1. This writ petition is filed by the mother of the detenu, Manu Mani, challenging Exhibit-P1 detention order dated 20th August, 2025, issued by the Government under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for short, "PITNDPS Act"), and Exhibit-P2 Government Order dated 19th November, 2025, whereby the Government directed that the detenu be detained for a period of one year.

2. The process leading to the issuance of the Detention Order commenced with the submission of proposals dated 28th April, 2025 and 5th June, 2025 by the District Police Chief, Idukki, the sponsoring authority herein, alleging that the detenu was involved in five crimes registered under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, (for short, “NDPS” Act,) during the period from 2019 to 2025. The proposals were thereafter forwarded by the State Police Chief to the Government on 10th June, 2025. The Government placed the matter before the Screening Committee on 23rd June, 2025. Thereafter, the Screening Committee, after considering the matter, made its recommendation, and based on such recommendation, the Detaining Authority issued the impugned Detention Order on 20th August, 2025.

3. The materials placed before us would disclose that the first adverse case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.27/2019 of Narcotic Enforcement Squad, Adimaly, registered for offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(B) and 25 of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 2.75 grams of dry ganja. The detenu was formally arrested in the said crime on 5th February, 2022. The detenu was granted bail on 31st March, 2022 by the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha, inter alia, on the following conditions:

                  “1. The accused shall be released on bail on executing bond for Rs.50,000/- (Fifty thousand) with two solvent sureties for the like sum. The sureties shall produce their title deed for verification.

                  2. The accused shall appear before the investigating officer as and when required and co-operate with the investigation till the final report is filed.

                  3. The accused shall not commit any offence while on bail.

                  4. The accused shall not influence or intimidate the witnesses or interfere with investigation.”

4. After completing the investigation in the aforesaid case, charge sheet was submitted before the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha on 29th April, 2022.

5. The second case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.18/2020 of the Narcotic Enforcement Squad, Adimaly, registered for offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(A), 25 read with Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 15 grams of ganja. The investigation in this case was completed and charge sheet was filed on 7th January, 2021. The detenu thereafter, pleaded guilty to the charge and he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of ₹10,000/- by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Adimaly on 30th September, 2022.

6. The third case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.37 of 2020 of the Narcotic Enforcement Squad, Adimaly, registered for offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 1.100 Kgs. of dry ganja. Since the detenu was in Peerumedu Sub-Jail in connection with other crime he was formally arrested on 5th February, 2022. Later, the detenu was granted bail by the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha on 31st March, 2022, inter alia, on the following conditions:

                  “1. The accused shall be released on bail on executing bond for Rs.50,000/- (Fifty thousand) with two solvent sureties for the like sum. The sureties shall produce their title deed for verification.

                  2. The accused shall appear before the investigating officer as and when required and co-operate with the investigation till the final report is filed.

                  3. The accused shall not commit any offence while on bail.

                  4. The accused shall not influence or intimidate the witnesses or interfere with the investigation.”

7. The investigation in the said case was completed and charge sheet was filed before the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha, on 20th April, 2022.

8. The fourth case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.03/2020 of the Excise Enforcement and Anti Narcotic Special Squad, Idukki, registered for offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 4 Kgs. of dry ganja. Since the detenu was in Peerumedu Sub-Jail in connection with other crime he was formally arrested on 5th February, 2022. Later, the detenu was granted bail by the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha, on 31st March 2022, inter alia, on the following conditions:

                  “1. The accused shall be released on bail on executing bond for Rs.50,000/ with two solvent sureties for the like sum. The sureties shall produce their title deed for verification.

                  2. The accused shall not commit any offence while on bail.

                  3. The accused shall not influence or intimidate the witnesses”

9. The investigation in the said case was completed and charge sheet was filed before the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha, on 24th January, 2024.

10. The fifth case relied upon by the Detaining Authority is Crime No.480/2025 of the Adimaly Police Station, registered for offences under Sections 20(b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act alleging possession of 1.100 Kgs. of dry ganja. In this case, the detenu surrendered before the court and was later granted bail by the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha vide Crl.M.C No.126 of 2025 on 9th June, 2025, inter alia, on the following conditions:

                  “1. The petitioner/accused no.2 shall execute bail bond for Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand only) with two solvent sureties each for the like sum for appearance before the Court.

