1. The present Writ Petition is filed challenging the docket order dated 06.05.2026 passed by the Principal District Judge, Bhadradri-Kothagudem in E.P. No.6 of 2026 whereby the execution petition was transferred to the Court of I Additional District Judge, Kothagudem.

2. Heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Kotagiri, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. D. Surender Kumar, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Law & Legislative Affairs, representing the respondent No.1.

3. The petitioner contends that the impugned order was passed without notice to the parties after the execution proceedings had been partly heard, and that the matter, which had originally been posted to 11.06.2026, was suo motu advanced to 06.05.2026 during the summer vacation. According to the petitioner, the transfer has caused prejudice, resulted in unnecessary delay, and violated the principles of natural justice. It is further contended that an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC”), seeking to set aside the ex parte decree, is still pending consideration, and therefore the execution proceedings ought not to have been transferred.

4. The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the impugned docket order transferring the execution petition warrants interference in the exercise of this Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

5. At the outset, it is to be noticed that the petitioner does not dispute the competence of the Court to transfer the execution proceedings. The challenge is confined to the procedure adopted while effecting such transfer. The power to transfer execution proceedings is statutorily recognized under Sections 38 and 39 of the CPC. Further, Section 42 of the CPC expressly provides that the Court to which a decree is transferred shall have the same powers in executing the decree as if it had itself passed the decree. Thus, once a transfer is validly effected, the transferee Court is fully competent to adjudicate every question arising in execution, including objections falling within the ambit of Section 47 of the CPC.

6. It is no doubt true that the petitioner alleges that the matter was advanced without notice and that the transfer was ordered after the execution proceedings had been partly heard. However, every procedural irregularity does not ipso facto vitiate judicial proceedings. It is a well-settled principle that interference on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice is warranted only where such violation has resulted in actual or substantial prejudice. The rules of natural justice are intended to advance the cause of justice and cannot be invoked to invalidate judicial proceedings merely on technical or procedural grounds in the absence of demonstrable prejudice.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, explained that the object of the principles of natural justice is to secure fairness in administrative and judicial action. Likewise, in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that every violation of a procedural rule or of the principles of natural justice does not automatically render an order invalid unless it is shown that such violation has caused prejudice. The same principle was reiterated in Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529, wherein it was held that the Court should not interfere on the basis of mere technical infractions where compliance with the rule would not have altered the ultimate outcome.

8. In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any substantial prejudice arising from the transfer of the execution petition. The transfer is only from the Court of the Principal District Judge to the Court of the I Additional District Judge, Kothagudem, which is the very Court that passed the decree sought to be executed. By virtue of Section 42 of the CPC, the transferee Court is vested with all the powers of the executing Court and is fully competent to consider every objection that the petitioner is entitled to raise in law. The petitioner has not shown that any substantive right has been taken away or that any statutory remedy has been affected.

9. The contention that the execution proceedings had been partly heard also does not persuade this Court to interfere. A part-hearing before one competent Court does not create any vested right in favour of a litigant to insist that the proceedings must continue before the same Presiding Officer. A transfer of judicial proceedings, when authorized by law, does not become invalid merely because some hearing has already taken place. At the highest, the transferee Court may be required to acquaint itself with the earlier proceedings before proceeding further. Such a consequence cannot be equated with legal prejudice warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10. Equally untenable is the contention founded upon the pendency of an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. It is well settled that the mere filing or pendency of an application to set aside an ex parte decree neither renders the decree in-executable nor automatically stays its execution. Unless a competent Court grants an order of stay, the decree-holder is entitled to pursue execution in accordance with law. Therefore, the pendency of the interlocutory application has no bearing on the validity of the impugned transfer order.

11. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that the advancement of the matter, by itself, vitiates the impugned order. Even assuming that notice ought to have been issued before effecting the transfer, the petitioner has failed to establish that such omission has resulted in a failure of justice or has deprived the petitioner of any valuable legal right. The challenge is essentially directed against the manner in which the transfer was effected and not against the jurisdiction or competence of the transferee Court. Such a challenge, in the absence of proof of actual prejudice, is largely technical in nature and does not justify the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

12. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and is exercised to remedy jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, or palpable injustice. The impugned docket order suffers from neither lack of jurisdiction nor any manifest illegality, nor does it result in the denial of any substantive legal right of the petitioner. The transferee Court continues to possess full authority to adjudicate the execution proceedings, as well as all objections raised by the petitioner, strictly in accordance with law.

13. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds no valid or tenable ground to interfere with the impugned docket order passed by the Principal District Judge, Bhadradri Kothagudem, in E.P. No. 6 of 2026.

14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner shall be at liberty to raise all objections available in law before the executing Court. The transferee Court shall consider and decide such objections independently, on their own merits, and strictly in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations made by this Court in the present order.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.