1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants/defendants challenging the judgment and decree in O.S.No.414 of 1988 on the file of the V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, dt.30.06.1999.

2. The said suit was decreed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, which was filed for ejectment, possession, 2 arrears of rent, damages for use and occupation in respect of the suit schedule properties.

3. For the sake of convenience and for better understanding of the case, the parties hereinafter shall be referred to as arrayed in the original suit filed before the learned trial Court.

PLAINTIFF’s CASE:

4. The plaintiff has instituted the underlying suit for ejectment, possession, arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation in respect of the suit schedule land admeasuring Acres 1.31 guntas in Plot No.17 in Survey No.58 of Bahaloolkhanguda, Erragadda, Hyderabad (popularly known as ‘Hyderabad Mental Hospital’), stating that the plaintiff is the owner and landlady of the suit schedule property. It is stated that the suit schedule property was leased out to the then Government of H.E.H. the Nizam for PAC at Erram-numa Camp, Yerragadda on a notional rent of 5 (Ds) equivalent to Rs.4.29 (IG) per acre per month.

5. It is further contended that after abolition of the Nizam Government, the suit schedule property continued in possession of the Hyderabad State Government and thereafter came into the possession of the Government of Andhra Pradesh on its formation w.e.f., 01.12.1956, and that the 3 rd defendant is in use and occupation of the suit schedule property under a lease agreement.

6. It is further contended that the 4th defendant, on behalf of the Government of A.P., executed a lease deed in respect of the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff, and the original lease agreement was entered into on 13.04.1972, with the lease commencing from 01.04.1969 on a monthly rent of 5 (Ds) or Rs.4.29 (IG) per acre per month. It is also stated that the lease was renewed from time to time till 31.03.1984, and that from the said date, the defendants neither paid rents nor renewed the lease deed.

7. It is further contended that the plaintiff, being a widowed lady and having no independent source of income, required the suit schedule property for her personal use for the benefit of her unemployed son. Accordingly, a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, read with Section 80 CPC, dt.14.09.1985 was issued, terminating the lease and calling upon the defendants to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the suit schedule property within 90 days and also to pay arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation in case of failure to do so.

8. It is further contended that though the defendants received the said notice of termination, they neither vacated the schedule property nor sent any reply. However, the 3rd defendant addressed a letter dt.04.12.1985 stating that a detailed reply would be sent, but no such reply was addressed. Therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file the present suit for ejectment, possession and recovery of Rs.83.75 towards arrears of rent and a further sum of Rs.2,21,875/- towards past damages for use and occupation, along with future damages @ Rs.5,000/- per acre per month and costs.

DEFENDANTS’ CASE:

9. The defendants No.1 to 4 resisted the said suit claim and the 3rd defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by defendants 1, 2 and 4, admitting receipt of notice of termination dt.14.09.1985, and inter alia contending that Plot No.17 in Survey No.58 of Bahaloolkhanguda (Mental Hospital Campus) was handed over to the Medical and Health Department in the year 1948 through PWD (R&B Hyderabad) along with structures for locating the Government Hospital for Mental Care, Hyderabad.

10. It is further contended that the Government Hospital for Mental Care, Hyderabad was shifted from Jalna, Mahabubnagar, to Hyderabad in the year 1952 to the schedule property and that the PWD (R&B) Department was paying rent to the landlady, i.e., the plaintiff herein, on behalf of the Medical Department. It is also contended that the department paid rent in respect of the schedule property upto 31.03.1984 and since the plaintiff/owner of the property did not submit renewal lease deed and advance stamp receipt for the subsequent period, and also as it was considered necessary to verify the ownership of the property before making further payment, the rent was not paid thereafter.

11. It is further contended by the 3rd defendant that considering that the disputed property is essential for the Government hospital, the Government initiated land acquisition proceedings to acquire the total land of Ac.99.00 guntas including Plot No.17 by G.O.Ms.No.2801, dt.19.10.1963, but the same could not be materialized, and it is further stated that the Government has not abandoned the proposal to acquire the land and that the corresponding process is in progress.

