Ramesh Sinha, CJ.

1. Heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing for the appellants. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State.

2. The matter is listed today for orders on the office objections/defaults. As per the Office Note dated 27.06.2026 and the AR(J) Note dated 08.07.2026, the following defects were pointed out by the Registry: (i) the chronology of events has not been properly arranged in the synopsis; (ii) some portions of pages 22, 24, 32 to 36 and 42 are faint and not easily readable in both sets; (iii) in the application for condonation of delay, the day(s) of delay have not been mentioned and the prayer paragraph has not been incorporated; (iv) the particulars of the respondent(s) under the heading "Others" have not been mentioned in the Index, Affidavit and Vakalatnama; and (v) the office has reported that the present writ appeal has been preferred with a delay of 596 days. Despite the defects having been notified by the Registry, the appellants have neither cured the office objections nor taken any steps for rectification of the defects. Consequently, the matter has been placed before this Court for appropriate orders.

3. The present intra-Court appeal has been preferred by the appellant assailing the order dated 06.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 999 of 2016 (Smt. Munni Gupta @ Moni vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed.

4. We have perused the records as well as I.A. No. 1 of 2026 filed along with the appeal. The office has reported that the present appeal has been preferred with a delay of 596 days. However, the application seeking condonation of delay is itself defective inasmuch as it neither specifies the day(s) of delay nor contains the requisite prayer clause, despite specific objections having been raised by the Registry. Even otherwise, the application fails to disclose any sufficient or satisfactory explanation for condonation of such an inordinate delay. The appellant has neither removed the office objections nor shown any sufficient cause for invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court to condone the delay.

5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India & Others vs. Tarsem Singh, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:-

          "7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition."

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and others, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115, having found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the order of termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all consequential benefits, held that the relief sought for was inadmissible. The legal position in this regard was laid out in the following terms:-

          "10. Every representation of the Government for relief, may not be applied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.

          11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits,being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of "acknowledgement of a jural relationship" to give rise to a fresh cause of action.

          12. When a government abandons service to take alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice.

          13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will encourage discipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages."

7. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to remove the office objections, the application for condonation of delay itself suffers from fundamental defects, and no sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of the inordinate delay of 596 days in preferring the present writ appeal. We, therefore, find no ground to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the appellant.

8. Consequently, I.A. No. 1 of 2026 stands rejected. As a necessary corollary, the present writ appeal, being barred by limitation, is also dismissed. No order as to costs.