                  2. The petitioner/accused no.2 shall appear before the Court as and when required.

                  3. The petitioner/accused no:2 shall appear before the investigating Officer on all Mondays between 10.00 am and 11.00 am till final report is filed.

                  4 The petitioner/accused no.2 shall appear before the investigating officer as and when required and co-operate with the investigation,

                  5. The petitioner/accused no.2 shall not influence or threaten or contact the witnesses or destroy evidence or involve in any crime while he is on bail.

                  6. The petitioner/accused no.2 shall not leave the State of Kerala without permission of the Court until final report is filed.”

11. The investigation in the said case was completed and charge sheet was filed before the Special Court for NDPS Act cases, Thodupuzha on 14th June, 2025.

12. We heard Mr. Muhammed Suhair C.A., the learned counsel for the petitioner, and Ms. O.A Nuriya, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor.

13. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the arrest and detention of the detenu pursuant to Exhibits-P1 and P2 are wholly illegal, unauthorized and constitute a wrongful exercise of the statutory power of preventive detention. According to the learned counsel, the impugned orders have been passed without proper application of mind and without recording any cogent reasons justifying the detention, thereby rendering the orders arbitrary and liable to be set aside.

14. It is further submitted that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay both in sponsoring the proposal for preventive detention and in passing the order of detention. The last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu is stated to have occurred on 30th March, 2025. Though the sponsoring authority initially submitted the proposal on 28th April, 2025 and forwarded a further report on 5th June, 2025, the order of detention came to be passed only on 20th August, 2025. It is argued that the unexplained delay at every stage has snapped the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities and the object sought to be achieved by the preventive detention.

15. Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala1, as well as the decision in Nasila K.M. v. Union of India ( 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 14275) , it is contended that although no rigid formula can be prescribed for determining the effect of delay, the test is whether a live and proximate nexus continues to exist between the prejudicial activities and the necessity for detention. According to the petitioner, in the facts of the present case, the delay remains wholly unexplained and has consequently vitiated the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority.

16. It is also contended that the subjective satisfaction contemplated under the PITNDPS Act, must be founded upon an independent and meaningful application of mind. The Detaining Authority, however, has mechanically accepted the proposal submitted by the sponsoring authority without independently examining the necessity for invoking the provisions of the said Act.

17. The learned counsel further submits that the authorities have failed to assign any valid reason as to why preventive detention was considered necessary when the detenu was already in judicial custody. In the absence of any material demonstrating a compelling necessity to invoke the provisions of the PITNDPS Act despite the detenu being in custody, the impugned detention order is liable to be held arbitrary and unsustainable.

18. Lastly, it is contended that neither the sponsoring authority nor the Detaining Authority has placed any material to substantiate the conclusion that the detenu posed such a threat to the public as to warrant preventive detention under PITNDPS Act.

19. Per Contra, the learned Senior Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the writ petition and contended that the impugned order of detention has been passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the PITNDPS Act, after due application of mind and in compliance with all the procedural safeguards prescribed under the Act.

20. It is submitted that the delay in sponsoring the proposal has been satisfactorily explained. According to the respondents, the time taken was on account of the necessity of collecting all relevant records and documents from the various authorities which had registered criminal cases against the detenu. It is pointed out that the last prejudicial activity occurred on 30th March, 2025, the detenu was apprehended on 9th April, 2025 and was subsequently released on conditional bail by the Special Court for NDPS Cases, Thodupuzha on 9th June, 2025.

21. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor further submitted that the proposal submitted by the District Police Chief, Idukki, through letters dated 28th April, 2025 and 5th June, 2025, was forwarded by the State Police Chief to the Government on 27th May, 2025 and 10th June, 2025. Upon receipt of the proposal, the Government examined the materials and placed the matter before the Screening Committee constituted under the chairmanship of the Law Secretary on 23rd June, 2025. The Screening Committee, after examining the proposal in detail, found the case to be both subjectively and objectively fit for invoking Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. Thereafter, the report of the Screening Committee was circulated among its members and the sponsoring authority for authentication, and the authenticated report was received by the Government on 21st July, 2025. It is submitted that the Government thereafter independently considered the proposal together with the opinion of the Screening Committee and, being satisfied about the necessity for preventive detention in view of the antecedents and narcotic activities of the detenu, passed the order of detention on 20th August, 2025. The slight delay in issuing the detention order is stated to be attributable solely to the time required for completion of the statutory and administrative procedures.

