1. This Writ Petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the prayers are as under:

                  “(i) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, calling for the records culminated in Exts.P28, P29, P30, P31, P32, P35, P36, P37 and quash the same.

                  (ii) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the 1st respondent to initiate Revenue Recovery proceedings against the 7th respondent for the realisation of arrears of rent amounting to Rs.22,72,738/-, in connection with the conduct Coffee Shop in the Alappuzha Govt. T.D. Medical College, for the period commencing from 25/12/2017 till 06/12/2019.

                  (iii) Issue an order staying the operation and implementation of Ext.P37 Order, till the disposal of above Writ petition (Civil).

                  (iv) May dispense with filing translation of vernacular documents.

                  (v) Issue such other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper to grant in the nature and course of the proceedings.”

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader in detail. Also heard the learned counsel appearing for the 7th respondent. The petitioner herein is aggrieved by Exts.P28, P29, P30, P31, P32, P35, P36 and P37 order and according to the learned counsel for the petitioner those are manifestly illegal, arbitrary and violative of all the norms of natural justice. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner was working as Associate Professor in the Govt. T.D. Medical College, Alappuzha. During the period commencing from February 2017 till the month of August 2021, the petitioner was appointed as Medical Superintendent of the hospital. The 5th respondent -Society, is an association registered under Act 12 of 1955 and the same was functioning in terms of Ext.P1 Memorandum of Association. As per Ext.P1, the Hospital Superintendent would be the Secretary of the 5th respondent Society. The 5th respondent Society was formed with the avowed objectives of activities connected with the Alappuzha Medical College Hospital, administered under The District Collector, Alappuzha, the Chairman. The income for carrying out the various activities of the 5th respondent society was accumulated by various methods, including the money obtained by auctioning the right to vend coffee at the Coffee Shop in the hospital premises. While so, the 7th respondent bid in auction, the right to conduct Coffee Shop in the hospital premises, on the basis of Ext.P2 quotation notice, for a period of 2 years commencing from the month of August 2017 and as per Ext.P4 Order, the said right was conferred on the 7th respondent for a monthly rent of Rs.1,99,363/-. The 7th respondent, remitted the security deposit of Rs.5,98,089/-, as per Ext.P5, with the 5th respondent Society and she had also paid the advance rent. The petitioner was paying the monthly rent for the initial months, as evidenced by Ext.P6, bank account statement of the 5th respondent Society. Thereafter, the 7th respondent was not regular in paying the monthly rent and she requested time for making payment on various occasions, as evident from Ext.P16 series. Thereafter, since the 7th respondent committed willful default in payment of rent, the petitioner issued Ext.P17 notice, calling upon her to pay off the arrears of rent, which she accepted as per Ext.P18 reply, but raised lame excuses for not paying the arrears. Thereafter, Ext.P19 notice was issued by the petitioner to the 7th respondent, informing her that the arrangement would be terminated and legal actions would be initiated. Thereafter, as per Ext.P19 notice, the functioning of the Coffee Shop was stopped on 06/12/2019, as evident from Ext.P20. Accordingly, Ext.P20 notice was issued to the 7th respondent, followed by Ext.P24 demand notice. The 7th respondent issued a reply to Ext.P24 even denying the tenancy arrangement. Again the petitioner issued Ext.P26 notice to the 7th respondent calling upon her to pay off the amount due, failing which revenue recovery proceedings would be initiated against her for the realisation of the amounts due. While so, one Mr. A. Nazir, filed Ext.P27 complaint before the District Collector, Alappuzha, based on which an enquiry was conducted by the State Vigilance and Anti- Corruption Bureau and it was reported that though the 7th respondent conducted the Coffee Vending Shop and committed default, as there was no formal agreement executed between the petitioner and the 7th respondent, regarding the conduct of the shop, the amounts due cannot be realised from her and on the finding that it was on account of the fault on the part of the petitioner and other office staff concerned, that the said loss occurred and therefore, recommended action against the petitioner and other persons responsible for it and a departmental enquiry recommended in that regard was conducted and as observed by the Vigilance Department, in the departmental enquiry, it was found that the amount due from the 7th respondent has to be realised from the petitioner and other delinquent officials. On the basis of the reports, Ext.P37 Order was passed by the 4th respondent informing the 6th respondent to realise Rs.22,72,738/-from the salary of the petitioner and remit the same to the account of the 5th respondent. From Exts.P2 to P22 documents, it is very much clear that the 7th respondent had run the Coffee Shop and therefore, the action initiated against the petitioner for the realisation of the amount, on the ground that revenue recovery proceedings could not be initiated against her, in the absence of a formal agreement executed by her is unsustainable in law and on facts. Moreover, as per Ext.P38, it was decided by the Govt. that in matters connected with Hospital Development Committee, the Superintendent could not be individually held responsible for any irregularity, unless misrepresentation of facts is established against him. Here, in the case on hand, admittedly, mis-representation of any facts is not at all established against the petitioner in any way. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as such, Exts.P28 to P32 and P35 and P37 including the enquiry report, to the extent the same are against the petitioner, are unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

