(Prayer: Criminal Revision Case filed under Section 397 r/w 401 of Cr.P.C., praying to set aside the order of discharge order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvannamalai in Crl.MP.No.256 of 2017 in Special Case No.2 of 2016 dated 23.11.2017.)

1. This criminal revision case has been filed against the order passed in Crl.MP.No.256 of 2017 in Special Case No.2 of 2016 dated 23.11.2017 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvannamalai, thereby discharging the accused from all the charges.

2. The case of the prosecution is that the first accused, formerly Deputy Superintendent of Police amassed wealth disproportionate to his income during the check period between 01.04.2003 to 31.03.2011 along with his wife, who is arrayed as the second accused. The accused are in possession of pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to their known sources of income for which they cannot satisfactorily account for the investigation done for the check period from 01.04.2003 to 31.03.2011. At the end of the check period, they possessed wealth worth about Rs.23,65,217/- and thereby the assets acquired by them during the check period were worth about Rs.23,65,217/-. The income of the family during the check period was found to be only Rs.76,55,237/- and the expenditure for the same period was calculated as Rs.83,69,615/-. During the check period, they acquired asset to the value of Rs.23,65,217/- which is more than the income from known sources during the check period and a sum of Rs.7,14,378/- is an excess expenditure over the income. Therefore, the total disproportionate asset acquired by the accused amounted to Rs.30,79,595/-. Therefore, the first accused was charged for the offence under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act and the second accused was charged for the offence under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act r/w 109 of IPC. While pending trial, both the accused filed discharge petition to discharge them from all the charges. After enquiry, the trial court allowed their application and discharged them from all the charges. Aggrieved by the same, the present criminal revision case has been filed.

3. The learned Counsel for Government of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Side) appearing for the petitioner submits that the trial court had gone into the merits of the charges and had discharged the accused. There are oral and documentary evidences very much available to substantiate the charges against the accused. Further, the trial court erroneously concluded that detailed estimation was not produced during inspection by the prosecution after the evaluation of the residential building which was purchased by the accused and the construction of which was commenced in the year 2005 and completed during the year 2006. During the evaluation, the accused failed to give details and particulars about the construction of building and the probable value of the said building at the time of construction was worked out to Rs.16,39,288/-. Therefore, the evaluation of the house was conducted on the basis of scientific method. If at all there is any issue in the valuation of the house property, it can be considered only during the trial. Further, the trial court concluded that the loan amount obtained by the accused was Rs.6,00,000/- and the proposed estimate as made by the superior officers of the accused before the construction of building was Rs.7,25,000/-. But as per the explanation submitted by the accused, he obtained loan of Rs.8,00,000/- in which Rs.6,00,000/- was obtained with permission and Rs.2,00,000/- was obtained without permission from the head of the department. Therefore, the proposed cost of construction is Rs.10,00,000/-. However, the accused failed to give any satisfactory explanation about the value of the construction of the house. Further, a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- as income by way of rent was taken into account by the trial court. However, the tenant was examined and his statement was recorded wherein he had stated that he was inducted as tenant only just before seven months of his examination. This would mean that during the check period, he was not residing in the house owned by the accused and as such, the said income cannot be taken into account. Therefore, the accused are liable to be prosecuted.

4. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the charges itself are baseless because of the calculation adopted by the prosecution to come to conclusion that the accused amassed wealth disproportionate to their source of income. Therefore, the trial court had gone into the calculation and found that there was no amassment of wealth disproportionate to the legal source of income of the accused. He further submitted that the case is of the year 2012 and even after period of 14 years, the accused are facing mental agony even till today. Both the accused are ailing with all kinds of illness due to their old age. Therefore, the trial court rightly discharged them from all the charges and it does not warrant any interference by this Court.

5. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused all the materials placed before this Court.

