1. Since both CRLMCs arise out of the same set of facts and involve common questions of law, they are being heard together and disposed of by this common order. For the sake of convenience and effective adjudication, CRLMC No.4901 of 2025 is treated as the lead case.

2. In the CRLMC, the petitioner seeks a direction from this Court to quash Infocity P.S. FIR No.61 of 2025 registered under Sections 296, 351(2), 318(4) and 3(5) of the BNS, alleging procedural illegality, mala fides and retaliatory prosecution.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

                  (i) The Petitioner has filed the present CRLMC seeking quashing of Infocity P.S. FIR No. 61 of 2025, registered against the Petitioner, his mother-in-law and others, under provisions including Sections 296, 351(2), 318(4) and 3(5) of the BNS. The FIR is stated to have arisen from a written complaint allegedly filed by Opposite Party No. 5, who claims to have been subjected to blackmail, extortion, threats, criminal intimidation and conspiracy by the Petitioner and others.

                  (ii) The background of the dispute traces back to a property transaction and an earlier civil dispute concerning land. There is reference to a civil suit pending since 2013 relating to the disputed property, and the Opposite Party claims to have purchased land through a sale deed. The Petitioner’s side alleges that the sale deed was tampered with, whereas the Opposite Party disputes this and claims to be a bona fide purchaser.

                  (iii) Prior to the Infocity FIR, Town P.S., Puri FIR No. 72 of 2024 had been registered in relation to alleged forgery or tampering of the same sale deed. In that Puri FIR, the informants of the present Infocity FIR are stated to be accused persons. Their anticipatory bail applications were dismissed by the High Court on 13.12.2024, and the Petitioner relies heavily on that dismissal to contend that the later Infocity FIR is retaliatory.

                  (iv) The Infocity FIR was registered after the informant allegedly approached the police and, according to the record, after the complaint was routed or downloaded through the High Court’s Litigation Management System in connection with CRLMP proceedings. The Petitioner disputes the legality of this mode of registration, while the Opposite Parties contend that the complaint had also been physically submitted or sent by post earlier and that the LMS route does not invalidate the FIR.

                  (v) The dispute therefore involves two parallel versions: on one hand, the Petitioner alleges that the present FIR is a malicious counterblast to the earlier Puri FIR and related proceedings; on the other hand, the Opposite Parties allege that the Petitioner and his relatives used the pending property dispute and earlier criminal proceedings as pressure tactics to blackmail, threaten and extract money from them.

II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

4. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:

                  (i) The Petitioner contends that the Infocity FIR is void ab initio because it was not registered in accordance with Section 173 of the BNSS. According to the Petitioner, the written complaint was never properly submitted to the Officer-in-Charge as required by law, but was instead downloaded by the IIC, Infocity Police Station from the High Court’s LMS after the informant filed CRLMP No. 258 of 2025. The Petitioner argues that there is no statutory provision permitting registration of an FIR merely on the basis of a complaint received from a court server or LMS, and that the mandatory safeguard of physical signature within three days for electronic complaints was bypassed.

                  (ii) The Petitioner submits that if the informant’s own claim is accepted that the complaint had already been submitted earlier at Infocity Police Station, then the later use of the same complaint annexed in CRLMP proceedings could not legally become the FIR. The Petitioner argues that once police had already received information and investigation had begun or ought to have begun, the later complaint would be hit by Section 181 BNSS, corresponding to Section 162 CrPC, as a statement made during investigation, relying on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Punati Ramulu ( 1994 Supp 1 SCC 590).

.                 (iii) The Petitioner argues that the FIR is a malicious counterblast to Puri FIR No. 72 of 2024, in which the present informant is an accused. The Petitioner points out that the informant’s anticipatory bail application in the Puri FIR was dismissed on 13.12.2024, and thereafter the informant allegedly pursued the present complaint to falsely implicate the Petitioner and his family. According to the Petitioner, the present FIR falls within the seventh category of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ( 1992 Supp 1 SCC 335) , being a criminal proceeding manifestly attended with mala fide and instituted to wreak vengeance due to private and personal grudge.

                  (iv) The Petitioner contends that the allegations in the Infocity FIR are inherently false and contradicted by unimpeachable materials such as inquiry reports, court orders, earlier pleadings and documents connected with the Puri FIR. The Petitioner particularly relies on the Sub-Registrar’s inquiry report, which allegedly records tampering in the sale deed and supports the Petitioner’s version that the informant was involved in manipulation of the sale deed.

