1. Since a common issue is involved in these writ petitions, they were heard and disposed of by a common judgment.

W.P.(C)No.11715 of 2025

2. The above writ petition is filed challenging Ext.P8 order issued by the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, in R.P.No.204/2024. The petitioners are a Primary Agricultural Credit Society and its Board of Directors. It is contended that the 1st respondent, while working as Secretary of the 1st petitioner Society, acted against the interest of the Society. Thereupon, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the 1st respondent, and an enquiry was ordered. Thereafter, by Ext.P1, a punishment was imposed, reverting the 1st respondent from the post of Secretary to the post of Senior Clerk. It was challenged before the Appellate authority, the Board of Directors, under Rule 198(4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules, 1969’) by filing Ext.P2 appeal dated 21.08.2023. The 1st respondent, without waiting for an order on Ext.P2, on the very next day, i.e., on 22.08.2023, approached the Co-operative Arbitration Court by filing Ext.P3 - ARC No.47/2023, challenging Ext.P1 order issued by the Disciplinary Sub Committee. An interim order was issued by the Co-operative Arbitration Court, injuncting further appointment to the post of Secretary, which was challenged before this Court by the petitioners herein, filing W.P. (C)No.34044/2023. The said writ petition was disposed of as per Ext.P4 judgment directing the petitioners to approach the Arbitration Court and to file their objection. Thereupon, I.A. No. 2 of 2023 was filed in ARC No. 47/2023 requesting to dismiss the suit on the ground of maintainability. Thereafter, the Co-operative Arbitration Court found that the suit is not maintainable as the 1st respondent has an effective alternative remedy to file a statutory appeal, and by Ext P6 order, dismissed ARC No.47/2023 and allowed the interlocutory application regarding maintainability. After the issuance of Ext.P6, the appellate authority considered Ext.P2 appeal and, as per Ext.P7 order, modified the punishment to reversion to the post of ‘Accountant’ instead of ‘Senior Clerk’. In the meantime, the 1st respondent challenged Ext.P6 order of the Co-operative Arbitration Court, which held that the ARC is not maintainable, by filing a Revision Petition No. 204/2024. The Co-operative Tribunal allowed the same as per Ext.P8 upholding the contention of the 1st respondent that the order issued by the Disciplinary Sub Committee under Rule 198 can be directly challenged before the Co-operative Arbitration Court under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1969’), without resorting to the remedy available under Rule 198 (4) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and remitted the matter back to the Co-operative Arbitration Court for a fresh consideration. It is aggrieved by the same that the present writ petition has been filed.

3. Adv.M.R.Anison, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that it is not proper on the part of the 1st respondent to have approached the Co-operative Arbitration Court challenging the order of the Disciplinary Sub Committee, after having preferred an appeal before the Board of Directors as provided under Rule 198(4) of the Rules, 1969. The order passed by the Appellate Authority under Rule 198(4) of the Rules, 1969, is still in force and has not been challenged by the 1st respondent before any competent forum. He would further submit that though this Court in Krishnan T v. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Soceities (General) Kasargod and Others 2017 (5) KHC 726, Veerankavu Welfare Co-operative Society Limited v. Sindhu Kumari [2025(l) KLT 166] and the Apex Court in Annamma K.A. V. Secretary, Cochin Co-operative Society Limited [2018(l) KLT 414] has held that two forums are provided for challenging an order imposing punishment, the employee concerned could choose any one forum out of the same, available to him and since the employee has chosen the appellate forum by filing Ext.P2 appeal before the Appellate Authority, the 1st respondent is estopped from filing an arbitration case before the Co-operative Arbitration Court. In support of his contention the petitioners rely on the Apex Court Judgment in Shirdi Nagar Panchayat v. Kishor Sharad Borawake and Others [(2024) 17 SCC 418] and the decision in National Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Mastan and Another [(2006) 2 SCC 641] and contended that the doctrine of election postulates that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to elect either of them but not both. Based on the same, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that when the 1st respondent has already chosen to file an appeal, simultaneously, he cannot maintain a proceeding before the Arbitration Court.

4. Adv. T.P Pradeep, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, based on the counter affidavit filed, would submit that it is settled law that an employee could approach any forum to redress his grievances. He would further submit that before the Appellate Authority, i.e., the Board of Directors, the only request made was to set aside the proceedings taken by the Sub-Committee, but in the proceedings before the Arbitration Court, as per Ext.P3, further reliefs have been sought, which cannot be granted by the Appellate Authority - the Board of Directors. The 1st respondent would further submit that based on Ext.P8 order, whereby the matter has been remitted back for reconsideration by the Co-operative Arbitration Court, she could very well file a petition seeking amendment of the plaint by incorporating a challenge against Ext.P7 order, but due to the stay order granted by this Court, she could not take any steps in this regard.

