1. The Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner with the following prayer:
“issue an order direction or Writ more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ of Certiorary or any other appropriate Writ after calling for the records in I.D.No.128 of 2004 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal-II, Hyderabad and quash the Award in I.D.No.128 of 2004 dated 28.2.2005 and consequently, direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of service with full back wages and all other attendant benefits and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice”.
02. Heard Ms. K.Soujanya, learned counsel appearing for Ms.K.Udaya Sri, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Ms. N.S.V.Janaki, learned counsel representing Mr. R.Anurag, learned Standing Counsel for Telangana State Road Transport Corporation, appearing for respondent No.2 and perused the record.
03. The petitioner joined the Corporation as a Conductor on 01.04.1997, and his services were subsequently regularized. While so, he was allotted Bus No. AP 9 Z 7990 on 22.08.1999 for operation on the Jeevangi–Tandur route. During the course of duty, a check was conducted between stages 6 and 5, wherein certain cash and ticket irregularities were allegedly noticed. Based on the said allegations, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner. Thereafter, a departmental inquiry was conducted, and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 03.11.1999 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. Based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the 2nd respondent issued proceedings dated 23.12.1999 disengaging the services of the petitioner with effect from 23.12.1999. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal, which was rejected on 18.03.2000. Thereafter, he filed a review petition on 11.04.2000, which was also rejected on 29.09.2000. Challenging the said review order, the petitioner approached the Labour Court by raising an industrial dispute; however, the Labour Court dismissed the I.D. without granting any relief. Aggrieved by the said award, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
04(a). Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Labour Court failed to appreciate the petitioner's specific case that, at Stage No. 5, two lady passengers boarded the bus and, despite repeated requests, did not immediately tender the fare, each pointing to the other. It was only after considerable persuasion that they paid the fare. In the meanwhile, the bus proceeded further and, while the petitioner was in the process of issuing tickets, the checking officials boarded the bus and booked a case against him alleging that tickets had not been issued.
04(b). Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner had explained to the checking officials that, after collecting the fare from the passengers, he had already taken out the tickets from the tray and was in the process of issuing them. It is contended that the Labour Court failed to consider that no penalty was imposed upon the two lady passengers and no top-punched tickets were issued to them by the checking officials. This, according to the learned counsel, clearly establishes that the fare had already been collected and that the tickets were being issued at the relevant point of time.
04(c). It is further contended that the charge alleging that the petitioner had neither collected the fare nor issued tickets to the two lady passengers is false and unsupported by the evidence on record. The learned counsel submits that the delay in issuing the tickets occurred solely due to the passengers' failure to tender the fare promptly. The learned counsel also contended that both the Disciplinary Authority and the Labour Court failed to appreciate that the checking officials did not verify the bus cash with the petitioner. Had the bus cash been checked, it would have revealed that the fare amount had already been collected from the passengers. This material aspect, according to the learned counsel, was not taken into consideration while passing the impugned award.
04(d). It is further contended that the Labour Court failed to note that the two lady passengers were not examined during the departmental inquiry and, in the absence of their evidence, the charges could not have been held proved. Learned counsel further submitted that, although two TTIs had conducted the check, only one TTI, namely Sri M. Singh, was examined during the inquiry. The other TTI, Sri K.B. Reddy, who had allegedly conducted the check and prepared the charge memo, was not examined. Consequently, the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine the official who had actually conducted the check. It is further contended that the punishment of disengagement from service is not a recognized penalty. It is therefore contended that the inquiry was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel prayed that this Court allow the writ petition by setting aside the award passed by the Labour Court.
04(e). In support of her contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector Singh v. L.M.L. Limited, Kanpur((2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 410) wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.10 and 14 that:
“10. Insofar as the next limb of contention at the hands of the learned counsel for the respondent as to the quantum of punishment is concerned, it is not necessary for us to refer to the plethora of judgments relied upon by the respondent. In those decisions, the termination of services was held to be justified on the basis of abusive and filthy language in the light of the facts and circumstances of those cases. It is well settled that the court or the tribunal will not normally interfere with the discretion of the disciplinary authority in imposing of penalty and substitute its own conclusion or penalty. But the punishment should be commensurate with the proved misconduct. However, if the penalty imposed is disproportionate with the misconduct committed and proved, then the Court would appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation, it may in exceptional cases even impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. This principle was reiterated in various decisions of this Court in Dev Singh v. Punjab Tourism Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2003) 8 SCC 9 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1198] , Om Kumar v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 : AIR 1997 SC 3387] and Sardar Singh v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 213 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 503 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 975 : (1992) 19 ATC 325].