                  (v) The Petitioner submits that the ingredients of the alleged offences are not made out from the written complaint. In particular, the Petitioner contends that Section 296 BNS is not attracted as there is no allegation in the complaint satisfying its ingredients, and that the allegations under Section 318(4) BNS are merely an attempt to recast an existing property and forgery dispute into a fresh criminal case.

                  (vi) The Petitioner also alleges suppression and fraud on the Court by the informant. According to the Petitioner, the informant did not disclose in the CRLMP proceedings that his anticipatory bail application in the earlier Puri FIR had already been dismissed by the High Court. The Petitioner therefore seeks not only quashing of the FIR but also initiation of contempt proceedings or appropriate inquiry against the informant for allegedly filing false and backdated documents under oath.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:

5. The Learned Counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:

                  (i) The Opposite Parties contend that the CRLMC is misconceived, premature, not maintainable and liable to be dismissed because the FIR, on its plain reading, discloses cognizable offences under the BNS. They argue that at the quashing stage, the Court is only required to see whether the FIR discloses a prima facie offence and cannot conduct a mini-trial, weigh disputed facts, examine defence documents or adjudicate factual inconsistencies.

                  (ii) The Opposite Parties submit that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia and need not contain every minute detail of the incident. According to them, the legal requirement is only that the information should disclose commission of cognizable offences. They rely on the principle that an FIR merely sets the criminal law in motion and is not a substantive piece of evidence, and therefore omissions, procedural imperfections or lack of exhaustive narration cannot justify quashing.

                  (iii) The Opposite Parties deny any violation of Sections 173 or 175 BNSS. They contend that the informant had already submitted a handwritten signed complaint and had also sent the complaint by post to the police authorities, and that the complaint was later authenticated by signing the FIR copy. Therefore, even if the FIR mentions receipt through LMS, the Opposite Parties argue that the substance of the complaint, and not the channel of receipt, is legally relevant.

                  (iv) The Opposite Parties submit that even assuming some procedural irregularity in the registration of the FIR, such irregularity does not vitiate the FIR or the investigation unless prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown. They contend that the Petitioner has not demonstrated any prejudice caused by the alleged LMS-related defect, and therefore the FIR cannot be quashed on a hyper-technical objection regarding the mode of receipt.

                  (v) The Opposite Parties argue that the present FIR is not barred as a second FIR. According to them, Puri FIR No. 72 of 2024 concerns alleged forgery or tampering of a sale deed, whereas the Infocity FIR concerns separate and subsequent allegations of blackmail, extortion, death threats, criminal intimidation and conspiracy. They rely on the principle that rival versions, counter-cases, or distinct transactions may give rise to separate FIRs and separate investigations.

                  (vi) The Opposite Parties reject the Petitioner’s attempt to portray the matter as purely civil. They contend that the existence of a civil suit or property dispute does not bar criminal prosecution where independent criminal offences are disclosed. According to them, a decade-old civil dispute over property does not give the Petitioner or his family members any licence to intimidate, threaten, blackmail or demand money from the informant.

                  (vii) The Opposite Parties allege that the Petitioner has approached the Court with unclean hands, suppressed material facts and relied upon defence materials such as inquiry reports, civil suit documents, sale deed materials and alleged inconsistencies. They contend that such materials cannot be considered at the stage of quashing and that the Petitioner is attempting to convert the proceeding into a full-fledged trial before investigation is complete.

                  (viii) The Opposite Parties finally submit that the allegations in the FIR cannot be said to be absurd, inherently improbable or devoid of substance. They argue that the FIR warrants investigation, that the CRLMC has been filed only to stall investigation and exert pressure on the informant, and that the petition should therefore be dismissed with costs, allowing the investigating agency to proceed in accordance with law

IV. JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS:

6. Heard Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed before this Court.

7. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashing of Infocity P.S. FIR No. 61 of 2025.

8. The petition is, in substance, a quashing petition invoking the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction now preserved by Section 528 of the BNSS. That provision is pari materia in substance with Section 482 CrPC and preserves the power of the High Court to make orders necessary to give effect to the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of process, or to secure the ends of justice. Section 173 BNSS provides that information relating to a cognizable offence may be given orally, in writing, or by electronic communication, and where it is given by electronic communication it is to be taken on record on being signed within three days by the person giving it. The same statutory framework also shows that what matters at the threshold is the laying of information before the police that discloses a cognizable offence.

