Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The petitioners, namely, the State of Kerala, represented by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department and the Commissioner for Land Revenue, who are the respondents in O.A.No.1038 of 2026 on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, have filed this original petition invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P2 interim order dated 23.06.2026 of the Tribunal in that original application.

2. O.A.No.1038 of 2026 was filed before the Tribunal by the respondents herein-applicants, namely, the Kerala Revenue Department Staff Association (KRDSA), represented by its Vice President, along with its two members, who are working as the Senior Superintendent, Collectorate, Ernakulam, and the Special Tahsildar, Uduppi-kasargod Transmission Ltd., Cheemeni, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking an order to quash Annexure A10 order dated 19.06.2026 issued by the 2nd respondent Commissioner for Land Revenue, regarding the promotion and transfer of Tahsildar/Senior Superintendent in the Kerala Revenue Service, and Annexure A14 order dated 20.06.2026 issued by the said respondent regarding the posting of Tahsildar, Tahsildar (Land Records), etc., in the Kerala Revenue Service; to direct the 2nd respondent Commissioner for Land Revenue to finalise the general transfer for the year 2026, notified as per Annexure A6 circular dated 24.01.2026 and Annexure A7 circular dated 26.03.2026, strictly in accordance with the norms prescribed in Annexures A1 to A3 Government orders dated 25.02.2017, 21.10.2021 and 26.08.2020, respectively, expeditiously, within a time frame to be fixed by the Tribunal.

3. On 23.06.2026, the applicants filed O.A.No.1038 of 2026 before the Tribunal. When that original application came up for admission, the Tribunal passed Ext.P2 interim order dated 23.06.2026. The learned Government Pleader was directed to get instructions and file a statement why such en masse transfer orders, giving short shrift to established norms, are issued when the general transfer process is already underway. While posting the O.A. on 30.06.2026 (today), the Tribunal ordered that till such time, the implementation of Annexures A10 and A14 orders shall be kept in abeyance. The Tribunal has made it clear that the interim order shall not affect those persons who have already joined their respective new stations consequent to the above orders. The learned Government Pleader was directed to bring to the notice of the Tribunal any difficulty that might arise in implementing the

interim order dated 23.06.2026, especially in the case of those who are promoted and who are already relieved.

4. Challenging the interim order dated 23.06.2026 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1038 of 2026, the petitioners-respondents are before this Court in this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. We heard arguments of Sri. T.T. Muhamood, the learned Special Government Pleader for the petitioners-respondents and also Sri. Nirmal V. Nair, the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants.

6. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

7. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329], the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.

8. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a 'bull in a China shop', to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.

9. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39], the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

10. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1], a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.

11. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors in the order of the Administrative Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order of the Administrative Tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the Administrative Tribunal has committed a manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the Tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

12. During the course of arguments, the learned Special Government Pleader would place reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Kerala Government Veterinary Officers Association [2024 KHC Online 852]. The learned Special Government Pleader would point out that SLP(C)No.22261 of 2024, filed by the Kerala Government Veterinary Officers Association and another, challenging the said decision of the Division Bench, was dismissed by the Apex Court by its order dated 30.09.2024, declining interference. The learned Special Government Pleader would also point out that Tahsildars/Senior Superintendents in the Kerala Revenue Service are designated as Executive Magistrates and Incident Commanders under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. Moreover, since ‘census duties’ are about to be commenced, the promotion and transfer of the officers are to be completed immediately. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants would rely on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kerala State Government Ayurveda Medical Officers Association v. State of Kerala [2024 KHC Online 7094].

13. In Kerala Government Veterinary Officers Association [2024 KHC Online 852], a Division Bench of this Court, in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J.] was a party, held that on a conjoint reading of Section 19 and Section 20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, it is possible to say that in matters connected to transfers, right to approach the Tribunal is confined to only a person who is personally aggrieved by the order of transfer. In other words, a person who is holding a post and who is aggrieved by an order connected to his transfer alone has the locus standi to approach the Tribunal to challenge that order. Viewed so, it cannot be said that either the 1st respondent Association of Kerala Government Veterinary Officers or the 2nd respondent, who aspires to get a transfer in the next general transfer, is a person aggrieved by the order of transfer.