14. Having said that the punishment of dismissal from service is harsh and disproportionate, this Court in ordinary course would either order reinstatement modifying the punishment or remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority for passing fresh order of punishment. But we are deliberately avoiding the ordinary course. We are doing so because nearly two decades have passed since his termination and over these years the appellant must have been gainfully employed elsewhere. Further, the appellant was born in the year 1955 and has almost reached the age of superannuation. In such circumstances, there cannot be any order of reinstatement and award of lump sum compensation would meet the ends of justice. Considering the length of service of the appellant in the establishment and his deprivation of the job over the years and his gainful employment over the years elsewhere, in our view, lump sum amount of compensation of Rs 5,00,000 would meet the ends of justice in lieu of reinstatement, back wages, gratuity and in full quit of any other amount payable to the appellant.”
04(f). Further, she relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Managobinda Samantaray(2022 SCC OnLine SC 284) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.9 that:
“9. Impugned judgment by the Division Bench is difficult to sustain as it equates appellate power under Rule 52 of the CISF Rules, 2001, with power of judicial review exercised by constitutional courts. Rule 52 of the CISF Rules, 2001 empowers the appellate authority to examine whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate and pass consequential order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty. In the present case, the procedure requiring issue of show-cause notice and compliance with the principles of natural justice is made. Quantum of punishment is within the discretionary domain and the sole power of the decision-making authority once the charge of misconduct stands proved. Such discretionary power is exposed to judicial interference if exercised in a manner which is grossly disproportionate to the fault, as the constitutional courts while exercising the power of judicial review do not assume the role of the appellate authority. Writ jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural error leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. The decision are also disturbed when it is found to be ailing with perversity. On the question of quantum of punishment, the court exercising the power of judicial review can examine whether the authority has been a reasonable employer and has taken into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and excluded irrelevant matters. In the context of quantum of punishment these aspects are examined to consider whether there is any error in decision making process. On merits of the quantum of punishment imposed, the courts would not interfere unless the exercise of discretion in awarding punishment is perverse in the sense the punishment imposed is grossly disproportionate.”
04(g). Further, she relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others((2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 242) wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.11 to 15 and 23 that:
“11. Admittedly, the punishment imposed upon the appellant is not provided for under Rule 4 of the 1991 Rules. Integrity of a person can be withheld for sufficient reasons at the time of filling up the annual confidential report. However, if the statutory rules so prescribe, it can also be withheld as a punishment. The order passed by the disciplinary authority withholding the integrity certificate as a punishment for delinquency is without jurisdiction, not being provided under the 1991 Rules, since the same could not be termed as punishment under the Rules. The Rules do not empower the disciplinary authority to impose “any other” major or minor punishment. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment not prescribed under the Rules as a result of disciplinary proceedings cannot be awarded.
12. This Court in State of U.P. v. Madhav Prasad Sharma [(2011) 2 SCC 212 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 300] dealt with the aforesaid 1991 Rules and after quoting Rule 4 thereof held as under : (SCC p. 216, para 16)
“16. We are not concerned about other rule. The perusal of major and minor penalties prescribed in the above Rule makes it clear that ‘sanctioning leave without pay’ is not one of the punishments prescribed, though, and under what circumstances leave has been sanctioned without pay is a different aspect with which we are not concerned for the present. However, Rule 4 makes it clear that sanction of leave without pay is not one of the punishments prescribed. Disciplinary authority is competent to impose appropriate penalty from those provided in Rule 4 of the Rules which deals with the major penalties and minor penalties. Denial of salary on the ground of ‘no work no pay’ cannot be treated as a penalty in view of statutory provisions contained in Rule 4 defining the penalties in clear terms.”
