1. The legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 08.07.2026 as passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands in Sessions Case No. 20 of 2026 (State vs. Pradip Biswas) under Section 103/109 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is the subject matter of the instant revisional application. By the impugned order the learned Sessions Judge directed for release of the accused on bail. The informant felt aggrieved and thus preferred the instant revisional application.

2. At the time of hearing Ms. Nag, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner/informant at the very outset submits before this Court that the order impugned is a glaring example of non application of mind by the learned Sessions Judge inasmuch as the learned Sessions Judge while passing the impugned order has failed to visualize the gravity of the offence allegedly committed by the opposite party No. 1/accused, the brutality of the crime as would be evident from the post mortem report of the deceased as well as the injury report of the victim who is the informant and further the likelihood of causing serious prejudice to the mind and person of the informant, inasmuch as from the written complaint as lodged before the jurisdictional PS it would reveal that the informant with his family resides just besides the property of the accused and his family members.

3. In her next fold of submission Ms. Nag took me to page Nos. 37 and 38 of the instant revisional application being copies of two written complaint dated 15.07.2026 and 23.07.2026 as lodged by the informant/petitioner against the accused after passing of the impugned order alleging the causing of threat by the accused violating the condition of bail over which according to the informant/petitioner no police action has been taken. It is thus argued by Ms. Nag that the alleged action of the accused as unfolded in the aforementioned two subsequent written complaints tantamount to the violation one of the conditions of bail for which an appropriate order may be passed for cancellation of bail.

4. To substantiate her contentions Ms. Nag places her reliance upon the following reported decisions namely:

               i. Criminal Appeal No. 1843 of 2017 dated 23.10.2017, [Chaman Singh vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh Through Secretary, Deptt. Of Home, Govt. of UP and others].

               ii. Kumari Suman Pandey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2007 (12) SCC 364

               iii. Brij Nandan Jaiswal vs. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal and another reported in 2009 (1) SCC 678.

5. Placing her reliance upon the case of Brij Nandan Jaiswal (Supra), Ms. Nag submits before this Court that in paragraph 7 of the said judgement the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly mandated that a complainant can always question the order of granting bail if the said order is not validly passed and thus the bail order can be tested on merits also.

6. It is further argued by Ms. Nag that in the case of Kumari Suman Pandey (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court also came to a finding regarding relevant factors which are to be considered by a Court before granting bail and those are as under:

               “11. … … … … … … …

               1. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence;

               2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;

               3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge.”

7. It is thus submitted that from the proposition of law as decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgement it would reveal that an order granting bail without considering the basic parameters for granting bail can be questioned by filing a revisional application and exactly the same has been done in the case in hand.

8. It is further argued by Ms. Nag that from the report as submitted by the IO it would reveal that despite submission of two successive written complaints against the accused regarding threatening the present petitioner after enlarging on bail, no action has been taken by the Investigating Officer.

9. It is further argued by Ms. Nag that the report as submitted by the Investigating Officer further reveals that the petitioner left for Diglipur which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge, Port Blair, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and therefore the petitioner has consciously violated the condition of the bail especially when by the impugned order learned Sessions Judge specifically directed that the accused should not leave the local jurisdiction of the said Court.

10. It is thus submitted by Ms. Nag that for the aforementioned reasons the bail order as has been passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands may be cancelled and the order impugned may be set aside.

11. In course of his submission Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar also draws the attention of this Court to the report as submitted by the Investigating Officer today. It is submitted by Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar though in the report as submitted by the Investigating Officer no materials could be found regarding the allegation made by the informant/petitioner under cover of his two letters dated 15.07.2026 and 23.07.2026 however, it would reveal that the accused without taking prior permission of the learned Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands had left the local jurisdiction of the said Court and thus he has violated one of the conditions of bail.

12. It is further argued by Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar that considering the nature of the crime, the gravity of the injuries found in the dead body of the victim as well as in the person of the informant/petitioner, the learned Trial Court ought not to have enlarged the opposite party No.1/accused on bail.

13. Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar, thus submits that it is a fit case for allowing the instant revisional application.

14. Per contra, Mr.Rakesh Pal Gobind, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party No.1/accused submits before this Court that the informant/revisionist must not blow hot and cold in the same breath. It is submitted that perusal of the petition under consideration it would reveal that by filing the instant revisional application the revisionist has challenged the correctness of the impugned order and at the same breath the revisionist has also prayed for cancellation of bail which is not permissible.

15. It is argued by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that the instant revisional application must fail inasmuch as no case has been made out for cancellation of the bail as prayed for as also no cogent materials could be placed before this Court to substantiate that while passing the impugned order the learned Sessions Judge has failed to visualize the basic principles of grant of bail especially when no case has been made out on behalf of the respondent/State before the learned Sessions Judge that in the event the present opposite party No. 1 is enlarged on bail, there is a chance of absconsion and/or flee from justice.

