(Prayer:- Criminal Appeal filed under Section 21(1) of National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 to call for the records and set aside the order dated 30.04.2026 in Crl.M.P.No.868 of 2026 passed by the Principal Sessions Court, Sivagangai in Crime No.71 of 2026 on the file of the second respondent and enlarge the appellants on bail)

A.D. Jagadish Chandira, J.

1. The instant criminal appeal is filed by the 1st and 2nd accused (hereinafter referred to as “the appellant”) seeking to set aside the order dated 30.04.2026 (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”) in Crime No.71 of 2026 in Crl. M.P. No. 868 of 2026 passed by the Principal Sessions Court, Sivagangai (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”).

2. The appellants were arrested on 19.04.2026 in Crime No.71 of 2026 for the offences under Sections 326(f) BNS and Section 9(B)(1)(b) of Explosives Act and later altered to Sections 61(2), 196(1), 326(f) BNS, Section 3 of Explosives Substances Act and Section 15 r/w. 16(b) of Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act. The appellants were remanded to judicial custody on 19.04.2026 and they have been under incarceration for more than 110 days. The appellants filed Cr. M.P. No. 868 of 2026 seeking for bail and the same was dismissed vide the impugned order on 30.04.2026. Challenging the impugned order of dismissal the present appeal has been filed.

3. The brief facts of the case in a nutshell is as follows:

                     3.1. On 11.03.2026, the defacto complainantAndiyappan (Hereinafter referred to as "the defacto complainant") had given a complaint based on which a case in Crime No. 71 of 2026 was registered for the offences under Sections 326(f) BNS and 9(B)(1)(b) of Explosives Act.

                     3.2. As per the complaint the defacto complainant was working as a night watchman in the office of the Member of Parliament of Sivagangai and he used to come to work every day at 6.00 pm., and leave work by 6.00 a.m., on the next day. Likewise on 10.06.2026 he went to the said office at 6.00 p.m. and after the office Manager N.Senthil Kumar left the office, at around 9.30 p.m., he closed the outer gates and thereafter at about 11.30 p.m., he closed the doors of the said office and went to sleep inside the said office. On the morning of the next day i.e., 11.03.2026, at about 5.15 a.m., when he went outside the said office to sweep the floors of the said office, he noticed a burnt and broken alcohol bottle. When he lifted the said bottle to have a closer look, he was able to smell kerosene. Thereby he had immediately informed the office manager and upon his instructions gave a complaint to the Karaikudi North Police Station, based on which the case in Crime No. 71 of 2026 was registered for the above said offence.

                     3.3. During the enquiry, based on the CCTV footages the appellants were arrested on 19.04.2026 at about 20.00 hrs. It was revealed during the enquiry that the appellants in collusion with the other absconding accused had hurled petrol bombs at the office of the Member of Parliament in order to show protest to the public observations made by the Karaikudi, Member of Parliament following the death of Iranian President.

                     3.4. Later, during the course of further investigation it had come to light that the appellants were having links with the absconding accused who in turn were having links with various banned terrorist organizations and that therefore they have committed the present offence to threaten the Member of Parliament to instill fear in the minds of general public and thereby pave way for disturbance based on communal differences. Hence, based on the further investigation, the offences in Crime No. 71 of 2026 were altered to include Sections 61(2), 196(1), 326(f) BNS, Section 3 of Explosives Substances Act and Section 15 r/w. 16(b) of Unlawful activities(Prevention) Act.

                     3.5. Whileso the appellants filed a bail application in Cr. M.P. No. 868 of 2026 before the Trial Court and the same came to be dismissed vide the impugned order on 30.04.2026. Hence, the appellants have now filed the present appeal to set aside the said order.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions:

                     4.1. The appellants are youngsters belonging to the age group of 19 to 22 years and they have no criminal antecedents or criminal records whatsoever. The appellants are not directly related to any banned terrorist organization and they have been falsely implicated in this present case. However, the Trial Court has failed to consider same.

                     4.2. The respondent resorted to an alteration report only for the purpose of keeping the appellant under long periods of incarceration by invoking section 15 r/w. 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. However, without duly considering this aspect, the remand has been extended by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi which, is inconsistent with the object of Section 43D(2)(B) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

                     4.3. The case of the respondent does disclose the essential ingredients to attract an offence the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 in the FIR and its alteration report. The allegation in the FIR, are insufficient to attract the offence of a "Terrorist Act" as contemplated under Section 15 r/w. Section 2(1)(k) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and neither does the investigation reveal that the appellants are members of a banned terrorist organisation.

