1. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The present petition challenges the order dated 12.08.2026 passed in Application No. 256/2026 by the respondent No. 1, i.e., the District Co-operative Election Officer and Divisional Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies, Amravati.

3. The facts, as can be seen from the petition, are as under:

                    a) Respondent No. 3 herein is the Yavatmal District Central Co-operative Bank Limited, of which respondent No. 4 is a member. Respondent No. 4 being a society, is governed by its bye-laws, which have been duly approved by respondent No. 2.

                    b) It is the primary contention of the petitioner that the election programme for electing board of directors of respondent No. 3 Bank was published, according to which the provisional voter list was published on 16.01.2026. Objections were to be submitted from 21.07.2026 to 29.07.2026. The said objections were to be decided on 12.08.2026, and the final voters list is to be published on 19.08.2026.

                    c) In the backdrop of this election programme, and to nominate a representative, a meeting of respondent No. 4 Society was called on 29.12.2025. In the said meeting, since there was no requisite quorum of 7 members, it was adjourned and was then held on 05.01.2026. In the said meeting dated 05.01.2026, the respondent No. 5 was nominated to represent respondent No. 4 Society. Thereafter, since the Secretary of the respondent No. 4 Society did not forward the proposal, the provisional voter list was published, wherein there was no proposal received by the respondent No. 4 Society, it was shown in the said voter list accordingly. This prompted the respondent No. 5 to file an application before the respondent No. 1 bearing Application No. 250/2026. The petitioner herein also filed an application, which was numbered as Application No. 256/2026. The application filed by the petitioner bearing Application No. 256/2026 was rejected, and the name of the respondent No. 5 in the voter list was confirmed. This has prompted the petitioner to challenge the said order by way of present petition.

4. I have heard Mr. P.A. Kadu, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. C.A. Lokhande, learned AGP for the Respondent(s)/State and Mr. Amol Patil, a/w Mr. Raunak Kurani, learned counsel for the Respondent Nos. 4 and 5.

5. Mr. P. A. Kadu, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the order of respondent No. 1 in continuing the name of respondent No. 5 in the voter list is contrary to law and illegal. He points me out that, as per the bye-laws of the society and, more particularly, bye-law No. 5, a quorum of a minimum of 7 members is required. Furthermore, the said bye-law also provides that if the meeting cannot be conducted for want of quorum, the said meeting would be adjourned, but there would not be any requirement of quorum for the said adjourned meeting. It also provides that any resolution passed in the said meeting would not be implemented till the said resolution is ratified/confirmed in the next meeting.

6. By taking me through the record of the matter, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is an admitted fact on record that the resolution nominating respondent No. 5 was never adopted in a subsequent meeting and, therefore, the same cannot be countenanced. He further submits that the order of respondent No. 1 is de-hors the provisions of law, inasmuch as it records that such ratification would not be required. He submits that such a finding is in the teeth of the express bye-laws of the society. In that regard, he also places reliance on a communication issued by respondent No. 1 dated 28.11.2025, stating that the nomination of a representative of a society such as respondent No. 4 is to be made only in accordance with the bye-laws and that too till 31.12.2025. Therefore, on both these grounds, the action of respondent No. 1 in continuing the name of respondent No. 5 as a representative of respondent No. 4 cannot be supported.

7. Per contra, Mr. Amol Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 4 and 5, opposes the submissions. By way of a preliminary objection, he submits that the petitioner has no locus to object in view of Rule 11 of the Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies (Election To Committee) Rules, 2014. The second preliminary objection of Mr. Patil is regarding existence of a statutory remedy in the form of an election petition. The next objection is regarding the omission on the part of the petitioner to challenge the order passed on the application moved by respondent No. 5, bearing Application No. 250 of 2026, whereby the application filed by the said respondent was allowed and his name was included in the voters' list. Furthermore, by way of another preliminary objection, Mr. Patil submits that the election process has already commenced and, therefore, it would not be proper to stall the said election process once it has commenced.

