no proceedings could have been initiated in the Courts in Patna and the proceedings ought to have been initiated in the High Court of Calcutta. The decision in Ravi Kumar Choudhary’s case can have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in as much as, the petitioner therein was at liberty to select a State and he selected West Bengal and he participated in the selection process, which happened in West Bengal and challenged the rejection order before the High Court of Patna and it is in the said circumstances the Court held that High Court of Patna has no jurisdiction to entertain such a case. The present selection is an all India selection and even in Ext.R1(A) it is specified that selected candidates are liable to be posted anywhere in India.

6. In Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another [2004 KHC 1435], the Apex Court held that in view of the expressions used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. In Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and others [(2014) 9 SCC 329], the Apex Court was considering the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition. In the said case, the Shipping Corporation of India in Mumbai cancelled the registration of an employee as a seaman as he was found permanently unfit for sea service due to medical reasons, and the employee, who is residing at his native place in Bihar, sent letters seeking financial claims, which were declined by the Shipping Corporation. Challenging the same, a writ petition was filed before the Patna High Court, and the same was dismissed on the ground that no cause of action arose within its jurisdiction. The Apex Court held that since representations were sent by him from Bihar claiming disability compensation and a copy of the order cancelling registration as seaman was sent to the employee in his address in Bihar, a part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Patna High Court where employee received letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation and thus the Patna High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In the present case also, the representation was submitted by the petitioner from his address in Thiruvanathapuram, Kerala and Ext P4 communication intimating that no further extension will be permitted and the candidature will be cancelled, was sent to the address of the petitioner in Thiruvanathapuram, Kerala by Speed Post with acknowledgement due. Therefore, I am of the view that the decision in Nawal Kishore Sharma’s case will squarely apply in the facts and the circumstances of the present case. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kuchibhotla Srivatsa v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others [2022 KHC OnLine 4620], has held that since the letters which are subject matter of the challenge and by which the petitioner’s request was negatived were addressed to him at Andhra Pradesh and thus, a fraction of the part of the cause of action has arisen within the State of Andhra Pradesh and therefore, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has territorial jurisdiction to hear and decide the lis. In Nageswara Rao M. v. Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Human Resources Development, New Delhi and Others [2015 KHC 3858], the Orissa High Court, while considering a similar issue and taking into consideration the fact that the candidate is a resident of State of Orissa and he was allowed to download application form etc. in State of Orissa, held that cause of action has occurred in State of Orissa and therefore, the High Court of Orissa has jurisdiction to adjudicate the writ petition. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues raised in this writ petition.

7. The respondents also contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the lis relying on Clause P(xv) of Ext.R1(A) Advertisement, which provides that any legal proceedings in respect of any matter of claim or dispute arising out of the advertisement shall be instituted only in courts in Mumbai. The Apex Court in Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India [(2020) 13 SCC 285] was considering a question as to whether a private agreement entered into between the parties in the form of constitution and bye-laws can confer exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at Chennai, ousting the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and a preliminary objection was raised that the writ petition cannot be entertained in the High Court of Mumbai based on the clause in the agreement that there is exclusive jurisdiction on the Courts at Chennai and based on the same, the Bombay High Court accepted the said contention. It is challenging the same that the party has approached the Apex Court and the Court held that the role of the High Court under the Constitution is crucial to ensure the rule of law throughout its territorial jurisdiction and no limitation can be placed on the powers of the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Paragraphs 18, 21 and 22 of the said judgment read as follows:

                  “18. This argument of the second Respondent is misconceived. The existence of an alternate remedy, whether adequate or not, does not alter the fundamentally discretionary nature of the High Court's writ jurisdiction and therefore does not create an absolute legal bar on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by a High Court. The decision whether or not to entertain an action under its writ jurisdiction remains a decision to be taken by the High Court on an examination of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

                  xxxx xxxx xxxx

                  21. The mere existence of alternate forums where the aggrieved party may secure relief does not create a legal bar on a High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction. It is a factor to be taken into consideration by the High Court amongst several factors. Thus, the mere fact that the High Court at Madras is capable of granting adequate relief to the Appellant does not create a legal bar on the Bombay High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction in the present matter.

