Gadi Praveen Kumar, J.

1. Heard Sri P.Sri Raghuram, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Mallikharjuna Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms.Priyanka Banala, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 and Sri Velagapudi Srinivas, learned counsel representing Ms.S.Bhavana Sagar, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2-4.

2. Both the Appeals are filed being aggrieved by the orders dated 12.08.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge for Trial of Offences under S.Cs/S.Ts. (POA) Act-cum-III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sangareddy (for short ‘the Trial Court’) allowing I.A.Nos.783 and 782 of 2024 in O.S.No.270 of 2022 granting ad interim injunction in favour of respondent No.1 and against the appellant, restraining the appellant and its men from changing the nature of the suit schedule property till disposal of the suit and from interfering with the peaceful possession of the respondent No.1 in respect of the suit schedule property till disposal of the suit.

3. The appellant herein is the defendant No.4 in the suit O.S.No.270 of 2022 filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff herein against respondent Nos.2-4/defendant Nos.1-3, who are his own family members i.e. mother and brothers and the appellant herein, for the relief of declaration that the registered sale deed vide Doc.No.15488/2021 dated 31.03.2021 as null and void, and not binding on the respondent No.1 to the extent of 5/16th share of the respondent No.1 and to restrain the appellant from interfering with the joint peaceful possession and enjoyment of the respondent No.1 over the suit schedule property i.e. the land in an extent of Ac.3.07 gts in Sy.No./491 situated at Velimela Village, Ramachandrapura Mandal, Sangareddy District.

4. The facts leading to file the suit by the respondent No.1 are that the suit schedule property is the joint family property of respondent No.1 and respondent No.2-4 without any partition with metes and bounds. The respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4 jointly entered into an agreement of sale in respect of the land to an extent of Ac.3.25 gts in Sy.No.491, an extent of Ac.0.09 gts in Sy.No.476, Ac.0.17 gts in Sy.No.477 and Ac.0.20 gts in Sy.No.487 of Velimela village in favour of the appellant on 18.09.2019. Subsequently, the appellant failed to pay the balance sale consideration within three months and as such, the said agreement of sale deemed to be cancelled.

5. It is the further case of respondent No.1 that in the month of August, 2022, the appellant started digging the land in Sy.No.491 for construction of apartments, and when respondent No.1 questioned the said act of the appellant, he was informed that respondent Nos.2-4 executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant in respect of land to an extent of Ac.3.07 gts in Sy.No.491 vide Doc.No.15488/2021 dated 31.03.2021. Respondent No.1 is having share of 5/16 in the suit schedule property. Respondent Nos.2-4 and the appellant colluded with each other and created the sale deed dated 31.03.2021 to deprive the rights of the respondent No.1.

6. It is the case of the respondent No.1 that as the suit schedule property is the joint family property of respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4 and as no partition took place, the sale deed executed by the respondent Nos.2-4, who do not have exclusive rights, in favour of the appellant is not binding on the respondent No.1, and the appellant cannot claim any right or possession over the schedule property. On 25.08.2022, when the appellant started interfering with the peaceful possession of the respondent No.1 of the suit schedule property and proceeded with construction in the undivided property by creating third party interests, he was constrained to file the suit for declaration and injunction against the appellant.

7. Pending adjudication of the suit, the respondent No.1 filed I.A.Nos.783 and 782 of 2024 for ad interim injunction against the appellant.

8. The appellant herein filed counter to the Interlocutory Applications contending that the appellant herein entered into an agreement of sale dated 18.09.2019 with respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4 in respect of lands in Sy.No.491 to an extent of Ac.3.25 gts, Sy.No.476 to an extent of Ac.0.09 gts, Sy.No.477 to an extent of Ac.0.17 gts and Sy.No.487 to an extent of Ac.0.20 gts, in total admeasuring Ac.4.31 gts and paid advance sale consideration of Rs.1,60,00,000/- under acknowledgment and balance of sale consideration was to be paid within three months at the time of registration subject to clause 7 to 9 of the agreement of sale, which provides for prior performance of the obligations by the vendors therein, such as survey of land. Despite receiving huge amount of Rs.1,60,00,000/-, the respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4 never came forward to perform their part of the obligations within the stipulated time though the appellant is ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration. Subsequently, respondent Nos.1 to 4 represented to the appellant that respondent Nos.2-4 have exclusive possession of the suit schedule property in Sy.No.491 and accordingly, registered sale deed Doc.No.15488/2021 dated 31.03.2021 was executed in favour of the appellant and possession was also delivered.