W.P.(C)No.11766 of 2026

5. The above writ petition is filed by the present Secretary of the 5th respondent Bank, who was appointed in place of the 7th respondent (the 1st respondent in W.P.(C)No.17715 of 2025).

6. Dr.Pradeep K.P., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that when the respondent bank took a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the 7th respondent, and after she was reverted to the post of Accountant, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Secretary on 07.09.2024, i.e., after Ext.P4 order was issued by the Disciplinary Sub-Committee, whereby the 7th respondent was reverted to the post of Senior Clerk. It is submitted that the petitioner is validly appointed by the bank after the 7th respondent was reverted. After completing the service in the 5th respondent bank, the petitioner is due to retire on 31.05.2026. Thereupon, the petitioner submitted Ext.P6, a request for processing her pension papers in a speedy manner. By Ext.P7, the pension docket was forwarded by the 6th respondent to the Pension Board, through the 4th respondent, Assistant Registrar. The 4th respondent, Assistant Registrar, has issued Ext.P9 proceedings stating that since there is an audit objection with respect to the grant of salary to the petitioner in the post of Secretary, the pension papers are to be resubmitted in the post of Assistant Secretary and not that of the Secretary. It is aggrieved by the same that the present writ petition has been filed.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the petitioner was promoted and posted as Secretary as per the resolution dated 07.09.2024, based on Ext.P4, whereby the 7th respondent was reverted from the post of Secretary to the post of Senior Clerk. Appeal filed against the same was also rejected as per Ext.P10 with a modification that the 7th respondent shall be reverted to the post of Accountant. It is true that in ARC No.47/2023, there is an order restraining further promotion in the post of Secretary, against which the 5th respondent bank filed W.P. (C)No.34044 of 2023, which was allowed by this Court, whereby a direction was issued to the 5th respondent to move before the Arbitration Court and file an objection. After the judgment of this Court in W.P.(C)No.34044 of 2023, an interlocutory application was filed in ARC No.47/2023 by the 5th respondent bank, challenging the maintainability itself, which was allowed as per Ext.P12. The petitioner would contend that whatever be the objection or the dispute between the bank and the 7th respondent, the petitioner has been duly promoted to the post of the Secretary, which order was not challenged in any proceedings by the 7th respondent and has become final and she has duly discharged her duties to the satisfaction of the Board of Directors and therefore, pension and other retirement benefits due to her has to be fixed in the post of Secretary, consequent to her retirement on 31.05.2026. The direction in Ext.P9 to fix the pension and retirement benefits, treating the petitioner as an Assistant Secretary, is absolutely without any basis. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further point out that the 4th respondent has absolutely no role in the matter, after the respondent bank forwards the pension papers to the pension Board, and it is for the Pension Board to decide the matter.

8. Relying on the Kerala Co-operative Societies Employees Self Financing Pension Scheme, 1994, especially Clause 3, which stipulates that the contribution of the employees shall be credited to the Pension Board at the rate of 10% of the pay of each of its employees, it is submitted that 10% of the pay applicable to the post of Secretary has been deducted and has been credited to the pension fund. Relying on Clause 20, it is further submitted that every employee shall be eligible for a superannuation pension on attaining the age of superannuation. Reliance was also placed on Clause 27 and based on the same it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the payment of pension is not automatic on the date of superannuation and an employee has to submit his formal application for superannuation pension, which has to be routed through the Chief Executive of the society and the Officers of the Pension Board shall have all the power to verify the pension fund remittance, service books, pay fixation etc., and based on which the applicable pension is sanctioned. Based on the same, it is submitted that the 4th respondent has absolutely no power in the matter and the direction in Ext.P9 is liable to be interfered with.

9. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the 7th respondent reiterating her stand that the reversion to the post of Accountant is under challenge, and in the meanwhile, if the pension and the retirement benefits of the petitioner are fixed in the post of Secretary, serious prejudice will be caused to her.

10. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent bank supporting the petitioner.