12. It is also the case of the defendants that they are ready and willing to clear the arrears of rent to the owner, as soon as the landlady completes the requisite formalities such as execution of the lease deed along with advance stamp receipt.

13. It is further contended by the defendant No.3 that the suit schedule property is being utilized for public purpose and that, as per revenue records, an extent of Acres 63.15 guntas is classified as Poramboke land vide MRO Secunderabad Letter No.A1/1750/82, dt.17.03.1987, together with pahani copies of Survey No.127/1 of Bahaloolkhanguda Village, and on that basis, the 3rd defendant sought dismissal of the suit with costs.

ISSUES FRAMED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT:

14. The learned trial Court after completion of pleadings has framed the following issues:

               1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for vacant possession of the suit premises as prayed for?

               2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree for Rs.8.370 ps towards arrears of rent from 18.01.1985 to 18.12.1985 at Rs.7.61 ps per month as prayed for?

               3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a sum of Rs.2,21,875/- towards damages for illegal use and occupation of the land from 19.12.1985 to 18.02.1988 for period of 25 months i.e., Rs.8,875/- p.m., and also future mesne profits from the date of the suit till delivery of possession?

15. In order to substantiate their respective claims, on behalf of the plaintiff, her son was examined as PW1 and got marked Exs.A1 to A9, and defendants have examined DWs.1 and 2, who are the concerned Mandal Revenue Officer, Ameerpet and the Deputy Director, Survey & Land Records, and got marked Ex.B1 to B9.

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT:

16. The learned trial Court, on consideration of the pleadings, particularly the written statement of the 3rd defendant, observed that the department had paid rent in respect of the schedule property upto 31.03.1984 and that as the plaintiff did not submit renewal lease deed and advance stamp receipt for the subsequent period, and as it was considered necessary for the defendants to verify the ownership of the property before making further payment, the rent was not paid thereafter, and as the 3 rd defendant had stated that the Government Hospital for Mental Care, Hyderabad was shifted from Jalna to Hyderabad in the year 1953 and located in the existing structures and that the PWD (R&B) Department was paying rents to the landlady, thus opined that the defendant No.3 admitted the plaintiff as the owner of the demised premises.

17. The learned trial Court, on further consideration of the averments in the written statement of the 3rd defendant stated that the 3rd defendant has specifically pleaded that the demised property was essential for the Government hospital as such the Government had issued land acquisition proceedings to acquire the total extent of 99 acres including the suit schedule property vide G.O.Ms.No.2801, dt.19.10.1963, and as the defendants had expressed willingness to clear arrears of rent as soon as the landlady completed the formalities such as execution of lease deed along with submission of advance stamp receipt, the learned trial Court has held that the jural relationship of landlord and tenant was established by the specific admission of the defendants No.1 to 3.

18. Further, the learned trial Court Judge, while answering Issue No.1, held that in view of the admission made in the written statement, as to the status of the plaintiff as landlady and their own status as tenants of the suit schedule property and the specific admission of the ownership of the plaintiff, and the proposal for acquisition of the land pending before the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.2801, dt.19.10.1963, and though the defendants resisted the relief stating that non-payment of rent was due to non-renewal of lease deed and non-furnishing of advance stamp receipt by the plaintiff, which was subject to verifying the ownership of the plaintiff.

19. Thus, the learned trial Court in view of such admissions by the 3rd defendant, recorded a categorical finding that though there was inconsistency and variance between the pleas taken in the written statement and the evidence adduced during trial, considering the fact that DW1, who was the Tahsildar of the concerned jurisdiction, has specifically filed evidence vide Exs.B1 to B9 to show that the plaintiff has title to the schedule property, held that evidence without pleadings and pleadings without evidence cannot be looked into and are not legally sustainable, as 10 such came to a conclusion that the plaintiff has established title and ownership over the schedule property.