                     4.4. In fact, the Inspector of Police, Karaikudi North Police Station i.e. the second respondent herein had referred the investigation of the case to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) i.e. the first respondent herein. But however, the first respondent, finding that the facts of the present case do not warrant an investigation to be conducted by them, rejected the first respondent's referral.

                     4.5. None of the absconding accused are linked with any banned terrorist organization and the Trial Court has failed to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner known to law and has thereby erroneously dismissed the appellant's application for bail vide the impugned order. Hence, reliance was placed on National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] and Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] to urge that the impugned order was not sustainable as the same was inconsistent with the settled principles for the grant of bail. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and thereby the appellants are entitled to bail.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed reliance on the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent and submitted that the accused persons with an intention to threaten the Karaikudi, Member of Parliament and further to instill fear in the minds of general public and thereby pave way for disturbance based on the communal differences hurled petrol bombs at the office of the Member of Parliament in order to show protest to the public observations made by the Karaikudi, Member of Parliament following the death of Iranian President. He further submitted that during the investigation the accused were arrested based on the CCTV footage and during the further investigation thereof, it was ascertained that the appellants have connections with the absconding accused namely Abdul Kasim, Mohammed Pyas, Haneefa and Bareeth. These absconding accused have their links with banned terrorists organizations and hence it would be possible to identify the person behind the present offence only upon securing the aforesaid absconding accused. Moreso, he submitted that the investigation is at a nascent stage and that the pen drive and mobile phones seized from the appellants have now been submitted to RFSL, Chennai for forensic analysis and recovery of relevant digital material. Hence, he urged that the first respondent having forwarded the proposal to the second respondent for taking over the investigation, the grant of bail to the appellants would prejudice the investigation and provide an opportunity for the appellants to abscond from the clutches of facing trial.

6. When the matter was listed on 27.07.2026, notice was ordered to the first respondent and upon service of the same, Mr.R. Karthikeyan, learned Special Public Prosecutor appeared for the first respondent submitted that the first respondent would not be taking over the investigation of the case.

7. This Court has also called for the case diary and has perused the same. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials available on records.

8. The impugned order under challenge in the criminal appeal is an order of denial to grant bail to the appellants who are alleged to have committed an offence under Section 61(2), 196(1), 326(f) BNS, Section 3 of Explosives Substances Act and Section 15 r/w. 16(b) of Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act.

9. The case of the respondent is that the defacto complainant, the night watchman of the office of the Member of Parliament had found a burnt broken liquor bottle emitting the smell of kerosene and that on investigation thereof the appellants in furtherance of their connection with the aforesaid absconding accused who in turn have connections with a various banned terrorist organizations had committed the offence to instill fear in the minds of general public and thereby pave way for disturbance based on the communal differences. Whereas, it is the case of the appellants that they are youngsters without any criminal antecedents whatsoever and that they have been falsely implicated in the present case. It is the further case of the appellants that the second respondent is making a mountain out of a molehill and that even assuming for a moment that the implications are true, the averments of the second respondent do not by any figment of imagination disclose the essential ingredients for attracting an offence under Section 15 r/w. Section 16 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

10. The Trial Court has perceived that the offence lodged against the appellant was grave in nature and there upon finding that the investigation was still at a preliminary stage had denied the grant of bail to the appellants, pending investigation of the case. The correctness of which is in question before us.

11. Therefore, before entering into the merits of the case, this court feels that it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of the of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and they are extracted hereunder:-

                     "2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

                     (k) “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to it in section 15, and the expressions “terrorism” and “terrorist” shall be construed accordingly;

                     15. Terrorist act.— (1) Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,—

                     (a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause—

                     (i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or

                     (ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or (iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or

                     (iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or

                     (iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or

                     (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or

                     (c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or an international or intergovernmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or commits a terrorist act.

                     (2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.

                     16. Punishment for terrorist act.—(1) Whoever commits a terrorist act shall,—

                     (a) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine;

                     (b) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine."

12. The offence under Section 16 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 falls within Chapter IV of the said Act. When an offence falls within the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act, necessarily, while deciding an Application for bail, the court has to take into consideration the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 and thereby formulate an opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against such person is prima facie true.