11. I have heard the rival contentions on both sides.

12. First, let me consider the contentions raised in W.P. (C)No.11715 of 2026. The issue essentially revolves around the imposition of a penalty as per Ext.P1 order, whereby the 1st respondent was reverted from the post of Secretary to the post of Senior Clerk, for a period of 5 years, and subsequent modification as per Ext.P7. As per Section 69 of the Act, 1969, the 1st respondent could challenge the said order before the Co-operative Arbitration Court. Likewise, going by Rule 198(4) of the Rules, 1969, against Ext.P1 order of punishment, an appeal lies to the Executive Committee or the Board of Management. So, two remedies are provided to challenge Ext.P1 order of punishment. The issue as to which forum an employee could approach in the above circumstance has been settled by this Court in Krishnan T.’s case cited supra, wherein paragraph 13 reads as follows:

                  “13. As I have pointed out earlier, if the 4th respondent has any grievance against Ext.P4 order of the sub committee, the 4th respondent is conferred with a remedy to file appeal against the order in accordance with sub-R.4 of R.198 before the Board of Management and also to institute any proceedings in accordance with S.69(2)(d) of Act, 1969. Apart from all these, when a statute prescribes a particular modality and procedure, the authority constituted thereunder shall confine himself to the power conferred thereunder. Learned counsel for petitioner has also invited my attention to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court is State of Kerala and others v. Shree Navangar Sadavrat Trust, 2017 (3) KHC 754 : 2017 (3) KLJ 485 : ILR 2017 (3) Ker. 838 : 2017 (4) KLT 476, to counter the contention that, there is an appeal remedy against the order impugned. Paragraph 14 is relevant which read thus:

                  "We would first start with the contention as raised by the State. The first contention we would deal with is the question of alternative remedy provided by S.11 of the Act. No doubt, it is a remedy provided by the Statute. But as is well - settled that where the order has been passed by an authority wholly without jurisdiction, the question of alternative remedy does not arise. It is submitted that there were no facts to justify the assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the enquiry report of the Tahsildar, which formed the basis of the order of the District Collector to assume jurisdiction and initiate proceedings, would itself show that the property belonged to the trust and all taxes were being paid by Shree Navanagar Sadavrat Trust and was being maintained by the Trust. If that be so, then where is the question of property belonging to a person who died without heirs. But the District Collector having no other materials before him, accepted the report of the Tahsildar and still choose to assume jurisdiction which he lacks in the facts aforesaid. If this be correct, then the District Collector clearly acted without jurisdiction and that being so, the alternative remedy would be no bar in entertaining the original petition and the learned Single Judge did no wrong in entertaining the original petition."

                  (underline supplied)

                  In Krishnan T. ‘s case cited supra, the Court held that against the order imposing punishment, the delinquent has a remedy either to file an appeal under Rule 198(4) of the Rules, 1969, before the Board of Management or to institute proceedings before the Co-operative Arbitration Court in accordance with Section 69(2)(d) of the Act, 1969. In the present case, the 1st respondent filed Ext.P2 appeal before the Board of Directors invoking Rule 198(4) of the Rules, 1969, on 21.08.2023. Without awaiting an order in Ext.P2, on the very next day, i.e., on 22.08.2023, the 1st respondent directly approached the Co-operative Arbitration Court, filing Ext.P3 proceedings numbered as ARC No.47/2023. An interim order was passed in the ARC directing the bank not to make any appointment to the post of Secretary, pending disposal of the arbitration case. The said order was challenged by the 1st petitioner herein, and this Court directed the petitioner to file an objection before the Arbitration Court. Thereupon, objections were filed and also requested to consider the maintainability of the ARC as a preliminary issue. The Arbitration Court dismissed the ARC No.47/2023 on the ground that the arbitration case filed under Section 69 of the Act, 1969, is not maintainable without exhausting the statutory remedy available under Rule 198(4) of the Rules, 1969. After the dismissal of the arbitration case, the appellate authority has considered Ext.P2 appeal and modified the earlier order of reversion to the post of Senior Clerk, as per Ext.P7 order. Admittedly, Ext.P7 order is not challenged before any of the forums, and it has become final. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the arbitration case, a revision petition was filed before the Co-operative Tribunal and the Tribunal set aside the order as per Ext.P8, holding that the order issued by the Disciplinary Sub Committee under Rule 198 can be directly challenged before the Co-operative Arbitration Court under Section 69 of the Act, 1969 and therefore, set aside Ext.P6 order and remitted the matter back for fresh consideration. It is not in dispute that, going by the judgment of this Court in Krishnan T.’s case cited supra, a delinquent employee aggrieved by the order imposing punishment by the Sub-Committee could either file an appeal under Rule 198 of the Rules, 1969 or raise a challenge before the Arbitration Court, which has been rightly found by the Co-operative Tribunal as per Ext.P8. The question here is whether the 1st respondent, having elected to choose one of the forums, could approach the other forum. The said issue was considered by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company’s case cited Supra, wherein the Apex Court has held that the doctrine of election postulates that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to elect either of them but not both. Paragraph 23 of the said judgment reads as follows:

                  “23. The "doctrine of election" is a branch of "rule of estoppel",

in terms whereof a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. The doctrine of election postulates that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to elect either of them but not both. Although there are certain exceptions to the same rule but the same has no application in the instant case.”