20. Further, though the Assistant Government Pleader vehemently contended that the written statement has to be read as a whole to determine whether it amounts to admission of a particular fact, and contended that though the plaintiff was described as landlady, the defendants had withheld payment of rent for want of verification of her title, the learned trial Court categorically held that the defendants specifically admitted the jural relationship in the pleadings, and though in the evidence the defendants took a contrary stand by denying the title of the plaintiff, held that the specific admission by the defendants as to the jural relationship proved that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property.

21. Further, the learned trial Court also observed that PW1, who is the son of the GPA holder of the plaintiff, deposed in support of the plaint averments, who deposed about the existence of jural relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, and no material contradictions were elicited in his cross-examination to 11 discredit his evidence. It was also noted that no suggestion was made to PW1 denying the existence of landlord-tenant relationship or asserting that the suit schedule property is Government land; more so, a suggestion was made that rent was not paid due to non-renewal of the lease deed of 1984, and thus, the learned trial Court held that the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff are consistent and trustworthy.

22. The trial Court further noted that asExs.A2 and A9 were not seriously disputed, the unchallenged evidence of PW1 coupled with recitals in Ex.A2 and Ex.A9 clearly establish the existence of jural relationship between the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant upto 1984. It was also noted that Ex.A3 legal notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 80 CPC was duly served as evidenced by Exs.A4 to A9, and though Ex.A8 letter dt.04.12.1985 indicated that a reply would be sent, admittedly no reply was sent, which support the version of the plaintiff.

23. The learned trial Court held that as the jural relationship is proved, in view of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, a tenant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord during the continuance of tenancy. The plea of the defendants, based on evidence of DW1 and DW2, that the suit schedule property is Government Poramboke land as per Exs.B4 and B5, was disbelieved. Further, the trial Court further observed that if the property was Government land, there would be no necessity for initiating land acquisition proceedings for the Mental Hospital. It was also held that Exs.B4, B5 and B7 do not establish that the suit property as Government land and as there was no pleading in the written statement, as such the said documents were disbelieved, and accordingly, Issue No.1 was answered in favour of the plaintiff, declaring her as landlady and defendant No.3 as tenant of the schedule property.

24. As a consequence of the finding on Issue No.1, the other Issues No.2 to 4 were also answered in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiff, and the suit was decreed by judgment and decree dt.30.06.1999, which has given rise to the present appeal.

25. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader from the Office of the learned Advocate General for the appellants/defendants and Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel representing Smt Manjari S.Ganu, learned counsel for respondents/plaintiff.

Submissions on behalf of Appellants/Government:

26. The learned Special Government Pleader from the Office of the learned Advocate General, appearing for the defendants, contended that the plaintiff has failed to establish the basic foundation of her claim, and that apart, no credible documentary evidence has been produced to establish that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. It is further argued that when the initial burden as to title is not discharged, the question of declaring the plaintiff as landlady does not arise, and that even prima facie title has not been established by the plaintiff, and more so, the learned trial Court went on the admissions of the defendants No.1 to 3 without any document filed by the plaintiff to prove prima facie title.

27. The learned Special Government Pleader further contended that a specific plea was taken by the 3rd defendant that lease amount was withheld pending verification of the plaintiff’s title, but the learned trial Court did not properly considered the said pleadings. It is also argued that the authorities have handled the matter negligently and admitted the plaintiff as landlady without proper verification of the records available with the concerned Revenue Department.

28. It is further contended that suits involving Government property must be dealt cautiously, as Government officers, who are expected to safeguard public property, may, due to negligence or collusion, admit claims of private parties, thereby putting public property at risk, and any such loss ultimately affects the public at large.

29. The learned Government Pleader relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Hanumaiah and others v. Secretary to Govt. of Karnataka(2010(5) SCC 203) and contended that the plaintiff must establish at least prima facie title, particularly where the suit is based on a lease deed purportedly executed by the 4th defendant on behalf of the Government. It is further argued that the 3rd defendant, being Superintendent of the Government Mental Care Hospital, Hyderabad, acted without proper verification of the records and perfunctorily admitted the plaintiff as owner.