14. In Kerala State Government Ayurveda Medical Officers Association [2024 KHC Online 7094], the challenge in the O.A. filed before the Tribunal was against Annexure A15 order rejecting the representation made by the Kerala State Government Ayurveda Medical Officers Association. It was contended that the rejection of the representation was not in conformity with the existing Government orders referred to as Annexure A1. In paragraph 3 of the decision, the Division Bench noticed that in Kerala Government Veterinary Officers Association [2024 KHC Online 852], an earlier Division Bench, after noting the maintainability of the application filed at the instance of an Association, held that a transfer order passed in violation of an executive order can only be challenged by the aggrieved person and not by the association. The Division Bench endorsed the earlier Division Bench’s view regarding transfer orders; the aggrieved individuals will have to challenge such orders individually. However, it was noted that if there are numerous individuals, nothing prevents individuals from espousing their cause through an association, as the association also can be deemed as aggrieved. In that application, the details of such aggrieved persons will have to be mentioned or enlisted to espouse grievances before the Tribunal.

15. Though, placing reliance on the aforesaid decisions, rival contentions have been raised by the learned Special Government Pleader for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent, on the locus standi of the applicants to challenge Annexures A10 and A14 orders before the Tribunal, in an original application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, we do not propose to consider the said contentions in this original petition, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, since the challenge made in this original petition is against an interim order passed by the Tribunal, i.e., Ext.P2 order dated 23.06.2026, and the original application, i.e., O.A.No.1038 of 2026, is pending consideration before the Tribunal. Therefore, it is for the Tribunal to deal with the rival contentions on the question of locus standi of the applicants to challenge Annexures A10 and A14 orders, by invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the said Act.

16. It is well settled that Courts or Tribunals are not appellate forums to decide on transfers of officers on administrative grounds. It is for the administration to take an appropriate decision in such matters, which shall stand unless it is vitiated by mala fides or by extraneous considerations without any factual foundation. When an order of transfer has been issued on administrative grounds, the Courts or Tribunals cannot examine the expediency of such an order. Further, the Courts or Tribunals cannot go into the question of relative hardship. It is for the administration to consider the facts of a given case and mitigate the real hardship in the interest of good and efficient administration. See: State of M.P. v. S.S. Kourav [(1995) 3 SCC 270].

17. It is also well settled that transfer is an incident of service, and an employee working on a transferable post cannot claim, as a matter of right, that he should be retained in a particular post or at a particular place. It is the employer’s choice to determine how long the service of an employee is required in a particular post or at a particular place. The order of transfer does not affect any legal rights of the employee, and the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with an order of transfer or posting made in public interest or on administrative exigency. However, if the power of transfer is abused or the transfer is made not in the public interest but for collateral purposes and with oblique motive, the order would stand vitiated, warranting interference by the Court or Tribunal.

18. An order of transfer cannot be interfered with by the Court or Tribunal in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, the Courts or Tribunals cannot interfere with the order of transfer. Therefore, a mere assertion that the order of transfer is 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', in the original application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, cannot sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives. The concept being basically different, the Tribunal cannot even draw an inference that the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or on extraneous considerations or with oblique motives, unless it is specifically pleaded in the original application with reliable materials, which are sufficient to draw an inference of any vitiating circumstances influencing such an order of transfer.

19. An order of transfer cannot be subjected to judicial interference by the Courts or Tribunals, as a matter of routine, unless the order of transfer is shown to be the outcome of mala fide exercise of power or issued in violation of the statutory provisions. The transfer guidelines issued by the State cannot be treated as either statutory or amounting to conditions of service. The realm of judicial intervention in such matters is confined to scrutiny as to whether there is any vitiating element of mala fides, malice, substantial legal or factual perversity or arbitrariness, recognisable on the touchstones of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. When an order of transfer is shown to be issued on administrative grounds, the Courts or Tribunals cannot examine the expediency of such an order or go into the question of relative hardship.

20. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants would point out the specific ground raised in O.A.No.1038 of 2026 that Annexure A10 and A14 orders have been issued without complying with the mandate of Annexures A1 to A3 Government orders. Annexures A1 and A3 are the guidelines issued by the State regarding the general transfer of Government employees. Annexure A2 Government order provides for general transfer of Government employees, in the online mode to ensure transparency and strict compliance with the guidelines for general transfer. In Ext.P2 interim order, the Tribunal noted the absence of convincing reasons for not following the transfer guidelines in Annexures A1 and A3, while issuing Annexures A10 and A14 orders, which were issued after inviting options for general transfer. The learned Special Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the respondents-applicants referred to various clauses in Annexures A1 and A3 guidelines.