9. It is the further case of appellant that after purchase of the property, the appellant obtained necessary permissions from different authorities by paying requisite fees and developed the land and commenced construction of flats/villas by pooling the neighbouring lands and dumped construction material in the suit schedule property. In spite of having knowledge about purchase of the schedule property by the appellant from respondent Nos.2-4 under registered sale deed and taking delivery of possession, the respondent No.1 kept silent and when the constructions undertaken by the appellant are going on, the respondent No.1 without issuing any notice, approached this Court with the present suit. It is contended that the time period of three months stipulated in the agreement of sale is not an essence of the contract and that the respondent No.1 cannot seek cancellation of the sale deed when the principal agreement itself is in force and binding. The appellant is in possession of the property as on the date of filing of the suit by virtue of induction into possession by respondent Nos.2-4 on the basis of oral partition disregarding the joint possession claimed by the respondent No.1. The respondent No.1 has to seek appropriate remedy for recovery of possession in his discretion instead of persisting with perpetual injunction without there being possession. He therefore sought for dismissal of the suit as well as Interlocutory Applications.

10. Respondent Nos.2-4 did not file any counter, but filed written statement in the main suit taking a stand that there had been an oral partition and that the suit schedule property was in their exclusive possession.

11. The learned Trial Court marked Exs.P-1 to P-12 on behalf of respondent No.1 and Exs.R-1 to R-4 on behalf of the appellant.

12. Taking into consideration of the submissions made on behalf of both parties and basing on the material available on record, the learned Trial Court held that there is inter se family dispute between the respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4. Though, respondent No.1 had entered into an agreement of sale with the appellant along with his mother and siblings i.e. respondent Nos.2-4, due to strained relationship between them, the respondent No.1 had not participated in the execution of sale deed of the appellant and not received the advance sale consideration under agreement of sale along with respondent No.2-4. When the issue between the family members was not resolved, the appellant had stepped into their shoes and proceeded with the construction at his own risk. Due to the approach of the appellant and respondent Nos.2-4 on account of alleged interference, the respondent No.1 was put to great inconvenience since identification and extent of the land to the share of respondent No.1 itself is in ambiguity as the appellant is not in a position to explain the respondent No.1’s left over share in the disputed property. The learned Trial Court further held that mere filing of petition for rejection of plaint by respondent Nos.2-4, by itself is not fatal to the case of the respondent No.1 and it all depends on the evidence adduced by either party during the course of trial.

13. The learned Trial Court therefore held that prima facie case, balance of conveyance and irreparable injury lies in favour of the respondent No.1 and accordingly granted ad interim injunction in favour of respondent No.1.

14. Aggrieved by the said orders, the appellant filed the present Appeals.

15. Sri P.Sri Raghuram, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the appellant confirmed the agreement of sale deed dated 18.09.2019 in respect of land to the extent of Ac.3.25 gts in Sy.No.491, Ac.0.09 gts in Sy.No.476 and Ac.0.17 gts in Sy.No.47 and Ac.0.20 gts in Sy.No.487 of Velimela Village and paid advance sale consideration of Rs.1,60,00,000/-, and balance sale considerable is payable subject to compliance of Clause 7 and 8 of the agreement by respondents, and though the appellant is always ready and willing to pay the balance consideration, and in spite of many demands, since the respondent No.1 failed to discharge his obligations under the agreement of sale, the non-payment of balance sale consideration, is not a default on the part of appellant, but it is on the part of respondent No.1.

16. It is contended that respondent Nos.2-4 have executed the registered sale deed dated 31.03.2021 in favour of the appellant in respect of the suit schedule property with the knowledge of respondent No.1 and possession was also delivered. It is further contended that the suit extent of Ac.3.25 gts is in exclusive possession of respondent Nos.2-4 while the balance extent out of Ac.4.05 gts was in possession of respondent No.1.

