(Prayer: The Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking for a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records pertaining to the impugned order G.O.(D) No.761, dated 08.06.2026, issued by the 1st respondent and to quash the same and consecutively direct the respondents to release the detenu, Sundaralingam S/o Velayutham, aged about 44 years, bearing PID No.9400, prematurely, confined at Central Prison, Palayamkottai as per G.O.(Ms).No.488, dated 15.11.2021.)

Sunder Mohan, J.

1. The father of the convict prisoner, by the name, Sundaralingam, S/o.Velayutham, aged 44 years [PID No.9400] has challenged the impugned order, by which, the prisoner’s case for premature release has been rejected.

2. The convict prisoner (hereinafter referred to as prisoner) was convicted for the offences under Sections 498 A and 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for the major offence under Section 302 IPC. The conviction was confirmed by this Court in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.211 of 2015 vide order dated 17.10.2016. The prisoner had completed 14 years, 9 months and 16 days of imprisonment as on 06.03.2026 and hence, his case was taken up for premature release and was placed before the State Level Committee. The State Level Committee in its meeting held on 18.03.2026 had not recommended for premature release of the prisoner and therefore, the first respondent passed the impugned order

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the sole ground that the respondents had not considered the factors which ought to be considered for premature release and had instead only considered the heinousness of the crime, which ought not to be the only basis for denying premature release. The learned counsel relied upon the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rohit Chaturvedi Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Others in W.P.(Crl.) Nos. 446 of 2023, dated 15.05.2026, in support of her submission.

4. The learned counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Side) per contra submitted that remission cannot be claimed as a matter of right; that the authorities have taken into consideration all the relevant factors, including the conduct of the prisoner in the prison, the report of the probation officer and the District Collector and therefore, there is no reason to set aside the discretionary order, which is passed on the recommendation of the State Level Committee; and prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition. The respondents have also filed a counter to that effect.

5. Admittedly, the prisoner is in confinement for more than 14 years. His case was considered along with other convicts who had completed 14 years of imprisonment. The State Level Committee had not recommended premature release considering the nature of the offence namely, that the prisoner had caused the death of his wife, since she did not accede to his dowry demand and therefore, the crime had serious social implications in the context of dowry related violence.

6. It is seen from the impugned order that the first respondent had primarily considered the heinous nature of the offence to deny premature release. This has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in several cases. It would be apposite to refer to the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohit Chaturvedi case (supra).

                   “7.Reverting to the present case, the faint ground invoked by the respondent-Union of India in support of rejection of the petitioner’s plea for premature release is that the crime committed by the petitioner was a heinous one. We wish to make it clear that in a constitutional polity governed by the rule of law, the denial of remission cannot rest solely on the ground of heinousness of the crime. As we have already stated above, remission is not an extension of the sentencing process, but a distinct executive function concerned with the present and future, namely, the prisoner’s conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society. To predicate its denial only on the heinous nature of the offence is to collapse this distinction and to reconvert remission into a retrospective reaffirmation of guilt, which the criminal justice system has already adjudicated upon. The gravity and heinousness of the offence stand exhausted at the stage of sentencing and the judicial determination of punishment necessarily incorporates these considerations. A criminal justice system that refuses to look beyond the gravity of the offence to the offender’s transformation will betray its reformative ideal particularly at the remission stage. Justice does not permit permanent incarceration of an individual in the shadow of their worst act.”

7. In the impugned order, we find that the first respondent had noted the following aspects:

                   “4. … (i) The prisoner was convicted for the murder of his wife Kartheeswari, arising out of a dowry-related dispute, as she was unable to meet the additional demand for jewels and cash. The offence involved the use of a deadly weapon and resulted in the death of his spouse, reflecting a serious offence against a woman within the marital relationship.

                   (ii) The District Collector and the Probation Officer have not reported any apprehension of law and order issues and no adverse incidents were recorded during the prisoner’s leave period. The prisoner’s family members are willing to receive him after release, which may provide social support and reduce the likelihood of reofffending.

                   (iii) The prisoner has maintained satisfactory conduct during incarceration, with no prison offences reported. He has been regularly engaged in the work assigned to him and is currently employed in the Freedom Fuel filling station inside the prison, indicating a disciplined and responsible behavioural pattern.

                   (iv) The Medical Officer has reported that the prisoner is suffering from a seizure disorder for which appropriate treatment is being provided. Apart from this chronic condition, he is not suffering from any communicable disease. The Psychologist has assessed him as having average intelligence with an ambivert personality and his mental condition is stable with positive behavioral change.

                   (v) The prisoner’s family members are willing to accept him after release and he may sustain himself through family support or daily wage employment. The reports also indicate that his premature release may enable him to assist his ailing mother and no adverse reactions are anticipated in the locality.”

