1. The Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by the Petitioner/Accused No.4 for granting of pre-arrest bail in connection with Crime No.18 of 2022 on the file of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, Mangalagiri District, registered for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 420, 403, 409 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.

3. Sri Bilaal Ahmed Syed, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner has been falsely implicated merely on account of his empanelment as a panel valuer with the State Bank of India, the only allegation against him being the submission of valuation reports dated 08.07.2019 and 27.08.2019. Except for this solitary act, there is no material to suggest his involvement in sanction, disbursement, diversion or utilization of loan proceeds, which allegations are directed exclusively against the borrower and bank officials. The FIR is bereft of foundational facts, and the imputation that one property was treated as two or that photographs were incorrect is a bald assertion incapable of constituting offences under Sections 420, 409 or 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ absent dishonest intention or entrustment of property. The Petitioner, a senior citizen aged 61 years under medical supervision for cataract surgery, has deep roots in society, unblemished antecedents, and undertakes to cooperate fully with the investigation. Hence, it is urged that this Court may be pleased to enlarge the Petitioner on anticipatory bail in the event of arrest.

4. Per contra, Mr. K.Sandeep, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed anticipatory bail, contending that without approaching the learned Sessions Judge of first instance, the Petitioner filed Criminal Petition directly before this Court, such procedure is contrary to the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. Rasal C. v. State of Kerala (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2728) and it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Petition.

5. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the entire records.

6. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsels for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, now the point for consideration is:

               “Whether the Petitioner/Accused No.4 is entitled for grant of pre-arrest bail?”

7. The de-facto complainant alleged that the Petitioner has committed offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., ((2024) 10 SCC 690) at paragraph Nos.44 & 49 held as under:

               “44. At the most, the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420IPC i.e. cheating but in any circumstances no case of criminal breach of trust is made out. The reason being that indisputably there is no entrustment of any property in the case at hand. It is not even the case of the complainant that any property was lawfully entrusted to the appellants and that the same has been dishonestly misappropriated. The case of the complainant is plain and simple. He says that the price of the goods sold by him has not been paid. Once there is a sale, Section 406IPC goes out of picture. According to the complainant, the invoices raised by him were not cleared. No case worth the name of cheating is also made out.

               49. From the aforesaid, there is no manner of any doubt whatsoever that in case of sale of goods, the property passes to the purchaser from the seller when the goods are delivered. Once the property in the goods passes to the purchaser, it cannot be said that the purchaser was entrusted with the property of the seller. Without entrustment of property, there cannot be any criminal breach of trust. Thus, prosecution of cases on charge of criminal breach of trust, for failure to pay the consideration amount in case of sale of goods is flawed to the core. There can be civil remedy for the non-payment of the consideration amount, but no criminal case will be maintainable for it. [See : Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P. [Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., (2024) 12 SCC 483 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171] and Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand [Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, 2023 SCC OnLineJhar 301”

8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arshad Neyaz Khan v. State of Jharkhand (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2058), at paragraph No.21 held as under:

               “21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No. 2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.”

9. Section 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deals with criminal breach of trust, which presupposes lawful entrustment of property followed by dishonest misappropriation or conversion. In contrast, Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ addresses cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, which requires deception at the inception of the transaction. Thus, while Section 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ arises from a breach of an existing fiduciary relationship, Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is predicated upon fraudulent inducement at the very outset. The two offences, therefore, operate in distinct spheres.

10. As seen from the record, Petitioner was arraigned as Accused No.4 and had not approached the learned Sessions Judge concerned at the first instance for grant of pre-arrest bail. Filing of anticipatory bail without approaching the learned Sessions Judge concerned is contrary to the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohammed Rasal.C supra wherein at paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 it was held as follows:

               “7. The Sessions Judge exercises powers under Section 438 Cr.P.C in relation to all cases registered with the police stations in the particular District. This area-wise distribution of work would make it much more convenient and facilitate expeditious disposal, if the application for pre-arrest bail is first filed before the Sessions Court which would have a direct and first-hand assistance of the concerned Public Prosecutor appointed for that particular District. The Sessions Court would also have an immediate access to the Case Diary thereby facilitating a better appreciation of facts of the case.

               8. We further feel that if the practice of entertaining the applications for pre-arrest bail directly in the High Court is encouraged, and the parties concerned are not relegated to first approach the Sessions Court concerned, the High Court would be flooded with a spate of pre-arrest bail applications thereby creating a chaotic situation. We say so, because if the parties are required to approach the Sessions Court concerned for seeking remedy of prearrest bail, there is a strong probability that significant number of applications would be allowed at that level only thereby acting as a filtration process before the process reaches the High Court.