17. It is contended that the appellant invested huge sums for conversion of land from agriculture to non-agricultural land and also obtained permission from various authorities, commenced construction and also dumped construction material in the land being in its possession, and that despite knowledge of such hectic activity, the respondent No.1 remained silent and approached the Court with unclean hands by material suppression. The respondent Nos.2-4 having alienated the property pursuant to the agreement sale, confirmed the possession of the appellant

18. It is further contended that there is no clear finding in the impugned orders with respect to the possession of the property; that in a petition filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), it is necessary to record a finding with regard to possession; that it is the duty of the respondent No.1 to establish prima facie case with regard to possession, and in the absence of such a clear finding, the impugned order is unsustainable.

19. Learned Senior Counsel contended that without there being any pleading with regard to collusion, the learned Trial Court recorded an erroneous finding that there is collusion between the appellant and respondent No.2-4. The learned Trial Court also failed to observe that respondent No.1 having committed breach of the contract, cannot seek equitable relief of injunction.

20. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that in the present suit, cancellation of sale deed is not sought under Section 31 of The Special Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘The Act”), but a declaration was sought to declare the sale deed is not binding to the extent of his share under Section 34 of The Act and as such, the sale deed of the appellant is not in complete challenge.

21. It is further contended that the respondent No.1 filed the present suit after one and half year of the sale deed executed by respondent No.2-4 in favour of the appellant, but by that time, the appellant had constructed over three Towers each comprising upto seven floors in the suit schedule property.

22. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Sk.Golam Lalchand Vs. Nandu Lal Shaw alias Nand Lal Keshri alias Nandu Lal Bayes and others(2024 SCC OnLine SC 2456) on the ground that since the suit property has many co-owners, the defendant therein could not have acquired right, title and interest in the whole of the suit property solely on the basis of the sale deed executed by one of the co-sharer. He relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bachan Singh Vs. Swaran Singh(2000 SCC OnLine P&H 233), Ananthula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) Lrs & Ors(AIR 2008 SC 2033), Dharma Devi Vs. Sardari Devi(2009 SCC OnLine Raj 144) and judgment of this Court in Ravulkole Vijay Kumar Vs. Smt.Gruhalaxmi(Judgment dated 19.02.2025 in S.A.No.90/2024).

23. On the other hand, Sri A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.1/plaintiff while defending the orders passed by the learned Trial Court urged that the suit schedule property is an undivided joint family property and each co-owner holds undivided interest in the joint property. Therefore, in the absence of family partition by metes and bounds, no co-owner is entitled to alienate any specific portion thereof.

24. It is further contended that the alleged sale deed dated 31.03.2021 executed by respondent No.2-4 in the absence of partition and without the consent of the respondent No.1 is inoperative in law to the extent of his undivided share. Further, the total joint property in Sy.No.491 (Ac.3.25 guntas) if divided equally among four co-owners yields approximately Ac.0-36.25 gts per co-owner and that respondent No.2-4 collectively own about Ac.2.29 gts, yet conveyed Ac.3.07 gts, thereby exceeding their lawful share. The boundaries in the sale deed cover the entirety of the joint property, leaving no identifiable portion corresponding to respondent No.1’s share on ground and therefore, the transaction effectively appropriates the whole property to the exclusion of a co-owner.

25. Leaned Senior Counsel, by placing reliance upon the observation of the learned Trial Court to the effect that appellant is not in a position to explain the respondent No.1’s left over share, which goes to the root of the matter justifying the grant of interim relief in favour of the respondent No.1.

26. It is further contended that the possession of one co-owner is deemed to be possession of all and a co-sharer in occupation holds the joint estate as a ‘constructive trustee’ for the benefit of other co-owners. Consequently, mere claims of exclusive possession cannot constitute an ‘ouster’ or establish a title by adverse possession against a non-consenting co-owner. It is contended that the alleged exclusive possession by respondent Nos.2-4 is legally insufficient to displace the presumption of respondent No.1’s joint possession.