30. It is further contended that the plaintiff impleaded only the Medical & Health Department officials, whereas the Revenue Department, being the custodian of Government lands, ought to have been impleaded. It is further stated that though the District Collector filed an application to be impleaded, the same was dismissed and no revision was filed, and therefore the matter was not properly contested and it is further contended that in the case of this nature, the authorities ought to have filed a revision before this Court under Section 115 of CPC or relevant provisions of law which shows that authorities acted without proper diligence. It is further emphasized that the learned trial Court ought to have at least decided the prima facie title of the plaintiff de-horse the admission of the defendants, so as to prevent conversion of public property into private property due to negligence or collusion of the public authorities.

31. It is also argued that except Ex.A1 lease deed, no document is produced to substantiate ownership, and since it is only a Xerox copy allegedly executed on behalf of the Government, signed by the Executive Engineer (4 th defendant), it should not have been marked or exhibited since it is only Xerox copy and more so, no application was filed to mark it under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, more so, it is hit by the provisions of Registration Act and Stamp Act. Nonetheless, the 4th defendant is not the competent authority to execute such document representing the Government. Therefore contends that the claim of the plaintiff is based on defective and unreliable material, and the learned trial Court had not appreciated the said facts in proper perspective.

32. The learned Special Government Pleader further contended that the suit property is situated in Bahaloolkhanguda(now core locality of Hyderabad), which is an ex-Jagir village, and pursuant to the Jagir Abolition Regulation, 1358 Fasli (1948 AD), the entire village vested in the State Government. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Waqf Board & Ors(2022(20) SCC 383), wherein it was held that Jagir lands vested in the State and were  administered by the Jagir Administrator under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act; and in that view of the matter, the assertion of the plaintiff that she is the owner of the property is baseless and the plaintiff cannot derive any title in relation to the jagir land.

33. It is further contended that after such vesting, surveys were conducted and original Survey No.58 was subdivided and merged into Survey No.127, which was classified as Sarkari land (Government land) and recorded as Potekharab (uncultivable), and the Sethwar of 1953, marked as Ex.B6, which is the final settlement record, supports such classification, and the learned trial Court ought to have atleast scrutinized the material placed by the plaintiff with Ex.B7.

34. It is also submitted that this Court in G. Satyanarayan v. Govt. of AP. (2014 SCC Online AP 334) considered the evidentiary value of Sethwar and held that presumption of title arises from such entires, though the plaintiff has not produced any document to rebut the same. It is further contended that the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate this aspect and decreed the suit merely on admissions of defendant No.3.

35. It is further that in the Town Survey conducted between 1965–72 under the A.P. Surveys and Boundaries Act, 1923, final notification under Section 13 was published in the Hyderabad District Gazette, dt.22.04.1976 (Ex.B7), and as per the said survey, the land in question correlates to TS No.1, Block B, Ward 3 of Bahaloolkhanguda Village and is classified as Government Poramboke and Government Mental Hospital land, the said entries have attained finality as they were not challenged within the prescribed period, and the plaintiff solely rested claim on an unregistered and unstamped Photostat copy of lease deed, without any prima facie title and the learned trial Court decreed the suit without proper scrutiny of the various aspects of the case.

36. It is also argued that Plot No.17 in Survey No.58 is no longer in existence and that the evidence of DW1 (Mandal Revenue Officer, Ameerpet) and DW2 was not considered by the trial Court and without properly appreciating the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the defendants.

37. The learned Special Government Pleader, reiterating the principles laid down in R.Hanumaiah’s case(supra) contended that in suits against the Government, strict proof of title is necessary, as sometimes mischievous officers may admit claims without proper verification of records, and the plaintiff or the other parties will reap benefits out of the said admissions resulting in heavy damage to the public properties.

38. It is further contended that Ex.A2 lease deed is a nullity in law, as contracts on behalf of the Government must comply with constitutional requirements and be executed under proper procedure prescribed by the Constitution under General Clauses Act represented by competent authority, under Order XXVII of CPC, and that the Executive Engineer who executed Ex.A2 had no authority to bind the Government. It is also submitted that Ex.A2 is written on plain paper, hit by Section 3 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1957, and suffers from procedural irregularities, including retrospective operation, which casts serious doubt on its genuineness, and moreover, a photostat copy was produced without the original.

