K. Sujana, J.

1. This Criminal Appeal is filed challenging the judgment dated 24.06.2011 passed in S.C.No.517 of 2010 by the V Additional Sessions Judge (II-FTC), Warangal, whereby the respondents/Accused Nos.1 and 2 were acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that there existed a long-standing civil dispute between the family of the deceased and the family of Accused No.1 regarding agricultural land admeasuring Ac.2-20 guntas in Survey No.342/A situated at Kadipikonda village. According to the prosecution, about fifteen years prior to the incident, the deceased purchased the said land from the mother of Accused No.1, Dava Bharathamma, and had been in possession and cultivation thereof ever since. Subsequently, owing to the steep increase in the market value of the land, Accused No.1 and his mother allegedly disputed the sale transaction and initiated civil proceedings questioning the title of the deceased. Several civil litigations and criminal complaints were stated to have been pending between the parties, thereby giving rise to strong enmity and motive for the commission of the offence.

3. It is alleged that on 24.03.2010, PW.2, the wife of the deceased, along with the deceased had gone to their agricultural field for harvesting cotton. After completing the agricultural work, while they were returning to their house in a bullock-cart carrying the harvested cotton, and when they reached near the tamarind tree situated in the land of Manikanti Venkat Reddy between 7.00 p.m. and 7.30 p.m., accused Nos.1 and 2, who were allegedly waiting in ambush armed with hunting sickles, intercepted the bullock-cart and attacked the deceased. It is alleged that accused No.1 first assaulted the deceased with a hunting sickle, and when PW.2 attempted to rescue her husband, she also sustained an injury on her left ear. Thereafter, both the accused allegedly dragged the deceased from the bullock-cart and indiscriminately hacked him with hunting sickles on his neck, shoulders and other vital parts of the body, causing his instantaneous death at the scene of offence.

4. According to the prosecution, PW.2 immediately rushed home in an injured condition and informed PW.1, the son of the deceased, about the occurrence. PW.1 proceeded to the scene of offence, found his father lying dead in a pool of blood with multiple bleeding injuries, and thereafter lodged a written complaint before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Madikonda Police Station. Based on the said complaint, Crime No.42 of 2010 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC, and investigation was taken up.

5. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer visited the scene of offence, prepared the scene observation report and rough sketch, conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased, seized material objects, recorded the statements of witnesses and referred the dead body for post-mortem examination. PW.2, who sustained injuries in the occurrence, was medically examined, and her statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate. On 29.03.2010, both the accused were arrested. Pursuant to their alleged confessional statements, the investigating agency claimed to have recovered hunting sickles and other incriminating material objects allegedly used in the commission of the offence. A Test Identification Parade was also conducted in respect of PW.7, who was examined to establish that the accused had earlier approached him for sharpening the hunting sickles.

6. The post-mortem examination conducted by PW.14 revealed that the deceased sustained multiple cut-lacerated injuries on vital parts of the body, and the doctor opined that the cause of death was due to a cut-through injury on the right side of the neck resulting in shock and haemorrhage. The prosecution also relied upon the medical evidence relating to the injuries sustained by PW.2, the recovery of the alleged weapons of offence, the forensic reports and other documentary evidence collected during the course of investigation.

7. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against both the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions, where charges were framed against both the accused. They pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

8. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 20, marked Exs.P1 to P50, and produced MOs.1 to 13. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein they denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against them. On behalf of the defence, contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses were marked as Exs.D1 to D5.

9. After appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court found several material discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution case, including inconsistencies regarding the time and place of occurrence, delay in lodging the First Information Report, contradictions between the testimony of the injured eyewitness and her earlier statements, doubtful recovery of the alleged weapons of offence, infirmities in the medical and forensic evidence, failure of independent witnesses to support the prosecution case, and serious lapses in the investigation. Holding that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt, the trial Court, by judgment dated 24.06.2011, acquitted accused Nos.1 and 2 under Section 235(1) Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the present Criminal Appeal.

10. Heard Sri M. Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent – State and Sri A. Prabhakar Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents – accused.

11. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant/State contended that the trial Court erred in acquitting the respondents/accused despite there being cogent and reliable evidence establishing their guilt. He submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved the motive for the commission of the offence, namely, the long-standing civil disputes relating to the agricultural land between the family of the deceased and Accused No.1. He further contended that P.W.2, being the wife of the deceased, is not only an eyewitness but also an injured witness who sustained injuries in the very same transaction in which her husband was brutally murdered. The evidence of an injured eyewitness carries greater evidentiary value and ordinarily commands implicit reliance unless there are compelling reasons to discard it.

12. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that immediately after the occurrence, P.W.2 was shifted to MGM Hospital, Warangal, where her statement was recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate. The medical evidence corroborates that she had sustained injuries during the incident. According to her testimony before the Court, while she and the deceased were returning from their agricultural field in a bullock-cart carrying cotton, the accused suddenly attacked them with hunting sickles. When she attempted to rescue her husband, she sustained an injury to her left ear, fell from the bullock-cart, and thereafter ran to the village and informed P.W.1 about the occurrence. Her evidence consistently establishes that the accused attacked the deceased on account of the long-standing land dispute and caused his death.

13. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the trial Court committed a serious error in discarding the testimony of P.W.2 merely because several independent witnesses turned hostile. It is well settled that conviction can safely be based on the testimony of a solitary witness, particularly an injured eyewitness, if the Court finds such evidence to be trustworthy and of sterling quality. Merely because other witnesses did not support the prosecution case, the otherwise reliable evidence of P.W.2 could not have been rejected. He further submitted that the discrepancies pointed out by the trial Court are only minor and natural inconsistencies which invariably occur in the testimony of truthful witnesses and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. Nothing substantial was elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.2 to discredit her testimony or to establish that she had falsely implicated the accused. Therefore, the trial Court ought to have relied upon her evidence in conjunction with the medical and other circumstantial evidence and convicted the accused. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this Criminal Appeal.

14. Further, learned Additional Public Prosecutor relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adalat Yadav etc. v. The State of Bihar (2026 LiveLaw (SC) 415), wherein paragraph No.7 is extracted hereunder:

               “7. In light of the submissions, we now proceed to examine the matter. Out of the manifold contentions advanced by the appellant - convicts, the fact that four PWs have been discounted by the High Court is a major factor. This cannot be faulted since convictions on the basis of the testimony of a singular eyewitness is also permissible. After all, evidence on record is to be measured for quality, not on the basis of quantity. If the testimony is of ‘sterling quality’, resting a conviction thereon would be entirely permissible. Although this position is well settled, we may for ready reference reiterate the same as follows:

               Evidence to be weighed not counted

               (i) In Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, this Court observed:

               “10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000].)”

(ii) A bench of three judges in Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), held:

               “16. …As a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise [see Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ].””

15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused supported the judgment of acquittal and submitted that the trial Court has meticulously appreciated the entire evidence on record and rightly concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that the evidence of P.W.2, though that of an injured witness, is not free from serious contradictions, material omissions and inconsistencies. Her statement recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate immediately after the incident, though initially treated as a dying declaration, cannot be treated as such since she survived. However, the said statement is admissible for the purpose of contradicting or corroborating her testimony before the Court.

16. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there are glaring contradictions between the statement of P.W.2 before the Magistrate and her deposition during trial. In her statement before the Magistrate, she specifically attributed the assault only to Accused No.1 and stated that accused No.2 was merely moving around the scene of offence and watching the incident without participating in the assault. She also stated that accused No.1 attacked the deceased with a knife, which is used to cut wood whereas before the trial Court she deposed that both the accused indiscriminately hacked the deceased with hunting sickles. Thus, there are material contradictions regarding the overt acts attributed to accused No.2 as well as the very nature of the weapon allegedly used in the commission of the offence.

17. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the prosecution case regarding the recovery of the weapons of offence is also highly doubtful. According to the prosecution, two hunting sickles were recovered pursuant to the confession of the accused. However, the photographs of the scene of offence reveal that one hunting sickle was already lying at the scene, which was admittedly not seized by the Investigating Officer. Moreover, while the seizure panchanama shows recovery of one sickle without a wooden handle and another with a wooden handle, the Forensic Science Laboratory report refers to examination of two sickles having wooden handles. This material discrepancy creates serious doubt regarding the identity of the alleged crime weapons and completely demolishes the prosecution case relating to recovery.

18. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that none of the independent witnesses, including the mediators to the seizure and recovery proceedings, supported the prosecution case and they were declared hostile. The alleged recovery of the weapons, therefore, remains unproved. Apart from the interested testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2, there is no independent evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the offence. Therefore, he prayed the Court to dismiss the Criminal Appeal.

19. In support of his submissions, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhim Singh V. State of Haryana (2002 10 SCC 461), wherein paragraph No.9, is extracted hereunder:

               “9. Before concluding, we would like to point out that this Court in a number of cases has held that an appellate court entertaining an appeal from the judgment of acquittal by the trial court though entitled to reappreciate the evidence and come to an independent conclusion, it should not do so as a matter of routine. In other words, if from the same set of evidence two views are possible and if the trial court has taken one view on the said evidence, unless the appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is either perverse or such that no reasonable person could come to that conclusion or that such a finding of the trial court is not based on any material on record, it should not merely because another conclusion is possible reverse the finding of the trial court. (See: Mohanlal Hargovind Dass v. Ram Narain [(1979) 3 SCC 279 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 649] , State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh [(1978) 3 SCC 129 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 359] , State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [(1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] and Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 815 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 225] ) In the instant case also we find that the trial court had taken a view which the High Court has not held to be either perverse, unreasonable or a finding which is not based on evidence, still on reappreciation of the evidence, the High Court came to a different conclusion which on facts of this case and on the basis of the ratio of the law laid down by this Court in the abovecited cases cannot be sustained.”