22. It is further submitted that the detention order was duly communicated to the Central Government on the very same day, namely 20th August, 2025, in compliance with Section 3(2) of the PITNDPS Act. The detenu was arrested on 3rd September, 2025 and lodged in the Central Prison and Correctional Home, Thiruvananthapuram on 4th September, 2025. Thereafter, in compliance with Section 9(b) of the PITNDPS Act, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board on 27th September, 2025. The Advisory Board heard both the detenu and the sponsoring authority on 4th November, 2025 and, after considering the records, opined in its report dated 7th November, 2025 that there existed sufficient cause for the continued detention of the detenu. Based on the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government confirmed the detention under Section 9(f) of the PITNDPS Act and directed that the detention should continue for a period of one year from the date of detention by the Government Order dated 19th November 2025.

23. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor has also contended that the detenu is a habitual offender involved in repeated narcotic offences, and that his criminal antecedents clearly justified the invocation of the provisions of the PITNDPS Act. It is submitted that ordinary criminal law and the conditions imposed while granting bail had proved ineffective in preventing him from engaging in further illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs. Particular emphasis was laid on the fact that, despite being granted bail in Crime Nos.27/2019 and 37/2020 of the Narcotic Enforcement Squad, Adimaly, and Crime No.3/2020 of the Excise Enforcement and Anti-Narcotic Special Squad, Idukki, subject to the condition that he should not involve himself in similar offences, the detenu allegedly violated those conditions by committing Crime No.480/2025 of Adimaly Police Station. According to the respondents, this clearly demonstrates that the detenu has scant regard for the conditions imposed by the criminal courts and is likely to continue his involvement in narcotic offences if not preventively detained.

24. It is, therefore, contended that the competent authority arrived at its subjective satisfaction on the basis of relevant materials and that the impugned order of detention was passed after due consideration of all relevant factors. It is further submitted that every procedural requirement contemplated under the PITNDPS Act was scrupulously complied with, no constitutional or statutory safeguard was denied to the detenu, and consequently, the detention order as well as its subsequent confirmation are legal, valid and do not warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

25. The principal issue that arises for consideration is whether the impugned order of preventive detention passed under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS is vitiated on account of the inordinate and unexplained delay in sponsoring the proposal and passing the order of detention, thereby snapping the live and proximate link between the alleged prejudicial activities of the detenu and the object sought to be achieved by the detention.

26. At the outset, it is to be noticed that the PITNDPS Act does not prescribe any specific period within which an order of detention is required to be passed from the date of the prejudicial activity. What is required is that the Detaining Authority must arrive at its subjective satisfaction on the basis of the relevant materials that preventive detention is necessary with a view to prevent the person concerned from engaging in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the prejudicial activities relied upon must bear a live and proximate nexus with the order of detention. If there is undue and unexplained delay in passing the detention order, such delay may, in a given case, have the effect of snapping the nexus between the prejudicial activities and the purpose sought to be achieved by the detention. At the same time, where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the time consumed in investigation, collection of materials, administrative processing, scrutiny by the sponsoring and screening authorities and consideration by the Government, the detention order cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of time.

27. To ascertain whether the live and proximate link gets snapped, it is pertinent to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.A Abdul Rahman (supra) wherein the Apex Court has reiterated the observation in Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta ((1974) 4 SCC 530) as follows:-

                  “10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

28. In Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1979) 1 SCC 465) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the phrase “live and proximate link” in the following words:

                  “It is further true that there must be a “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention, namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is “snapped” if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case, we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

29. As regards the contention relating to the question of delay, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Licil Antony v. State of Kerala ((2014) 11 SCC 326) wherein it was observed as follows:

