1. Since both these cases are on identical facts and arise out of execution petitions of different claims decided by common award arising out of same accident, therefore, they are being decided by this common order.

2. The present cases depict a classic sorry state of affairs, plaguing execution of decrees and awards and this Court is deciding objections as to executability of award of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) 36 years after the said award was passed in the year 1990. The accident took place 40 years ago, in May 1986. These revisions are pending since last 17 years i.e. from the year 2009 only on the question of disposal of objections as to executability of the award passed in 1990, on the ground of limitation and maintainability.

3. These revisions are at the instance of owner of motor vehicle objecting to maintainability of execution proceedings and aggrieved by rejection of his objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an award dated 10.09.1990 for an accident which took place in May, 1986. For the last 40 years, the claimants are still awaiting payment of compensation to them. The said accident resulted in death of one person and injuries to another person. By the common award deciding both the claim petitions arising out of the same accident, in injury case an award of Rs.80,000/- was passed and in death case an award of Rs.2,25,000/-was passed by the M.A.C.T., partly against the owner and partly against the Insurance Company. These revisions are at the instance of owner.

4. It is vehemently contended by learned counsel for the applicant/owner that the execution cases are not maintainable because the execution was filed on 20.01.2004 for an award passed on 10.09.1990 and the execution having been filed more than 13 years after passing of the said award was barred by limitation and the Executing Court while disposing of the objections under Section 47 of CPC has erroneously held that since there is no limitation for filing a claim petition for claim under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, in the same breath, there cannot be any limitation for execution of the award once passed under Section 166. It is argued that reliance made by the M.A.C.T. on judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Padma and another, reported in (2003) 7 SCC 713 is utterly misconceived because the said judgment relates to limitation for filing claim petition and not limitation for filing of execution petition. It is argued that as per the State Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, i.e. Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, the procedure as contained in Order 21 of Code of Civil Procedure applies to proceedings before the M.A.C.T. and, therefore, once Order 21 of CPC applies, that means that all the regular procedural laws including the Limitation Act would apply to executions for awards of Claims Tribunals. It is argued that not only the execution was barred by law of limitation but furthermore the execution petition was not maintainable because it was barred by res judicata as earlier also execution petition was filed which was dismissed, though on technical grounds, and the claimants ought to have prayed for restoration of the said execution petition rather than filing a new execution petition. Therefore, it is argued that the order of the Executing Court in holding execution proceedings to be maintainable be set aside and the executions be rejected.

5. Per contra, it was contended learned counsel for the claimants that the order passed by the Tribunal is fully valid and justified. Once there is no limitation for filing claim petition, then there cannot be any limitation for filing execution of award passed on such claim petition. It is contended that even otherwise the claimants have been seeking execution of the award right from the year 1992 but they have been caught in legal intricacies for no fault of theirs and it is the inertia of the Executing Courts in executing the awards that earlier execution proceedings were disposed of for no fault of the claimants. The claimants cannot be denied fruits of award in such a manner in which they are not at fault and the Executing Court for its own convenience disposed of the execution proceedings on technical ground without looking to the perils of the claimants.

6. This Court has heard learned counsel for the rival parties at length and perused the record.

7. The award under execution was passed on 10.09.1990 by MACT at Hoshangabad. At that time Harda was part of district Hoshangabad and it had not been constituted into a separate district. The owner is admittedly resident of Harda and the award has to be executed at Harda.

8. The execution petition was filed for the first time in the year 1990 itself i.e. on 05.12.1990. This was filed before the MACT at Hoshangabad. The said execution was disposed of on 16.09.1998 directing preparation of transfer certificate in terms of Section 39 of the CPC and to be sent to MACT, Harda, as per the order-sheets that are placed on record in CR No.402/2009.

9. The order-sheets as available in CR No.401/2009 do not indicate the proceedings in the execution filed in the year 1990, but indicate that a fresh execution was filed on 15.05.1998 before the executing court at Hoshangabad and in the said execution proceedings, the proceedings continued and the executing court at Harda awaited transfer certificate from MACT at Hoshangabad but once no transfer certificate from MACT at Hoshangabad was forthcoming, therefore, dismissed the execution proceedings in absence of transfer certificate from MACT, Hoshangabad. There is a document available in the said revision issued by MACT Hoshangabad whereby transfer certificate has been issued in terms of Section 41 of CPC. As per the said provision, the result of execution proceeding is to be certified to the court to where it is being transferred. Therefore, it is evident that on one hand, the MACT at Hoshangabad had prepared the transfer certificate, but it was not received by MACT at Harda and MACT at Harda just to get rid of the execution proceedings, rejected the proceedings awaiting transfer certificate.

