1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally, with the consent of the learned Advocate for the Petitioner, Respondent No. 6, and learned AGP. Perused the impugned judgment and order and record.

2. The Petitioner assails the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned judgment and order dated 18-05-2017 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner, Nashik Division, Nashik, (for short, the ‘Additional Commissioner’) whereby confirmed the order passed by the learned Additional Collector, Jalgaon, (for short, the ‘Additional Collector’) and Sub-Divisional Officer, Pachora, Pachora division (for short, ‘SDO’), who allowed the Application filed by the Respondent No. 5 and thereby cancelled the mutation entry No. 1083 in Gut No. 8 of village Kajgaon, Tq. Bhadgaon, Dist. Jalgaon.

3. Heard the learned Advocate for the parties and having gone through the record. It is apparent that the land Gut No. 8 (Old Gut No.5) belonged to one Shravan Patil, alleged to be the uncle of the Petitioner, who on 16-12-1960 sold the 7-R land from Gut No. 8 (for short, “disputed property”) in favour of the Gram Panchayat. Based on the said sale deed, the Gram Panchayat’s name is recorded in the 7/12 extract as owner. It further reveals that thereafter, the Gram Panchayat obtained permission from the competent authority, i.e., the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Jalgaon, vide permission dated 31-12-1980, and passed resolution No. 72 on 11-01-1981, resolving to sell the 7-R land property of the Gram Panchayat by auction. Pursuant to that, they conducted the auction, and at the auction, the father of the Petitioner purchased the said property on 25-01-1981 for consideration of Rs. 6000/-. Based on the said sale deed dated 30-03-1981, the father of the Petitioner applied for mutation of his name in the revenue record. Accordingly, his name was mutated as owner and possessor of the disputed property.

4. Thus, the above facts indicate that the disputed property was/is not the property of the Government, but it was initially owned by an ancestor of the Petitioner who sold it to the Gram panchayat; then the Gram panchayat, after obtaining necessary permission from the competent authority, sold it in auction and the father of the Petitioner purchased the same in auction.

5. It is further evidence that one Satish Patil, resident of Kajgaon, made a complaint with the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pachora alleging that the transfer of the disputed property by the Grampanchayat in favour of the father of the Petitioner is illegal and therefore, urged for cancellation of the said mutation entry. It is to be noted that the SDO treated the said complaint as a revision without considering how the complainant, Satish, has locus or whether it has jurisdiction to entertain or cancel the mutation entry after lapse of eighteen years, and has allowed the revision and thereby cancelled mutation entry No. 1083. Said order was challenged before the learned Additional Collector and learned Divisional Commissioner; they confirmed the order passed by the learned SDO. Aggrieved by the said order, the Petitioner has preferred this Petition.

6. Learned Advocate for the Petitioner vehemently contended that the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction. He emphasised the following five points:

                   i] The complainant Satish has no locus standi to make a complaint/revision.

                   ii] Said complaint/revision was not within limitation. Therefore, the revision was not maintainable.

                   iii] Learned SDO wrongly applied Section 51 of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act [for short ‘the Act’] instead of Section 55 as the land belongs to the Gram Panchayat and not the Government.

                   iv] The sale deed executed by the Gram Panchayat in favour of the father of the Petitioner was/is not challenged till this date and therefore, in the absence of such challenge, it would not be appropriate to cancel the mutation entry.

                   v] Lastly, he argued that the matter was heard by the learned Additional Commissioner and reserved the matter for order on 08-11-2016 and passed the order on 18-05-2017, i.e. beyond six months contrary to the procedure laid down by this Court in Savitri’s case.

7. To buttress his submission, he has relied on the following judgments:

                   (i) Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors Vs Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Ors reported in 2009 (6) Bom. C. R. 664,

                   (ii) Shankar Tukaram Gaikar through LRs Vs Suvarnaprabha Adurkar through LRs in WP/2547/2006 with connected Petition dated 14-07-2025,

                   (iii) Ragho Singh Vs Mohan Singh reported in 2001 (9) SCC 717, Kashinath Vasant Pawar Vs Sub Divisional Officer in WP/18486/2024 dated 24-11-2025,

                   (iv) Namdev Mahadu Jambhulkar and Ors Vs State in WP2298/2022 with connected matters dated 10-08-2023,

                   (v) Kamlakar Ananda Patare and anr Vs Addl. Commissioner, Nashik and ors in WP/12743/2016 dated 31-01-2017.