               9. It is trite that in most of the States, there is a consistent practice requiring the litigant concerned to first approach the Sessions Court for seeking relief of pre-arrest bail and only in the event of denial of such relief, the litigant would be granted access to approach the High Court for seeking such relief. This is, of course, subject to just exceptions and the High Court, for reasons to be recorded, may entertain an application for pre-arrest bail directly in special/ extraordinary circumstances.”

11. In Jagdeo Prasad v. State of Bihar (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2108), the Hon'ble Apex Court held at para No. 6 as under:

               “6. However, before parting, we do wish to express our sincere concern with the haste at which the High Court has dealt with this matter. While the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) provides concurrent jurisdiction to the High Court and Sessions Court for entertaining applications for anticipatory bail, this Court has time and again observed that High Court should always encourage exhausting an alternative/concurrent remedy before directly interfering itself. This approach balances the interests of all the stakeholders, first by giving the aggrieved party a round of challenge before the High Court. Second, this approach provides the High Court an opportunity to assess the judicial perspective so applied by the Sessions Court, in concurrent jurisdiction, instead of independently applying its mind from the first go. Further, the High Court fails to record any reason for directly granting anticipatory bail without impleading the appellant-complainant as a party.”

12. Albeit, this Court has got concurrent jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the BNSS’, such discretionary relief would only be granted, when the Petitioner establish a special or extra ordinary circumstance. As seen from the averments, the Petitioner neither established a special circumstances nor extra-ordinary circumstance.

13. As seen from the record, the alleged offences levelled against the Petitioner/Accused is punishable with imprisonment for less than seven (07) years.

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Practical Solutions Inc. v. State of Telangana (2026 SCC Online SC 923) has held as follows:

               “We also take notice of the fact that the petition before the High Court was to quash the FIR. In a petition where quashing of the FIR is prayed for, the High Court should not have passed an order directing the Investigating Officer to comply with Section 41-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because it indirectly amounts to granting a relief which the High Court could have considered only if a prima facie case for quashing of the FIR is made out.”

15. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5191 of 2021, dated 15.01.2026), wherein at paragraph No.33, it is held as under:

               “33. On the basis of the interpretation given by us, we conclude as follows:

               a. An arrest by a police officer is a mere statutory discretion which facilitates him to conduct proper investigation, in the form of collection of evidence and, therefore, shall not be termed as mandatory.

               b. Consequently, the police officer shall ask himself the question as to whether an arrest is a necessity or not, before undertaking the said exercise.

               c. For effecting an arrest, qua an offence punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, the mandate of Section 35(1)(b)(i) of the BNSS, 2023 along with any one of the conditions mentioned in Section 35(1)(b)(ii) of the BNSS, 2023 must be in existence.

               d. A notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 to an accused or any individual concerned, qua offences punishable with imprisonment up to 7 years, is the rule.

               e. Even if the circumstances warranting an arrest of a person are available in terms of the conditions mentioned under Section 35(1)(b) of the BNSS, 2023, the arrest shall not be undertaken, unless it absolutely warranted.

               f. Power of arrest under Section 35(6) read with Section 35(1)(b) of the BNSS, 2023, pursuant to a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, 2023 is not a matter of routine, but an exception, and the police officer is expected to be circumspect and slow in exercising the said power.”

16. Furthermore, in this regard, it is apposite to mention the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar ((2014) 8 SCC 273), wherein a detailed guidelines were issued at Para Nos.11 and 12, for arresting a person, which are being reproduced herein below:-

               “11. Our endeavor in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following direction:

               a).All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.’);

               b) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub- clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

               c) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

               d) The Magistrate while authorizing detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

               e) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

               f) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A of Cr.P.C be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

               g) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, he shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

               h) Authorizing detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

               12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.”

17. The similar view is also reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Md.Asfak Alam supra, which also reiterated the guidelines laid down in the case of Arnesh Kumar.

18. In the light of the law laid down in the case of Satender Kumar Antil, Arnesh Kumar and Md. Asfak Alam, the investigating officer is under legal obligation to proceed in accordance with law, but he shall follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 41 and 41(A) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ (now Sections 35 and 35(3) of ‘the B.N.S.S.,’ 2023). The Petitioner is obliged to render his fullest cooperation in the ongoing investigation.

19. In the result, the Criminal Petition is disposed of directing the Investigating Officer to comply with Section 35(3) of ‘the BNSS’/41-A of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and to strictly follow the directions issued in the cases of Satender Kumar Antil, Arnesh Kumar and MD. Asfak Alam. If it is noticed in the course of investigation that the Petitioner has committed any offence which is punishable with imprisonment beyond seven years, the investigating officer is at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.

As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.