3. The legal question posed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since Ext.P37 order was issued by the 4th respondent informing the 6th respondent to realise Rs.22,72,738/-, ie,19 months' rent along with accrued interest thereof from the petitioner and remit the same to the 5th respondent on the premise that a rental agreement in between the 7th respondent and the petitioner was failed to be executed and, in turn, the amount could not be realised from the 7th respondent, who had used the premises for the purpose of running coffee shop, would not sustain in the eye of law as there was a concluded contract in between the 7th respondent and the Superintendent. Thus in this case characteristics of a concluded contract to be found from the documents produced by the petitioner. According to him, as per Ext.P4 order, the right to run the coffee shop was given to the 2nd respondent for a monthly rent of Rs.1,99,363/- and the 7th respondent remitted the security deposit of Rs.5,98,089/- as per Ext.P8 to the Secretary to the 5th respondent Society. Further Ext.P6 bank account would show that one month's rent was paid by the 7th respondent. He also pointed out that when rent was in arrears during the COVID period, she had repeatedly requested for time for making the payment, as could be seen from Ex.P16 series. Thereafter, Ext.P17 notice was issued to the 7th respondent by the petitioner and for which she had given Ext.P18 reply raising some excuses for non payment of rent. Again Ext.P19 notice was issued by the petitioner to the 7th respondent stating that in the event of failure to clear the arrears of rent, the arrangement would be terminated and legal action would be initiated. It was thereafter the function of the coffee shop was stopped on 06.12.2019, as discernible from Ext.P20. Thereafter Ext.P24 demand notice was issued for the arrears of rent from the 7th respondent and again Ext.P26 notice was issued for the same intimating initiation of further proceedings. It was thereafter Ext.P27 complaint was filed by one Mr.A.Nazeer before the District Collector, Alappuzha, and Vigilance conducted enquiry and Ext.P37 order was passed against him. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Exts.P20 to P22 documents would categorically show that, despite the failure to execute the rental agreement as per Ext.P1, the 7th respondent took possession of the shop for running a coffee shop and defaulted in the payment of rent, except for the advance equivalent to one month's rent. Therefore, it is well established that a mere absence of a formal contract does not prevent the formation of a binding bargain between the parties and the fact that the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement by which the terms agreed upon are to be embodied does not, by itself, prevent the existence of a binding contract.

4. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court reported in [1968 KHC 425], Kollipara sriramulu(dead) by his LRs. v T. Aswatha Narayana(dead) by his LR and others, with reference to paragraph 3 where the Apex Court held as under:

                  “3. We proceed to consider the next question raised in these appeals, namely whether the oral agreement was ineffective because the parties contemplated the execution of a formal document or because the mode of payment of the purchase money was not actually agreed upon. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was no contract because the sale was conditional upon a regular agreement being executed and so such agreement was executed. We do not accept this argument as correct. It is well-established that a mere reference to a future formal contract will not prevent a binding bargain between the parties. The fact that the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement by which the terms agreed upon are to be put in a more formal shape does not prevent the existence of a binding contract. There are, however, cases where the reference to a future contract is made in such terms as to show that the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal contract is signed. The question depends upon the intention of the parties and the special circumstances of each particular case. As observed by the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth) in Ridgway v. Wharton 6 H.L.C. 238 the fact of a subsequent agreement being prepared may be evidence that the previous negotiations did not amount to a concluded agreement, but the mere fact that persons wish to have a formal agreement drawn up does not establish the proposition that they cannot be bound by a previous agreement In Von Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander [1921] 1 Ch. 284 it was stated by Parker, J. as follows :

                  "It appears to be well settled by the authorities that if the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract contemplate the execution of a further contract between the parties, it is a question of construction whether the execution of the further contract is a condition or term of the bargain or whether it is a mere expression of the desire of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction already agreed to will in fact go through. In the former case there is no enforceable contract either because the condition is unfulfilled or because the law does not recognize a contract to enter into a contract. In the latter case there is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal document may be ignored." In other words, there may be a case where the signing of a further formal agreement is made a condition or term of the bargain, and if the formal agreement is not approved and signed there is no concluded contract. In Rassier v. Miller 3 A.C. 1124 Lord Cairns said :

                  "If you find not an unqualified acceptance subject to the condition that an agreement is to be prepared and agreed upon between the parties, and until that condition is fulfilled no contract is to arise then you cannot find a concluded contract."

                  In Currimbhoy and Company Ltd. v. Creet 60 I.A. 297 the Judicial Committee expressed the view that the principle of the English law which is summarised in the judgment of Parker, J. in Van Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg v. Alexander [1912] 1 Ch. 284 was be applicable in India. The question in the present appeals is whether the execution if a formal agreement was intended to be a condition of the bargain dated July 6, 1952 or whether it was a mere expression of the desire of the parties for a formal agreement which can be ignored. The evidence adduced on behalf of respondent No. 1 does not show that the drawing up of a written agreement was a pre-requisite to the coming into effect of the oral agreement. It is therefore not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that the oral agreement was ineffective in law because there is no execution of any formal written document. As regards the other point, it is true that there is no specific agreement with regard to the mode of payment but this does not necessarily make the agreement ineffective. The mere omission to settle the mode of payment does not affect the completeness of the contract because the vital terms of the contract like the price and area of the land and time for completion of the sale were all fixed. We accordingly hold that Mr. Gokhale is unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case.”