8. We in W.P.No.35730 of 2024 etc., batch, by an order dated 30.06.2026, had observed as follows;

                   “16. The basis of an order considering a plea for premature release thus cannot be unitary in its consideration, proceeding solely on the nature of offences committed by the convict, but has also to take into account the aspects of their reformation and rehabilitation. This is what the judgment in Joseph [Joseph vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2023 SCC Online 1211] has to say, on that account:

                   ‘Numerous judgments of this court, have elaborated on the penological goal of reformation and rehabilitation, being the cornerstone of our criminal justice system, rather than retribution. The impact of applying such an executive instruction/guideline to guide the executive’s discretion would be that routinely, any progress made by a long-term convict would be rendered naught, leaving them feeling hopeless, and condemned to an indefinite period of incarceration. While the sentencing courts may, in light of this court’s majority judgment in Sriharan (supra), now impose term sentences (in excess of 14 or 20 years) for crimes that are specially heinous, but not reaching the level of ‘rarest of rare’ (warranting the death penalty), the state government cannot – especially by way of executive instruction, take on such a role, for crimes as it deems fit.’

                   17. The Court, referring to Articles 72 and 162 of the Constitution in matters of remission, commutation etc., says that those powers cannot be caged in the form of guidelines that are inflexible. In fine, the conclusion is that typecasting a convict through guidelines that are inflexible, based on crimes committed by them in the past, may well result in the real danger of overlooking the reformative potential of the individual. This point is best elaborated in the words of the Court that reads as follows:

                   ‘33. Classifying - to use a better word, typecasting convicts, through guidelines which are inflexible, based on their crime committed in the distant past can result in the real danger of overlooking the reformative potential of each individual convict. Grouping types of convicts, based on the offences they were found to have committed, as a starting point, may be justified. However, the prison laws in India – read with Articles 72 and 161 - encapsulate a strong underlying reformative purpose. The practical impact of a guideline, which bars consideration of a premature release request by a convict who has served over 20 or 25 years, based entirely on the nature of crime committed in the distant past, would be to crush the life force out of such individual, altogether. Thus, for instance, a 19 or 20 year old individual convicted for a crime, which finds 27 (2007) 13 SCC 606 place in the list which bars premature release, altogether, would mean that such person would never see freedom, and would die within the prison walls. There is a peculiarity of continuing to imprison one who committed a crime years earlier who might well have changed totally since that time. This is the condition of many people serving very long sentences. They may have killed someone (or done something much less serious, such as commit a narcotic drug related offences or be serving a life sentence for other non-violent crimes) as young individuals and remain incarcerated 20 or more years later. Regardless of the morality of continued punishment, one may question its rationality. The question is, what is achieved by continuing to punish a person who recognises the wrongness of what they have done, who no longer identifies with it, and who bears little resemblance to the person they were years earlier? It is tempting to say that they are no longer the same person. Yet, the insistence of guidelines, obdurately, to not look beyond the red lines drawn by it and continue in denial to consider the real impact of prison good behaviour, and other relevant factors (to ensure that such individual has been rid of the likelihood of causing harm to society) results in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Excluding the relief of premature release to prisoners who have served extremely long periods of incarceration, not only crushes their spirit, and instils despair, but signifies society’s resolve to be harsh and unforgiving. The idea of rewarding, a prisoner for good conduct is entirely negated.’

                   18. On an examination of the impugned orders in the present cases, we find that the rejections are based solely on the basis of the offences committed. There is no examination of their conduct while in incarceration, the remorse, if any, shown of their past acts, assessment, if any, of whether, and how they could contribute to society if released, perception of threat that they may pose to society and other relevant parameters.”

9. The above observations are self-explanatory. We had held that the request for premature release cannot be rejected for the sole reason that the convict had committed a heinous offence. Several other factors, such as his conduct during incarceration; the remorse, if any, shown by him; the possibility of the convict leading a peaceful life and abstaining from any crime; and the threat that he may pose to the victim’s family or the society in general, are to be considered. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive.

10. Admittedly, since most of the relevant factors that are required to be considered for premature release as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Joseph case (supra) and in Rohit Chaturvedi case (supra) are in favour of the convict prisoner, as could be seen from paragraph 4 of the impugned order extracted above, we are of the view that it is desirable that the authorities reconsider the case of the convict prisoner afresh in the light of our aforesaid observations, after taking into consideration all the relevant factors. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. The respondents are directed to consider the prisoner’s case for premature release and pass orders, within a period of four (4) weeks, from the date of receipt of this order.

11. With the above observations, the Writ Petition (Criminal) is allowed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.