Oral Judgment:

1. By the present Petition, the Petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 71/2025, registered by the Crime Branch, Ribandar. The FIR was lodged on 20th May 2025 by the Crime Branch, Ribandar, for offences under Sections 61, 318, 336(1), 336(3), 143(1), 143(3) and 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (the BNS) and Section 10 of the Emigration Act, 1983. The FIR was lodged on the basis of a complaint dated 20th May 2025 filed by the 4th Respondent against the Petitioners. The Petitioners are detailed as proprietors of M/s. Talent Hunt Consultancy in the FIR.

2. Rule. The Rule is made returnable forthwith by consent of parties and heard finally. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Talaulikar, waives notice on behalf of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents. The notice is also waived by Mr. Vibhav Amonkar on behalf of the 4th Respondent.

3. Heard Mr. Kantak, the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. Talaulikar, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State Respondents and Mr. Amonkar, the learned Counsel for the 4th Respondent.

4. The 4th Respondent, i.e. the Complainant, vide his affidavit dated 17th April 2026, filed before this Court, has stated that the said FIR was lodged due to certain misunderstanding and disputes between the Petitioners and him. The same have been amicably settled and he has no objection to the quashing of the said FIR.

5. The said affidavit of the 4th Respondent reads as follows:

                    “3. I say that the misunderstanding and disputes between myself and the Petitioner have been amicably settled and on 21.05.2025, I have filed an Application for withdrawal of the said complaint before the Crime Branch Police Station, Ribandar –Goa. I am annexing a copy of the said Application dated 21.05.2025.

                    4. I further state that I have resolved all my differences with the Petitioner and presently there are no grievances or dispute remaining between us.

                    5. I say that I have NO OBJECTION if this Hon’ble Court quashes and set aside the FIR No. 71/2025 dated 20/05/2025 registered at Crime Branch Police Station, Ribandar-Goa for alleged offences punishable U/s 61, 318, 336(1), 143(1), 143(3), 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 and Section 10 of the Emigration act 1983 and all consequential proceeding arising therefrom.

                    6. I say that this Affidavit is executed voluntarily, out of the my own free will, without any force, coercion, undue influence or pressure from any person.

                    7. I say that the present affidavit is made in support of the quashing petition filed by the Petitioner before this Hon’ble Court.”

6. However, the 1st Respondent, on 7th July 2026, filed a reply to the Petition objecting to the quashing of the said FIR. It is stated that the Petitioners directed the Complainant and others to visit his office and offered Rs.50,000/- as compensation and forced the Complainant to sign an agreement absolving the Petitioners of any liability. It is admitted that the Petitioners and the 4th Respondent have addressed letters to the Investigating Officer (the I.O.) intimating the settlement and withdrawal of the complaint. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the offences under which the Petitioners are booked are grave and are against society. Therefore, it is submitted that the parties cannot settle the matter internally and seek quashing of the said FIR.

7. Mr. Talaulikar, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, submitted that the Petition is opposed by the State, particularly, having regard to the allegations relating to human trafficking and the offence punishable under Section 10 of the Emigration Act.

8. The Petitioners and the 4th Respondent deny that any, compensation as alleged by the I.O., was offered to the 4th Respondent or that the 4th Respondent has accepted the same.

9. Though some of the offences are not compoundable, Mr. Kantak submitted that it is now a settled law that in exercise of inherent power of the High Court under Section 530 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (the BNSS), this Court can quash the FIR even in respect of non-compoundable offences if the Complainant does not wish to prosecute the complaint on account of settlement with the Accused as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303.

10. In any case, Mr. Kantak further submitted that merely because Section 143 of the BNS and Section 10 of the Emigration Act are invoked, it does not mean that the ingredients of an offence under Section 143 (1) and (3) or under Section 10 of the Emigration Act are made out. It is open for this Court to examine whether the complaint discloses such an offence. He submitted that the complaint in the present matter does not make out any such ingredients. It is therefore submitted that the ingredients of Section 143(1) and (3) are wholly absent in the complaint.