                  “9. While dealing with the question of delay in making an order of detention, the court is required to be circumspect and has to take a pragmatic view. No hard-and-fast formula is possible to be laid or has been laid in this regard. However, one thing is clear that in case of delay, that has to be satisfactorily explained. After all, the purpose of preventive detention is to take immediate steps for preventing the detenu from indulging in prejudicial activity. If there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activity and making of the order of detention and the delay has not been explained, the order of detention becomes vulnerable. Delay in issuing the order of detention, if not satisfactorily explained, itself is a ground to quash the order of detention. No rule with precision has been formulated in this regard. The test of proximity is not a rigid or a mechanical test. In case of undue and long delay the court has to investigate whether the link has been broken in the circumstances of each case.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

30. Similarly, in Adishwar Jain v. Union of India, it was held as follows:

                  “15. Delay, as is well known, at both stages has to be explained. The court is required to consider the question having regard to the overall picture. We may notice that in Sk. Serajul v. State of W.B. [(1975) 2 SCC 78: 1975 SCC (Cri) 425] this Court opined: (SCC p. 80, para 2)

                  “There was thus delay at both stages and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate, Burdwan recited in the order of detention. It would be reasonable to assume that if the District Magistrate of Burdwan was really and genuinely satisfied after proper application of mind to the materials before him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, he would have acted with greater promptitude both in making the order of detention as also in securing the arrest of the petitioner, and the petitioner would not have been allowed to remain at large for such a long period of time to carry on his nefarious activities.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

31. On consideration of the materials placed on record, it could be seen that the last prejudicial activity relied upon against the detenu was registered on 30th March, 2025. The sponsoring authority submitted the proposal for preventive detention only on 28th April, 2025, after a delay of 29 days, and thereafter forwarded an additional report on 5th June, 2025, i.e., 67 days after the last prejudicial activity. The proposal was placed before the Screening Committee on 23rd June, 2025, whose authenticated report was received by the Government only on 21st July, 2025. Ultimately, the order of detention came to be passed on 20th August, 2025, nearly 143 days after the last prejudicial activity.

32. The explanation given by the Detaining Authority for the alleged delay is stated as follows:

                  “Sponsoring Authority informed that delay occurred in submitting proposal and that was due to the time taken in the process of collecting documents from the relevant authorities who had registered cases against the detenu, Manu Mani. The last prejudicial activity was registered on 30.03.2025. The respondent was apprehended on 09.04.2025 and released on conditional bail by the Hon'ble Court of the Special Judge for NDPS Act Cases, Thodupuzha on 09.06.2025.

                  The order was passed after considering the proposal submitted to Government of Kerala by the Sponsoring Authority, District Police Chief, Idukki, as per letter dated 28.04.2025, 05.06.2025 through the State Police Chief as per the letter dated 27.05.2025 & 10.06.2025. The Government examined the proposal and placed the same before the Screening Committee constituted in this regard under the Chairmanship of Law Secretary on 23.06.2025. The Screening Committee examined the proposal in detail and opined that this is subjectively and objectively a fit case for issuing order of detention under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act. Later, the report of the Screening Committee Report was sent to the Screening Committee members and Sponsoring Authority concerned for getting their authentication and same received back to Government on 21.07.2025.

                  Government examined the proposal along with the opinion of the screening committee in detail, and by considering the narcotic criminal activities of the detenu, the order of detention was issued on 20.08.2025 with full application of mind. Slight delay happened in issuing the detention order was due to the time taken for the completion of above mentioned procedure.”

33. On consideration of the above explanation, we are unable to accept the contention of the respondents that the delay has been satisfactorily explained. While it is true that some time may legitimately be consumed in collecting the relevant records, processing the proposal at various administrative levels and obtaining the opinion of the Screening Committee, the explanation offered in the present case is only a narration of the procedural steps undertaken by the authorities. It does not disclose any specific or exceptional circumstance which necessitated the considerable time consumed at each stage of the proceedings.

34. Merely narrating the various stages involved in the process of preventive detention is not sufficient to establish the existence of a live and proximate link between the last prejudicial activity and the passing of the detention order. What is required is a specific and satisfactory explanation for the delay at each stage of the proceedings. In the present case, the respondents have failed to furnish any explanation for the delay of 29 days in submitting the proposal for preventive detention from the date of the last prejudicial activity, namely 30th March, 2025. Equally, no satisfactory explanation has been offered for the period of approximately 30 days between 21st July, 2025, when the authenticated report of the Screening Committee was received by the Government, and 20th August, 2025, when the detention order was ultimately issued. In the absence of any specific explanation for these periods of delay, a mere reference to the administrative and procedural steps undertaken by the authorities cannot be regarded as sufficient to sustain the live and proximate nexus between the alleged prejudicial activities and the order of preventive detention.