13. The Apex Court in Shirdi Nagar Panchayat’s case cited Supra, while considering a similar issue, has held that, if a party has more than one remedy and if he chooses one of them, he is estopped from taking recourse to the other remedies. Paragraph 21 of the said judgment reads as follows:

                  “21. It has been consistently held by this court in a catena of judgments that if a party has more than one remedy and if he chooses one of them, he is estopped from taking recourse to the other remedy. Reference in this respect could be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of A.P. State Financial Corporation v. GAR Re - rolling Mills and another, 1994 (2) SCC 647, R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, 1992 (4) SCC 683, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan and another, 2006 (2) SCC 641, State of Punjab and others v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, 2014 (15) SCC 144 and recently in the case of Union of India and others v. N. Murugesan and others, 2022 (2) SCC 25.”

                  Here is a case where the 1st respondent could approach two forums for redressal of his grievances, and he has chosen one forum by filing Ext.P2 appeal before the appellate authority and thereafter filed Ext.P3 arbitration case before the Arbitration Court. Going by the dictum laid down in National Insurance Company’s case and Shirdi Nagar Panchayat’s case cited Supra, though an applicant has a right to choose a forum, and he chooses one of them, he is estopped from taking recourse to the other remedy. The principle of doctrine of election will apply in the present case, since the 1st respondent has chosen the forum of appeal as well as to file a case before the Arbitration Court, which is impermissible. Further, it is to be noted that after Ext.P6 order was passed by the Arbitration Court, dismissing the arbitration case, Ext.P7 order was passed by the Board of Directors modifying the punishment, which is not challenged in any of the proceedings. Though I am in full agreement with the finding in Ext.P8 order of Co-operative Tribunal that the rejection of the arbitration case as per Ext.P6 on the ground that the 1st respondent has to avail the remedy of an appeal first, and then to approach the Co-operative Arbitration Court is not correct, but going by the principle doctrine of election, once the 1st respondent has already elected one forum, he is estopped from making a complaint before the other forum. Based on the same, I am inclined to interfere with Ext.P8 order.

14. Accordingly, Ext.P8 order of the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, is set aside. This order will not stand in the way of the 1st respondent in challenging Ext.P7 in appropriate proceedings.

15. Now, coming to W.P.(C)No.11766 of 2026, after the issuance of Ext.P4 order, the petitioner herein was promoted to the post of Secretary, and she has worked in the said post and retired from service, with effect from 31.05.2026. The grievance raised by the petitioner is that by Ext.P9 proceedings, the petitioner was informed that since disputes are raised by the 1st respondent in W.P.(C)No.17715/2025, the pension could be sanctioned to the petitioner, only if the pension papers are resubmitted in the post of ‘Assistant Secretary’ and not in the post of ‘Secretary’. I am afraid such a condition in Ext.P9 cannot stand the scrutiny of law, inasmuch as the petitioner was promoted to the post of Secretary after issuance of Ext.P4 order of punishment. Thereafter, by Ext.P5, the reversion order was modified from the post of Secretary to Accountant. Since Ext.P5 order has not been challenged by the 7th respondent (the 1st respondent in W.P. (C)No.17715 of 2025) before any of the forums, I am of the view that the petitioner herein has been rightly appointed to the post of Secretary and therefore, entitled for pension, taking into consideration that she has retired from the post of Secretary. The fact that the petitioner has worked in the post of Secretary is undisputed. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits, treating that she has retired from the post of Secretary.

16. Accordingly, Ext.P9 is set aside. It is ordered that the petitioner is entitled to pension and other retirement benefits, treating her as having retired from the post of Secretary of the 5th respondent, on 31.05.2026. Necessary steps shall be taken by the 4th respondent to forward the pension papers, treating the petitioner as having retired from service in the post of Secretary. Needful shall be done within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

These writ petitions are disposed of as above.