10. The aforesaid order passed by MACT, Harda in rejecting the execution proceedings cannot be stated to be a legal and valid action to be undertaken by the Executing Court in proceeding to dispose of execution proceedings awaiting transfer certificate. Once it was execution filed by a claimant and transfer certificate had been prepared by MACT Hoshangabad, then correspondence could have been carried out with MACT Hoshangabad to ensure execution of award in favour of the claimants so that the claimants could have got the fruits of the award. However, the MACT Harda simply disposed of the execution proceedings. This was on technical ground, and not on merits.

11. Thereafter, fresh execution proceedings were initiated in January, 2004 and now it is being argued that such execution is barred by limitation.

12. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagyoday Cooperative Bank Limited vs. Ravindra Balkrishna Patel (Deceased) through Legal Heirs and others, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 417 that dismissal of earlier execution petition on technical ground would not bar filing of a fresh execution petition so long as second petition is filed within period of limitation. Same has been held recently by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Habban Shah vs. Sheruddin, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 814. Therefore, no question of res-judicata arises because the first execution petition was not rejected on merits.

13. Therefore, now it is to be seen whether the second execution petition is barred by limitation or not. It is not in dispute that the claimants have been seeking execution of the award right since December, 1990 but only on account of technical intricacies and lack of communication and coordination between two courts, i.e. MACT Hoshangabad and Harda which were earlier within the same district but are now different districts, execution proceedings were disposed of on technical ground awaiting transfer certificate from MACT Hoshangabad because the property of the owner lies in Harda.

14. This Court finds that the earlier rejection of execution proceedings was an utterly illegal order passed by the MACT in rejecting the execution proceedings awaiting transfer certificate from MACT Hoshangabad. If transfer certificate was not forthcoming, then correspondence could have been initiated through the Principal District Judge to ensure justice to the litigant, or the Executing Court could have waited for some more time, but only to get statistical leverage, in such a manner, the execution proceedings could not have been scuttled by the MACT.

15. Therefore, the fresh execution proceedings filed by the claimants before MACT Hoshangabad was the only option available with the claimants as per the legal advice that might have been given to the claimants and this time they were successful in getting transfer certificate issued by MACT Hoshangabad and it was received within time by the MACT Harda and then the owner appeared and filed objections as to limitation. Once the execution was filed within time, then even if it was disposed on technical ground, then also, technically the execution remained and it was open for the decree holder to either file fresh execution petition, or to seek revival of earlier one. Only if there was a substantial gap between disposal of earlier one and filing of subsequent one, for that period only, limitation could have been said to start to run. However, that is not the case here. If the period spent in prosecuting the earlier execution is excluded, then the fresh execution is undisputedly within limitation.

16. An identical issue was raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab Ali, (1998) 3 SCC 148. A question arose as to whether the fresh execution petition filed after technical disposal of first one, would be deemed to be continuation of earlier execution for the purpose of limitation, or not. The said case related to disposal of earlier execution as abated and then filing a fresh one by impleading the Legal Representatives. The issue was answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following terms :-

          "15. It is clear, therefore, that if after the filing of an execution petition in time, the decree-holder dies and his legal representatives do not come on record -- or the judgment- debtor dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record, then there is no abatement of the execution petition. If there is no abatement, the position in the eye of law is that the execution petition remains pending on the file of the execution court. If it remains pending and if no time-limit is prescribed to bring the legal representatives on record in execution proceedings, it is open in case of death of the decree-holder, for his legal representative to come on record at any time. The execution application cannot even be dismissed for default behind the back of the decree-holder's legal representatives. In case of death of the judgment-debtor, the decree-holder could file an application to bring the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor on record, at any time. Of course, in case of death of judgment-debtor, the Court can fix a reasonable time for the said purpose and if the decree-holder does not file an application for the aforesaid purpose, the Court can dismiss the execution petition for default. But in any event the execution petition cannot be dismissed as abated. Alternatively, it is also open to the decree-holder's legal representatives, to file a fresh execution petition in case of death of the decree-holder; or, in case of death of the judgment-debtor, the decree-holder can file a fresh execution petition impleading the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor; such a fresh execution petition, if filed, is, in law, only a continuation of the pending execution petition -- the one which was filed in time by the decree-holder initially. This is the position under the Code of Civil Procedure.

          (Emphasis supplied)"

17. At the most, limitation can be calculated for the period prior to filing the first execution, and the interregnum between the succeeding execution petitions. Decree holders are entitled to benefit of extension of limitation for the period they were prosecuting the earlier execution proceedings, by treating the subsequent execution as continuation of first one. By calculating the limitation in this manner, the execution petitions fall within the limitation period.

18. As this Court finds that the present Executions are within time, hence, there remains no occasion to decide the question whether there would be any limitation for executing the awards of MACT, or not.

19. In view of the aforesaid, this Court does not find any good reason to interfere in the well-reasoned order passed by the executing court in rejecting the objections of the petitioner/owner as to maintainability of execution proceedings. The revisions fail and are dismissed.

20. The executing Court is directed to carry out execution of the award expeditiously and complete it within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.