Judgment & Order (Oral):

Arun Dev Choudhury, J.

1. The present intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 09.06.2026, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.1609/2026.

2. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge negated the challenge to the decision of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (for short MoRT&H), to cancel the tender process intimated to the State Public Works Department under communication dated 03.03.2026, and the further challenge to the consequential cancellation notice dated 09.03.2026, issued by the Chief Engineer, PWD (NH Works).

3. By NIT dated 17.11.2025, bids were invited from eligible bidders for the Performance-Based Maintenance Work (PBMC) contract for a certain portion of National Highways 127D and 127A under Rangiya National Highway Division in the state of Assam.

4. During the two-bid tender process, the appellant was declared technically responsive and emerged as the lowest financial bidder, though it quoted a rate above the estimated costs.

5. The appellant, having been declared technically responsive and having emerged as the lowest financial bidder, contended that the MoRT&H lacked the authority to unsettle the evaluation undertaken by the Bid Evaluation Committee constituted under Circular dated 23.02.2018 and that, in any event, the cancellation of the entire tender process was arbitrary and disproportionate.

6. At the outset, it is worth noting that the execution of national highway works under the present scheme is based on a policy of delegated implementation by the state Public Works Department, while retaining supervisory and regulatory control by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. The project in question belongs to MoRT&H. The source of funding, the formulation of eligibility criteria, the governing conditions of the tender, and the policy regulating evaluation are all traceable to the MoRT&H.

7. In this regard, the Circular dated 23.02.2018, mentioned hereinabove, prescribes different authorities and procedures depending upon the value of the work.

In respect of works with a sanctioned cost of Civil works up to 5 crores, the state PWD is delegated the authority to evaluate Bids and finalise them in accordance with the Ministry’s guidelines.

However, for Cost exceeding 5 crores and up to 100 crores, however, the delegation is not absolute; the opening and the evaluation of Bid is entrusted to a multi member evaluation committee constituted under clause 8.2 comprising senior officers of the state PWD, representative of the state Finance Department and significantly, an officer nominated by the Chief Engineer-Regional Officer/ Superintending Engineer of Ministry of Road Transport and Highways

8. Thus, in the State PWD and Bid Evaluation Committee, authority over the project is derived from powers delegated by the Ministry under the Circular dated 23.02.2018.

Clause 8.2 of the Circular prescribes the Constitution of the Bid Evaluation Committee and entrusts to it the task of opening and evaluating bids.

Clause 9.2 authorises the competent authority, on the recommendation of the committee, to accept bids, while clause 10.2 provides the authority to issue a letter of acceptance and to execute the contract.

9. These provisions identify the institutional mechanism through which the tender process must be undertaken; they do not create an autonomous body whose decisions are immune from scrutiny by the MoRT&H itself.

Thus, the authority of the committee flows from the Circular and remains circumscribed by the terms of delegation and the policy framework prescribed by MoRT&H.

In our opinion, a delegatee cannot claim a status superior and independent of the delegator from whom it derives its authority.

10. In this context, the Guidelines dated 16-01-2017 issued by MoRT&H that govern bid evaluation are equally important.

The circular deals with who shall evaluate the bids. At the same time, guidelines prescribe how such an evaluation should be conducted.

The Guidelines expressly provide that the Tender Committee may seek clarifications where deficiencies do not affect the basic character or profile of the offer, and specifically identify categories of deficiencies in technical and financial documents that may be clarified to ensure fairness and transparency in the evaluation process, including deficiencies in various certifications.

In our opinion, the evident objective is to avoid rejection of otherwise competitive bids for curable or inconsequential deficiencies and thereby preserve genuine competition in public procurement.

11. In the aforesaid mandate of the Guidelines, the circular, therefore, is not an instrument divesting the ministry of its authority. Such a circular is intended to decentralise the project execution mechanism within a specified financial threshold, while retaining overall administrative and policy control by the project owner, MoRT&H.

The Guidelines are not in conflict with the circular, but operate in conjunction with it.

12. It is in that backdrop that the factual controversy requires examination. The facts are largely undisputed and within a narrow campus.

13. The bid evaluation committee initially found only the appellant and another bidder to be technically responsive, while respondent Nos. 7 and 8 were declared technically non-responsive.

