1. Judgment dated 11.03.2016 in S.C.No.512/2014 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court, Ottapalam, is under challenge in this appeal, at the instance of the sole accused in the above case. The State of Kerala, represented by the Public Prosecutor, is the respondent.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/accused and the learned Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the verdict under challenge and the records of the trial court.

3. I shall refer the parties in this appeal as 'victim' and 'accused' for easy reference.

4. Here, the prosecution alleges commission of offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) by the accused and the prosecution case is that, due to previous animosity, at about 21 hours on 30.11.2012, the accused assaulted the victim, by name ‘Suresh Babu’, who was examined as PW4, near the bunk shop of PW5 situated at Kanhiram Junction, Pottassery I Village, Mannarkkad, with intention to commit his murder and caused serious injuries in this attempt, though PW4 survived.

5. The learned Sessions Judge proceeded with the matter. PW1 to PW12 were examined, Exts.P1 to P13 and MO1 were marked on the side of the prosecution. DW1 was examined on the side of the defence.

6. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge found that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC and accordingly, he was convicted and sentenced as under:

                   “In the result, the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default a payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months under section 307 IPC. The fine amount, if realised, shall be paid to PW4 as compensation under section 357(1) Cr.P.C. The accused was in judicial custody from 04/12/2012 to 16/01/2013. The above period will be set off against the substantive sentence of imprisonment awarded.”

7. While assailing the verdict impugned, the main contention raised by the learned counsel for the accused is that, in this case, there was no proper identification of the accused as the assailant. According to the learned counsel, though the accused was a person known to PW4, the injured, he was not identified before the court in a proper manner by pointing him as the assailant. According to the learned counsel for the accused, proof of the identification of the accused, as the assailant is a fundamental requirement to fasten criminal culpability upon an accused. Therefore, the identification must be so precise and legible to be acted upon. In this connection, the learned counsel for the accused placed decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tukesh Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2025 KHC 6479, with specific reference to paragraph No.21, which reads as under:

                  “21. In a case where there are eyewitnesses, one situation can be that the eyewitness knew the accused before the incident. The eyewitnesses must identify the accused sitting in the dock as the same accused whom they had seen committing the crime. Another situation can be that the eyewitness did not know the accused before the incident. In the normal course, in case of the second situation, it is necessary to hold a Test Identification Parade. If it is not held and if the evidence of the eyewitness is recorded after a few years, the identification of such an accused by the eyewitness in the Court becomes vulnerable. Identification of the accused sitting in the Court by the eyewitness is of utmost importance. For example, if an eyewitness states in his deposition that "he had seen A, B and C killing X and he knew A, B and C". Such a statement in the examination-in-chief is not sufficient to link the same to the accused. The eyewitness must identify the accused A, B and C in the Court. Unless this is done, the prosecution cannot establish that the accused are the same persons who are named by the eyewitness in his deposition. If an eyewitness states that "he had seen one accused assaulting the deceased with a sword, another accused assaulting the deceased with a stick and another accused holding the deceased to enable other accused to assault the deceased." In such a case, the eyewitness must identify the accused in the open Court who, according to him, had assaulted the accused with a stick, who had assaulted the deceased with a sword and who was holding the deceased. Unless the eyewitnesses identify the accused present in the Court, it cannot be said that, based on the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the guilt of the accused has been proved.”

8. Similarly, the learned counsel for the accused also placed decision of this Court in @ Babu @ Japan Shaji v. State of Kerala, reported in 2021 KHC OnLine 382, with specific reference to paragraph No.17, which reads as under:

                  “17. Reverting to the prosecution case that the accused and deceased were living together in a room rented out by the accused, we have already referred to the rent agreement and the discrepancies in the evidence led. PW8 is the alleged landlord, PWs.9 & 10, persons who occupied rooms in the building, the former running a medical shop and the latter, a flower merchant, PW15, the Manager of OK Yogam and PW16, the scribe of P6, who is engaged in document writing in the very same building have been examined on the side of the prosecution to establish this case. We find none of these witnesses having identified the accused in Court, as required, which is a very serious omission on the part of the prosecution as also the Court. PW8 has made a vague statement that the accused is present in Court I If not the prosecution, the Court should have asked the witness to specifically identify the accused as usually done by asking the witness to point out the man/woman. Even the vague identification, as made by PW8, was not made by the other witnesses paraded before Court. Insofar as the residence of the deceased in the room; none speaks of it. PW14 speaks about having seen one woman coming to the room, which person was identified from the ID card MO16 without any statement made of joint residence  PW16 also speaks of having seen 'one woman on one day' No identification of the woman was attempted by the prosecution through PW16. PW16, in cross-examination also admitted that he did not tell the police about having seen 'one woman on one day'. The prosecution case of the accused and deceased having lived together has not been established.”