                   (vi) Savitri Chandrakesh Pal Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors reported in 2009 (4) All M.R. 194 and pointed out sub-para 14 of para 17.

8. Thus, he submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, the revision is not maintainable as it was filed beyond the period of five years, and Satish had no locus to make a complaint. As such, he propounded that the order passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner is without jurisdiction and null and void in law and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and urged for allowing the Petition.

9. Per contra, learned AGP strenuously opposed the Petition contending that in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 31 of the judgment in Gurudassing Nawoosing Panjwani Vs State of Mah and Ors reported in (2016)2 SCC 213 an alternate remedy of second revision is lies with the learned Minister and therefore, this Petition is not maintainable; secondly, he tried to canvass that the Petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hand and suppressed the fact. Therefore, also the Petitioner is not entitled for any relief as prayed; thirdly, he propounded that twice mutation entries in respect of the sale deed dated 30-03-1981 was cancelled and therefore, fresh Application for mutation entry was not tenable in absence of challenge to the said cancellation of the mutation entries; lastly, he advanced the argument that learned SDO has considered Section 51 of the Act and rightly cancelled the mutation entry as the Gram panchayat was not competent to sell the property without the permission of the Government. As such, he urged for dismissal of the Petition.

10. In view of the above rival contentions, I would like to deal with the first controversy “whether the Writ Petition is tenable or Revision would lie before the learned Revenue Minister”; also I would like to refer to law laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SantoshKumar (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court framed a short question in para 3 as follows:

                   “The short question that arises for consideration in this Appeal by special leave is whether power of revision in section 257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be exercised at any time although no time has been prescribed for exercise of such power”

11. The Reply to the said question is answered in para 15 and 16 of the judgment, which reads as under:

                   15. Recently, in the case of State of Punjab and Others v. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd.3 while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of 2 (1997) 6 SCC 71 3 (2007) 11 SCC 363 the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held:

                   "17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefore, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time.

                   18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.

                   19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years."

                   16. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time. Rather, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within a reasonable time is inherent therein. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub- Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case, assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime, never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of Tehsildar, Shirol, although it was passed on March 30, 1976 and he was alive up to 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondent Nos.1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the Sub-Divisional Officer either that the order dated March 30, 1976 was obtained fraudulently.

12. Bare perusal of the said judgment reveals that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after considering its own judgment in State of Punjab and others VS Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd 2007 (11) SCC 363, has categorically observed that revisional jurisdiction, U/s 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (for short, the ‘M.L.R. Code’) in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years, and after considering the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so, because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “exercise of revisional power by the revenue authorities under Section 257 of the M. L. R. Code after lapse of seventeen years is not a reasonable time and said order is beyond the period of limitation.” Therefore, the Petition was allowed. In the case in hand also, the mutation entry was effected on 20-02-1991, and Satish made a complaint in 2009, i.e. after lapse of eighteen years. And the Commissioner has taken cognisance thereof, and on 28.03.2011, he passed the order cancelling the Mutation entry No.1083, which was settled for more than eighteen years. Therefore, the facts in the case in hand are identical with the facts in the case of Santoshkumar (supra). Therefore, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is squarely covered and applicable in the case in hand. Therefore, the Petition needs to be allowed.

13. Now, I would like to deal with the objections raised by the learned AGP about the maintainability of the writ Petition. While dealing with the same, I would like to reproduce para 31 of the Gurudassing (supra) as under:

                   Considering the entire scheme of the Code, and the provisions contained in Sections 257 and 259, we are of the definite opinion that the Minister concerned of the State Government can entertain a second revision to satisfy the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Revenue Officer. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has elaborately discussed the question and passed the impugned order holding that Section 257 confers jurisdiction on the State Government to entertain its revision against the order passed by any Revenue Officer either in appeal or in revision. We find no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the High Court. Hence, this appeal has no merit, which is accordingly dismissed.