                  22. This brings us to the question of whether Clause 21 itself creates a legal bar on the Bombay High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction. As discussed above, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is fundamentally discretionary. Even the existence of an alternate adequate remedy is merely an additional factor to be taken into consideration by the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise its writ jurisdiction. This is in marked contradistinction to the jurisdiction of a civil court which is governed by statute. In exercising its discretion to entertain a particular case under Art.226, a High Court may take into consideration various factors including the nature of the injustice that is alleged by the petitioner, whether or not an alternate remedy exists, or whether the facts raise a question of constitutional interpretation. These factors are not exhaustive and we do not propose to enumerate what factors should or should not be taken into consideration. It is sufficient for the present purposes to say that the High Court must take a holistic view of the facts as submitted in the writ petition and make a determination on the facts and circumstances of each unique case.”

                  In Kuchibhotla Srivatsa’s case cited Supra, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has also considered the same issue and relying on the judgment in Maharashtra Chess Association’s case cited Supra, held that any clauses in the prospectus which limit jurisdiction to one Court or the other will not apply to the jurisdiction that is being exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the above, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be ousted based on Clause P(xv) of Ext R1(A) Advertisement.

8. Coming to the facts of the present case, the claim of the petitioner for appointment has been declined only for the reason that he is involved in a criminal case. Such a stand has been taken based on Clause 12 of “Important Instructions” in Ext.R1(A) Advertisement, which mandates that candidates against whom there is/are adverse report regarding character and antecedents, moral turpitude are not eligible to apply for the post and if any such adverse orders/reports against the shortlisted/selected candidates is found/received by the Bank post their selection, their candidature/services will be rejected forthwith. Reliance is also placed on Clause P(xix) of the “General Information” in Ext.R1(A), which mandates that at the time of interview, the candidate will be required to provide details regarding criminal cases pending against him/her, if any and suppression of material facts will result in cancellation/termination of candidature at any point, even if the candidate is selected, his/her selection will be cancelled in such circumstances and the bank is also entitled to conduct independent verification, including verification of police records. Further, it is contended that the bank reserves the right to deny the appointment depending upon such disclosure and/or independent verification. Going by Clause P(xix) of the “General Information” provided in Ext.R1(A), if at the time of interview if there is any suppression of material facts, it would result in cancellation/termination of candidature. Even in the counter affidavit filed, it is admitted that it is only after the interview of the petitioner that the respondent Bank had received a complaint from one Mr.Vijayakrishnan, who is none other than the father-in-law of the petitioner, that a crime has been registered on 14.04.2025, in which the petitioner is arrayed as an accused. Therefore, there is absolutely no suppression on the part of the petitioner at the time of interview, which entails cancellation of his candidature. But, Clause P(xix) of the “General Information” of Ext.R1(A) also provides that the Bank could conduct an independent verification, including verification of police records, and the Bank could deny the appointment depending upon such disclosure. Further, going by Clause 12 of “Important Instructions” in Ext.R1(A), candidates against whom there is/are adverse report regarding character and antecedents, moral turpitude are not eligible to apply for the post and if any such adverse orders/reports against the shortlisted/selected candidates is found/received by the Bank post their selection, their candidature/services will be rejected forthwith. As regards the first limb of Clause 12, the same is regarding the eligibility to apply for the post when there is an adverse report against the candidate regarding character and antecedents and moral turpitude. The said Clause is not applicable in the case of the petitioner because no crime was registered when he applied for the post. Now the second limb will come into play, where candidature could be declined when adverse reports are received by the Bank even post the selection. The question to be considered is whether, only for the reason that a crime was registered which was the off-shoot of the matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife, that too registered only after the interview was over, could be a reason for denying employment to the petitioner. I am of the opinion that only for the reason that a crime has been registered, which is the off-shoot of the matrimonial dispute between the petitioner and his wife, cannot be a reason for rejecting the appointment granted to the petitioner. Whether a case registered under Section 85 of BNS could be categorised as one involving moral turpitude depends upon the facts of each case. There is no general rule that every offence under Section 85 of BNS by its very nature can automatically be translated into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences such as employment, promotion or higher education. The word 'moral turpitude' was considered by the Apex Court in State Bank of India and others v. P.Soupramaniane [(2019) 18 SCC 135] and held in paragraph 8 as follows:

                  "8. There is no doubt that there is an obligation on the Management of the Bank to discontinue the services of an employee who has been convicted by a Criminal Court for an offence involving moral turpitude. Though every offence is a crime against the society, discontinuance from service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only for committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which disclose depravity and wickedness of character can be categorized as offences involving moral turpitude. Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not depends upon the facts and the circumstances of the case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for judging an offence involving moral turpitude are:

                  a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience or society in general;

                  b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one, and

                  c) Whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.