9. According to the learned counsel for the accused, during chief examination of PW4, though PW4 identified the accused as the assailant at the dock, he did not identify him as the assailant specifically. The same is the case of PW2 and PW5, the other occurrence witnesses. Therefore, for want of identification of the accused as the assailant, the accused is liable to be acquitted, as the prosecution has failed to prove the identity of the accused.

10. Whereas it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that, by the evidence of PW2, PW4 and PW5 the prosecution categorically proved the identity of the accused as the assailant. Therefore, the challenge, on the ground that the identity of the accused as the assailant has not been properly established, would not succeed. Otherwise, the prosecution case is well proved by the evidence of PW2, PW4 and PW5 and the conviction and sentence do not require any interference.

11. Having considered the rival submissions, points arise for consideration are,

                  1. Whether the Additional Sessions Judge is right in holding that accused committed the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC?

                  2. Whether the impugned verdict would require any interference by this Court.

                  3. The order to be passed.

12. Point Nos.1 to 3

In this case, the prime witness is PW4. PW4 deposed that he had sustained injury in this occurrence. According to him, PW2, who was examined in this case, is his brother and they had been residing with family in Kanhiram, Kallamala. On 30.11.2012, there was supply of butter milk in connection with the festival of Kunnappally Bhagavathi Temple, Kallamala. At about 9.00 p.m, on the same day, he reached the shop of Balan (PW5), situated at Kanhiram junction, to purchase cigarette. After purchasing a cigarette, while he was engaged in smoking it standing a bit away from the shop, the accused at the dock, by name ‘Manu Prasad’, reached near by him and uttered to kill him and caused stab injury on his stomach. Then the accused beat on his chest repeatedly, apart from causing stab injuries on his left hand. On seeing this, people gathered, including PW2 (brother of the victim), Manikandan and Mohanan. Soon, the accused ran away through the canal road. PW4 deposed further that he was first taken to Taluk Hospital, Mannarkkad, and thereafter to Moulana Hospital, Perinthalmanna. He also deposed that PW2 and Mohanan witnessed the occurrence of stabbing him by the accused. According to him, the accused stabbed him since he failed to repay the money borrowed from the accused which led to the quarrel. He deposed further that he could identify the knife used to stab him, and he identified MO1 as the same. During cross-examination, he deposed that there had been a quarrel one week prior to the occurrence. During further cross-examination, PW4 gave rational answers to justify the prosecution case. It was suggested that the accused did not cause stab injuries and he sustained injuries arose out of quarrel involving other persons, who assembled in the temple festival. The further suggestion was that, due to previous animosity of demand of repayment of the money availed from the accused, he was implicated in this case falsely. Both suggestions were emphatically denied by PW4. During further cross-examination, PW4 stated that he was sitting 10 to 15 feet distance from the shop of PW5. When the evidence of PW2 and PW5 are gone through, they fully supported the version of PW4 after identifying the accused as the assailant.

13. As regards the question of identity, argued by the learned counsel for the accused, is concerned, it is true that, in order to succeed a prosecution alleging commission of some offence/offences by a particular accused, his identity should be proved by the prosecution in a convincing and cogent manner. The legal position argued by the learned counsel for the accused, relying on the decisions in Tukesh Singh’s case (supra) and Shaji @ Babu @ Japan Shaji’s case (supra), is not in dispute. However, when there is only one accused, and the injured witnesses and other occurrence witnesses categorically deposed before the court that the injured was stabbed by the accused at the dock by naming him, that is sufficient to establish his identity as the assailant. Therefore, the identification of a sole accused, referring him as by naming the accused is sufficient to find that the accused/assailant was identified by the witnesses. Therefore, this contention must fail.