20. The following points arise for consideration in the Criminal Appeal:

               i. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the respondents/accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC beyond reasonable doubt?

               ii. Whether the trial Court was justified in acquitting the respondents/accused by disbelieving the evidence of P.W.2 and other prosecution evidence?

               iii. Whether the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court warrants interference by this Court?

21. To prove the allegations against the respondents/accused, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 20, marked Exs.P1 to P50 and produced M.Os.1 to 13. P.W.1, the son of the deceased and the de facto complainant, deposed regarding the long-standing land dispute between his family and accused No.1, the information received from P.W.2 about the incident, his visit to the scene of offence and lodging of Ex.P1 complaint. P.W.2, the wife of the deceased and the injured eyewitness, spoke about the occurrence, the assault on the deceased and the injury sustained by her while attempting to rescue him. P.Ws.3 to 7 and 9 were cited as independent witnesses, of whom most turned hostile. P.Ws.8 and 11 were the photographers who photographed the scene of offence and the dead body. P.Ws.10 and 12 were the mediators for the scene of offence panchanama and inquest proceedings. P.Ws.13 and 15 were the mediators for the alleged confession and recovery proceedings. P.W.14, the post-mortem doctor, opined that the deceased died due to a cut-through injury on the neck resulting in shock and haemorrhage. P.W.16, the Medical Officer, examined P.W.2 and issued the wound certificate. P.W.17, the learned Judicial Magistrate, recorded the statement of P.W.2 immediately after the incident. P.W.18, another Judicial Magistrate, conducted the Test Identification Parade. P.Ws.19 and 20 were the Investigating Officers who spoke about the registration of the crime, investigation, arrest of the accused, recovery of the alleged weapons of offence and filing of the charge sheet. M.O.1 consists of a pair of chappals allegedly belonging to Accused No.1, M.Os.7 and 8 are the hunting sickles alleged to have been used in the commission of the offence, M.O.9 is the LML Vespa allegedly connected with Accused No.1, and M.Os.10 to 13 are the clothes allegedly seized from the accused.

22. The evidence of P.W.14 establishes that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, as the deceased sustained multiple cut injuries, including a fatal cut-through injury on the neck. The prosecution sought to rely upon the testimony of P.W.2, the injured eyewitness, the medical evidence of P.Ws.14 and 16, the statement recorded by P.W.17, the Test Identification Parade conducted by P.W.18, and the recovery of M.Os.7 and 8 to connect the accused with the commission of the offence. However, the trial Court noticed material contradictions in the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, inconsistencies between the ocular, medical and documentary evidence, infirmities in the recovery of the alleged weapons of offence and the forensic evidence, besides the fact that the independent witnesses and mediators did not support the prosecution case. Consequently, the trial Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted them.

23. In the light of the submissions made by both the learned counel and upon a careful re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, the prosecution case mainly rests upon the testimony of P.W.2, who is not only the wife of the deceased but also an injured eyewitness to the occurrence. There is no dispute that P.W.2 sustained injuries in the same transaction in which the deceased lost his life. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that the testimony of an injured witness ordinarily carries great evidentiary value and, if found trustworthy, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration from independent witnesses. It is further contended that merely because the independent witnesses turned hostile, the evidence of P.W.2 cannot be discarded when it inspires confidence and is otherwise consistent with the medical evidence.

24. There can be no quarrel with the settled proposition of law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a solitary witness, particularly an injured witness, provided such evidence is wholly reliable and of sterling quality. However, before placing implicit reliance on such testimony, the Court is required to examine whether the evidence is free from material contradictions and inspires confidence.

25. In the present case, the evidence of P.W.2 is not free from material inconsistencies. Immediately after the occurrence, while undergoing treatment in MGM Hospital, her statement was recorded by the learned Magistrate. Though the said statement cannot be treated as a dying declaration since P.W.2 survived, it is nevertheless relevant for the purpose of appreciating the consistency of her version. In the said statement, P.W.2 specifically stated that accused No.1 alone attacked the deceased with a "kathi" and caused injuries, whereas accused No.2 was merely moving around the scene of offence without participating in the assault. However, while deposing before the trial Court, she materially improved her version by stating that both the accused attacked the deceased with two hunting sickles and actively participated in the commission of the offence. Thus, there is a clear contradiction regarding the overt acts attributed to accused No.2, which goes to the root of the prosecution case. Such an improvement cannot be treated as a trivial discrepancy, particularly when the prosecution seeks to invoke the common intention under Section 34 IPC.