35. Thus, the contention raised on the ground of delay by the learned counsel for the petitioner merits acceptance.

36. The second issue for consideration before us is whether the detention order is vitiated on the ground that the Detaining Authority failed to record its subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of invoking the provisions of the PITNDPS Act when the detenu was already in judicial custody.

37. From the records, it appears that the detenu had been released on bail in all the crimes relied upon by the Detaining Authority. In respect of the last prejudicial activity, namely, Crime No. 480 of 2025, the detenu was granted bail by the Special Judge for NDPS Act Cases, Thodupuzha, by order dated 9th June, 2025 in Crl.M.C. No. 126 of 2025, well before the impugned detention order was passed on 20th August, 2025.

38. The materials placed before this Court further reveal that the Detaining Authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu had already been enlarged on bail. The question, therefore, is not whether the detenu was in custody on the date of the detention order, but whether the Detaining Authority had arrived at a genuine subjective satisfaction that the ordinary criminal law and the conditions imposed while granting bail were inadequate to prevent the detenu from indulging in further prejudicial activities.

39. It further appears from the records that the Detaining Authority had duly taken note of the fact that the detenu had been released on bail subject to stringent conditions. The detention order specifically records that, despite being enlarged on bail in Crime No.27/2019 and Crime No.37/2020 of the Narcotic Enforcement Squad, Adimaly, as well as Crime No.03/2020 of the Excise Enforcement and Anti-Narcotic Special Squad, Idukki, the detenu had allegedly violated the conditions of bail by involving himself in the subsequent offence, namely, Crime No.480/2025. The Detaining Authority has, therefore, observed that the detenu had scant regard for the conditions imposed by the criminal courts and that the ordinary criminal law, including the imposition of stringent bail conditions, had failed to deter him from indulging in further offences under the NDPS Act.

40. However, the detention order is conspicuously silent as to whether the authorities had explored the ordinary remedies available under the criminal law, particularly the remedy of seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the detenu. Though the Detaining Authority has observed that the detenu had violated the conditions of bail by involving himself in subsequent offences, there is nothing on record to indicate that any proceedings were initiated for cancellation of bail on that ground. Equally absent is any consideration as to why such a statutory remedy was either unavailable or inadequate to prevent the detenu from indulging in further prejudicial activities.

41. In justification of the order of detention, the Detaining Authority, inter alia, has observed as follows:

                   “The last prejudicial activity involved by the defendant is Crime No.480/2025 on 30.03.2025 of Adimaly Police Station. The respondent was granted bail by the Hon'ble Court of the Special Judge for NDPS Act Cases, Thodupuzha on 09.06.2025. From his past criminal activities, it is evident that he is likely to violate the bail conditions and there is high propensity that the respondent will indulge in drug peddling activities in future. The present bail conditions are not seen sufficient to curb the criminal activity of the respondent, since he has violated similar conditions multiple times in the past. Therefore, it is absolutely imperative to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities in the event of getting bail.”

42. In the order of detention, 5 cases, including the last prejudicial activity being Crime No.480/2025, have been considered. It does not appear from the record that the respondents have filed any application in any of the earlier 4 cases for cancellation of bail alleging violation of such conditions if any.

43. In the above context, it is relevant to refer to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala & Others (2025 INSC 809 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1315 : AIR 2025 SC 2868) The said Special Leave Petition and the Criminal Appeal arose from the final judgment of this Court in W.P.(Crl.) No. 874/2024, dated 4th September, 2024. This Court had affirmed the order of detention. The appellant’s husband, Rajesh, was kept under preventive detention in prison in terms of Section 3 of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Preventive) Act, 2007 [KAA(P)A]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the Criminal Appeal, finding that, in view of the attending facts and circumstances, the case would not fall under the category of a public order situation, as the detention order did not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu were against the public order of the State. The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the Criminal Appeal, finding that, in view of the attending facts and circumstances, the case would not fall under the category of a public order situation, as the detention order did not ascribe any reason as to how the actions of the detenu were against the public

order of the State, and further observed that the State had not filed any application for cancellation of bail in respect of the earlier cases.