8. On merits, Mr. Patil submits that all the notices of the meetings were duly served upon the petitioner, and he chose not to appear at the said meetings. He points me out notice dated 29.12.2025, 05.01.2026, 12.01.2026 and 24.01.2026, of which notices were duly served and there is an acknowledgment of the receipt. He further submits that the petitioner purposely remained absent to ensure that the meeting was either not held or was adjourned for want of quorum. He, therefore, submits that the petitioner should be non-suited on this ground alone.

9. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the name of the petitioner was never in the provisional voter list and, therefore, respondent No. 1, i.e., the Election Officer, had no jurisdiction to include his name in the final voter list.

10. Rival contentions fall for my consideration.

11. As far as the preliminary objection regarding the locus of the petitioner is concerned, it would be appropriate to reproduce the said rule for the sake of brevity.

                    “11. Claims and objections to the provisional list of voters and the final list of voters for the societies having society or societies and individuals as members

                    (1) When any provisional list of voters is published for inviting claims and objections, any omission or error in respect of name or address or other particulars in the list may be brought to the notice of the District Co-operative Election Officer or Taluka or Ward Co-operative Election Officer in writing by any member of the society concerned, who is a voter or any representative authorized to vote on behalf of such society during office hours within ten days from the date of publication of the provisional list of voters.

                    (2) Any member of the society concerned making a claim or raising objection shall do so by a separate petition, which shall be presented to the District Co-operative Election Officer or Taluka or Ward Co-operative Election Officer during office hours, before the last date published for inviting claims and objections. Such claims or objections shall be preferred in writing and state the grounds on which the claim is based or the objection is raised, as the case may be.”

12. A minute perusal of this rule, as has rightly been pointed out by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, shows that the Sub-Rule (1)contemplates that any member of the society concerned who is a voter or any representative authorized to vote on behalf of such society may bring to the notice of the District Co-operative Election Officer any omission or error in respect of the name or address or other particulars in the list, i.e., the provisional voter list.

13. In my view, the words “society concerned” would entail the society in respect of which the election is to be held, i.e., respondent No. 3 in the present case. It, therefore, follows that only a member of the said society, i.e., respondent No. 3, which in the present case would be respondent No. 4, and who is also a voter, or any representative authorized to vote on behalf of such society, i.e., respondent No. 5, would alone have the locus to raise any objection. I entirely agree with the contention canvassed by the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in that regard that the present petitioner does not fall in any of the contingencies mentioned in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11, since admittedly, he is not a member of respondent No. 3, neither is he a voter nor a representative authorized to vote on behalf of such society.

14. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that Sub-rule (2) begins with the words “any member of the society concerned making a claim...”, that would not include the present petitioner, since, as already held by me, the words “society concerned” would mean respondent No. 3 in the present case, in respect of which the elections are due to be held, and not respondent No. 4. In fact, Sub-rule (2) and Sub-rule (3), in my view, are procedural, and a substantive right is engrafted in Sub-rule (1) in favour of the persons mentioned in the said sub-rule. Therefore, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of this Court in the case of Shesherao S/o Kondiba Jorvar Vs. Maharashtra State Cooperative Election Authority and Others (Writ Petition No. 5568 of 2026) is not applicable.

15. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2023 (5) Mh.L.J. 328 in the case of Zamsingh S/o Bhuraji Yerne Vs. District Co-operative Election Officer Cum District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gondia and Others, and more particularly paragraph 11.1 thereof. In the said judgment, the expression “any omission or error in respect of name or address” would mean any correction which is required to be done in respect of the name or address of the voter as per Rule 7. However, the said judgment does not deal with the phrase “society concerned” and, therefore, in my view, is not applicable to the present case.

