1. The present petition has been filed by the accused-petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. against the order dated 21.02.2018 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 3, Alwar (for short, 'the learned Revisional Court') whereby the revision petition No. 80/2017 filed by the petitioners was dismissed and also, against the order dated 22.12.2016 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alwar (for short, 'the learned trial Court') in criminal case No. 23/762/2014 whereby cognizance was taken against the petitioners.

2. The brief facts of the case borne out from the pleadings are that the complainant/non-petitioner filed a complaint before the learned trial Court, pursuant to which, an FIR was registered on 03.12.2004 at Police Station Kotwali, Alwar for offences under Sections 420, 463, 464, 467, 468, 471 and 474 IPC with the allegations that the complainant took plot no. 2 located at the main road, Manu Marg on rent from the accused/petitioner and a rent deed was signed for the same. It has been alleged that despite many reminders, the petitioner did not provide a copy of the said rent deed to the non-petitioner. Further, the original stamp has been changed by the petitioners, as on page no. 1 of the rent deed, the date of rent deed has been mentioned as 01.11.2002, whereas on page no. 3, it is 14.10.2002, thus, they prepared a forged rent deed and also changed the terms and conditions of the rent.

3. The final report was proposed on 12.12.2004, against which a protest petition was filed by the complainant, however, the said final report was accepted by the learned trial Court vide order dated 04.02.2006. Against the said order, a revision petition was preferred by the complainant, which was allowed by the learned Revisional Court vide its order dated 16.09.2008 and the case was remanded back to the learned trial Court.

4. Pursuant to this, the learned trial Court took cognizance against the petitioners vide order dated 21.08.2014, against which a revision petition was preferred by the petitioners, however, the same was dismissed by the learned Revisional Court on 31.01.2015.

5. In the meantime an application filed by the petitioner No. 3-Prempuri under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 before the learned Rent Control Tribunal (for short, 'the learned Tribunal') against the complainant for restoration of the rented premises came to be dismissed on 15.10.2008, against which an appeal was preferred by the complainant which came to be decided on 03.02.2016.

6. The complainant also filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of CPC read with Section 151 of CPC before the learned Tribunal mentioning therein that pages 1 and 2 of the rent deed have been forged, however, the same was dismissed and a writ petition preferred against the same also came to be dismissed on 28.03.2006. Further, an appeal preferred by the complainant against the said order dated 28.03.2006 was also dismissed on 04.07.2006.

7. Against the orders dated 21.08.2014 and 31.01.2015, misc. petitions were preferred by the petitioners which were partly allowed by this Court and the matter was remanded back to the learned trial Court vide order dated 29.06.2015.

                  The learned trial Court again took cognizance against the petitioners for offences punishable u/S 420, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 120B IPC vide its impugned order dated 22.12.2016, which was challenged by the petitioners by filing a revision petition which also came to be dismissed by the learned Revisional Court vide its impugned order dated 21.02.2018.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the learned Revisional Court vide its orders dated 23.02.2017 and 21.02.2018 set aside the orders of cognizance dated 13.07.2015 and 31.01.2015 and thus, no cognizance should be taken in the present case once the case of the complainant is found to be devoid of merits. He further submitted that as per the letter dated 21.03.2005 written by the District Excise Officer, Alwar to the Excise Commissioner, Udaipur, based on the rent deed in question, the complainant acquired bar license for foreign liquor.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners themselves prayed in the criminal misc. petition No. 918/2015 for sending the rent note in question to FSL for investigation by the investigating agency and they themselves got the same examined by a private document examiner laboratory, Jaipur which found the document true through its report dated 21.05.2015.

                  It is contended that the complainant's relative is working in the treasury and a seal has been put by him on the original seal on the back of the stamp paper and the said contentions have been supported by the stamp cashier, District Treasury, Alwar.

He further submits that the Notary Public changed his statement as to the notarization of all three pages of the rent deed and the 11 conditions of the rent deed (kirayanama) and its genuineness were not considered by the learned Courts.

10. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 in the reply to the present petition denied the averments made in the petition and submitted that the rent deed was never submitted by the complainant to the Excise Department and the petitioners themselves inserted the documents in the office of the District excise Officer, Alwar.

                  Further, as per the judgment passed by this Court, no FSL examination was required. It is contended that forgery has been committed by the petitioners with the intention to make out a case that the tenancy was for 22 months only and eviction became eminent post that.

                  He submitted that a detailed investigation has been conducted on the seven points of the rent note (kirayanama) upon the directions of this Court, after which, cognizance has been rightly taken by the learned trial Court. He further submitted that the learned Tribunal's proceedings are summary in nature and no certificate of genuineness of the rent note has been provided to the petitioners.

                  He also submitted that from the bare perusal of the contents of the rent deed it is revealed that some forgery has been committed by changing certain pages of the rent deed.

11. Considered the submissions made by counsels for the respective parties and also perused the material available on record.

12. As regards order dated 21.02.2018 in criminal revision No. 28/2015, 29/2015 and 21/2015 is concerned, it is in respect of different allegation i.e. the alleged forged rent deed has been submitted by accused in the record of Excise Department after connivance with the officers. Those allegations and orders have no bearing in this case.

13. The allegation against the accused petitioners is that they have changed certain pages of the alleged rent deed containing the terms and conditions of the rent and have committed forgery. The learned trial Court, after considering the material placed before it, formulated as many as 7 issues and making specific findings and observations on those issues, has taken cognizance against the petitioners. As admitted by the petitioners the alleged rent deed is said to have been signed on 14.10.2002 and the said date has been mentioned at the end of the contents of the rent deed on page No. 3. On page No. 1 of the alleged rent deed, the date of execution of rent deed has been mentioned as 01.11.2002 and on the back of page No.1, the date of issuance of the stamp paper has been mentioned as 23.10.2002. When a stamp paper is said to have been issued on 23.10.2002, then a rent deed cannot be executed on the said stamp paper on 14.10.2002 i.e. a date prior to issuance of the stamp paper.

                  The last line of page No.1 of the rent deed does not correlate with the first line of page No.2 of the rent deed. The trial Court has also observed that the statements of certain officers and employees of the treasury were also recorded by the police. The stamp vendor is said to have sold the alleged stamp paper on 12.10.2002, but on the back of the stamp paper there is seal of treasury dated 23.10.2002 and rent deed is alleged to have been executed on 14.10.2002 which cause suspicion about the rent deed as the stamp paper bearing date of sale as 23.10.2002 and the stamp vendor is said to have sold it on 23.10.2002. The trial Court has also found certain discrepancies in the register being maintained by Prahlad Gupta-the stamp vendor. The learned trial Court, on perusal of the alleged rent deed has also observed that there is some kind of variation in the dates under the signatures of the notary public who has attested the rent deed and the dates on which the rent deed is said to have been executed. On the first page of the rent deed the date of execution has been mentioned as 01.11.2002 which is said to have been attested by the notary public on 20.10.2002, which in normal course is not possible and the rent deed cannot be attested by the notary public prior to its execution. In a normal course, signatures of the parties to the rent deed are mentioned on each page of the rent deed, however in the present case, signatures of the complainant are only on the last page of the rent deed, and in such circumstances possibility of change of first and second page of the alleged rent deed and making forgery cannot be ruled out.

14. Having considered the material made available on record and so also the statements of the witnesses, the trial Court has found the allegation against the accused petitioners to be prima-facie proved and there is sufficient material to prosecute the accused petitioners. On going through the order passed by the revisional Court, the Court finds that revisonal Court, after considering the material available on record, concurred with the findings of the trial Court as it does not suffers any perversity or illegality.

15. Learned counsel for the accused petitioners submitted that as regards the issue No. 7 in proceedings before Rent Tribunal as formulated by the trial Court, the matter is ceased with the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6727/2016 as the rent Tribunal has not found the rent deed as forged one. He has referred the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sardool Singh & Anr. Vs. Smt. Nasib Kaur, reported in (1987) Supp. SCC 146 and so also the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of R. Nagender Yadav Vs. State of Telangana and Anr., reported in (2023) 2 SCC 195.

