Ninala Jayasurya, J.

1. State aggrieved by order dated 02.08.2024 in Writ Petition No.6164 of 2022 filed present appeal.

2. Learned Single Judge also allowed W.P.No.16324 of 2022 by a separate order, dated 02.08.2024 against which, W.A.No.1069 of 2025 was filed and disposed of through a separate order.

3. Brief factual matrix of the case is that Bommuru Police Station registered Crime No.415 of 2011 against respondent No.1 / writ petitioner, who worked as Inspector of Police, for offences punishable under Sections 342, 419, 420, 385, 389 and 120-B r/w Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, inter alia on the allegation that he along with a Head Constable extorted a sum of Rs.4 lakhs from the Director of Jayanthi Industries situated at Morampudi, Rajahmundry, posing themselves as CBI officers. Charge Sheet was filed and VII Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, took cognizance of the offences vide C.C.No.1132 of 2012.

4. During pendency of said Calendar Case, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against 1st respondent / writ petitioner and a Charge Memo No.103/P/2012 dated 30.04.2012 along with Articles of Charge was issued. He was placed under suspension. Aggrieved by suspension proceedings, writ petitioner / applicant filed O.A.No.8376 of 2013 before the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (APAT) at Hyderabad. Said O.A. was admitted and vide interim order dated 09.12.2013 respondents therein were directed to finalize disciplinary enquiry within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of the said order. Applicant was directed to extend his cooperation for conclusion of disciplinary proceedings.

5. Against said order, delinquent employee filed W.P.No.10958 of 2014 which came to be dismissed on 10.04.2014 with a direction to the APAT to dispose of Original Application itself expeditiously. Thereafter, Enquiry Officer appointed to conduct departmental enquiry called upon respondent / writ petitioner to appear before him. Challenging action of authorities in proceeding to conduct departmental enquiry though criminal proceedings in Crime No.415 of 2011 are pending, writ petitioner filed O.A.No.79 of 2015 and APAT granted interim stay of departmental proceedings by an order dated 19.01.2015. During pendency of O.A., C.C.No.1132 of 2012 ended in acquittal on 05.05.2016. Recording the said aspect, on 26.12.2017 APAT dismissed O.A. opining that no orders are necessary.

6. In another case C.C.No.114 of 2015 on the file of learned Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Alamuru relating to Crime No.97 of 2003 of Alamuru Police Station, writ petitioner was found guilty. Hence, he was dismissed from service w.e.f. 09.11.2015. Crl.A.No.586 of 2015 filed by him was allowed by an order dated 29.04.2016 and on remand, he was convicted by Judgment dated 22.06.2018. In view of the same, vide proceedings dated 01.11.2018 he was dismissed from service. Meanwhile, against order of conviction Crl.A.No.214 of 2018 was preferred. Learned 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District allowed the appeal by order dated 01.04.2019. Therefore, he was reinstated into service vide proceedings dated 29.12.2021 w.e.f. 01.04.2019.

7. In the interregnum, he attained age of superannuation on 30.06.2019 and deemed to be retired from service. Enquiry officers appointed to conduct departmental proceedings in respect of separate incidents / charges could not proceed in the enquiry on account of transfers, dismissal of writ petitioner, Court orders etc., from service on two occasions, though it was separated and concluded in respect of Charged Officer No.2. With a view to continue enquiry, message / Memo dated 10.01.2022 was issued. Aggrieved by same, petitioner approached Writ Court and sought a declaration that proceedings initiated against him is contrary to G.O.Ms.No.679, GA (Ser-C) Department dated 01.11.2008, illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India etc; and to set aside them.

8. On contest, learned Single Judge allowed writ petition and set aside proceedings impugned therein.

9. Mr.G.Raju, learned Government Pleader for Services-I made submissions to impress upon the Court that order of learned Single Judge is not sustainable in Law, as it was passed without considering the matter in proper perspective. He submits that learned Single Judge ought to have appreciated that delay in conducting disciplinary enquiry was due to various administrative reasons, apart from non co-operation of respondent / writ petitioner. Further that disciplinary enquiry also could not be proceeded with in view of the orders passed in legal proceedings initiated by respondent / writ petitioner. In such circumstances, he submits that order of learned Single Judge in interfering with the same and setting aside Memo of Articles of Charge dated 30.04.2012 and subsequent order of appointment of Enquiry Officer dated 30.12.2013 is not sustainable. He also submits that as laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Chairman, LIC of India & Ors., v. A.Masilamani ((2013) 6 SCC 530), disciplinary enquiry cannot be set aside on the ground of delay in conducting same. Accordingly, he urges to allow appeal, while stating that respondent / writ petitioner involved in several criminal cases.

10. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent / writ petitioner made submissions to sustain order under appeal. He submits that delay in completion of disciplinary enquiry against respondent / writ petitioner is solely attributable to concerned authorities, that criminal case registered against respondent / writ petitioner ended in acquittal long back. Further, that though there is no stay or any other impediment to proceed with disciplinary enquiry, authorities delayed it, thereby irreparable loss to respondent / writ petitioner, who ultimately retired from service on attaining age of superannuation in the year 2019 was caused and promotion opportunities lost. He also submits that learned Single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case was justified in allowing writ petition and order under appeal warrants no interference by appellate Court.

