1. The petitioners are working in the 2nd respondent, Food Corporation of India, as Assistant Grade-II (Technical). They were initially appointed as Assistant Grade-III (Technical) in the 2nd respondent Corporation, pursuant to Exts.P1 to P8 orders dated 16.05.2014. The petitioners state, with reference to Ext.P9 provisional seniority list of Assistant Grade-III (Technical) dated 01.06.2018, that they were included at Serial Nos.34, 54, 83, 169, 176, 207, 211, and 215 respectively, whereas one Smt.Nivya Cletus was listed at Serial No. 227 and was therefore junior to all the petitioners. The petitioners further state that apart from Nivya Cletus, there were several other juniors appointed in the category Assistant Grade-III (Technical) in the respondent Corporation. Later, with reference to their seniority, the petitioners were promoted as Assistant Grade-II (Technical) pursuant to Exts.P10 and P11 orders dated 05.10.2018 and 15.10.2019, respectively.

2. Ext.P12 is an order issued by the 4th respondent herein providing for stagnation Impact Amelioration Scheme in various categories in the Corporation as regards the employees who continue in the same post for a specified period. The petitioners refer to Clause 3 to show that additional increments on completion of 6, 12, and 20 years of completion of service were entitled to an employee. They further point out that since Nivya Cletus and several other juniors to the petitioners were not promoted; they were extended the additional increments under Clause 3 of Ext.P12. The petitioners again point out that later, Nivya Cletus and other juniors to the petitioners were promoted to the category Assistant Grade-II (Technical). However, by that time, they were extended the additional increment under Ext.P12. Consequently, when fixing the pay in the post of Assistant Grade- II (Technical), the increments granted in the post of Assistant Grade-III (Technical) under Ext.P12 Scheme was also taken into account. This is sought to be established with reference to the pay slip of Nivya Cletus at Ext.P14 for the month of June, 2023, as per which, her basic pay was shown at Rs.36,860/-, whereas, the pay slip for the same period, as regards the petitioners, has shown the basic pay on a lesser figure - Rs.35,780/-. Therefore, they sought for stepping up their pay, pointing out the salary being paid to their juniors in the Corporation. By the proceedings at Ext.P25, the 4th respondent sought to reject the same, placing reliance on Clause 25 of Ext.P12 order. It is in such circumstances, the petitioners have preferred the captioned writ petition seeking to challenge Ext.P25 order issued by the 4th respondent as well as seeking to challenge Clause 25 of Ext.P12 order as unconstitutional, arbitrary, unfair, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India.

3. A learned Single Judge of this Court initially had sought to reject the writ petition by judgment dated 23.01.2025. In an appeal filed against the afore judgment, a Division Bench of this Court, pursuant to the judgment dated 04.12.2025 in W.A.No.1242 of 2025, has set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing the matter to be considered afresh, adverting to all contentions, including the validity of Clause 25 of Ext.P12 order. It is on that basis that the captioned writ petition is posted before this Court for final hearing.

4. Sri.Elvin Peter P.J., the learned senior counsel, instructed by Smt.Reshma Prakash Kurian, the learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that:

                  i. The fact that the petitioners were seniors to Nivya Cletus and others is not in dispute.

                  ii. Even then, there is disparity among the pay scales as evident from the pay slips for the period June, 2023.

                  iii. The disparity arose only because Nivya Cletus and others were granted additional increments under Clause 3 of Ext.P12, which was not extended to the petitioners since they were by then promoted during 2018.

                  iv. In the light of this disparity, the petitioners are entitled for stepping up their pay on par with their juniors, who are admittedly drawing higher pay than the petitioners, applying the principle of equal pay for equal work.

                  v. The said claim is rejected solely on account of Clause 25 of Ext.P12, which requires to be declared as unconstitutional and arbitrary.

                  vi. He sought to rely on Union of India and Others v. C.R. Madhava Murthy and Another [(2022) 6 SCC 183], Union of India and Ors. v. G.Rajendran Nair [MANU/KE/2825/2023], Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others v. Guddu Singh Rawat [2023 SCC OnLine Del 6536], Government of Kerala and Another v. Dr. Anitha and Others [2018 KHC 108], Dr.S.M.Ilyas and Others v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Others [(1993) 1 SCC 182] and Kamala Devi v. Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. [2002 (1) KLT 157].

5. Per contra, Sri.George Poonthottam, the learned senior counsel, instructed by Smt.Anu Thankam Mathew, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation would contend that:

                  i. The petitioners are not correct in stating that Nivya Cletus and others are their juniors. All of them were appointed during 2014.

                  ii. The petitioners are not prejudiced on account of the extension of the additional increments to Nivya Cletus and others since the petitioners would be granted such increment during 2024 with reference to their promotion during 2018, whereas Nivya Cletus and others would get this only upon completing six years of service with reference to their promotion during 2020.

                  iii. As regards the challenge against Ext.P12 Scheme, he would state that Clause 25 alone cannot be dissected and challenged. Ext.P12 Scheme is an exclusive one, as per which a person, so as to be granted the benefits under Clause 3, is also to accept Clause 25.

                  iv. Ext.P12, having been issued during 2014, the challenge against Clause 25 is highly belated.

6. I have considered the rival contentions as well as the connected records.

7. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioners were appointed in the respondent Corporation during 2014 as Assistant Grade-III (Technical). Nivya Cletus and others were also appointed on the same date as the petitioners. Due to the absence of an appropriate vacancy in the next category, only the petitioners were granted promotions in 2018. On account of this, Nivya Cletus and others became entitled to additional increments under Clause 3 upon their completion of the period of service mentioned therein. Later, Nivya Cletus and others were also promoted during 2020. However, due to such promotion, when fixing their pay, the additional increments extended in the category Assistant Grade III (Technical) were also reckoned. It is on account of this, that there is disparity in the pay scales of the petitioners and Nivya Cletus and others.