13. The authority has to act or purport to act in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the statute or statutory rules. (See Poona City Municipal Corpn. v. Dattatraya Nagesh Deodhar [AIR 1965 SC 555] ; Municipal Corpn., Indore v. Niyamatullah [(1969) 2 SCC 551 : AIR 1971 SC 97] ; J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi [(1996) 9 SCC 495 : AIR 1996 SC 2520] and Borosil Glass Works Ltd. Employees' Union v. D.D. Bambode [(2001) 1 SCC 350 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 997 : AIR 2001 SC 378] .)
14. The issue involved herein is required to be examined from another angle also. Holding departmental proceedings and recording a finding of guilt against any delinquent and imposing the punishment for the same is a quasi-judicial function and not administrative one. (Vide Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 395] , Union of India v. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364] , Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. [(2010) 10 SCC 539 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 180] and Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha [(2011) 5 SCC 142 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 750] .)
15. Imposing the punishment for a proved delinquency is regulated and controlled by the statutory rules. Therefore, while performing the quasi-judicial functions, the authority is not permitted to ignore the statutory rules under which punishment is to be imposed. The disciplinary authority is bound to give strict adherence to the said rules. Thus, the order of punishment being outside the purview of the statutory rules is a nullity and cannot be enforced against the appellant.
23. Thus, in view of the above, the punishment order is not maintainable in the eye of the law. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 8-7-2010 withholding the integrity certificate for the year 2010 and all subsequent orders in this regard are quashed. The respondents are directed to consider the case of the appellant for all consequential benefits including promotion, etc. if any, afresh taking into consideration the service record of the appellant in accordance with law.”
05(a). Learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-RTC submitted that the petitioner declined to cross-examine the checking official and also declined the opportunity to examine and cross-examine the second checking official. It is further contended that the petitioner did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence in his defence during the departmental enquiry and merely submitted his statement. The respondents further contend that, before the 1st respondent, the petitioner filed a memo stating that he was not disputing the validity of the domestic enquiry. The petitioner did not raise the plea before the learned Labour Court that disengagement from service is not a recognized penalty and failed to urge such a contention before the Labour Court, the petitioner is not entitled to raise the said ground for the first time before this Court. It is submitted that the 1st respondent, upon reappraisal of the entire material available on record, arrived at a conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner stood proved and that the punishment of disengagement from service was legal and justified. It is further contended that the impugned award passed by the 1st respondent is valid, legal and does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the respondents, the writ petition is devoid of merits and is therefore liable to be dismissed.
05(b). In support of her contentions, she relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran((2015) 2 Supreme Court Cases 610) wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.12, 13 and 16 that:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
16. These principles have been succinctly summed up by the living legend and centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298] . To quote the unparalleled and inimitable expressions : (SCC p. 493, para 4)
“4. … in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor textbooks, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.”
05(c). Further, she relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Vinod Kumar((2008) 1 Supreme Court Cases 115) wherein it was held at Paragraph No.10 that:
“10. As stated in the preceding paragraphs, the respondent had confined his case only to the conclusions reached by the enquiry officer as well as the quantum of punishment. Therefore, since the respondent had not challenged the correctness, legality or validity of the inquiry conducted, it was not open to the Labour Court to go into the findings recorded by the enquiry officer regarding the misconduct committed by the respondent. This Court in a number of judgments has held that the punishment of removal/dismissal is the appropriate punishment for an employee found guilty of misappropriation of funds; and the courts should be reluctant to reduce the punishment on misplaced sympathy for a workman. That, there is nothing wrong in the employer losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. That, in such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering with the quantum of punishment. Without burdening the judgment with all the judgments of this Court on this point, we may only refer to a recent judgment in Divisional Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. v. H. Amaresh [(2006) 6 SCC 187 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1290] wherein this Court, after taking into account the earlier decisions, held in para 18 as under: (SCC p. 193)
“18. In the instant case, the misappropriation of the funds by the delinquent employee was only Rs 360.95. This Court has considered the punishment that may be awarded to the delinquent employees who misappropriated the funds of the Corporation and the factors to be considered. This Court in a catena of judgments held that the loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated and that the sympathy or generosity cannot be a factor which is impermissible in law. When an employee is found guilty of pilferage or of misappropriating the Corporation's funds, there is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or misplaced sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefore with the quantum of punishment. The judgment in Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti [(2001) 2 SCC 574 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 469] was also relied on in this judgment among others. Examination of the passengers of the vehicle from whom the said sum was collected was also not essential. In our view, possession of the said excess sum of money on the part of the respondent, a fact proved, is itself a misconduct and hence the Labour Court and the learned Judges of the High Court misdirected themselves in insisting on the evidence of the passengers which is wholly not essential. This apart, the respondent did not have any explanation for having carried the said excess amount. This omission was sufficient to hold him guilty. This act was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a conductor because such action or inaction of his was bound to result in financial loss to the appellant irrespective of the quantum.”