26. Further, the prosecution attempted to establish that the hunting sickles used in the commission of the offence had been sharpened by P.W.7, a blacksmith, shortly before the occurrence. A Test Identification Parade was also conducted through P.W.18 to establish the identity of the accused. However, P.W.7 did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He categorically stated that he had not prepared the alleged hunting sickles and further deposed that the police had shown the accused to him prior to the Test Identification Parade. Consequently, the evidence of P.W.7 does not advance the prosecution case and, on the contrary, creates doubt regarding the alleged preparation of the weapons and the fairness of the Test Identification Parade.

27. The recovery of the alleged weapons of offence also suffers from serious infirmities. According to the prosecution, M.Os.7 and 8, namely, the hunting sickles, were recovered pursuant to the confessional statements of the accused. However, the seizure panchanama and the evidence of the Investigating Officer disclose that one of the recovered sickles had an iron handle and the other had a wooden handle. On the other hand, the Forensic Science Laboratory report (Ex.P.50) shows that the articles received for examination were two sickles having wooden handles. This discrepancy regarding the identity and description of the alleged weapons has remained unexplained. The prosecution has failed to establish that the weapons allegedly seized from the accused are the very same weapons examined by the Forensic Science Laboratory. Such an unexplained discrepancy strikes at the root of the prosecution case relating to the recovery of the weapons of offence.

28. Another significant circumstance creating doubt in the prosecution case is the evidence of the Investigating Officer regarding the photographs of the scene of offence. During cross-examination, the Investigating Officer admitted that the photographs marked under Ex.P7 depict a hunting sickle covered with a white cloth lying at the scene of offence. Surprisingly, the said weapon was not seized by the Investigating Officer. When questioned regarding the omission, he stated that he had not noticed the said hunting sickle. If, according to the prosecution itself, a hunting sickle was found at the scene of offence, the failure of the Investigating Officer to seize the same assumes significance and casts serious doubt on the subsequent recovery of M.Os.7 and 8 pursuant to the alleged confessional statements of the accused.

29. Further, though P.W.2 claimed that the accused attacked the deceased with hunting sickles, the prosecution did not identify the alleged weapons through her during trial. No attempt was made to have P.W.2 identify M.Os.7 and 8 as the weapons actually used in the commission of the offence. This omission assumes importance in view of the contradictions regarding the description of the weapons and the discrepancies noticed in the forensic evidence.

30. The prosecution version also suffers from inconsistencies regarding the place of occurrence. While P.W.2 deposed regarding the place where the assault allegedly occurred, the scene of offence panchanama, the charge-sheet and the photographs indicate the existence of a cotton crop in the field. These inconsistencies, though by themselves may not be sufficient to reject the prosecution case, assume significance when considered cumulatively with the other discrepancies noticed above.

31. It is also not in dispute that most of the independent witnesses examined by the prosecution, including the mediators to the recovery proceedings, did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile. Consequently, except for the testimony of P.Ws.1 and 2, there is no reliable independent evidence corroborating the prosecution version regarding the participation of both the accused in the commission of the offence.

32. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor placed reliance upon the principle that conviction can be based on the testimony of a solitary witness. There is no dispute regarding the said proposition. However, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Yadav v. State of Bihar, the evidence of a solitary witness must be wholly reliable and of sterling quality. Where the testimony suffers from material contradictions and does not inspire complete confidence, the Court must look for corroboration in material particulars before acting upon such evidence.

33. The learned counsel for the respondents rightly relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhim Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 461, wherein it was held that although the appellate Court possesses the power to re-appreciate the evidence in an appeal against acquittal, interference is permissible only when the view taken by the trial Court is perverse, unreasonable or wholly unsupported by the evidence on record. If two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence, the view favourable to the accused must ordinarily be adopted.

34. In the present case, the trial Court has meticulously considered the inconsistencies in the testimony of P.W.2, the contradictory versions regarding the overt acts of accused No.2, the doubtful recovery of the alleged weapons of offence, the discrepancy between the seizure proceedings and the forensic report, the omission to seize the hunting sickle found at the scene of offence, the failure to identify the weapons through the injured eyewitness, the hostility of the independent witnesses and the lapses in the investigation. On the basis of the said evidence, the trial Court recorded a finding that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

35. This Court does not find the view taken by the trial Court to be either perverse or contrary to the evidence available on record. On the contrary, the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court is a possible and plausible view emerging from the material on record. In an appeal against acquittal, merely because another view is possible, this Court would not be justified in substituting its own view for that of the trial Court. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish any compelling or substantial reason warranting interference with the judgment of acquittal. Therefore, there are no merits in the Criminal Appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.