16. In course of his submission, Mr.Rakesh Pal Gobind places his reliance upon the following reported decisions namely:-

               a. Nikita Bhuwalka vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2004 0 Supreme (Cal) 270.

               b. Bhagirathsinh Judeja vs. the State of Gujarat, reported in 1983 0 Supreme (SC) 378.

               c. Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana reported in 1994 0 Supreme (SC) 1183 : 1995 1 SCC 349.

               d. XXX vs. Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Another reported in 2023 0 Supreme (SC) 796: (2023) 14 SCC 280.

               e. Himanshu Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 160: (2024) 4 SCC 222.

               f. Phireram vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2005 Supreme (Online) (SC) 11794: 2025 INSC 1074.

               g. Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme dated March 21, 2025 Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 2725 of 2025 in the case of Lovkesh Kumar vs. Union of India.

17. It is submitted by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that from the aforementioned reported decisions it would reveal that in absence of any adverse report regarding threatening to withdraw the case, the practice of cancellation of bail has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nikita Bhuwalka (supra). It is further argued by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the recent trend regarding grant of bail by holding the power of grant of bail is not to be exercised as the punishment before trial is being imposed.

18. It is further submitted by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that simply because a bail has been granted in a non bailable case, cancellation of bail ought not to be granted as held in the case of Dolat Ram (supra).

19. It is further argued by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that unless primary factors regarding cancellation of bail is clearly established there cannot be any justification to cancel the order of bail.

20. It is further submitted by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that though from the report of the Investigating Officer as submitted before this Court it would reveal that the accused proceeded to Diglipur but the same occurred on account of his own personal threat regarding his involvement in the alleged incident and immediately after getting notice from the IO concerned, he returned to his home which shows that he had no intention to abscond and or flee from justice.

21. It is thus submitted by Mr. Rakesh Pal Gobind that it is a fit for case for rejection of the prayer as made by the informant/petitioner.

22. This Court has meticulously gone through the entire materials as placed before the Court. This Court has given its due consideration over the submissions of the learned Advocates for the contending parties.

23. Since before this Court that the instant revisional application has been filed challenging the correctness of the impugned order of grant of bail to the accused/opposite party No.1, this Court at the very outset proposes to consider to Law of the land regarding the grant of bail.

24. In the judgement of Centrum Financial Services Ltd. v. State NCT of Delhi and anr. reported in (2022) 13 SCC 286 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasioned to consider as to whether a State High Court was at all justified in releasing the accused on bail and in doing so the Hon’ble Apex Court the expresses following view:

               “25. In the light of the above facts, it is required to be considered whether the High Court is at all justified in releasing Respondent 2 on bail.

               ***********************************************************

               27. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] , while cancelling the bail and quashing and setting aside the order passed by the High Court granting the bail to the accused it is observed in paras 9 to 12 as under : (SCC pp. 499-500)

               “9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is clearly unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

               (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;

               (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

               (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

               (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

               (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

               (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

               (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

               (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

               [See State of U.P. v. AmarmaniTripathi [State of U.P. v. AmarmaniTripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1960 (2)] (SCC p. 31, para 18), Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674] , and Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [Ram GovindUpadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688] .]

               10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it to be illegal. In Masroor [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368] , a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, observed as follows : (SCC p. 290, para 13)

               ‘13. … Though at the stage of granting bail an elaborate examination of evidence and detailed reasons touching the merit of the case, which may prejudice the accused, should be avoided, but there is a need to indicate in such order reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence.’

               ***

               11. We are constrained to observe that in the instant case, while dealing with the application of the accused for grant of bail, the High Court completely lost sight of the basic principles enumerated above. The accused, in the present case, is alleged to have committed a heinous crime of killing an old helpless lady by strangulation. He was seen coming out of the victim's house by a neighbour around the time of the alleged occurrence, giving rise to a reasonable belief that he had committed the murder. We feel that under the given circumstances, it was not the stage at which bail under Section 439 of the Code should have been granted to the accused, more so, when even charges have not yet been framed.

               12. It is also pertinent to note that, as stated above, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had rejected three bail applications of the accused but the High Court did not find it worthwhile to even make a reference to these orders. In this regard, it would be useful to refer to the following observations echoed in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] : (SCC p. 536, para 12)

               ‘12. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent application for bail should be granted.’ ”

               ****************************************************

               29. In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] , it is observed and held by this Court that while granting bail, the relevant considerations are:

               (i) nature of seriousness of the offence;

               (ii) character of the evidence and circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; and

               (iii) likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice;

               (iv) the impact that his release may make on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the society; and

               (v) likelihood of his tampering.