27. Learned Senior Counsel further urged that it is established legal position that purchaser of a co-owner’s undivided interest does not acquire title to any defined share in the property. It is contended that the alleged unregistered agreement of sale dated 18.09.2019 was never marked in evidence in the learned Trial Court and became unenforceable due to appellant’s admitted failure to pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time and respondent No.1 consistently denied receipt of any consideration under Ex.R-4. It is contended that an agreement of sale does not convey title or create any interest in immovable property and at best, gives rise to a right to seek specific performance, and admittedly, no suit for specific performance has been instituted, and in the absence of such an adjudication, the agreement of sale remains as an untested contractual claim and cannot form basis for any equitable or possessory right against a co-owner.

28. Learned Senior Counsel contended that after institution of the suit O.S.No.270 of 2022 and subject Interlocutory Applications, the appellant proceeded with the construction on the undivided property at its own risk knowing fully aware of the subsisting co-ownership and absence of partition, thereby the learned Trial Court rightly observed that the issue between respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4 was not resolved and the appellant proceeded with construction at its own risk, and therefore, the orders dated 12.08.2024 are well reasoned orders passed in exercise of judicial discretion based on a correct application of the principles of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, and the said orders does not warrant any interference.

29. It is further urged that the appellant’s conduct throughout the proceedings has been characterized by concealment of material facts, misrepresentation and an attempt to overreach the legal process and that the appellant failed to disclose the true status of RERA books and appellant’s misleading statements regarding the extent of construction demonstrates lack of bona fides, and continuation of injunction causes no prejudice to the appellant beyond a temporary deferment of construction, subject to the outcome of the suit, and permitting construction would irreversibly alter the subject matter. The appellant, having proceeded in conscious disregard of admitted co-ownership, cannot convert its own acts into a ground for equitable relief, and therefore contended that the Appeals are liable to be dismissed.

30. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 placed reliance on the decisions in Sk.Golam Lalchand (supra), Karbalai Begum Vs. Mohd.Sayeed and another((1980) 4 SCC 396), Sidheshwar Mukherjee Vs. Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh and others((1953) 2 SCC 265), Deoraj Vs. State of Maharashtra and others((2004) 4 SCC 697), Bachan Singh (supra), Dharma Devi (supra), Ravulkole Vijay Kumar (supra).

31. Sri Velagapudi Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.2-4, while reiterating the contentions made on behalf of the appellant contended that the execution of agreement of sale is an admitted fact by the respondents, and that the execution of registered sale deed dated 31.03.2021 by respondent Nos.2-4 in favour of the appellant in respect of the suit schedule property and delivery of possession is within the knowledge of respondent No.1.

32. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2-4 by drawing the attention to para-12 of the written statement filed by respondent Nos.2-4 in the suit contended that joint family properties were partitioned with mutual understanding and therefore the respondent No.1 is not in possession of the suit schedule property. It is contended that there are conflicting prayers in the I.As. and the impugned orders passed by the learned Trial Court lacks clear findings with respect to possession of the property. The learned Trial Court, instead of considering the prima facie case, balance of convenience in deciding an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC, dealt with the issues which are related to trial.

33. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court failed to consider that the plea of collusion raised by the respondent No.1 is not established as there was an agreement of sale between the parties and the sale deed was executed in pursuance of agreement of sale and in compliance of the same. It is also contended that the learned Trial Court gave a finding that respondent No.1 did not receive any consideration under agreement of sale and such a finding is based upon no evidence and as respondent No.1 did not produce the agreement of sale to establish the same, the same cannot be considered.

34. Learned counsel further contended that suit is filed for injunction and declaration that the sale deed is not binding on respondent No.1 is not maintainable in the absence of the relief for recovery of possession since respondent No.1 is not in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit.

35. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2-4 placed reliance on the decision in Dharmi Devi (supra) and Ananthula Sudhakar (Supra), Ravulkole Vijay Kumar (supra).

36. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2-4 therefore contends that there are glaring infirmities in the impugned orders passed by the learned Trial Court and are liable to be set aside.

37. We have extensively heard leaned counsel for the parties and have gone through the impugned orders and the material placed on record.