39. It is further contended that the trial Court erred in relying on admissions and ignoring the plea of fraud and misrepresentation. It is contended that the Revenue Department is the proper custodian of Government lands and the District Collector is the competent authority, whose application for impleadment was dismissed and no doubt, a revision was not filed before this Court challenging the dismissal of the said order, but nonetheless, the perfunctory attitude of the defendants cannot deprive the government of the property in the present facts of the case and further contends that several persons claimed the land in said survey number through various fabricated documents and their claims were dismissed by the respective competent Courts and one such connected second appeal i.e., SA.No.512 of 2003 is also being heard along with this appeal, in which suit, the District Collector was impleaded as defendant No.33, who has pleaded altogether a different stand in the written statement filed.

40. It is further contended that in the backdrop of the factual issue some credence should have been given to the evidence of DW1 and DW2, which clearly establish that the property belongs to the Government, but the trial Court erroneously came to conclusion in view of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, when jural relationship is admitted, the defendants are estopped from disputing title.

41. Finally, it is contended that Exs.A2 to A9, which are mere correspondences, do not confer even prima facie title on the plaintiff and on the basis of mere admission on the part of the defendants alone, the plaintiff cannot succeed without any prima facie title and that the learned trial Court, without proper appreciation of evidence, decreed the suit, and therefore the judgment and decree are liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/Plaintiff:

42. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, Sri Sunil B. Ganu, while reiterating the pleadings in the plaint as well as the admissions made by the defendants in the suit, contended that the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants has been admitted by the defendants by their own specific admission, and once the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted, the question of proving title by the plaintiff does not arise.

43. It is further contended that the exhibits filed by the defendants, particularly Ex.A6, clearly indicate that the defendants themselves pleaded that the schedule property along with other lands were proposed to be acquired by the Government by initiating appropriate proceedings, but the said acquisition could not be proceeded with due to certain difficulties.

44. It is further contended despite admitting tenancy and the plaintiff as the owner of the property, the defendants examined DW1 and DW2 setting up a new case that the suit schedule property formed part of Jagir lands and that by virtue of the Jagir Abolition Regulation, 1948, the entire land vested in the Government by virtue of Section 5 of the Act. This contention, according to the learned Senior Counsel, is wholly inconsistent with the pleadings and settled principles of law.

45. It is further submitted that the admissions made in the written statement, read along with Exs.A1 to A9, clearly establish that the plaintiff is the landlady of the suit schedule property, and therefore the learned trial Court was justified in holding that under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, in a suit for ejectment, once the jural relationship is admitted, the tenant is estopped from disputing the title of the landlord, particularly in the absence of a specific plea in the written statement.

46. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, sets out the circumstances under which a lease stands forfeited, and in the present case, Exs.A8 and A9 are crucial documents which were issued after receipt of the notice of termination, wherein the defendants had promised to send a detailed reply, but no such reply was ever issued.

47. It is further submitted that Ex.A9, dt.13.02.1984, is an important official document issued by the Superintendent of Government Mental Hospital referring to G.O.Ms.No.676, dt.21.06.1980, wherein assurance was given for payment of arrears of rent, thereby clearly admitting landlord-tenant relationship.

48. Reliance is placed on the judgment in G. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish(1987 (4) SCC 424), wherein it was held that under Section 116 of the Evidence Act, a tenant who has been inducted into possession cannot deny the title of the landlord, however defective it may be, so long as possession is not surrendered; and in the light of the said decision, it is contended that as the defendants in the underlying suit have not filed any counter claim, they are therefore precluded from raising inconsistent claims in appeal.

49. The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon State of Andhra Pradesh v. Hyderabad Potteries P. Limited & Another(2010 (5) SCC 382), to contend that TSLR entries have no conclusive evidentiary value to establish title, as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Further reliance is placed on Ahmed Saheb (Dead) LRs. v. Sayed Ismail(2012 (8) SCC 516), to contend that admitted facts need not be prooved.