14. The Respondent No.7 was declared technically nonresponsive by the Evaluation Committee on two principal grounds.

First, it was found that the annual turnover certificate by the Chartered Accountant did not correspond with the particulars furnished by the Bidder in Annexure-III, resulting in a discrepancy in the financial information submitted as part of the bid.

Secondly, the Labour Licence produced by the respondent No. 7 was found to be invalid as on the Bid due date, the bid was non-compliant with the stipulated tender requirements.

On the basis of this deficiency, the evaluation committee treated the Bid of Respondent No. 7 as technically non-responsive and excluded it from further consideration

Thereafter, the respondents Nos. 7 and 8 submitted representations challenging their exclusion and asserting that the technical evaluation had not been conducted uniformly.

In particular, respondent number 7 questioned the rejection on the basis of discrepancies in the Chartered Accountant certificate and the alleged invalidity of its Labour License, while simultaneously alleging that clarifications had been extended to other bidders but denied to it.

The representations were forwarded for consideration before the procurement process attained finality, prompting scrutiny by the project owner, MoRT&H, as to whether the delegated authority had faithfully adhered to the governing guidelines.

15. The appellant would contend that the technical bid of respondent No.7 was rightly rejected and that the deficiencies noticed in its bids were substantive and incapable of cure.

The Project Owner, however, upon examining the matter, reached a different conclusion.

It was of the opinion that the discrepancy between the Chartered Accountant certificate and Annexure-III was capable of clarification within the meaning of the Guidelines dated 16-01-2017, and that rejection without affording such opportunity was inconsistent with the prescribed evaluation mechanism.

The ministry further opined that the Labour License requirement pertained to statutory compliance during contract execution and did not, by itself, constitute a bid-stage disqualification.

It was also recorded that, despite the ministry's advice not to open the financial bids until a decision on the representation filed by some bidders, the Executing authority went ahead and opened the financial Bids.

16. Whether this interpretation is the only possible interpretation is not the question that falls for judicial determination.

The relevant enquiry is whether such a view is reasonably open to the Project Owner when construing and enforcing its own guideline.

17. We are unable to hold that the interpretation adopted by the ministry is manifestly erroneous or so irrational as to warrant judicial interdiction. The argument that MoRT&H became functus officio after delegating the evaluation process cannot be accepted either.

18. Delegation in administrative law does not amount to abdication. The delegatee exercises powers for and on behalf of the principal and remains bound by the limitations subject to which such powers are conferred.

19. The MoRT&H, being the owner of the project and the author of both the Circular dated 23-02-2018 and the Guidelines dated 16-01-2017, necessarily retains the authority to ensure that the delegatee exercises the delegated power in conformity with the framework laid down by it.

20. If the MoRT&H bona fide forms the view that its delegatee has misapplied the governing norms or has adopted an approach resulting in unequal treatment of bidders or distortion of competition, it cannot be compelled to remain a passive spectator until the contract is awarded.

Such a construction would reduce the power of supervision to an empty formality and defeat the very object of retaining administrative control over projects funded and owned by the MoRT&H.

21. The reliance of the appellant on Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji reported in 1971 (3) SCC 844 also does not support the case of the appellant.

In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court was dealing with a situation in which the delegator had no power to review its own order, but the delegatee exercised that power.

In the present case, as recorded hereinabove, the delegator has the power and authority of supervision and to take corrective measures.

22. The reliance of the learned senior counsel on Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour Vs. Chief Executive Officer and Others, reported in (2024) 15 SCC 461, also of no aid.

23. There is no quarrel with the proposition laid down in Subodh Singh (supra) that cancellation of a tender process cannot be termed a pure contractual dispute and that while cancelling a tender, the authorities carry a public duty to act in a reasonable and rational manner.

24. However, it is equally settled in Subodh (Supra) that while scrutinising the reasons assigned for the cancellation, a writ court must be mindful of the fact that it is not supposed to delve into every minute detail of the reasoning assigned, it need not go to a detailed exercise of assessing the pros and cons of the reasons themselves, but should only see whether the reasons were earnest, genuine and had rationale with the ultimate decision.