11. In support of his submissions, Mr. Kantak has relied on the following judgments:-

                    (a) Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 9 SCC 677;

                    (b) Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303;

                    (c) Narendra Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 46;

                    (d) K. Bharthi Devi & Another Vs. State of Telangana & Another, (2024) 10 SCC 384;

                    (e) Naushey Ali & Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (2025) 4 SCC 78 and

                    (f) Judgment dated 17.12.2020 passed by the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application (Apl) No. 770 of 220 in the case of Rahul A. Malve & Others Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another.

12. In this background, I have considered the rival submissions and perused the complaint filed by the 4th Respondent and other material on record.

13. The 4th Respondent, in his complaint, inter alia, stated that he learnt that Talent Hunt Agency has a job vacancy with “Adnoc” Company in Dubai. Therefore, he visited the agency and he was interviewed for a vacancy in the said company but was rejected. On 29th November 2023, he received a call from the Petitioners’ agency office that he was selected for the post of Petrol filler in the UAE. As requested, he paid Rs.45,000/- to the Petitioners at their office. However, later on, he was told to take the money back as the agency was unable to give him the job. He then requested the agency to arrange a job for him in Ireland for the post of a food packer. He was informed that he was selected for the said post and was asked to pay Rs.3,50,000/-, which he did. He also paid an additional Rs.1,10,000/- for issuance of HDFC card. However, he was later informed that the agency could not provide a job in Ireland due to the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. It was then proposed to the 4th Respondent that there is a job vacancy at Kyrgyzstan with an expected salary between Rs.50,000 to Rs.70,000/-to which the 4th Respondent agreed. The agency then arranged his visa and other travel documents. He was told that his ticket to Uzbekistan would be ready, from which he would have to travel by road to Kyrgyzstan. Thereafter, the 4th Respondent provided details of his travel in the complaint. The 4th Respondent booked his tickets on 1st May 2025 from Goa to Delhi and departed from Delhi to Uzbekistan on 2nd May 2025. He was provided with a tourist visa. He, along with another 4 persons, stayed in one room in a hostel for 10 days on reaching Uzbekistan. It was found that visas were fake and the hotel reservation was also found to be fake. Thereafter, it is stated in the complaint that ‘at the time of recruitment, they were promised a job as food packers. However, after arriving in Uzbekistan, they were informed that they would be provided with the job of loader. As the working/living conditions were very poor, they informed them that they do not want to work and want to go back to Goa’. Thereafter, the 4th Respondent returned to Goa and on the way, he was informed by other persons travelling with him that the 1st Petitioner had duped them for various amounts. Thereafter, they were asked to sign certain agreements and were also threatened, deterring them from filing any complaints. The FIR is filed on the basis of these allegations and Sections 61, 318, 336(1), 336(3), 143(1), 143(3) and 351 of the BNS and Section 10 of the Emigration Act are invoked.

14. The entire gamut of the complaint filed by the 4th Respondent is in the nature of a deficiency in service and was a civil transaction between the parties. The 4th Respondent has already written letters to the I.O. and has withdrawn the complaint. The dispute has already been settled between the parties. Therefore, as far as the offences under Sections 61, 318, 336(1), 336(3) and 351 of the BNS are concerned, the FIR can be quashed in view of the unconditional withdrawal of the complaint and the settlement arrived at by the parties and by applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh (supra) and Narendra Singh and Others Vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 46.

15. The entire core of the objection of the State for grant of relief to the Petitioners is based on Section 143 (1) and (3) of the BNS and Section 10 of the Emigration Act.

16. As far as the offences alleged under Section 143 (1) and (3) of the BNS and Section 10 of the Emigration Act are concerned, I agree with the submission of Mr. Kantak that the complaint does not make out any of the ingredients of offences under Section 143 (1) and (3) of the BNS and Section 10 of the Emigration Act.

17. The Petitioners have annexed the Registration Certificate, at page 33 of the Petition, issued under Section 11 of the Emigration Act. It is issued in the name of M/s Talent Hunt Consultancy. Hence, an offence under Section 10 of the Emigration Act is not made out.

18. In Gian Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

                    “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

                    58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

                    61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

                    (emphasis supplied)

19. In Narendra Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:

                    “5. The aforesaid submission, however, did not impress the High Court as the medical report depicts the injuries to be of grievous nature. The question for consideration, in these circumstances, is as to whether the Court should have accepted the compromise arrived at between the parties and quashed the FIR as well as criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner.