50. It is further submitted that the decision in R. Hanumaiah’s case(supra) is distinguishable, as that was a suit for declaration of title against the Government, whereas the present suit is one for ejectment and consequential reliefs, and in the present case, there are clear admissions of tenancy by the defendants themselves.

51. It is further contended that reliance placed by the learned Special Government Pleader on G.Satyanarayana v. P.Jagdish’s case (supra) is also misplaced, as the Sethwar entries lose significance in the light of the categorical admissions by the Government, and such entries cannot override admitted jural relationships, and that the fact remains that the government made convenient entries once they decided to change their stand.

52. Further reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jyothi Sharma v. Vishnu Goel(2025 INSC 1099), wherein it was held that in eviction proceedings, strict proof of ownership is not required as in a title suit, and a tenant who has entered possession under a rent deed cannot subsequently dispute the landlord’s ownership.

53. It is therefore contended that the defendants are now attempting to take a completely inconsistent stand by challenging the title of the plaintiff in appeal, contrary to their admissions in the written statement and evidence.

4. It is further contended that once the jural relationship is admitted, the defendants are estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff, and therefore the learned trial Court has rightly decreed the suit. It is finally contended that the appellants have not made out any substantial grounds warranting interference with the well-considered reasoned judgment and decree of the trial Court, and contended that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT:

55. In the light of the above contentions raised by the appellants and respondents, in the considered view of this Court, the following points fall for consideration and adjudication of the instant appeal, and are answered accodingly:

               1. Whether the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court in holding that the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants stands proved on the basis of admissions made by the defendants in the written statement, are proper, just and based on a proper appreciation of evidence in right perspective?

               2. Whether the learned trial Court is justified in holding that, in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the defendants are estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff once the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted?

               3. Whether the defendants have established that the admissions made by the 3 rd defendant and other defendants regarding the jural relationship are sufficient to sustain the decree, particularly when the evidence of DW1 and DW2 asserts that the suit schedule property is Government land?

               4. Whether the appellants/defendants have made out a case challenging the prima facie title of the plaintiff to demonstrate that the admissions regarding the jural relationship are erroneous or unsustainable, so as to warrant interference by this Court with the judgment and decree of the trial Court?

               POINT No.1: Whether the findings arrived at by the learned trial Court in holding that the jural relationship between the plaintiff and defendants stands proved on the basis of admissions made by the defendants in the written statement, are proper, just and based on a correct appreciation of evidence in proper perspective?

56. The entire case of the plaintiff as accepted by the trial Court substantially rests upon the alleged admissions made in the written statement of the 3rd defendant and the documentary evidence marked as Exs.A6 to A9.

57. It is not in dispute that the defendants have admitted payment of rent up to 1984, but have not completely denied the existence of an arrangement under which possession was delivered. Further, Ex.A8 and Ex.A9 also indicates acknowledgment of continued interaction between the parties in relation to rent and tenancy. It is also significant that Ex.A9, issued by the Superintendent of the Government Mental Hospital, refers to Government orders and records relating to payment of arrears of rent, thereby reinforcing the inference of an admitted tenancy arrangement between the parties up to the relevant period.

58. In an ejectment claim, the primary requirement is proof of tenancy and its valid termination. The material on record, particularly the admissions and contemporaneous correspondence, do indicate the existence of some form of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, at least up to 1984, but theCourt has to view such admission in consonance to the cardinal principle oflaw that as to the evidentiary value of a Photostat cpy of a lease deed executed by a Executive Engineer of R&B Departmnet,who do not have the authority to enter lease agreement on behalf of the Government, more so, the authenticity of the alleged correspondences also should be seriously considered.

59. It is trite law that Section 116 of the Evidence Act also reinforces that a tenant, having been inducted into possession, is estopped from disputing the landlord’s title during subsistence of tenancy, but however, the lease deed should prima facie show that it is a valid transaction coupled with delivery of possession.

