1. The petitioner is the former Secretary of the Karthikapalli Taluk Aided Primary Teachers Co-operative Bank Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Bank'). The Bank filed ARC No.77 of 2024 before the 2nd respondent under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1969 Act'), seeking an award for the recovery of Rs.89,85,296/- with 18% interest from the petitioner and the 4th respondent. The petitioner filed Ext.P2 reply statement, inter alia contending that the members of the Managing Committee of the Bank at the relevant time were necessary parties to the proceedings before the 2nd respondent. According to the petitioner, proceedings under Section 65 of the 1965 Act had revealed that the Managing Committee members and the former Secretary of the Bank (one V. Padmajan) were responsible for causing loss to the Bank. According to the petitioner, since Ext.P1 plaint was filed without impleading these necessary parties, the petitioner filed I.A No. 1 of 2026 in ARC No. 77 of 2024 seeking to implead respondents 5 to 15 herein as additional respondents 4 to 14 in the ARC. However, by Ext.P5 order, the said application was dismissed holding that respondents 5 to 15 are not necessary parties for the adjudication of the dispute. This order of the 2nd respondent is under challenge in this writ petition.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that Rule 47(d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1969 Rules’), indicates that the Committee of the Bank shall be primarily responsible for the maintenance and safety of all accounts, records, cash, and other assets of the Bank. It is pointed out that the said Rule further mandates that it shall be the duty of the Committee to ensure that the officers concerned discharge their functions and perform their duties as laid down in the Rules and the bye-laws. It is submitted that when there is such a statutory mandate, the Bank could not have initiated proceedings solely against the petitioner and the 4th respondent, who was working as a peon at the relevant time. It is submitted that the attempt of the Bank is to save the Managing Committee members by making it appear that the petitioner and the 4th respondent alone were responsible for causing the loss. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner referred to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), to contend that the Court has the power to strike out or add parties. It is submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in Maniyappan T.V and another vs. Pattanakkad Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2020 (4) KHC 733 held, after referring to the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, that an Arbitrator under Section 69 of the 1969 Act has the power to add necessary parties to the proceedings pending before him. It is submitted that the decision of the Division Bench categorically holds that even if the plaintiff does not implead all necessary parties, it is open to the Court to add any person as a party at any stage of the proceedings. It is submitted that vide Ext.P5 order, the Arbitrator has concluded that respondents 5 to 15 are not necessary parties and therefore the petitioner has also lost his right to demonstrate that the proceedings initiated by the Bank are bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is submitted that in such circumstances, Ext.P5 order is liable to be set aside, and the matter has to be remanded to the Arbitrator to decide Ext.P4 application afresh, having regard to the principles under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC and the decision of this Court in Maniyappan T.V (supra).

3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank submits that the Bank, as the plaintiff in the proceedings before the Arbitrator, is dominus litus and has the authority to decide as to who should be impleaded as a party to the proceedings before the Arbitrator. It is submitted that though the principles under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC may apply to proceedings before the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator must first decide whether the presence of any party other than those impleaded in the plaint is necessary for an effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. It is submitted that when the claim of the Bank is restricted to the petitioner and the 4th respondent, the petitioner cannot insist that the Bank must proceed against some other parties also. It is submitted that while it may be open to the petitioner to demonstrate that he is not responsible for any loss caused to the Bank, he cannot insist that the Bank must proceed against other parties, as this is not the purpose or intent behind Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC. The learned counsel also places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and others, (2020) 13 SCC 733, in support of her contention that the Bank, as the plaintiff in the proceedings before the Arbitrator, cannot be compelled to fight against parties against whom it does not seek relief.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit in reply that the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC are an exception to the principle that the plaintiff is dominus litis on the strength of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd., vs. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd and others, (2010) 7 SCC 417. It is submitted that the court may even allow the impleadment of necessary parties without the permission of the plaintiff in the exercise jurisdiction under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC.

5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, I am of the opinion that the petitioner has not made out any case for grant of the reliefs sought in the writ petition. While the provisions of Rule 47(d) of the 1969 Rules (on which the considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner) indicates that the primary responsibility for safeguarding the assets and other properties of a Society will be on the Committee, it does not mean that whenever a loss is caused to the Society, only the members of the Committee can be proceeded against. Under the provisions of Section 68 of the 1969 Act, even a person who is not a member of the Managing Committee of a Society can be surcharged if any action of his has caused loss to the Society. The provisions of Section 68 of the 1969 Act indicate that any person, who is or was entrusted with the organization or management of such Society or who is or has, at any time, been an officer or an employee of the Society, can be proceeded against for recovery of amounts of loss suffered by a Society on account of any act or omission on the part of such person. While the petitioner may be able to contend that he is not responsible for the loss caused to the Society by raising such a contention before the Arbitrator, in the facts of this case, it is not for him to say that the Bank must have proceeded against the Managing Committee members also.

6. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Maniyappan T.V (Supra) on which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is itself an answer to the contentions raised before this Court. Paragraph 8 of the judgment in Maniyappan T.V (Supra) reads thus:-

                  “8. Even when we are inclined to uphold the finding of the learned single Judge that Ext.P10 cannot stand judicial scrutiny, we are of the definite opinion that it was open to the Arbitrator to invoke the powers under Rule 10(2) of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Though the plaintiff is the dominus litis, and has to decide who are the necessary parties to the suit, if the plaintif f does not implead all the necessary parties, it is open to the Court to add any person as party at any stage of the proceedings, if the person whose presence before the Court is necessary for an effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. It is the settled proposition of law that a person may be a necessary party in a suit, namely, (a) if he ought to have been joined as a party to the suit and has not been so joined, and (b) if the suit cannot be decided without his presence. Apex Court has repeatedly held that the theory of dominus litis should not be overstretched in the matter of impleading of parties, because it is the duty of the Court to ensure that, if for deciding the real matter in dispute, a person is a necessary party, the said person is impleaded. In order to do complete justice between the parties the power available under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 CPC shall be invoked by the Court.”

                  (Emphasis is supplied)

                  Thus, while the court or other adjudicatory body retains the power to ensure that all parties necessary for adjudication of the dispute before it are impleaded as parties to the proceedings, when the relief is confined to certain individuals, the test is whether the presence of any person, who is not a party to the proceedings, is necessary for an effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. This question will always have to be answered by the court or adjudicatory body with reference to the pleadings in the plaint/petition and having regard to the reliefs sought. When the Bank is seeking relief only against the petitioner and the 4th respondent, the Arbitrator cannot come to the conclusion that the Bank ought to have initiated proceedings against some other party also. This is further amplified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurmit Singh Bhatia (supra). Paragraph 5 of the Gurmit Singh Bhatia (supra) reads thus:-

                  “5.1 ………...Therefore, the short question which is posed for consideration before this Court is, whether the plaintiffs can be compelled to implead a person in the suit for specific performance, against his wish and more particularly with respect to a person against whom no relief has been claimed by him?

                  5.2 An identical question came to be considered before this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra) and applying the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, in the similar facts and circumstances of the case, this Court observed and held that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. It is further observed and held by this Court that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. The tests are – (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party………..

                  “15. As discussed hereinearlier, whether Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 were proper parties or not, the governing principle for deciding the question would be that the presence of Respondents 1 and 4 to 11 before the court would be necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit………...

                  16. …………...That thereafter, after observing and holding as above, this Court further observed that in view of the principle that the plaintiff who has filed a suit for specific performance of the contract to sell is the dominus litis, he cannot be forced to add parties against whom, he does not want to fight unless it is a compulsion of the rule of law……..

                  The aforesaid observations are made by this Court considering the principle that plaintif f is the dominus litis and cannot be forced to add parties against whom he does not want to fight unless there is a compulsion of the rule of law. Therefore, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Kasturi (supra), the appellant cannot be impleaded as a defendant in the suit filed by the original plaintiffs for specific performance of the contract between the original plaintiffs and original defendant no.1 and in a suit for specific performance of the contract to which the appellant is not a party and that too against the wish of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs cannot be forced to add party against whom he does not want to fight. If he does so, in that case, it will be at the risk of the plaintiffs.” (Emphasis supplied)

                  The Supreme Court in its recent judgment in NAK Engineering Company Pvt Ltd v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah, (2026) 3 SCC 631, explained the doctrine of dominus litis while considering an appeal against the rejection of an application for impleadment, where the Court held as follows:

                  “37. This apart, Respondents 1 and 2 who have instituted the suit are dominus litis and it is for them to choose their adversaries. If they do not array the proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it at their own risk. However, they cannot be compelled to add a party to defend a suit against their wishes. The decree, if any, passed in the suit would be binding only between the parties to the suit and would not infringe upon any right of a third party, much less of the appellant that is not a party to the suit.

                  38. This conclusion is reinforced by the fundamental principle laid down in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das, wherein this Court has observed: (SCC p. 355, para 11)

                  “11. … 11.4. … the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit. …

                  11.5. … a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.””

                  Thus, it is clear that the respondent Bank cannot be compelled to fight against parties against whom it does not want to fight. As pointed out earlier, while it may be open to the petitioner to contend that he is not responsible for the claim raised by the Bank, it is not for the petitioner to insist that the Bank must sue other parties, especially when the reliefs sought for in the plaint do not relate to such parties.

7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd., (supra) also does not compel me to take a different view. It is true that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has taken the view that the principles behind Order I Rule 10 of the CPC are in the nature of an exception to the Rule of dominus litis. However, the ratio of the decision does not lead me to conclude that the test of whether the presence of such party before the court is necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the issues involved in the suit can be disregarded.

8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Ext.P5 order prevents the petitioner from raising a contention regarding non-joinder of necessary parties also does not appeal to this Court. As already observed, it is for the petitioner to establish by suitable means that he was not responsible for the alleged loss caused to the respondent Bank. The right to establish that the particular proceeding is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties does not mean that the petitioner also has a right to seek impleadment of parties when the court itself concludes that the presence of such parties is not necessary for a proper adjudication of the issues involved in the suit. Thus, the petitioner is clearly not entitled to any relief. However, to allay the apprehension of the petitioner that he will be prevented from taking up any contention based on Ext.P5 order, it is clarified that no observation or finding in Ext.P5 shall prevent the petitioner from taking up a contention that he is not responsible for the alleged loss caused to the bank.

Subject to the above, the writ petition will stand dismissed.