44. In Dhanya M. (supra), in the above context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed at paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 as follows:

                  “20. Moreover, it has been stated therein by the authority that the detenu is violating the conditions of bail imposed upon him in the cases that have been considered for passing the order of detention. However, pertinently, no application has been filed by the respondent-State in any of the four cases, alleging violation of such conditions, if any, and moreover, have not even been spelt out here.

                  21. This Court in SK. Nazneen v. State of Telangana [(2023) 9 SCC 633], had observed that the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention, which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana [(2023) 9 SCC 587], this Court observed:

                  “59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been

moved by the State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention order. There may have existed sufficient grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.”

                  60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14: 1984 SCC (Cri) 361], Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed: (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)

                  32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”

                  22. Keeping in view the above expositions of law, we have no doubt that the order of detention cannot be sustained. The circumstances pointed out in the order by the detaining authority may be ground enough for the State to approach the competent Courts for cancellation of bail, but it cannot be said that the same warranted his preventive detention. We clarify that if such an application for cancellation of the detenu's bail is made by the respondent-State, the same must be decided uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

45. In Dhanya M. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also reiterated at paragraph 9 as follows:

                  “It is well settled that the provision for preventive detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an individual in anticipation of the commission of further offence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the ordinary course of nature.”

                  (emphasis supplied)

46. The principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh (supra) and Dhanya M. (supra) unequivocally underscore that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure which can be invoked only when the ordinary remedies available under the criminal law are found to be ineffective or inadequate. The power of preventive detention is not intended to supplant the ordinary criminal process but to supplement it in exceptional situations where the latter has demonstrably failed to prevent the detenu from engaging in prejudicial activities.

47. In the present case, the very basis on which the Detaining Authority has sought to justify the detention is that the detenu had violated the conditions of bail by involving himself in a subsequent offence. If that be so, the ordinary remedy available to the prosecution was to move the competent criminal court for cancellation of bail on the ground of breach of the conditions imposed. However, the records are completely silent as to whether any such proceedings were initiated or whether the authorities had even considered resorting to that remedy.

48. In our considered view, before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of preventive detention, the Detaining Authority was required to examine whether the ordinary remedy of cancellation of bail could effectively address the apprehended prejudice. In the absence of any such consideration, the satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority suffers from non-consideration of a relevant and material circumstance. The extraordinary power of preventive detention cannot be invoked by bypassing the ordinary remedies available under the criminal law without assigning any reasons as to why those remedies were inadequate. The omission to consider the remedy of cancellation of bail, particularly when the alleged breach of bail conditions forms the very foundation of the detention order, vitiates the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority.

49. We are, therefore, of the view that the failure of the authorities to first resort to the remedy of cancellation of bail, or at least to record cogent reasons as to why such a remedy would be ineffective or insufficient, constitutes a serious infirmity in the decision-making process. On this ground also, the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside.

50. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the impugned order of detention is unsustainable in law. The respondents have failed to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in sponsoring the proposal and passing the order of detention, resulting in the snapping of the live and proximate nexus between the prejudicial activities attributed to the detenu and the object sought to be achieved by the preventive detention.

Similarly, the Detaining Authority has failed to consider whether the ordinary remedy available under the criminal law, namely, seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the detenu, would have been sufficient to prevent him from indulging in further prejudicial activities. The omission to examine the efficacy of such an ordinary remedy, or to record reasons as to why it was considered inadequate before resorting to the extraordinary power of preventive detention, vitiates the subjective satisfaction recorded by the Detaining Authority.

51. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Exhibits P1 and P2 orders are hereby set aside.

52. The Superintendent of Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram, is directed to release the detenu Shri Manu Mani, forthwith from the custody, unless his continued detention is required in connection with any other case.

 53. The Registry shall communicate this order to the Superintendent of the Central Prison, Thiruvananthapuram, forthwith.

54. The records produced in the sealed cover shall be returned to the learned Public Prosecutor forthwith.