60. However, in the backdrop of the factual matrix coupled with the evidence of DWs.1 & 2 along with Exs.B1 to B9 the existence of such admissions by defendants alone, cannot be treated as conclusive proof of ownership or title unless it is supported by independent documents showing that the plaintiff has a prima facie right over the suit schedule property. An admission regarding payment of rent or tenancy may show how the parties were dealing with each other at a point of time and the authenticity of such admissions should be strictly considered as they by themselves cannot decide the question of ownership, especially when the property itself is claimed to be Government land. Further, though not pleaded in written statement and in the depositions of DW1 & DW2, at least an attempt was made by the District Collector to get impleaded in the suit, but however, the same was dismissed and the authorities have not challenged the said order in revision before this Court, which also shows the callous attitude of the authorities.

61. It is trite law that the plaintiff must stand on the strength of his own case and prove his title and entitlement through acceptable evidence, and he cannot succeed merely on the weakness or admissions of the defendants. Admissions made by the defendants, even if relevant for establishing tenancy, do not relieve the plaintiff of the initial burden of proving the foundational facts of ownership and lawful entitlement to seek ejectment, more particularly, when Ex.A2, a Photostat copy is marked, which is also an unregistered and undervalue stamped, more so, when the defendants have placed evidence to show that the property is a government land.

62. In cases where both sides rely on different sets of records, i.e., on lease related documents on one side and on revenue records showing Government ownership, on the other side, the Court has to carefully scrutinize the evidence, whether the plaintiff has first shown basic title or lawful entitlement before relying on admissions alone. Therefore, while the admissions and conduct of the parties may support the existence of tenancy up to a certain period, they cannot replace the requirement of proving ownership through proper and reliable evidence, when the property is claimed as Government land on the contrary and the basis for ejectment is through a Photostat copy of a lease agreement, Ex.A2,and only on correspondences. More so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Hanumaiah’s case(supra) categorically held that in suits against the Government, strict proof of title is to be verified, as sometimes mischievous officers admit the claims without verification.

63. Thus, the learned Senior Counsel’s contention that the principle laid down in R.Hanumaiah’s case(supra) is distinguishable in the nature of the instant case, is negated for the simple reason that in the instant case though the suit is for ejectment, the learned trial Court without any prima facie title has totally relied upon the admissions of the defendants and decreed the suit erroneously holding that since the defendants had admitted the plaintiff as owner and also admitted jural relationship. Further, the lease deed vide Ex.A2 has no evidentiary value being a Photostat copy and no proof lead by the plaintiff to fortify the alleged correspondences to prove their authenticity. Therefore, without any concrete proof to establish the jural relationship, such admissions of the gullible officers cannot prove the jural relationship and also the settled law under Section 116 of the Evidence Act that the tenant cannot attack the title of the landlord looses significance and the said contention of the learned Senior Counsel to that extent is also negated as misconceived.

               POINT No.2: Whether the learned trial Court is justified in holding that, in view of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the defendants are estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiff once the jural relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted?

64. The controversy, however, centers around Ex.A2, the alleged lease deed, which forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim. Ex.A2 is stated to have been executed on 13.04.1972 by the Executive Engineer of the PWD in favour of the plaintiff. A perusal of the document shows that it is a photostat copy executed on plain paper, containing three pages, and not the original instrument. The production of only a photocopy, without proper explanation of non-production of the original or laying proper foundation for secondary evidence, seriously affects its evidentiary value at the threshold itself.

65. Further, the document discloses certain inconsistencies, including retrospective commencement from 01.04.1969 and absence of uniform signatures of the executing authority on all pages. The competence of the officer executing the document on behalf of the Government also remains unclear from the record. More so, except correspondences, the plaintiff has not filed any piece of paper evidencing any part of the lease amount paid in lieu of the lease deed pertaining to any of the years. These circumstances create a serious doubt regarding the authenticity and enforceability of Ex.A2. The said document is also hit by Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, and Section 3 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899. When a document is said to bind the Government and create a continuing leasehold relationship, the authority of the executing officer and due execution in accordance with prescribed procedure assume decisive importance, and such requirements cannot be presumed on the basis of an incomplete or doubtful document.