13. Now coming to the facts of the case on hand initially the case was registered for the offences under Section 326(f) BNS and 9(B)(1)(b) of Explosives Act and thereafter based on the confession of the appellants that they had connections with the absconding accused who are member of banned terrorist organizations the offences were altered to include Sections 61(2), 196(1), 326(f) BNS, Section 3 of Explosives Substances Act and Section 15 r/w. 16(b) of Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act. Further, admittedly the referral of the case to the first respondent by the second respondent has been rejected by the first respondent as a case not fit to be investigated by them. When this Court enquired with the respondent in respect of the allegations pertaining to the connections enjoyed by the absconding accused with banned terrorist organizations, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the absconding accused, Abdul Kasim was the District Secretary of Indian National League Party which was earlier headed by one Thada Rahim who had connections with Al-Ummah terrorist organization. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel that the absconding accused, Abdul Kasim had delivered a hate speech in a gathering in which the appellants have also participated. Moreso, when this Court had posed a question as to whether the National League Organization is a banned organization, the learned Counsel submitted that the Indian National League is not a banned organization.

14. It would also be relevant to turn to Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, Supra wherein the aspects to be considered whilst deciding a bail in application in cases involving offences under the Unlawful activities (Prevention) Act. The relevant extract of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, Supra :

                     21. Before we proceed to analyse the rival submissions, it is apposite to restate the settled legal position about matters to be considered for deciding an application for bail, to wit:

                     (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

                     (ii) nature and gravity of the charge;

                     (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

                     (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

                     (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

                     (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

                     (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and

                     (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail. (State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi [State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21, para 18 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1960 (2)] .)

15. In this regard it is also noteworthy to turn to K.A.Najeeb, Supra wherein the Apex Court while dismissing an appeal filed by the Union of India against the grant of bail in a case involving offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The relevant extract of K.A.Najeeb, Supra is as follows :

                     17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.

16. The above view in K.A.Najeeb, Supra has been consistently followed and reiterated in various rulings including Jalaluddin Khan v Union of India [(2024) 10 SCC 574] and Syed Iftikhar Abdrabi Andrabi V.National Investigation Agency [2026 SCC Online 881].

17. Since the case on hand was initially registered for the offences under Sections 326(f) BNS and Section 9(B)(1)(b) of Explosives Act and was only based on the confession of the appellant that they had connections with the absconding accused who in turn are alleged to have connections with various terrorist organizations, the case was altered to include Sections 61(2), 196(1), 326(f) BNS, Section 3 of Explosives Substances Act and Section 15 r/w. 16(b) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Further, the claim of the second respondent that the absconding accused, Abdul Kasim belongs to a banned terrorist organization is also not substantiated with any reliable material whatsoever. Moreso, the present case is one where no person or property sustained any damage or injury and the first respondent who generally investigates cases involving offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act has also refused to investigate the present case on the premise that the same is unfit for being investigated by them.

18. Hence, on perusal of the case diary and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case and further on appreciating them in light of the settled position of law laid down by the aforesaid decision, this Court is of the opinion that the present case does not disclose reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against such person is prima facie true.

19. In view of the above, the Criminal Appeal is allowed and the order dated 30.04.2026 in Crime No.71 of 2026 in Crl. M.P. No. 868 of 2026 passed by the Principal Sessions Court, Sivagangai is set aside and the appellants are ordered to be released on bail in Crime No.71 of 2026:

                     a) on executing a bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) each with two sureties each for a likesum,( of which one shall be the relative) to the satisfaction of learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi;

                     (b) the sureties shall affix their photographs and Left Thumb Impression in the surety bond and the learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi may obtain a copy of their Aadhar Card or Bank Pass Book to ensure their identity;

                     (c) the appellants shall report before the respondent on every Monday and Thursday at 10.30 a.m. until further orders.

                     (d) the appellants shall not leave the State of Tamil Nadu without intimating the respondent police.

                     (e) the appellants shall not commit any offences.

                     (f) the appellants shall not abscond during investigation.

                     (g) the appellants shall not tamper with evidence or witness.

                     (k) on breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi is entitled to take appropriate action against the appellants in accordance with law as if the conditions have been imposed and the appellants released on bail by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Karaikudi himself as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K.Shaji vs. State of Kerala [(2005)AIR SCW 5560];

                     (l) if the appellants thereafter abscond, a fresh FIR can be registered under Section 229A IPC.

26. Before parting, we make it clear that the observations and findings recorded in this judgment are only for the limited purpose of considering the grant of bail to the appellants and that the Court concerned shall not be influenced by the observations and findings made herein during the trial or while rendering its decision.