5. Similarly reliance has been placed on another decision of the Apex Court reported in [1999 (1) SCC 1], Rickmers Verwaltung GMBH v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., and in paragraph 13 the Apex Court held as under:

                  “13. In this connection the cardinal principle to remember is that it is the duty of the court to construe correspondence with a view to arrive at a conclusion whether there was any meeting of mind between the parties, which could create a binding contract between them but the court is not empowered to create a contract for the parties by going outside the clear language used in the correspondence, except insofar as there are some appropriate implications of law to be drawn. Unless from the correspondence, it can unequivocally and clearly emerge that the parties were ad idem to the terms, it cannot be said that an agreement had come into existence between them through correspondence. The court is required to review what the parties wrote and how they acted and from that material to infer whether the intention as expressed in the correspondence was to bring into existence a mutually binding contract. The intention of the parties is to be gathered only from the expressions used in the correspondence and the meaning it conveys and in case it shows that there had been meeting of mind between the parties and they had actually reached an agreement upon all material terms, then and then alone can it be said that a binding contract was capable of being spelt out from the correspondence.”

6. Whereas the learned counsel for the 7th respondent categorically submitted that, except Ext.P2 application put up by the 7th respondent seeking allotment of the building for running a coffee shop, the 7th respondent emphatically denies all the other documents relied upon by the petitioner. It is further submitted that, by Ext. P25 communication dated 14.06.2021, the 7th respondent specifically intimated that she had neither taken possession of the building nor run a coffee shop therein. Since all the other documents are specifically disputed by the 7th respondent, this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot rely on the documents which are specifically denied by the 7th respondent, and are to be proved before a civil court on adducing evidence.

7. The learned Government Pleader justified the impugned order and according to him, in deviation from the Memorandum of Association of the hospital management Society, the petitioner, who held the post of Secretary cum Treasurer of the Society, failed to do his administrative responsibilities causing loss to the tune of Rs.22,72,738/-towards rent to the State exchequer. Since no agreement was executed in between the petitioner and the 7th respondent, the loss to be compensated from the petitioner in terms of Ext. P37, based on the vigilance enquiry and subsequent internal enquiry report. Therefore, it is submitted that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.

8. As regards the legal question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the decisions of the Apex Court in Kollipara Sriramulu (Dead) by LRs. v. T. Aswatha Narayana (Dead) by LRs. and Others (supra) and Rickmers Verwaltung GMBH v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are having force. It is well established that a mere reference to a future formal contract will not prevent a binding bargain between the parties. The fact that the parties refer to the preparation of an agreement by which the terms agreed upon are to be put in a more formal shape does not prevent the existence of a binding contract. There are, however, cases where the reference to a future contract is made in such terms as to show that the parties did not intend to be bound until a formal contract is signed. The question depends upon the intention of the parties and the special circumstances of each particular case. In this connection the cardinal principle to remember is that it is the duty of the court to construe correspondence with a view to arrive at a conclusion whether there was any meeting of mind between the parties, which could create a binding contract between them but the court is not empowered to create a contract for the parties by going outside the clear language used in the correspondence, except insofar as there are some appropriate implications of law to be drawn. Unless from the correspondence, it can unequivocally and clearly emerge that the parties were ad idem to the terms, it cannot be said that an agreement had come into existence between them through correspondence. The court is required to review what the parties wrote and how they acted and from that material to infer whether the intention as expressed in the correspondence was to bring into existence a mutually binding contract. The intention of the parties is to be gathered only from the expressions used in the correspondence and the meaning it conveys and in case it shows that there had been meeting of mind between the parties and they had actually reached an agreement upon all material terms, then and then alone can it be said that a binding contract was capable of being spelt out from the correspondence.

9. The next crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the contentions raised by the petitioner can be adjudicated by this Court on the basis of Exts.P2 to P23 and Exts. P26 to P36. As already noticed, the 7th respondent has categorically denied the execution and genuineness of all the said documents except Exts.P2 and P25. Here, the very foundation of the petitioner's claim rests upon Exts.P1, P3 to P36 documents, but its execution and authenticity are seriously disputed by the 7th respondent.

10. It is well settled that when the adjudication of a writ petition involves seriously disputed questions on facts, particularly with regard to the execution or genuineness of documents, such disputes cannot ordinarily be resolved in Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Those questions and issues would require appreciation of evidence and can be effectively adjudicated only by a competent civil court. Therefore, the remedy of the petitioner is to institute an appropriate civil proceedings and establish his claim in accordance with law.

11. In view of the above, this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to approach the competent civil court, for appropriate reliefs, in accordance with law.

In order to facilitate filing of the Suit, further steps on the basis of Ext.P37 stand deferred for a period of one month from today.