06. Having heard the learned counsel for the either side and upon perusal of the material available on record, the undisputed facts disclose that the petitioner was working as a Conductor in the respondent-Corporation and was subjected to a surprise check on 22.08.1999 while operating Bus No.AP 9 Z 7990 on the Jeevangi–Tandur route. During the check conducted between Stages 6 and 5, it was found that two passengers were travelling without tickets though, according to the checking officials, the requisite fare had already been collected from them. Based on the said irregularity, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner. A domestic enquiry was conducted in which the charges were held proved. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of disengagement from service, which was confirmed in appeal and review. The Industrial Tribunal, upon an independent consideration of the material placed before it, upheld the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings and dismissed the industrial dispute.
07. At the outset, it is required to be noted that before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner had filed a memo expressly stating that he was not disputing the validity of the domestic enquiry. Once the legality and fairness of the enquiry were accepted, the scope of challenge before the Tribunal as well as before this Court stood considerably narrowed. The learned Tribunal, upon reappraisal of the evidence available on record, recorded a categorical finding that the misconduct alleged against the petitioner stood established. Such findings of fact ordinarily do not warrant interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless they are shown to be perverse or based on no evidence.
08. The principal defence of the petitioner is that two lady passengers who boarded the bus had delayed payment of fare and that, immediately after collecting the fare, he had taken out the tickets and was in the process of issuing them when the checking officials entered the bus. This explanation does not inspire confidence. The record reveals that at the time of inspection there were only sixteen passengers travelling in the bus. In a bus carrying such a limited number of passengers, the petitioner, being the conductor, cannot reasonably contend that he was unable to issue tickets to two passengers after collecting fare from them. No satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why tickets had not been issued despite the alleged collection of fare. The explanation put forth is vague and unsupported by any independent material.
09. The contention that the checking officials did not verify the bus cash also does not advance the case of the petitioner. The charge against the petitioner was not merely with respect to possession of excess cash but with regard to failure to issue tickets to passengers travelling in the bus. The checking officials found two passengers without tickets and the petitioner failed to satisfactorily explain the omission. Merely because the bus cash was not verified, it cannot be presumed that the charge stood disproved. The finding of guilt recorded by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the Tribunal is based on evidence available on record and cannot be characterized as perverse.
10. It is the contention of the petitioner that the non-examination of the two passengers during the departmental enquiry vitiated the entire proceedings. It is well settled that the strict rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials are not attracted to domestic enquiries. A perusal of the record discloses that the said two passengers were examined by the checking officials at the time of inspection and their statements were recorded. Since the passengers were illiterate, the statements were admittedly written by the petitioner himself. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no material available before the disciplinary authority regarding the version of the passengers.
11. Further, even assuming that the respondent-Corporation did not rely upon or mark the said statements during the enquiry, nothing prevented the petitioner from producing the very same statements as defence evidence if they were genuinely supportive of his case. The petitioner, however, chose not to rely upon them nor did he adduce any independent evidence to substantiate his defence. Having failed to avail the opportunity available to him during the enquiry, the petitioner cannot now contend that prejudice was caused on account of non-examination of the passengers.
12. Moreover, the evidence of the checking officials who conducted the inspection constitutes relevant and admissible material upon which the disciplinary authority could legitimately place reliance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rattan Singh’s case and subsequently in Vinod Kumar’s case, cited supra, has categorically held that examination of passengers is not indispensable in every case involving ticket irregularities and that the findings can validly be sustained on the basis of the testimony of the checking officials. Therefore, the absence of examination of the passengers during the enquiry does not render the disciplinary proceedings illegal nor does it vitiate the findings recorded against the petitioner.