16. The next objection as far as omission to challenge the order passed in application of the petitioner is concerned, As can be seen from the prayer clause, the only challenge is to the order passed in Application No. 256 of 2026 filed by the petitioner herein. However, in a similar application filed by respondent No. 5 herein, the same authority passed an order on the same date, i.e., 12.08.2026, and directed the inclusion of the name of respondent No. 5 in the voter list. There is no challenge to the said order. This omission, in my considered opinion, is fatal and the petition is, therefore, liable to be rejected on this ground alone.

17. Furthermore, admittedly, there is a statutory remedy in the form of an election petition, wherein the petitioner, if he is aggrieved, can certainly challenge the election of respondent No. 3 Bank. This fact is also against the petitioner entailing rejection of the petition.

18. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 and 5, by relying on the judgment in the case of Dattatray Genaba Lole and Others Vs. Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Others, reported in (2021) 2 HCC (Bom) 612, and more particularly paragraphs 47 and 93, that the only circumstance in which a writ Court would interfere in a challenge to an election process at an intermediate stage would be when the order or action under challenge is patently and demonstrably illegal like applying a non-existent rule or provision to the election process or failing to adhere to a mandatory provision. The intervention in such cases has been explained as enabling or assisting the process of the election rather than thwarting or stalling it. Furthermore, in the same judgment this Court held that interference in process after the election procedure has commenced is minimal.

19. As far as the omission to ratify the resolution authorizing respondent No. 5 to represent respondent No. 4 Society is concerned, the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board Vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. and Others, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 500, and more particularly paragraph No. 30 thereof, where the question was regarding the effect of the non-confirmation of the minutes. Even though the said judgment is in the context of company law, this Court, after taking into consideration the entire case law on the subject, has recorded a finding that such an act of ratifying the minutes of an earlier meeting would, at the most, be a ministerial act.

20. By relying on an earlier judgment in Chetkar Jha (Dr.) v. Vishwanath Prasad Verma, reported in (1970) 2 SCC 217, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment has stated that minutes of meeting are recorded to safeguard against future disputes as to what had taken place thereat. They are a record of the fact that a meeting was held and of the decision taken thereat. Usually they are written after the termination of the meeting often from rough notes taken by the person who is to draft them and then are placed before the next meeting for what is generally known as confirmation though they are placed for verification and not for confirmation. Indeed there is no question of any confirmation at the next meeting of a decision already taken for a decision once taken does not require any confirmation. It is further held that, when the minutes of a meeting are placed before the next meeting, the only thing that can be done is to see whether the decision taken at the earlier meeting has been properly recorded or not. The accuracy of the minutes, and not the validity of the decision, is, therefore, before the meeting. Once a decision is duly taken, it can only be changed by a substantive resolution properly adopted for such a change. When, therefore, a decision is taken and is minuted, and such minutes are signed by the Chairman, they become prima facie evidence of what took place at the meeting.

21. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the aspect of confirmation of minutes, I find no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the subsequent omission to confirm/ratify the resolution passed at the earlier meeting would not ipso facto obliterate the resolution passed in the earlier meeting.

22. As has been rightly observed in the impugned order by respondent No. 1, the non-conducting of a meeting for want of quorum is not indicative of the fact that the Society, i.e., respondent No. 4, was not willing to nominate respondent No. 5 as its nominee. Furthermore, it has went on to observe that absence of any representative of the respondent No. 4 would hamper its interest and, therefore, it would be in the interest of all concerned that there is a valid representation of respondent No. 4 in the elections of respondent No. 3. It has also went on to observe that if, on such technicalities, if the respondent No. 4 goes unrepresented in the elections of the respondent No. 3, that would not be in the interest of anybody. I find no perversity in the impugned order.

23. Furthermore, admittedly, the petitioner has chosen to remain absent in spite of having sufficient notice. This, in my view, is sufficient to non-suit the petitioner in an equity jurisdiction. For the reasons stated hereinabove and taking an overall view of the matter, I find no merit in the petition so as to interfere at an intermediate stage when the election process has already commenced.

24. In that view of the matter, the petition is without any merit and is liable to be rejected.

25. The petition is accordingly rejected.

26. Rule is discharged.