14. Here, in order to corroborate the version of PW2, PW4 and PW5, the evidence of PW1, the Junior Medical Consultant, Taluk Government Hospital, Mannarkkad, who had examined PW4, after the occurrence also is relevant. He deposed that, at about 10.00 pm on 30.11.2012, he had examined PW4 and issued Ext.P1 wound certificate. He deposed further that the alleged cause of injury was assault at 9.30 pm on 30.11.2012 near Kanhiram. PW1 opined that the injuries were very grievous and the same might, in the ordinary course of nature, cause death of the patient. According to PW1, the injuries noted in Ext.P1 wound certificate could be caused by using a knife like MO1. The injuries noted by PW1 in Ext.P1 are as follows:

                  (1) Left Illiac fossa injury of 2 x 2 cm and loop of intestine protruding outside.

                  (2) Lacerated wound 3 x 4 cm and 3 x 2 cm over left forearm.

                  (3) Cut injury of 2 x 1 cm over left side of chest.

15. PW9 is the Causality Medical Officer, attached to the Moulana Hospital, Perinthalmanna. He had examined PW4 at 11.50 pm on 30.11.2012 and issued Ext.P7 wound certificate. He deposed that the injuries were grave in nature and accordingly surgery was conducted. PW9 opined that these injuries were possible with weapon like MO1 and if proper medical attention was not given, they might cause death of the patient. PW9 further deposed that the second injury noted in Ext.P7 was on a vital part of the body. The injuries noted in Ext.P7 are as follows:

                  (1) Stab injury 2 x 1 cm over left side of chest.

                  (2) Stab injury 5 x 3 cm over left side of umbilicus with intestine protruding outside.

                  (3) Stab injury 5 x 2 cm over left forearm.

16. In this case, MO1 - the weapon used to cause stab injury on PW4, was recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement given by the accused, stating authorship of concealment by preparing Ext.P4 mahazar by PW11 and the recovery was supported by PW6, stating that he had witnessed the accused taking MO1 knife from the canal and producing it before the Investigating Officer (PW11). He also identified his signature in Ext.P4 and MO1 as the weapon, so recovered.

17. Ext.P5 is the scene plan in the instant case, which was proved through PW7, the Village Officer, Pottssery I Village. In this case, Ext.P6 FIR was registered by PW8 on the basis of Ext.P2 statement given by PW2 and PW2 supported recording of his statement.

18. In order to find out the ingredients to attract offence under Section 307 of IPC, it is necessary to extract the said provision, which reads as under:

                  “307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is herein before mentioned.”

                  Thus the ingredients are;

                  (I) That the accused did an act;

                  (ii) That the act was done with intention or knowledge and under such circumstances to cause a bodily injury as the accused knew to be likely to cause death or that such bodily injury was in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause such death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury a is likely to cause death; and

                  (iii) That the accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.

                  In other words, the ingredients are;

                  (i) that the death of a human being was attempted;

                  (ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and

                  (iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:

                  (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or

                  (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury (see decision in Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 2009 SC 3223 : (2009) 11 SCC 273).

19. The first part makes any act committed with the intention or knowledge that it would amount to murder if the act caused death punishable with imprisonment up to ten years. The second part makes such an act punishable with imprisonment for life if hurt is caused thereby. Thus even if the act does not cause any injury it is punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years. If it does cause an injury and therefore hurt, it is punishable with imprisonment for life (see decision in Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in 2014 (2) Scale 417 : (2014) 5 SCC 369).

20. In the decision in State of Madhya Pradesh V. Saleem, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Apex Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307 IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the said judgment, it was pointed out that the court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha, (2019)3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, the intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.

21. Since, the learned counsel for the accused has miserably failed to find out any sustainable contentions to upset the verdict impugned rather than pointing out the fact that the accused was not identified, which is found against, the conviction is liable to be confirmed.

22. In view of the above, the conviction is confirmed. Coming to the sentence, having noticed the fact that very reasonable sentence was imposed by the Sessions Judge, the same also is confirmed.

In the result, this criminal appeal stands dismissed.

The order suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused stands cancelled and his bail bond also stands cancelled. The accused is directed to surrender before the trial court to undergo the sentence, forthwith, failing which, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence, without fail.

Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the trial court, forthwith for information and compliance.