16. As far as the judgment in the case of R. Nagender (supra) is concerned, in para 21 of the said judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified that the said order has been passed in the facts and circumstances of that case and same shall not be cited as a precedent.

                  In the case of Sardool Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

                  "2. A civil suit between the parties is pending wherein the contention of the respondent is that no will was executed whereas the contention of the appellants is that a will has been executed by the testator. A case for grant of probate is also pending in the court of learned District Judge, Rampur. The civil court is therefore seized of the question as regards the validity of the will. The matter is sub judice in the aforesaid two cases in civil courts. At this juncture the respondent cannot therefore be permitted to institute a criminal prosecution on the allegation that the will is a forged one. That question will have to be decided by the civil court after recording the evidence and hearing the parties in accordance with law. It would not be proper to permit the respondent to prosecute the appellants on this allegation when the validity of the will is being tested before a civil court. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and quash the criminal proceedings pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chandigarh in the case entitled Smt Nasib Kaur v. Sardool Singh. This will not come in the way of instituting appropriate proceedings in future in case the civil court comes to the conclusion that the will is a forged one. We of course refrain from expressing any opinion as regards genuineness or otherwise of the Will in question as there is no occasion to do so and the question is wide open before the lower courts."

17. Learned counsel for the respondent complainant has also relied upon various judgments.

                  In the case of Kathyayini Vs. Sidharth P.S. Reddy and Ors., reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1428, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:-

                  "19. We now come to the issue of bar against prosecution during the pendency of a civil suit. We hereby hold that no such bar exists against prosecution if the offences punishable under criminal law are made out against the parties to the civil suit. Learned senior counsel Dr. Menaka Guruswamy has rightly placed the relevant judicial precedents to support the above submission. In the case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S., this Court has reviewed its precedents which clarify the position. The relevant paragraph from the above judgment is extracted below:

                  “8. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in criminal law.”

                  20. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, this Court summed up the distinction between the two remedies as under:

                  “21. … There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.”

                  24. Therefore, we set aside the Impugned order of High Court dated 23.11.2023 in Writ Petition No. 23106 of 2021. Accordingly, we direct the Trial Court to continue its proceedings against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in accordance to law."

                  In the case of Anukul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 2060, the Hon'ble Apex Court, vide para 17, has summarized the principles for quashing the criminal proceedings.

                  "17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite:

                  “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

                  (i)  A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.

                  (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

                  (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

                  (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.

                  (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.

                  10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.”

                  In the case of Accamma Sam Jacob Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr., reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 585, the Hon'ble Apex Court, vide para 56, has observed as under:-

                  "56. In the facts and circumstances noted above, it was not at all justified for the High Court to have quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court."

18. Earlier the petitioners approached the High Court by filing Criminal Misc. Petition No. 918/2015 against the order of cognizance and dismissal of the revision and the High Court, vide its order dated 29.06.2015 disposed the said misc. petition observing as under:-

                 

                 

                

19. The police, after making an investigation on the issues as ordered by the High Court, submitted the report and the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance after taking into consideration the conclusion of investigation and so also the evidence collected during the investigation.

20. In the case of Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Delhi & Anr., reported in (2012) 2 SCC 188, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

                  "17. The taking of cognizance means the point in time when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence which appears to have been committed. At the stage of taking of cognizance of offence, the court has only to see whether prima facie there are reasons for issuing the process and whether the ingredients of the offence are there on record.

                  19. The correctness of the order whereby cognizance of the offence has been taken by the Magistrate, unless it is perverse or based on no material, should be sparingly interfered with. In the instant case, anyone reading the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance, will come to the conclusion that there has been due application of mind by the Magistrate and it is a well-reasoned order. The order of the High Court passed on a criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code (not under Section 482) at the instance of Dr. Mrs Nupur Talwar would also show that there has been a proper application of mind and a detailed speaking order has been passed."