                  The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are: - the person who commits the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the society. "

                  In the above background of definition of 'moral turpitude' as given in P.Soupramaniane's case cited supra, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Brahmjeet Kaushal v. Union of India and Others [2026 SCC OnLine P&H 14213] held in paragraphs 22 to 25 as follows:

                  “22. With all humility at my command, a careful distinction becomes necessary, on the one hand, between the genuine cases of egregious dowry-related cruelty which shock the collective conscience of the society as a whole, and, on the other hand, prosecutions arising out of essentially personal disputes within the precincts of the matrimonial home, which may culminate in compromise, acquittal, or even conviction based on findings of only technical or marginal cruelty.

                  23. Categorisation of a particular case under Section 498-A IPC may or may not involve moral turpitude depends on its own facts and is always debatable, and reasonable people may differ on that question. What cannot be accepted, however, is any general rule that every offence under Section 498-A IPC, by its very nature, must automatically be translated into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences such as employment, promotion or higher education.

                  24. On a plain reading of Section 498-A IPC, the gravamen of the offence is "cruelty" inflicted upon a wife by her husband or his relatives. Its axis is the matrimonial relationship and the conduct within that intimate sphere. To elevate every prosecution under Section 498-A, irrespective of its factual substratum, into an "offence against society" and, on that abstract footing, to brand it in all cases as an offence involving moral turpitude, is a proposition which cannot withstand legal scrutiny. If that idea is accepted, then almost every offence in the Penal Code, 1860 or Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita could easily be described as dealing with a "societal" problem, and almost every conviction would have to be treated as involving moral turpitude. This would wipe out the important difference between ordinary criminal offences and only those acts which are so base, vile, depraved or so shocking to the public conscience, that they deserve to be characterised against involving "moral turpitude".

9. In the present case, admittedly the crime was registered at a time when matrimonial disputes existed between the petitioner and his wife. It is also pertinent to note that the said crime was registered only after the interview was conducted. Even going by the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, the said factum of filing of criminal case was intimated by the father-in-law of the petitioner, that too after the interview was over. The petitioner has already been granted anticipatory bail in the matter, and the proceedings for quashing the crime filed as Crl.M.C.No.3766 of 2026 is pending consideration before this Court.

10. In the light of the above and especially when the proceedings before the Criminal Court has not been concluded, the respondent Bank authorities could not as a general rule, hold that on a mere registration of a crime alleging offence punishable under Section 85 of BNS, the same would automatically be translated into an offence involving moral turpitude for the purpose of civil consequences such as employment as in the present case.

11. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the decision in Anil Bhardwaj's case cited supra, in support of his contention. The Apex Court was considering the claim of the appellant to the post of District Judge (Entry Level) and he was selected and when he was asked to appear before the Medical Board, the appellant was informed that in his attestation form, FIR No.852 of 2014 was registered under Section 498/406/34 IPC, thereby an order was issued declaring the appellant ineligible and his name was deleted from the select list. The Apex Court considering the fact that the selection is being made to judicial service, held that character and integrity of the person should be impeccable and even in the case of acquittal, it has to be examined as to whether that person was completely exonerated in the case or not and that in the said case the acquittal having taken place after the close of the recruitment process, there was no question of examining the acquittal order by the High Court at the time of finalizing the selection process. The Apex Court also took note of the fact that since the acquittal in the case was almost a year after the candidature had been cancelled, held that there is no question of reconsideration of the claim of the appellant and accordingly dismissed the claim raised by him. The above case was in respect of selection to the post of District Judge and therefore the Apex Court held that high scrutiny is required regarding impeccable character and integrity. The same yardstick cannot be applied in the facts of the present case, especially taking note of the circumstances in which the present crime was registered as explained above. Further, the Apex Court declined to interfere, taking note that the appellant's acquittal was almost 1 year after the selection process was completed, and held that, at this distance of time, it cannot be reopened.

Taking into consideration the above facts and circumstances, I am of the view that registration of a crime alone against the petitioner cannot be a reason for denying the appointment due to the petitioner.

Accordingly, I allow the writ petition with a direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner to join duty as Assistant Manager (Engineer – Fire) pursuant to Ext.P1 selection, if it is otherwise in order, notwithstanding the pendency of the criminal case and subject to the outcome of the same. Proceedings in this regard shall be issued by the respondents within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.