11. This Court has considered submissions made and perused material on record.

12. At the outset, it may be pertinent to state that registration of Crime No.415 of 2011 and Article 1 of Charge Memo dated 30.04.2012 were based on same set of facts. In so far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned, according to appellants / authorities delay in enquiry was due to pendency of litigation and stay / directions in O.As., and dismissal of writ petitioner from service. However, learned APAT, which initially granted interim stay of all further proceedings in the enquiry vide Orders dated 19.01.2015 in O.A.No.79 of 2015, no doubt dismissed it, but not on merits. Taking note of the fact that applicant / writ petitioner was acquitted from criminal case, APAT opined that no further orders are necessary and dismissed O.A. on 26.12.2017. Department in its wisdom took a decision to proceed further in the matter. No doubt, concerned authorities are required to complete disciplinary proceedings expeditiously in view of seriousness of charge. Learned Government Pleader made submissions to justify delay in finalization of domestic enquiry on the premise that during pendency of departmental enquiry proceedings in question, respondent / writ petitioner was dismissed from service due to his involvement in other offences. A perusal of counter-affidavit filed in writ petition would go to show that against orders of conviction, respondent / writ petitioner filed appeals and same were allowed. Further, Enquiry Officers appointed at least on two occasions, could not complete enquiry on account of their transfers. Be that as it may.

13. Issue as to whether delay in completion of enquiry is attributable to writ petitioner or Department and effect of G.O.Ms.No.679 dated 01.11.2008 providing for conclusion of disciplinary proceedings in Six (6) months, was neither examined nor reasons for granting relief thereof were discussed at all in the order under appeal. Writ court referring to P.V.Mahadevan’s case simply allowed writ petition, as if decision therein is applicable to case on hand.

14. Against order of the High Court of Madras, P.V.Mahadevan approached Apex court. To quash a Charge Memo dated 08.06.2000 with reference to an irregularity in issuing a Sale Deed in 1990, he filed writ petition. Contentions that delay of more than 10 years in initiating disciplinary proceedings by issuance of Charge Memo would render departmental proceedings vitiated and in the absence of any explanation for the inordinate delay in initiating such proceedings of issuance of Charge Memo would justify prayer for quashing the proceedings were raised. In the said context, Hon‟ble Supreme Court opined that allowing respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be prejudicial to appellant and made observations extracted in Para 8 of order under appeal, which are not reiterated for the sake of brevity.

15. Aforesaid decision with reference to delay in initiation of departmental enquiry itself is not applicable to the present fact situation. Crime against respondent / writ petitioner herein was registered in 2011 and disciplinary proceedings were initiated vide Memo No.103/P1 2012 dated 30.04.2012. Thus, there is no delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings unlike P.V.Mahadevan case, but conclusion of the same. Therefore, reliance on decision in P.V.Mahadevan case is misapplied and order of Writ Court is liable to be set aside on this ground.

16. Further, legal position with regard to delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings / enquiry is well settled. In A.Masilamani’s case referred to supra, High Court quashed disciplinary proceedings initiated by L.I.C., against delinquent employee (Masilamani). One of the contentions raised before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court was that High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing disciplinary proceedings as well as punishment imposed, as the same does not fall within scope of judicial review. Answering issues / questions that fell for consideration, Apex Court at Para 18 held as follows:

               “18. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question have to be examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514 : AIR 1990 SC 1308] , Union of India v. Ashok Kacker [1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 : (1995) 29 ATC 145] , Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [(1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745] , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 : AIR 1998 SC 1833] , M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475] , Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304] and Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [(2012) 11 SCC 565 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 121 : AIR 2012 SC 2250].)”

17. At this juncture, it may also relevant to mention that crime is an act of commission in violation of Law or of omission of public duty. Departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service as opined by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Depot Manager, APSRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors. ((1997) 2 SCC 699). A Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M. (PJ) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., ((2005) 7 SCC 764) inter alia held as follows:

               “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt‟, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability‟. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”

18. In the present case, a reading of the Judgment in C.C.No.1132 of 2012 discerns that out of 5 prosecution witnesses, four turned hostile and learned Magistrate acquitted respondent / writ petitioner (A2) & Others by recording following conclusions:

               “Hence, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not at all sufficient to prove the guilt of accused for commission of offence towards Pw.1 and there is a doubt whether the accused has committed offence or not as Pw.1 categorically admitted during the course of cross examination that he had identified the accused at the instance of police. Therefore, the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.”

19. Thus, it is not a case of clean or honourable acquittal which would come in the way of appellants / authorities to proceed with Departmental Proceedings / enquiry. In fact, keeping in view the seriousness of the charge, enquiry should have been completed expeditiously. However, delay per se is not attributable to appellants alone, but conviction orders which lead to dismissal of respondent from service and his conduct during enquiry proceedings also contributed to it. Though G.O.Ms.No.679 dated 01.11.2008 contemplates that disciplinary proceedings shall be concluded within six months of initiation, same cannot be treated as mandatory, but directory. Any view to the effect that disciplinary proceedings cannot be continued on the premise that the same was not concluded in 6 (six) months or to be interdicted on the ground of delay in non-completion of the same would give scope for dilatory tactics and frustrate the object of departmental action. Allegations against the writ petitioner are grave and cannot be swept under the carpet due to reasons as accepted by learned Single Bench. Remedy cannot be worse than disease.

20. In our considered opinion, there is no material on record to indicate that delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings is attributable to appellants / Department and by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.679, cannot be proceeded further. Order under appeal, in the given facts and circumstances, is not sustainable. Accordingly, the same is set aside.

21. Keeping in view the object of disciplinary proceedings, as also nature of charges against respondent / writ petitioner who worked in Police Department, which commands high standards of honesty and integrity, this Court in the facts and circumstances, deems it expedient to direct completion of subject matter disciplinary proceedings within 3 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order, in accordance with Law and by affording due opportunity to respondent / writ petitioner. He shall extend all cooperation for completion of enquiry within the said time limit.

22. However, keeping in view the factum of this matter hanging fire since such long years, it is directed that in the event, enquiry is not completed and orders thereof are not passed within above stipulated period, disciplinary proceedings in respect of charges in question shall stand automatically terminated.

23. Writ Appeal is accordingly allowed, with the above directions. No costs.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.