Devan Ramachandran, J.

1. While the 1st respondent was working as an Assistant in ‘Andaman Lakshadweep Harbour Works’ (‘ALHW’), Kavarathi, he was served with Annexure A1 order notifying him that he had been compulsorily retired from service with effect from the forenoon of 01.12.2024, but without citing any specific reason.

2. It transpires that the said respondent filed a representation against the order; which culminated in Annexure A18 order dated 28.02.2025, issued by the Deputy Chief Engineer, informing him that action against him has been initiated and concluded under the provisions of FR 56(j)/(i).

3. The 1st respondent challenged the afore order before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench (‘Tribunal’, for short); and the same has now been allowed.

4. The petitioners - namely, the Union of India and the other Authorities of the ‘ALHW’, are before us, challenging the final order of the learned Tribunal.

5. Sri.T.V.Vinu – learned Central Government Counsel for the appellants, vehemently argued that, when the learned Tribunal found unequivocally that the procedure adopted by his clients was irreproachable, a conclusion in the manner it has now arrived at - leading to the quashing of Annexures A1 and A18 - was impermissible. He contended that, as per FR 56(j) - which is part of Annexure R1 Office Memorandum dated 28.08.2020, the appropriate Authority has the power to retire any Government servant by giving him or her not less than three months' notice in writing, or three months' pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, if it arrives at the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so.

6. Sri.T.V.Vinu added that the 1st respondent had suffered a punishment for misappropriation in the year 2016-17; and that, in his ‘Annual Performance Assessment Report’ (‘APAR’), for that year, the entry by the Supervising Authority was “yet to be watched ” (sic). He argued that, in such circumstances, since the 1st respondent’s integrity was “under a cloud”, it was fully authorized to the petitioners to have removed him, as was done through Annexure A1. He prayed that the impugned final order of the learned Tribunal be, therefore, set aside.

7. Smt.Kala T.Gopi – learned counsel for the 1st respondent, refuted the above contentions, submitting that, it may be true that her client had been proceeded against departmentally and found guilty in the year 2016–17; but that, thereafter, for the next five years - namely, from 2017–18 to 2021–22 - as has also been found by the learned Tribunal, he had been awarded certification: “beyond doubt”, qua integrity. She added that, in fact, her client, taking note of his so certified integrity, was given a promotion in the year 2023.

8. Smt.Kala T.Gopi argued that, in such circumstances, there was no justification for the Authorities to have issued Annexure A1, or even Annexure A18; and that, it is, therefore, that the learned Tribunal correctly intervened. She prayed that this Original Petition be, consequently, dismissed.

9. We record upfront that we are in full affirmation with the views and holdings of the learned Tribunal, for the reasons we will presently state.

10. Before we indite our opinion, it is necessary that the provisions of FR 56(j) be read in full; for which, it is extracted as under:

                  3.2 FR56(j):- The Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of such notice :-

                  (i) If he is, in Group ‘A’ or Group ‘B’ service or post in a substantive, quasi-permanent or temporary capacity and had entered Government service before attaining the age of 35 years, after he has attained the age of 50 years;

                  (ii) In any other case after he has attained the age of 55 years.

11. It is indubitable from the above that the removal of a Government servant in the manner provided in the aforementioned FR is possible only in public interest, and for no other cause.

12. Pertinently, in Annexure A1, the Authorities merely say that the first respondent is being removed in public interest; and then follows it up with Annexure A18 recording that this has been done because his integrity has been found doubtful. When the afore specifies that removal of the Government servant is possible only in public interest, it is for the Authorities to establish such, at least to satisfy the most basic requirements thereunder. However, in this case, even though the words ‘public interest’ is used in both the afore documents, this is based on the ground of ‘doubtful integrity’ (sic).

13. As noticed above, the explanation of Sri.T.V.Vinu – learned Central Government Counsel, in support of Annexure A18 order, is that the 1st respondent had been proceeded disciplinarily in the year 2016–17 and awarded punishment on the charge that he had embezzled more than four lakhs in cash.

14. Even assuming that the afore is taken as true, it is also unmistakable – being admitted – that, for the years 2017-18 to 2021-22, the Supervising Authorities have certified the 1st respondent’s integrity to be “beyond doubt” (sic).

15. One cannot, therefore, comprehend how the Authorities now rely upon an old punishment, to find against the 1st respondent, particularly that his integrity is ‘doubtful’.

16. As famously said by Oscar Wilde: “Every saint has a past and every sinner has a future”.

17. This is a classic case where the 1st respondent validates the afore quote because, after he was punished in the year 2017, he appears to have maintained an above satisfactory level of integrity, which is evident from the endorsement in his ‘APAR’ for the next five years, namely, “beyond doubt” (sic).

18. When Annexure A1 - which is the primary order – states, without any cogent explanation, that the removal of the first respondent has been ordered in public interest; followed by Annexure A18 order, ostensibly citing such interest, but seeming to maintain that he is a man found to be of doubtful integrity - again without any corroboration offered - no judicial Forum, much less the learned Tribunal or this Court, could have granted imprimatur to either of the said orders.

19. If we are to hold otherwise, then it would give unbridled and capricious rights to the Supervising and other Controlling Authorities, who will be armed to remove any person merely citing doubtful integrity, but without any substantiating material.

20. There is yet another angle that guides us, when we arrive at the above opinion.

21. The 1st respondent has, admittedly, been punished after being proceeded disciplinarily with an apposite penalty. To punish him again on the same set of circumstances, even though his integrity was found to be satisfactory thereafter, would be to do so twice, thus violating the cardinal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.

For the afore, we obtain no reason to intervene in the final order of the learned Tribunal; and consequently, dismiss this Original Petition.