                  In the case of SK Singh Vs. NCT Delhi & Anr.; CRL.A. 203/2024, decided on 20.12.2025, the Delhi High Court observed as under:-

                  "21. When quashing is sought at the stage of cognizance, this Court has to exercise great care that it does not weigh the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution case. Cognizance is taken of the offence and not the offender. What needs to be prima facie seen, is whether from the material in the chargesheet and statement of witnesses, a cognizable offence was made out and cognizance could be taken on that evidence. When the chargesheet or FIR does not disclose any cognizable offence, then this Court may exercise its inherent powers. Reference may be made to the decision in State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, wherein it has been held as under:-

                  5. It has been held by this Court in several cases that the inherent power of the court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be very sparingly and cautiously used only when the court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the court, if such power is not exercised. So far as the order of cognizance by a Magistrate is concerned, the inherent power can be exercised when the allegations in the first information report or the complaint together with the other materials collected during investigation taken at their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged. At that stage it is not open for the court either to sift the evidence or appreciate the evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. In a recent judgment of this Court to which one of us (Hon. K. Ramaswamy, J.) was a member it has been held, following the earlier decision in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059 : JT (1995) 7 SC 299] :

                  “It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is concluded and the charge-sheet is laid the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court could take cognizance of the offence, on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases, i.e., in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance, issue of process under Criminal Procedure Code is availed of. A reading of a complaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence — the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power.

                  When the remedy under Section 482 is available, the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under Section 482 of the Code is available. When the court exercises its inherent power under Section 482 the prime consideration should only be whether the exercise of the power would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process of the court. When the investigation officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the court, further action should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise of inherent power to quash the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power.”

21. One of the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners have sought license for bar from the Excise Department by submitting the alleged rent deed. The counsel for the complainant disputed this fact and submitted that the complainant, while submitting the application for seeking the bar license, did not submit any rent deed as it was not required. Counsel for the complainant also submitted that the accused party, so as to absolve from the allegation of forgery, might have inserted the alleged rent deed in the record of the Excise Department.

22. On going through the complete record placed before this Court, the Court finds that the allegations of forgery made by the complainant party against the accused party have some substance so as to initiate prosecution against the accused petitioner for the allegations of forgery.

23. One of the submissions of the petitioner is that in the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, even though a specific issue as regards the genuineness of the alleged rent deed was framed, but after recording evidence on that issue the alleged rent deed was not held to be forged one.

                  On going through the order of the Appellate Rent Tribunal dated 03.02.2016, it was observed that since the complainant could not submit the photocopy of the original rent deed said to be signed by him and therefore it cannot be said that the accused party has changed the pages of alleged rent deed.

                  When from the very beginning the complainant's stand is that after signing the rent deed the accused party said that they will provide the copy of said rent deed but was not provided and at later stage complainant came to know of the forgery. When the complainant was not provided the copy of rent deed, he could not place it before the Rent Tribunal. However, the certain facts regarding the rent deed as observed in above paras of this order the act of forging the document i.e. rent deed cannot be ruled out.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that as far as petitioner Smt. Surekha Chitkara and Sangeeta are concerned, they are the witnesses for signatures of petitioner Prempuri and there is averment as regards allegations of forgery against them and therefore orders of cognizance qua them is not sustainable.

                  As per the contents of the rent deed, their signatures were there on the rent deed as Yogeshpuri, their father was not going well. They were to receive each half same of rent after death of Yogeshpuri. Both these petitioners are the beneficiaries and their signatures are there on the both first and second pages of rent deed for which allegation of forgery have been levelled. When certain facts about two pages of rent deed which bears signatures of both petitioners prima-facie shows of some forgery, then order of cognizance against them does not suffer any illegality or perversity.

25. In view of the settled position of law as regards taking cognizance and making interference in the order of cognizance, this Court, in the present case is of the view that this is not a fit case to interfere in the order of cognizance as there is sufficient material, which prima-facie discloses the allegations of forgery against the accused petitioners so as to prosecute them.

26. Hence, this criminal misc. petition is dismissed.

27. Pending application/s, if any, also stand/s disposed.