25. In the present case, in our opinion, the reasons are genuine and earnest, and the rationale behind the impugned decision is to correct the misapplication of the governing principle by the delegatee and to prevent unequal treatment of bidders and/or distortion of competition

26. In Afcons Infrastructure Limited Vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited and Another reported in (2016) 16 SCC 818, it was clarified that mere disagreement with the decision-making process or decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of malafide intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be made before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision.

27. We find none in the present case.

28. We do not find that the impugned decision lacks any principle to term it as arbitrary. In the present case, the MoRT&H’s intervention was not based on an abstract disagreement with the bid evaluation committee's conclusions, but on concrete allegations raised by participating bidders and an independent assessment that the evaluation process had not uniformly adhered to the prescribed classification mechanism.

This distinction is of considerable importance.

The MoRT&H did not substitute its commercial preference for the committee's; rather, it examined whether the committee had exercised its delegated power consistently with the Policy and the Guidelines framed by the MoRT&H itself.

Such supervisory review lies at the heart of responsible public administration and cannot be equated with arbitrary interference.

29. The appellant has also contended that there were factual disputes regarding the participation of the representative of MoRT&H at the stage of opening the financial bids, and that the findings recorded in the cancellation order on that aspect are inaccurate.

In our considered view, the result or decision of the present appeal does not hinge upon the resolution of that controversy.

Even if the appellant's version is assumed to be correct, the cancellation order raised substantially upon the MoRT&H's conclusion that the technical evaluation itself was not undertaken in accordance with the Guidelines dated 16-01-2017 and that similarly situated bidders had not been treated uniformly.

That finding constitutes an independent and sustainable basis for the impugned decision.

30. We are also not persuaded by the submission that the MoRT&H ought to have confined itself to a narrower remedial measure rather than cancelling the entire process.

Once the project owner, acting upon relevant material, formed the opinion that the evaluation mechanism itself stood compromised by inconsistent application of the governing guidelines and that such inconsistency had the potential to adversely affect competition, transparency and fairness, the decision to recommence the process cannot be characterised as disproportionate merely because another course of action was also conceivable.

31. A writ court does not sit in appeal over administrative choices but examines whether the choice actually made is vitiated by arbitrariness, malafide or manifest unreasonableness. We find no such infirmity in the present case.

32. It must equally be borne in mind that the appellant had acquired no vested or enforceable right merely because it emerged as the lowest financial bidder.

Until the issuance of the letter of acceptance and the conclusion of the contractual process, no indefeasible right is accrued in its favour.

What the appellant was entitled to demand was fairness in the conduct of the tender.

The MoRT&H's decision, viewed objectively, was itself founded on concerns about fairness, equality of treatment, and the preservation of competition amongst the bidders.

Therefore, in balancing the individual expectation of a bidder against the larger public interest underlined transparent procurement, the latter must necessarily prevail.

33. For the discussions made hereinabove and the reasons recorded, we conclude:

                   I. The Circular dated 23-2-2018 and the Guidelines dated 16-1-2017, when read harmoniously, constitute an integrated framework governing procurement by MoRT&H.

                   II. The Circular identifies the authorities competent to evaluate and process bids. The Guidelines prescribe the substantive standards by which such evaluation must be undertaken.

                   III. The Bid Evaluation Committee cannot travel beyond those standards, and the MoRT&H, upon being satisfied that its delegatee had not adhered thereto, was fully justified in exercising its supervisory control.

                   IV. Far from acting contrary to the circular, the Ministry acted to preserve the sanctity of the very framework it established.

                   V. The decision dated 03-03-2026 represents a bona fide exercise of supervisory authority by the project owner, after considering grievances raised by participating bidders and finding that the delegated authority had not faithfully applied the governing evaluation guidelines.

                   VI. The decision, therefore, cannot be characterised as arbitrary, malafide or irrational to warrant interference in the exercise of the power of judicial review.

                   VII. The learned Single Judge, in our considered opinion, therefore, rightly declined to interfere with the impugned decisions dated 03.03.2026 and cancellation notice dated 09.03.2026.

34. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be dismissed, and accordingly, the same stands dismissed; parties to bear their own costs.