38. In the present case, it is an admitted fact by the appellant that the suit schedule property originally belonged to late Anthi Reddy; that upon his demise, his son Venkat Reddy succeeded to the property; that after the death of Venkat Reddy intestate, respondent No.1 and respondent Nos.2-4 succeeded to his estate as legal heirs; and that all of them jointly entered into an Agreement of Sale dated 18.09.2019 in favour of the appellant. These admitted facts, prima facie, establish the status of respondent No.1 as one of the co-owners of the property. Thus, the controversy is not whether respondent No.1 has any right in the property, but whether respondent Nos.2-4 could validly convey an extent of Ac.3.07 guntas under the registered sale deed dated 31.03.2021 in a manner affecting the undivided interest claimed by respondent No.1. Such an issue involves disputed questions of fact and law and necessarily requires adjudication on the basis of evidence during trial. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that respondent No.1 has made out a prima facie case.

39. Equally significant is the fact that the appellant cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser without notice. The contentions of the appellant show that it entered into the Agreement of Sale dated 18.09.2019 with respondent No.1 as well as respondent Nos.2-4. Thus, the appellant had full knowledge of the title history, the identity of all the legal heirs and the status of respondent No.1 as a co-owner. Having knowingly entered into a transaction with all the co-sharers, the appellant was fully aware that respondent No.1 possessed an undivided interest in the property. Therefore, the appellant cannot now contend that it acquired rights without being aware of respondent No.1's claim. In that view of the matter, the observation of the learned Trial Court that the appellant stepped into the shoes of respondent Nos.2-4 with full knowledge of the existing dispute cannot be said to be erroneous.

40. The consistent case of respondent No.1 is that no partition by metes and bounds has ever taken place among the legal heirs of late Venkat Reddy. Admittedly, no registered partition deeds, decree of partition or revenue entries evidencing such partition have been placed before this Court. Though the appellant and respondent Nos.2-4 seek to contend that there had been an oral partition and that respondent Nos.2-4 were in exclusive possession of the suit schedule property, such contention remains a disputed question of fact which can be established only upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence during trial. At this interlocutory stage, the contention of oral partition cannot be accepted as an established fact.

41. Another observation which weighed with the learned Trial Court is that the appellant has not been able to satisfactorily explain as to how the undivided share claimed by respondent No.1 would remain protected after execution of the impugned sale deed and the subsequent construction undertaken by it. Though the appellant claims to have purchased Ac.3.07 guntas under the registered sale deed dated 31.03.2021, there is no material placed before this Court to indicate the precise location of respondent No.1's remaining share, whether such share stands identified or demarcated on the ground, or the manner in which his rights would remain unaffected after the development undertaken by the appellant. The learned Trial Court specifically observed that the appellant was unable to explain the respondent No.1's remaining share in the disputed property. This Court finds no infirmity in such observation at this stage.

42. The contention of the appellant that substantial investments have already been made, necessary statutory permissions have been obtained and construction has progressed considerably cannot, by itself, disentitle respondent No.1 from seeking interim protection. The appellant admittedly undertook such development after entering into the Agreement of Sale with all the co-owners and with full knowledge of the competing claims. Any development or construction undertaken during the pendency of the litigation necessarily remains subject to the result of the suit, and the appellant cannot seek to defeat the claim for interim protection merely on the ground that substantial investments have already been made. Consequently, the appellant cannot rely upon the construction carried out by it to defeat the claim for preservation of the subject property.

43. If the injunction granted by the learned Trial Court is vacated, further construction may continue over the suit schedule property, the physical character of the property may undergo irreversible alteration and third-party interests may be created, thereby rendering the final adjudication more complex and giving rise to third-party complications. On the other hand, continuation of the interim order merely preserves the property pending adjudication of the rights of the parties and does not finally determine any issue. Preservation of the subject matter of the suit is, therefore, in the larger interest of justice. Therefore, the balance of convenience also lies in favour of maintaining the existing state of affairs.

44. Similarly, respondent No.1 has also established the element of irreparable injury. The dispute pertains to immovable property in which respondent No.1 claims an undivided property issue. If construction is permitted to continue and third-party rights are created pending disposal of the suit, restoration of the property to its original condition may become impossible and respondent No.1's undivided share may become incapable of effective enjoyment. Such consequences cannot be adequately compensated merely by award of monetary damages. The learned Trial Court was, therefore, justified in concluding that refusal of interim protection would result in irreparable injury to respondent No.1.

45. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant placed reliance upon the decision in Sk. Golam Lalchand (supra) to contend that the sale deed executed by respondent Nos.2-4 in favour of the appellant is a valid transfer. There is no dispute with the proposition that a co-owner is competent to transfer his undivided interest. However, the said decision also recognizes that such a transfer does not confer exclusive rights over any defined portion of an undivided property and that the transferee merely steps into the shoes of the transferor, subject to the rights of the remaining co-owners. In the present case, respondent No.1 alleges that the sale deed covers an extent exceeding the share of respondent Nos.2-4 and that the appellant is asserting exclusive rights over the undivided property by undertaking construction. These issues are yet to be adjudicated and, therefore, the said decision does not advance the appellant's case at this interlocutory stage.

46. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Bachan Singh (supra) to contend that injunction cannot ordinarily be granted against a co-owner or his transferee. The said judgment, however, also recognizes that an injunction may be granted where the acts are prejudicial to the rights of the other co-owners or alter the nature and character of the joint property. In the present case, respondent No.1 alleges that respondent Nos.2-4 conveyed an extent beyond their prima facie share and that the appellant has undertaken construction over the undivided property, thereby affecting his rights as a co-owner. Whether these allegations are true, are to be determined during trial, but at this stage they constitute sufficient grounds to preserve the subject property pending adjudication.

47. The appellant further relied upon Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to contend that the purchaser from co-owners acquires a valid right in the property. Section 44 merely recognizes the right of the transferee to step into the shoes of the transferor and enjoy such rights as the transferor himself possessed. However, the provision does not authorize the transferee to claim exclusive ownership over any specified portion of an undivided property or to alter the nature and character of the joint property to the prejudice of the remaining co-owners before partition. The extent of the rights acquired by the appellant and the effect of the sale deed executed by respondent Nos.2-4 are matters which necessarily require adjudication in the suit.

48. The contention of the appellant that respondent No.1 is bound by the Agreement of Sale dated 18.09.2019 and, therefore, disentitled to seek equitable relief also does not persuade this Court at this stage. The existence of the Agreement of Sale is not in dispute. Equally, it is not in dispute that the registered sale deed was not executed by respondent No.1. Whether the agreement continues to subsist, whether the appellant was always ready and willing to perform its obligations, whether respondent No.1 committed breach of the contractual obligations, and whether the appellant is entitled to seek enforcement of the agreement are all questions arising out of contractual rights which are yet to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings.

49. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2-4 relied upon the decision in Anathula Sudhakar (supra) to contend that the suit is not maintainable without seeking recovery of possession. The said decision merely lays down the principles governing the nature of relief to be claimed depending upon the character of the dispute relating to title and possession. In the present case, respondent No.1 asserts that the property continues to be joint and undivided, that no partition has taken place, and consequently, that he continues to be in constructive joint possession as a co-owner.

50. Similarly, the reliance placed on the judgment in Dharmi Devi (supra) is a case where the appellate court found that no clear finding regarding prima facie possession had been recorded while granting an order of status quo. In the present case, the learned Trial Court has considered the admitted relationship of co-ownership, the rival claims regarding possession, the absence of any established partition, the likelihood of alteration of the property, and thereafter recorded findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury.

51. The principles governing interference with discretionary orders granting temporary injunction are equally well settled. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh((1992)1 SCC 719), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while considering an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the Court is required to examine only whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience lies in his favour, and whether refusal of injunction would result in irreparable injury. At this stage, this Court is not expected to finally adjudicate the disputed questions of title or record conclusive findings on the merits of the controversy. The appellate court would interfere when the exercise of judicial discretion by the Trial Court is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or contrary to settled principles of law. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court exercised its discretion on relevant considerations and no ground is made out warranting interference in the impugned orders.

52. Therefore, the learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the material placed before it, came to a prima facie conclusion that the three essential points are made out for granting the injunction such as prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss lies in favour of the respondent No.1. No perversity, illegality or material irregularity is made out warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

53. Accordingly, both the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are dismissed, confirming the common orders dated 12.08.2024 passed in I.A.Nos.782 and 783 of 2024 in O.S.No.270 of 2022.

54. Interim orders granted, if any shall stand vacated. No order as to costs.