14. Bare perusal of the above para reveals that the Minister of State can entertain the second revision to satisfy legality and propriety of the order passed by the revenue officer. I do not dispute the above legal position. No doubt, existence of an alternate remedy is one of the limitations on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction. There are exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy. The High Court would be justified in exercising the writ jurisdiction, namely where a statutory authority has not acted in accordance with law and the provisions of the enactment in question or in defiance of fundamental principles of judicial procedure or has resorted to invoking the provisions which are not in existence or whether an order has been passed in total violation of the principle of natural justice.

15. Having considered the facts of the case, in my view, the present Petition takes an exception as held by the learned SDO without considering the legal position in its proper perspective, on the complaint made by one person, who has no locus or concern with the disputed property made a complaint for best reason known to him, has entertained the revision after period of eighteen years which is not permissible in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santoshkumar (supra). Therefore, this Court can exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction as an exception.

16. Apart from that, it appears that no one has challenged the sale deed dated 30.03.1981 or its validity and therefore, said sale deed remained intact and unchallenged. In that case also, based on the documents, i.e., the sale deed, the revenue authority has to take the mutation entry. The revenue authority is not empowered to determine the validity of the said documents while considering the facts and recording of the mutation entry. In this case also, it seems that the learned SDO exceeded its jurisdiction while cancelling the mutation entry without recording any reasons.

17. The next question is ‘whether the order passed by the learned SDO in consonance with Section 51(1)(a) of the Act is just and proper ‘. However, the learned AGP failed to show that the disputed property/land belongs to the Government to attract the provision of Section 51(1)(a) to seek permission of the Government before creating a third-party interest in the property. On the other hand, the sale deed dated 16-12-1960 produced on record indicates that Shravan Patil (claimed to be the uncle of the Petitioner) sold the disputed property /land in favour of the Gram Panchayat vide sale deed bearing registration No. 670 and based on the sale deed, the Gram Panchayat has got ownership right in the said property. I would like to reproduce Section 51(1)(A) as under:

                   51. (1) For the purposes of this Chapter the State Government may, subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may think fit to impose, vest in a panchayat, open sites, waste, vacant or grazing lands or public roads and streets, bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, wells, riverbeds, tanks, streams, lakes, nallas, canals, water courses, trees or any other property in the village vesting in the Government.

                   (1A) Where the State Government is of the opinion that any property vested in a panchayat under sub-section (1) is required for the purpose of any national or State Development Plan or for any other public purpose, or where any such property is not required by the panchayat for the purpose for which it was vested, the State Government may vest certain lands in panchayats. Government may resume such property; and upon such resumption, the property shall cease to vest in the panchayat and shall revest in the State Government.

18. Bare perusal of the above section indicates that if the property vested in the Gram Panchayat is required for the purpose of any National or State Development Plan or for any other public purpose, or where the Gram Panchayat does not require any such property for the purpose for which it was vested, Government may resume such property; and upon such resumption, the property shall cease to vest in the panchayat and shall revest in the State Government. In the case in hand, the property was not allotted by the Government. Nothing has been produced on record to show that said property belongs to the Government or that the Government allotted the said property to the Gram Panchayat or that the same is required for the purpose of any National or State Development Plan or for any other public purpose. To draw an inference that if the Gram Panchayat does not require it for the purpose for which it was vested, the State Government may resume such property.

19. On the contrary, as per Section 55 of the Act, which reads thus as under:

                   55. Competency of panchayat to lease, sale or transfer property:

                   Every panchayat shall be competent to lease, sell or otherwise transfer moveable or immovable property which may become [vested in (otherwise than under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 51)] or be acquired by it and to contract and do all other things necessary for the purposes of this Act :

                   Provided that no lease of immovable property other than property referred to in sub-section (1) of section 56 for a term exceeding three years, and no sale or other transfer of any such property shall be valid unless such lease, sale or other transfer has been made with the previous sanction of the [Chief Executive Officer].