13. The record discloses that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the checking officials and also to adduce evidence in defence. The respondents have specifically stated that the petitioner declined to avail such opportunity. Apart from filing his statement, the petitioner did not choose to examine any witness or produce any documentary evidence in support of his defence. Having failed to avail the opportunities afforded during the enquiry, the petitioner cannot now be permitted to contend that the enquiry stood vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice.
14. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is no longer res integra. In P. Gunasekaran’s case cited supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, cannot act as an appellate authority and re-appreciate evidence recorded in disciplinary proceedings. Interference is warranted only when the enquiry suffers from procedural illegality, violation of principles of natural justice, perversity or findings based on no evidence. None of these contingencies are attracted in the present case. The findings recorded by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the learned Tribunal are supported by evidence and do not warrant reappreciation by this Court.
15. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Collector Singh’s case cited supra, is misplaced. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court interfered on the ground that the punishment imposed was disproportionate to the misconduct established in the peculiar facts of that case. The said judgment does not lay down any proposition that punishment must invariably be interfered with in every disciplinary matter. On the contrary, the Court reiterated that interference with punishment is warranted only in exceptional circumstances where the penalty is shockingly disproportionate. In the present case, the petitioner was working as a Conductor, a post involving a high degree of trust and financial responsibility. Ticket irregularities and failure to account for passenger fare strike at the very root of the confidence reposed by the Corporation in its employees. Therefore, the punishment imposed cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate.
16. The reliance placed on Managobinda Samantaray’s case cited supra, is also of no assistance to the petitioner. The said judgment reiterates that constitutional courts can interfere only when the punishment is grossly disproportionate or where the decision-making process is vitiated by perversity or procedural illegality. As already noticed, neither perversity nor procedural infirmity has been established in the present case. The punishment imposed is commensurate with the misconduct proved and does not warrant interference.
17. This Court is unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that the punishment of disengagement from service is not a recognized penalty. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that no such plea was raised before the learned Labour Court. Having failed to urge the said contention before the Labour Court, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the same for the first time in the present writ proceedings. Even otherwise, the contention is devoid of merit. The expression "disengagement" is a recognized mode by which the employer brings the relationship of employment to an end in accordance with the applicable service conditions governing the petitioner. Merely because the order employs the expression "disengagement" instead of "dismissal" or "removal" does not render it unknown to service jurisprudence. The nomenclature assigned to the order is of little consequence; what is material is its substance and the source of power under which it has been passed. If the applicable service rules or conditions of service authorize the employer to disengage an employee on proof of misconduct, such disengagement constitutes a recognized form of penalty. Therefore, the petitioner's contention that disengagement from service is not a recognized penalty cannot be accepted.
18. Similarly, the decision in Vijay Singh’s case cited supra, has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, the punishment imposed was one not prescribed under the relevant statutory rules and was therefore held to be without jurisdiction. In the present case, the punishment of disengagement/removal from service is a recognized penalty under the applicable service regulations governing the employees of the Corporation. Therefore, the ratio laid down therein has no relevance to the controversy involved in the present writ petition.
19. On perusal of the Award passed by the learned Tribunal, it has also taken note of the petitioner's past service record. The award reflects that the petitioner's service record was not unblemished and that his regularization had been postponed on three occasions even prior to the present misconduct. Thus, the misconduct in question cannot be viewed as an isolated lapse committed by an otherwise exemplary employee. The previous adverse record constituted a relevant factor for the disciplinary authority while determining the appropriate punishment. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the petitioner approached the Industrial Tribunal after a delay of nearly two years from the date of rejection of his review petition. Even thereafter, the petitioner remained inactive and approached this Court only after more than one year from the date of the award passed by the learned Tribunal. Though this Court has examined the matter on merits, such unexplained delay and laches on the part of the petitioner constitute an additional factor disentitling him to any discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
20. Having regard to the nature of duties attached to the post of Conductor, the proved misconduct, the unsatisfactory explanation offered by the petitioner, the previous adverse service record, and the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters, this Court finds no perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
21. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