21. On the above aspect, we notice that the transfer guidelines issued by the State, as contained in Annexures A1 and A3, cannot be treated as either statutory or amounting to conditions of service. The realm of judicial intervention in such matters is confined to scrutiny as to whether there is any vitiating element of mala fides, malice, substantial legal or factual perversity or arbitrariness, recognisable on the touchstones of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Moreover, the guidelines in Annexures A1 and A3, as well as the online mode in Annexure A2, deal with the general transfer of Government employees.

22. Before passing an interim order in a matter relating to the transfer of Government employees, the Tribunal has to satisfy itself that there is a prima facie case warranting interference on the order of transfer, either on the ground of mala fides or violation of any statutory provisions. In the case of mala fides, an order of transfer cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal in the absence of any specific allegation of mala fides in the original application or at least a prima facie proof of vitiating circumstances influencing that order. Unless mala fides or oblique motives are specifically pleaded or can necessarily be inferred from the proof of facts, the Tribunals cannot interfere with the order of transfer. A mere assertion contained in an original application that the order of transfer is 'vitiated by extraneous considerations and imbued with mala fides', cannot sound in realms of mala fides or extraneous considerations or oblique motives.

23. From a reading of the statement of facts and grounds in O.A.No.1038 of 2026, it prima facie appears that there is absence of any specific allegation of mala fides in the original application, against the order of Transfer. We do not propose to delve much on the above aspect in this original petition, since the challenge made in this original petition is against Ext.P2 interim order passed by the Tribunal, and O.A.No.1038 of 2026 is pending consideration before the Tribunal. Therefore, it is for the Tribunal to deal with the rival contentions on the above aspect at the time of disposal of O.A.No.1038 of 2026. The observation contained in this judgment on the above aspect, which is made for the limited purpose of disposal of this original petition, will not stand in the way of the Tribunal in taking an appropriate decision on that aspect, after considering the legal and factual contentions raised by both sides.

24. As already noticed hereinbefore, in O.A.No.1038 of 2026 filed by the respondents-applicants, invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, to quash Annexures A10 and A14 orders issued by the 2nd respondent Commissioner for Land Revenue, i.e., the order dated 19.06.2026 regarding the promotion and transfer of Tahsildar/ Senior Superintendent in the Kerala Revenue Service, and the order dated 20.06.2026 regarding the posting of Tahsildar, Tahsildar (Land Records), etc., in the Kerala Revenue Service, none of the beneficiaries of those orders, who will be adversely affected by any interference made by the Tribunal on such orders, either by way of an interim order or a final order, are arrayed as the respondents. On the above aspect, we notice the provisions contained in Rule 4B of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2010, as amended by the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 2021, with effect from 15.03.2021.

25. As per Rule 4B of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, all persons directly affected shall be made parties to the application. Where such persons are numerous, one or more of them may, with the permission of the Tribunal, on application made for the purpose, be impleaded on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so affected; but notice of the original application shall, on admission, be given to all such persons either by personal service or by public advertisement as the Tribunal in each case may direct. As per the first proviso to Rule 4B, in cases where the State Government is a party, the Secretary to the Government Department concerned shall be arrayed as a party representing the Government. As per the second proviso to Rule 4B, if the subject matter of the application relates to two or more Government Departments or, if the application is of such a nature, the disposal of which warrants information from two or more Government Departments, the Chief Secretary to Government and the Secretaries to those Government Departments shall be made parties representing the Government.

26. When, as per the requirements of Rule 4B of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, all persons directly affected are not made parties to the original application, in the manner prescribed in the said Rule, read with its provisos, the Tribunal committed a grave error in granting an interim order, vide Ext.P2, to keep in abeyance the implementation of Annexures A10 and A14 orders, till 30.06.2026 (today), in clear violation of the principles of natural justice.

27. In the above circumstances, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, we find no reason to sustain Ext.P2 interim order dated 23.06.2026 of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal at Thiruvananthapuram in O.A.No.1038 of 2026.

28. In the result, this original petition is disposed of setting aside Ext.P2 interim order dated 23.06.2026 of the Tribunal in O.A.No.1038 of 2026.

The observation contained in paragraph 23 of this judgment is made for the limited purpose of disposal of this original petition, which will not stand in the way of the Tribunal in taking an appropriate decision on that aspect, after considering the legal and factual contentions raised by both sides. It would be open to the applicants to file miscellaneous applications in O.A.No.1038 of 2026, if so advised, seeking appropriate orders, including an order for impleading the affected parties.