8. When the petitioners sought for stepping up on account of the afore pursuant to Ext.P25, this is sought to be rejected, seeking to rely on Clause 25 of Ext.P12.

9. For ease of reference, Clauses 3 and 25 of Ext.P12 are extracted as under:

                  “3. An employee will be entitled for additional increments on each stage of completion of 6, 12 & 20 years period of 'Regular Service' in the same pay scale. However, in case of those employees who have reached the maximum of scale in which they are stagnating, additional increment will be given in the next higher pay scale.

                  ………………..

                  25. No stepping up of pay with regard to junior getting more pay then senior on account of pay fixation under ACP Scheme would be allowed.”

                  True, Clause 25 provides for no stepping up of pay in a situation where a junior is getting more pay than a senior on account of pay fixation under Ext.P12 Scheme.

10. On a literal interpretation of Clause 25 of Ext.P12, the petitioners are not entitled for any stepping up.

11. In this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in C.R. Madhava Murthy (supra) requires to be referred to. In that case, the respondents were appointed as Lower Division Clerk on 01.02.1973 and 03.08.1973, respectively, and promoted as Upper Division Clerk on 04.10.1976. They were promoted as Inspectors with effect from 02.04.1981 and 13.07.1981. One Sri.C.K.Satish was appointed as an Inspector by direct recruitment on 17.12.1981, and Sri.B.S.Srikanth was also appointed as an Inspector again by direct recruitment on 15.05.1982. There, also, under the ACP scheme, the juniors to the petitioners were granted upgradation, on account of which, they started drawing higher pay. The claim for stepping up was allowed by the High Court. Considering the afore situation, the Apex Court found as under:

                  “9. Having heard Ms Madhavi Divan, learned ASG and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, which has emerged from the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it cannot be said that the original writ petitioners were as such claiming the stepping up of the pay under the ACP Scheme. Their grievance was with respect to the anomaly in the pay scale and their grievance was that while granting upgradation under the ACP Scheme, their juniors were getting higher salaries than what they receive. Therefore, it was a case of removal of anomaly by stepping up of pay of seniors on promotion drawing a less pay than their juniors.

                  ………………..

                  11. Therefore, it was a case where a junior was drawing more pay on account of upgradation under the ACP Scheme and there was an anomaly and therefore, the pay of senior was required to be stepped up. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly directed the appellants herein to step up the pay of the original writ petitioners keeping in view of pay scale which has been granted to the juniors from the date they have started drawing lesser pay than their juniors. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.”

                  Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court in G.Rajendran Nair (supra) has considered an almost identical situation where the respondent entered service as LDC on 20.05.1970 and was promoted as Inspector on 17.08.1978. His junior one Sri.Koruth Jacob was appointed as Inspector by direct recruitment on 05.10.1978 and promoted as Superintendent on 30.09.1996. Since, Koruth Jacob could not be promoted and was stagnated, he was extended the ACP and MACP benefits. Therefore, the respondent before the court sought for stepping up on par with his junior with effect from the extension of ACP/MACP benefits to Koruth Jacob. The Union of India – employer has sought to place reliance on the provisions of the Scheme, which specifically provided that “there shall be no additional financial upgradation for the senior employee on the ground that the junior employee in the grade has got a higher pay scale under the ACP Scheme”. The Division Bench, with reference to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in C.R.Madhava Murthy (supra), found as under:-

                  “7. The apex court, in clear terms, held that there is anomaly when the junior is allowed to draw more pay. Even looking from the angle of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, a person who is holding same cadre, cannot expect to have different emoluments or allowances merely for the reason of stagnation of a junior in that cadre for a long period.”

                  Thus, in the light of the two decisions referred to above, it is quite clear that a senior can seek for stepping up of the pay with reference to a higher pay for his junior on account of the extension of ACP benefits. It is further clear that Article 14 of the Constitution of India also applies, and as regards the same cadre, one cannot expect to have different emoluments merely because the junior had stagnated in a cadre for a long period.

12. The Delhi High Court in Guddu Singh Rawat (supra) has also considered a similar situation, wherein an interdiction similar to Clause 25 of Ext.P12 in this writ petition was pressed into service for seeking to disallow the claim for stepping up of pay. The Clause to the afore effect considered by the Delhi High Court read as under:

                  “10. No stepping up of pay in the pay band or grade pay would be admissible with regard to junior getting more pay than the senior on account of pay fixation under MACP Scheme.”

                  Even on the face of the afore, the Delhi High Court, with reference to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in C.R.Madhava Murthy (supra), upheld the finding by the Central Administrative Tribunal that the pay of the senior is required to be stepped up on account of the anomaly pursuant to which the junior was drawing more pay due to the upgradation under the ACP Scheme. To the same effect is the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Dr.Anita (supra), where a contention to the effect that sanctioning of an advanced increment cannot be considered as an anomaly so as to seek for stepping up of the pay was rejected.

13. On the basis of all the above, I am of the considered opinion that even on the face of Clause 25 of Ext.P12, the prayer for stepping up raised by the petitioner requires to be accepted as has been ordered by the Division Bench of this Court in G.Rajendran Nair (supra) and also by the Delhi High Court in Guddu Singh Rawat (supra).

In the light of the afore, I am of the opinion that the petitioners are entitled to succeed. Therefore, this writ petition would stand disposed of as under:

It is declared that the pay of the petitioners requires to be stepped up on par with that of their juniors in the category of Assistant Grade-II (Technical), whose pay was fixed also reckoning the ACP benefits while they served as Assistant Grade-III (Technical).