20. As per the above section, every Panchayat is competent to sell or transfer the movable or immovable property vested in it otherwise than under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 51. Undisputedly, nothing has been brought on record to show that the property in question vested in the Government as per Section 51 (1) of the Act. Therefore, as per Section 55, the Gram Panchayat can sell the same with the prior sanction of the Chief Executive Officer. On perusal of the sale deed, it is evident that the Gram Panchayat had obtained necessary permission from the CEO of the Zilla Parishad vide order No. GP-7/1257 CR 199/80 dated 31-12-1980. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Gram Panchayat was not competent to sell the property. Therefore, the cancellation of the mutation entry by the SDO is also contrary to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

21. Though the learned AGP emphasised that earlier mutation entry Nos. 323 and 486 were recorded, those mutation entries were cancelled. Therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to take further mutation entry. But the learned AGP failed to produce the mutation entry Nos. 323 and 486 before the Court along with reply for perusal of the Court. It does not appear for what purpose those entries were cancelled, and what was the reason for cancellation of those entries is not brought to the notice of the Court. Therefore, I do not find substance in his argument that the twice mutation entry was cancelled and therefore the Petitioner was not entitled to record the mutation entry No.1083.

22. Though the learned AGP submitted that the Petitioner suppressed the fact from the Court and did not come with clean hands, however, he failed to point out from the record which facts were suppressed by the Petitioner and how the Petitioner did not come to the Court with clean hands. Therefore, I do not find any merit in his argument in that regard.

23. The learned AGP raised the question that an alternate remedy is available. Therefore, this Petition is not maintainable. However, in view of above discussion as well as law laid down by this Court in Namdev (supra) in my view despite existence an alternate remedy this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as the learned SDO has not followed the settled position of law and acted in contravention of the said legal position that the Application was filed after lapse of 18 years without an Application for condonation of delay or without considering the legal position to entertain the said revision cancelled the settled Mutation entry No.1083. Therefore, the Court is empowered to entertain the Writ Petition or justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction. Apart from that, by passing the order, the learned SDO violated the principle of natural justice.

24. In the light of the above discussion and the consequences thereof, the Court is persuaded to hold that the facts of the said case carved out an extraordinary situation where this Court would be justified in exercising the writ jurisdiction despite the existence of a statutory remedy. Therefore, the law laid down in Gurudassing (supra) is hardly of any assistance to the learned AGP in support of his contention. On the contrary, the law laid down by this Court in Namdev (supra) applies.

25. Perused the impugned judgment and order, it is apparent that the Petitioner has raised the first objection that the complainant has no locus standi to file the complaint /revision; secondly, the revision is barred by law of limitation; thirdly, none of the parties have challenged the sell transaction and lastly no material produced on record to show that the land was used for grazing the cattle. However, the learned SDO did not consider the objections raised by the Petitioner in its proper perspective nor did it deal with the same, and without assigning any reason, cancelled the mutation entry only on the ground that the Gram Panchayat did not obtain permission from the competent authority while selling the property. The learned SDO has not considered the fact that the mutation entry was recorded in February 1991 and after a period of eighteen years the complaint was lodged. Similarly, the learned SDO has not gone through the sale deed by which the Gram Panchayat has sold the property, as in the sale deed they have categorically stated that they have obtained the permission from the CEO as contemplated in proviso 55 of the Act and therefore, passing of the impugned judgment and order without assigning any reason, cancelled the mutation entry only on the ground that the Gram Panchayat did not obtain permission cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and liable to be set aside.

26. In the light of the above discussion, in my view, the impugned order dated 18-05-2017 passed by the learned Divisional Commissioner confirmed the order passed by the learned Additional Collector and SDO are not sustainable in the eyes of law. The same were passed without following the law of limitation, as well as the learned SDO exceeded its jurisdiction while passing the order. Therefore, interference is required in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, the sale deed is not challenged by any person or authority and the said sale deed is intact. Therefore, also recording of the mutation entry No.1083 was just and proper.

27. As a result, the writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause-B. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned SDO and confirmed by the learned Additional Collector and Divisional Commissioner are set aside.

28. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs.

29. The Writ Petition is disposed of.