                    13. The question is as to whether an offence under Section 307 IPC falls within the aforesaid parameters. The first limb of this question is to reflect on the nature of the offence. The charge against the accused in such cases is that he had attempted to take the life of another person (victim). On this touchstone, should we treat it as a crime of serious nature so as to fall in the category of heinous crime, is the poser. Finding an answer to this question becomes imperative as the philosophy and jurisprudence of sentencing is based thereupon. If it is heinous crime of serious nature then it has to be treated as a crime against the society and not against the individual alone. Then it becomes the solemn duty of the State to punish the crime-doer. Even if there is a settlement/compromise between the perpetrator of crime and the victim, that is of no consequence.

                    26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties.

                    27. At this juncture, we would also like to add that the timing of settlement would also play a crucial role. If the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of the offence when the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be somewhat liberal in accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings/investigation. Of course, it would be after looking into the attendant circumstances as narrated in the previous paragraph. Likewise, when challan is submitted but the charge has not been framed, the High Court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. However, at this stage, as mentioned above, since the report of the IO under Section 173 CrPC is also placed before the Court it would become the bounden duty of the Court to go into the said report and the evidence collected, particularly the medical evidence relating to injury, etc. sustained by the victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along with another important consideration, namely, in view of settlement between the parties, whether it would be unfair or contrary to interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings and whether possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. If the Court finds the answer to this question in affirmative, then also such a case would be a fit case for the High Court to give its stamp of approval to the compromise arrived at between the parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purpose would be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings which in all likelihood would end in acquittal, in any case.

                    29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.”

                    (emphasis supplied)

20. Therefore, the offences alleged against the Petitioners in the FIR are not such which cannot be quashed by this Court by invoking its inherent powers, particularly when on the face of the complaint the offences under Section 143 (1) and (3) of the BNS and Section 10 of the Emigration Act are not made out. Additionally, to put an end to the entire dispute, the parties have amicably settled the same. Prima facie, the dispute is of a civil nature and about the deficiency in services provided by the Petitioners to the 4th Respondent. In view of the withdrawal of the complaint by the 4th Respondent, there is no likelihood that the prosecution will succeed in the proceedings.

21. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the material on record justifies the exercise of inherent power to quash the FIR in the interest of justice. The continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties be put to an end. The offences in the present matter overwhelmingly and predominantly bear a civil flavour and have arisen out of a private transaction. Therefore, I am satisfied that on the face of the settlement arrived at between the Petitioners and the 4th Respondent, there is hardly any likelihood of the Petitioners being convicted, particularly in view of the withdrawal of the complaint by the 4th Respondent. Therefore, if the FIR is not quashed, justice shall be a casualty and the ends of justice shall be defeated. Considering the material on record, I am of the view that it would be unfair and contrary to the interest of justice to continue the criminal proceedings and their continuation would amount to an abuse of process of law. Therefore, I am exercising the inherent powers to quash the FIR registered against the Petitioners.

22. In view thereof, the Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (A), which reads as follows:-

                    “A) This Hon’ble may be pleased quash and set aside the entire First Information Report bearing its C.R. No. 71/2025 lodged with Crime Branch Ribandar Goa dated 20.05.2025 for an offence punishable u/s 61, 318, 336(1), 336(3) 143(1), 143(3), 351 of The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and Section 10 of the Emigration Act 1983 against the Petitioner above-named.”

23. However, the Petitioners and the 4th Respondent shall pay an amount of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) each to the Goa Police Welfare Society on or before 12th August 2026. The Bank details for the payment of costs are as follows:-

                    Bank Name: AXIS Bank Ltd.

                    Branch: Calangute Goa

                    Account No.918010063860868

                    IFSC Code: UTIB0003681

                    MICR Code: 403211015

24. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners shall send a copy of this order to Goa Police Welfare Society, by email at sphq@goapolice.gov.in along with a copy of the receipts of payment of costs on or before 14th August 2026.

25. The relief in terms of prayer Clause (A) of the Petition shall become operative only after payment of costs by the Petitioners and the 4th Respondent.

26. The Rule is made absolute in the above terms, and the Petition stands disposed of.

27. This order will be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.