Devan Ramachandran, J.

1. The first respondent was proceeded against disciplinarily by the appellant – State Bank of India (SBI), leading to an order of punishment, namely Ext.P1 dated 29.09.2009, imposing compulsory retirement on him. He filed a statutory appeal before the Appellate Authority, which confirmed the punishment, through Ext.P2 dated 18.08.2010.

2. It transpires that the first respondent then applied to the second respondent – Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (for short 'Tribunal'), on 18.10.2012, under the provisions of Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act for short); and this was registered as a dispute, bearing ID No.36/2013.

3. The learned Tribunal found that the application of the first respondent before it, under the afore provision, is not maintainable because it had been made more than 3 years after the date of punishment, thus attracting the rigor of Section 2A(3) of the Act; but nevertheless went on to decide the ID on its merits, leading to the impugned Award, dated 30.05.2017.

4. The first respondent challenged the Award through the writ petition, which has now been allowed by the learned Single Judge. The appellant is in appeal, assailing the findings and holdings in the afore judgment.

5. Sri.P.Ramakrishnan – learned standing counsel for the appellant, argued that the Award of the Tribunal ought not to have been disturbed by the learned Single Judge because, its findings – both on the question of maintainability and on merits - are irreproachable. He contended that, when the application was made by the first respondent before the learned Tribunal more than three years after the date when Ext.P1 order was issued, imposing punishment upon him, its findings on the question of limitation are irrefutable since the said application is dated 20.06.2013, admittedly. He concluded asserting that, once the learned Tribunal had found the ID to be not maintainable, its further holdings on the merits of the matter were only corollary, though not necessary. He prayed that this appeal be, consequently, allowed.

6. Sri.Rajasekharan Nair – appearing for the first respondent, vehemently refuted the above submissions, explaining that the learned Tribunal had, in fact, issued a preliminary order on the question of maintainability on 24.05.2017 – but conceding that the same has not been challenged; and then, proceeded to issue the impugned Award seven days later, without hearing his client, on the merits of the claim. He asserted that, even as per the preliminary order, the learned Tribunal had concluded, after finding the application of his client to be barred by limitation, that the enquiry conducted by the appellant was just, valid and proper and that there was no illegality and impropriety in it. He predicated that identical holdings have found its place in the final Award dated 30.05.2017; and that this shows the prejudged notions which swayed the learned Tribunal. He asserted that, in such factual scenario, the learned Single Judge has acted correctly, in setting aside the impugned Award, remitting the matter to the learned Tribunal for fresh consideration.

7. Even though the above-mentioned preliminary order of the Tribunal has not been placed on record, Sri.P.Ramakrishnan – learned standing counsel for the appellant, conceded that such an order had been issued on 24.05.2017.

8. Going by the conceded positions of the parties, the learned Tribunal issued the impugned Award, finding conclusively that the application of the first respondent before it is not maintainable; and it also refers to its preliminary order dated 24.05.2017. One fails to understand why the learned Tribunal should have then taken the burden of issuing a final Award in the manner as it has done, touching upon the merits of the allegations in incisive detail, when it itself records that it had issued the aforementioned preliminary order, finding the application to be not maintainable. In normal circumstances and as per the established procedure, when a preliminary order is issued finding the reference to be not maintainable, a final Award ought not to have been issued touching upon the merits of the claim.

9. However, the learned Tribunal has not merely reproduced its views on the issue of limitation in its final Award; but has then raised the question: “whether the workman is entitled to obtain an award directing his restatement in service with back-wages, continuity of service and other attendant benefits” (sic) to then proceed to answer it to the negative, but without giving any opportunity to either of the sides to lead evidence or to offer testimony. Why such a course was adopted, is anybody's guess; and we notice that it is precisely, therefore, that the learned Single Judge has set aside the Award.

10. From the impugned judgment, we see that the learned Judge has held that there is no limitation, as found by the learned Tribunal because, the application of the first respondent under Section 2A(2) of the ID Act was preferred within a period of three years from the date of order of the statutory Appellate Authority, confirming the order of punishment.

11. Sri.P.Ramakrishnan – learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently argued that, since Section 2A(3) of the ID Act mandates that an application under sub clause (2) thereof can be preferred before the Tribunal only within the expiry of three years from “the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of the service” (sic), it can only concede an interpretation that the said date is that of the first order of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority. He contended that, if any other interpretation is to be offered, it would defeat the very purpose of the statutory prescriptions.

12. We are afraid that we cannot find favour with the afore submission and are in full concurrence with the views of the learned Single Judge on this aspect because, an order of punishment becomes final only when it is confirmed in appeal. This is because, it is possible that the Disciplinary Authority can propose a punishment and that the Appellate Authority may vary, modify or vacate it; and in such cases, it is only the latter order which will cause any consequence to the delinquent.

13. As an illustration, assuming that a Disciplinary Authority is to impose a punishment, which do not entail termination of service, but the Appellate Authority is to differ and impose one such, would the period under Section 2A(3) commence from the first or the second order? The answer to this is very easy. It would only be from the second one.

14. If so, then, why should there be a different parameter in the case where the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is confirmed in appeal; to thus think that the period of limitation in such cases, for the purpose of Section 2A(3) of the ID Act, would be the date of the first order. This will lead to untenable situations, particularly if an Appellate Authority is to take more than two or three years to arrive at a final decision, which would then steal every opportunity of invoking the provision to a delinquent workman.

15. We are firm in our mind that the legislature did not design any such prejudice to be caused to a workman; and that the period mentioned in Section 2A(3) of the ID Act will only begin from the date on which the punishment becomes enforceable as against the workmen.

16. To paraphrase, the order of a Disciplinary Authority cannot be enforced against a workman if he or she is to challenge it before the Appellate Authority; and it would obtain such competence only when the said Authority finally decides the matter.

In such circumstances, we see no reason to intervene, and consequently, dismiss this appeal; however, clarifying that the learned Tribunal, on remit, will decide the claim of the first respondent on its merits de hors the question of limitation and treating the reference to have been validly instituted.