9. The offences invoked in the FIR include Section 296 BNS, which is confined to obscene acts in a public place or obscene words or songs in or near a public place, Section 318 which defines cheating and the sub Section 4 punishes cheating that dishonestly induces delivery of property or alteration or destruction of valuable security, Section 351 which defines criminal intimidation by threat to person, reputation or property with intent to cause alarm or compel action or omission, and Section 3 sub section 5 which embodies common intention.

10. The settled limits of this jurisdiction are no longer res integra. In Bhajan Lal (supra), the Supreme Court indicated that quashing may be warranted where the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute any offence, or where the proceeding is shown to be manifestly mala fide. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

                  “102. In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:

                  (1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused…”

11. Equally, in Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of UP (2020 SCC OnLine SC 958), the Court held that quashing of an FIR is an exception and that courts would not ordinarily thwart investigation into cognizable offences. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

                  “41. It is needless to point out that ever since the decision of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC 18, the law is well settled that Courts would not thwart any investigation. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. As cautioned by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While examining a complaint, the quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or in the complaint. In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat (2001) 7 SCC 659 this Court again cautioned that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage. Quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. In S.M. Datta (supra), this Court held that if a perusal of the first information report leads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.”

12. At this stage, this Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial. The correctness, sufficiency, and probability of the allegations are not matters for adjudication in a petition of this nature. In Sau. Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra ( 2019 14 SCC 350) the Supreme Court made it clear that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because the allegations may also have a civil complexion and that the correctness of the allegations has to be decided in trial. The Court held as follows:

                  “At the initial stage of issuance of process it is not open to the Courts to stifle the proceedings by entering into the merits of the contentions made on behalf of the accused. Criminal complaints cannot be quashed only on the ground that the allegations made therein appear to be of a civil nature. If the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are prima facie made out in the complaint, the criminal proceeding shall not be interdicted.”

13. The first limb of challenge relates to the mode of registration of the FIR. The petitioner contends that the complaint was not validly laid before the officer in charge and that it was merely downloaded from the High Court Litigation Management System. This contention cannot be accepted, at least at the present stage, for more than one reason. Section 173 BNSS itself contemplates that information relating to a cognizable offence may be given orally, in writing, or by electronic communication. The opposite parties, on the other hand, assert that a handwritten signed complaint had already been submitted and that the same had also been sent by post, besides the complaint later appearing in court proceedings. The controversy, therefore, is factual at its core.

14. The reliance placed on Punati Ramulu (supra), is misplaced in the facts of the present case. In that case, the police officer had admittedly received the earliest information, proceeded to the scene, commenced investigation, and only thereafter treated a later written complaint as the FIR. The precedents, on that proved evidentiary foundation, held that the later complaint was in the nature of a statement during investigation. The present matter stands on an entirely different footing. There is no incontrovertible material before this Court to conclude, at the Section 528 stage, that the police had first set the investigation in motion and only thereafter manufactured the FIR out of a later statement. Whether the LMS copy was the originating information or only one route by which an already submitted complaint came on record is not a matter that can be conclusively decided on affidavits in this proceeding.

15. It is also necessary to note that, in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh5, the Supreme Court held that where information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The Court has also accepted, in the line of cases noticed in the later official judgments, that even a general diary entry disclosing a cognizable offence may in an appropriate case be treated as an FIR. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

                  “54. It is thus clear that registration of FIR is to be done in a book called FIR book or FIR Register. Of course, in addition, the gist of the FIR or the substance of the FIR may also be mentioned simultaneously in the General Diary as mandated in the respective Police Act or Rules, as the case may be, under the relevant State provisions.

                  55. The General Diary is a record of all important transactions/events taking place in a police station, including departure and arrival of police staff, handing over or taking over of charge, arrest of a person, details of law and order duties, visit of senior officers etc. It is in this context that gist or substance of each FIR being registered in the police station is also mentioned in the General Diary since registration of FIR also happens to be a very important event in the police station. Since General Diary is a record that is maintained chronologically on day-to-day basis (on each day, starting with new number 1), the General Diary entry reference is also mentioned simultaneously in the FIR Book, while FIR number is mentioned in the General Diary entry since both of these are prepared simultaneously.”