               *********************************************

               31. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and the grounds on which the High Court has released Respondent 2 on bail, we are constraint to observe that in the instant case while dealing with the application of the accused for grant of bail, the High Court has completely lost sight of the basic principles enumerated above. The High Court has not at all considered the modus operandi adopted by the accused in commission of serious offence of siphoning and/or transferring the huge sum to another company through shell companies. The High Court has also not taken into consideration the status report filed by the investigating officer in which in detail it has been pointed out how systematically the accused have committed the offence and misappropriated/siphoned off the huge sum through shell companies. Thus, it appears that the High Court has not adverted to the relevant considerations and has granted the bail mechanically by observing that the case arises out of a commercial transaction.”

25. On perusal of the reported decision as cited from the petitioner this Court finds that in the case of Kumari Suman Pandey (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court had taken a similar view. In the reported decision of XXX (Supra) as cited from the side of the opposite party No.1/accused this Court noticed that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had again considered the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions while granting bail. Keeping in mind the aforementioned propositions of law, I propose to look to the materials as placed before this Court as well as before the learned Trial Court while passing the order impugned.

26. On perusal of the relevant CD this Court finds that from the written complaint it would reveal that the family members of the deceased and the informant/ victim and the family members of the accused are neighbours. It further reveals from the written complaint as lodged before the jurisdictional police station that on the fateful day and hour when the accused was allegedly cutting grasses and was doing cleaning work at the disputed plot of land the accused was restrained by the deceased victim to which the accused suddenly attacked her with grass cutting sword striking her forcefully on the neck causing severe bleeding injury to which she fell into the ground. It is the further case of the informant that when he rushed to rescue his wife, he was also assaulted and even after fell of his wife on the ground, the accused struck her on her right arm causing further injury.

27. This court has meticulously gone through the post-mortem report of the deceased vis-à-vis the injury report of the informant/ victim. This court has also perused the FSL report wherein matching is found regarding DNA as collected from blood sample of the accused and the blood sample as available on the alleged weapon of offence.

28. At this juncture if I look to the impugned order it appears to this Court that the learned Trial Court had made no venture regarding the gravity of the offence, the magnitude of the injuries as available in the post-mortem report of the deceased as well as in the injury report of the informant/victim. This Court finds that in the impugned order the learned Trial Court had not made observation that the case before him is based on the eye witness account of a sole witness who himself is an injured witness. This Court finds that while pasing the impugned order learned Trial Court was persuaded by two things namely; completion of investigation and tender age of the present accused.

29. In considered view of this Court while passing the impugned order learned Trial Court has miserably failed to consider the well settled principles of Law for grant of bail to the opposite party No.1/accused as time and again have been enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the reported decisions of Centrum Financial Private Limited (Supra), Kumari Suman Pandey (surpa) and XXX (Supra).

30. It thus appears before the Court that the learned Trial Court has erred in law in deciding the application for bail in accordance with the aforementioned judicial precedent. Learned Trial Court has failed to visualize the magnitude of the punishment as likely to be imposed if the charges are proved against the accused. Before the learned Trial Court no case has been made out on behalf of the accused that he is languishing in judicial custody for a considerable length of time without any progress in trial which tantamount to violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

31. Materials have been placed before this Court on behalf of State that the accused/opposite party No.1 has moved to Diglipur i.e. beyond the jurisdiction of the learned Trial Court without obtaining prior permission of the Learned Trial Court.

32. Consequently, the instant revisional application succeeds.

33. Consequently, the impugned order dated 08.07.2026 as passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair in connection with the Sessions Case No. 20/2026 is hereby set aside.

34. Consequently the bail granted by the learned Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair in Sessions Case No. 20/2026 stands hereby cancelled.

35. The accused/opposite party No.1 is hereby directed to surrender before the learned Trial Court positively within 07 (seven) working days from today, failing which the learned Trial Court shall issue non-bailable warrant of arrest against the opposite party No.1/accused herein for his apprehension and detention.

36. Before parting with it is made clear that the observations as made herein above is limited for disposal of the instant revisional application and thus learned Trial Court is directed to not to persuade himself by any of the observations made hereinabove while disposing the Sessions case as pending before him.

37. It is made further clear that allowing of the instant revisional application does not prevent the opposite party No.1/accused to make an application for bail before the learned Trial Court and in the event such an application is filed learned Trial Court is at liberty to dispose of the application on its own merit without being influenced that previously its bail order has been set aside by this Court.

38. With the aforementioned observation CRM (SB)/10/2026 is disposed of.

39. CD be returned forthwith.

40. Before parting with this Court further directs the Director General of Police, Andaman and Nicobar Islands to issue administrative order to all the Station House Officers of the police stations under his control to put page numbers on each and every pages of the CD failing which it will be construed that the judicial order of this Court is violated and in that event the Court may initiate a suo-motu contempt proceeding against the Investigating Officers of the concerned police stations.

41. Registry is directed to forward the copy of this judgment to the Director General of Police, Andaman and Nicobar for his immediate compliance.

42. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis on compliance of all legal formalities.