6. Both the respondents are arrayed as A1 and A2. While the first accused was working as Deputy Superintendent of Police, it was found that both the accused amassed wealth to the tune of Rs.30,79,595/- disproportionate to their known source of income. Therefore, the first accused was charged for the offence under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act and the second accused was charged for the offence under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act r/w 109 of IPC. The trial court found that the evaluation carried out by the prosecution, of residential building valued at Rs.16,39,288/- was without any substance. It was valued only on the ground that the accused failed to cooperate when the building was valued by the independent technical team and failed to produce details and particulars about the construction of building. On perusal of the records, it is revealed that the petitioner availed loan of Rs.8,00,000/- and the proposed cost of construction was Rs.10,00,000/-. However, the prosecution fixed the value at Rs.16,39,288/- as construction cost of the house. Further, the prosecution also failed to take into account the rental income of Rs.3,60,000/- from the tenant. Though the tenant’s statements revealed that he was a tenant of the accused for the past seven months, he did not even whisper from when he was inducted as tenant. In the explanation, the accused had categorically stated about the rental income which is to the tune of Rs.3,60,000/-. It was also not taken into account the prosecution while calculating the disproportionate assets of the accused. Further, the prosecution failed to take into account the jewelleries of the second accused which were not seized from the accused. Further, the prosecution also failed to take into account the general provident fund withdrawal and the payment of life insurance corporation premium of the accused. However, the prosecution had wrongly come to the conclusion the accused had amassed wealth disproportionate to their income. Therefore, the trial court had gone into the merits and found that there was no basis for the same.

7. As such, this Court cannot go into the exercise of re-evaluation / re-assessment of the quantum insofar as the disproportionate assets are concerned and the trial court rightly considered the materials on records and it is a well reasoned order. As far as the second accused is concerned, she had been charged for the offence under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act r/w 109 of IPC. The question as to whether the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act are abettable by non-public servants and whether they can be prosecuted by the Special Courts under the Act is no longer res integra. It is relevant to rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of P.Nallammal Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Police reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1040, wherein it is held as follows:

                     29. The question as to whether offences under the Act are abettable by non-public servants and whether they can be prosecuted by the Special Courts under the Act is no longer res integra. Interestingly, the position of law was also expounded in an earlier round of litigation wherein the 2nd Accused had approached this Court seeking pre-trial exoneration. The decision is reported as P Nallamal v State, 1999 6 SCC 559, wherein the Court cited illustrations fitting within each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the IPC visà- vis Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. They are:

                     ‘24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which, according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments fitting with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the Penal Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. The first illustration cited is this:

                     If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of how other public servants have become more wealthy by receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do the same in order to become rich and the public servant acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation. Next illustration is this:

                     Four persons including the public servant decide to raise a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons prompt the public servant to keep such money in their names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons are guilty of abetment through conspiracy. The last illustration is this:

                     If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he cannot keep them as he has no known source of income to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A's name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.’

                     30. Although the illustrations supra were cited by the prosecution/respondents therein, the Court was ad idem therewith. Ultimately, this Court held that the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act can be abetted by a non-public servant.

                     36. The 2nd Accused is the widow of the 1 st Accused-public servant. The assets standing in her name are three immovable properties, two cars, share certificates and some cash balance in the bank. Pausing here, we may note that the Trial Court has observed that the 2nd Accused showed interest to purchase the land, that she had given the sale consideration which is proved by witnesses and therefore her acts fall within the third limb of Section 107 of the IPC, which is one of intentional aid. Regard being had to the fiduciary relationship shared between the Accused, mens rea cannot ipso facto be presumed by the mere fact that some assets stood in the name of the 2nd Accused, and she had extended consideration for the same. This Court cannot be oblivious to human realities, especially the usual course of human conduct in marital relationships. We are cognizant of the presumptions provided for in criminal law, but the same by itself cannot supplant evidence. We reiterate that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of evidence. To presume culpability of a close relative of the public servant merely on the ground that certain transactions were made in such relative’s name would be akin to reversing the burden of proof. This may have dangerous consequences and result in diluting the presumption of innocence, beyond what the statute in question contemplates.

8. Therefore, the prosecution has to prove that a solitary circumstances of name-lending, such as one at present, cannot lead us to draw and sustain an interference which unerringly points to the guilt of the second accused. There has to be something more in the form of positive evidence to substantiate essential requirements for the offence of abetment. Life and liberty are not things to be trifled with on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Therefore, the trial court rightly discharged both the accused and this Court finds no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order.

9. In view of the above discussion, this criminal revision case is dismissed.