16. The emphasis, therefore, is on the existence of information disclosing a cognizable offence, not on hyper-technical objections as to the precise channel through which the complaint physically reached the police station, subject of course to proof and compliance to be tested on the facts.

17. The second limb of challenge is that the present FIR is a counterblast to Town P.S., Puri FIR No. 72 of 2024 and is therefore liable to be quashed as a second FIR. This submission also does not merit acceptance. The earlier Puri FIR is stated to concern forgery or tampering of the sale deed. The present FIR, as pleaded before this Court, concerns allegations of blackmail, threats, criminal intimidation, coercive demand of money, and conspiracy.

18. The mere fact that the complainant in the present FIR is an accused in the earlier Puri case, or that the present FIR followed the dismissal of an anticipatory bail application, does not by itself justify quashing. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque ((2005) 1 SCC 122)_, the Supreme Court reiterated that allegations of mala fides against the informant are of secondary importance once the FIR discloses a cognizable offence. The relevant excerpts are produced below:

                  “If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings.”

19. Bhajan Lal (supra) category seven is attracted not by sequence alone, but by a clear showing that the criminal process is being employed solely as a weapon of vengeance and that the FIR, on its own terms, does not warrant investigation. That standard is not met on the present record.

20. The petitioner has invited this Court to rely upon the Sub-Registrar’s enquiry report, sale deed related documents, civil suit pleadings, and prior orders passed in the Puri proceedings to hold that the present allegations are false. That invitation cannot be accepted in the present jurisdiction.

 21. In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013 3 SCC 330) , the Supreme Court permitted interference on the basis of defence material only where such material is of sterling and impeccable quality, rules out the prosecution case, and cannot be justifiably refuted. The materials relied upon by the petitioner here are all bound up with disputed questions relating to title, alleged tampering, conduct of parties, and competing factual narratives. They may furnish a defence. They do not, at this stage, conclusively demolish the accusation of intimidation and coercive pressure tactics.

22. Equally untenable is the broad submission that the dispute is purely civil and therefore the FIR must be quashed. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006 6 SCC 736) the Supreme Court held that a given set of facts may disclose both civil and criminal consequences and that the existence or even availment of a civil remedy is not by itself a ground to quash criminal proceedings. The court held as follows:

                  “A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”

23. Thus, the pendency of a civil suit of 2013 relating to the property does not confer immunity if the later allegations disclose independent criminal acts of intimidation or coercive money demand.

24. So far as the specific sections are concerned, this Court is of the view that the FIR cannot be annulled in toto merely because the petitioner disputes the applicability of one or more penal provisions. Section 351 BNS deals with criminal intimidation. Section 318 BNS concerns cheating and aggravated cheating involving dishonest inducement to deliver property. Section 3 sub section 5 embodies common intention. Whether the full factual foundation for each invoked section ultimately survives must necessarily depend upon investigation. This Court would therefore refrain from a section by section dissection at a nascent stage, except to observe that Section 296 BNS is a narrowly worded provision requiring obscenity in or near a public place, and if no material is found during investigation to satisfy its ingredients, the same ought not to be mechanically retained in the final report. This limited observation, however, does not affect the validity of the FIR as a whole.

25. The petitioner has also prayed for action on the allegation of suppression and fraud said to have been committed by the informant in earlier CRLMP proceedings. In the considered view of this Court, that issue falls outside the narrow compass of the present quashing petition. If any party seeks action for suppression, false affidavit, or abuse of the process of the Court in an earlier proceeding, such recourse must be worked out in accordance with law in the appropriate proceeding and on proper material. This CRLMC cannot be converted into a collateral enquiry on those allegations. The Court expresses no opinion thereon.

V. CONCLUSION:

26. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court is not satisfied that the present case falls within any of the recognised categories warranting quashing of the FIR at the threshold. The allegations in the impugned FIR cannot, at this stage, be said to be so absurd, inherently improbable, or legally barred as to justify interdiction of the investigation. Both the petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.

27. It is, however, clarified that all observations made herein are confined to the adjudication of the present petition under Section 528 BNSS. The investigating agency shall proceed in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation on the merits of the rival claims concerning title, validity of the sale deed, or the earlier Puri proceedings.

28. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.