66. Though the plaintiff relies upon Ex.A2 as the basis of tenancy, its evidentiary value is significantly weakened due to its nature as a secondary copy and absence of proper proof of execution, more so, it was executed by defendant No.4 (Executive Engineer), who has no authority to represent the Government. This aspect assumes importance particularly when the rights claimed are traced solely through such document. In the absence of satisfactory proof of execution and authority, Ex.A2 cannot be safely acted upon to establish or sustain the plaintiff’s primary claim, and therefore it fails to inspire confidence to support the relief sought. Accordingly, this point is answered.

               POINT No.3: Whether the defendants have established that the admissions made by the 3rd defendant and other defendants regarding the jural relationship are sufficient to sustain the decree, particularly when the evidence of DW1 and DW2 allegedly asserts that the suit schedule property is Government land?

67. On the aspect of the defendants’ evidence relevant to point No.3, namely ‘Whether the admissions in the written statement are sufficient to decree the suit despite contrary material on record’ is concerned, the defendants have placed reliance on revenue and survey records through Exs.B4 to B8. DW1, the Mandal Revenue Officer, has clearly stated in his evidence that the suit schedule land is Government land. Ex.B5, the Town Survey record, shows that Survey No.127/1 is classified as Government poramboke land and is shown as being used for the Mental Hospital. The oral evidence of DW1, being a responsible revenue official, also lends support to the documentary record, as it is based on official revenue entries maintained in the normal course of administration.

68. It is also seen that Town Survey proceedings were conducted and a notification was issued in 1976 under Ex.B7, by which time, survey No.58 was renumbered as survey No.127. Ex.B6 (Sethwar), Ex.B7 (Gazette notification), and Ex.B8 (survey records and village map) together indicate that the land has been shown as Government property in the official records. These documents form a consistent chain of official record entries reflecting classification of the land as Government poramboke, and they are not isolated or contradictory entries, but part of a continuous revenue record system.

69. Though revenue entries by themselves may not finally decide title, they are still relevant pieces of evidence to understand the nature of the land. When these records consistently show the land as Government poramboke and are supported by official survey and settlement documents, they cannot be ignored while examining whether the case can rest only on admissions of the officials of the defendants/Government in the written statement. Accordingly, the point is answered.

               POINT No.4: Whether the appellants/defendants have made out a case demonstrating that the admissions regarding the jural relationship are erroneous or unsustainable, so as to warrant interference by this Court with the judgment and decree of the trial Court?

70. The learned trial Court proceeded mainly on the premise that once jural relationship is admitted, Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act operates as an absolute bar against the defendants disputing the plaintiff’s title. There is no dispute regarding the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish’s case(supra), that a tenant is estopped from denying the landlord’s title during continuance of tenancy. However, this principle cannot be applied by itself without first making sure that a clear and valid tenancy is actually proved on record, because a tenancy cannot survive in law if the person claiming to be the landlord has no legal right to lease the property at all. Further, admissions alone are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but act as substantive evidence. So also, the estoppel under Section 116 is not automatic in all circumstances and necessarily depends upon the existence of a lawful and proved tenancy relationship. However, such estoppel presupposes a valid and established tenancy.

71. In the present case, the main document Ex.A2 itself is doubtful, and the defendants have placed reliance on consistent Government records indicating classification of the land as Government poramboke. In such a situation, the application of Section 116 in a mechanical manner without examining the competing documentary evidence is not justified. When the very basis of tenancy is disputed and is resting only on a secondary document, and there is credible material suggesting Government ownership, the Court is required to first test the strength of the plaintiff’s claim before invoking estoppel against the defendants. In such circumstances, estoppel cannot be applied in a routine manner, without first satisfying itself that the plaintiff’s claim is legally sustainable on proper evidence.

72. The principles laid down in R.Hanumaiah’s case (supra) assume relevance, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in cases involving Government land, Courts must exercise caution and require strict proof of title, especially when revenue records indicate Government ownership, and many a time it is the Government’s own officers, who are expected to protect public property and maintain proper records, who, either due to negligence or collusion, create incorrect or incomplete entries in revenue records, thereby enabling private parties to set up claims against Government land. Though in the said case, suit was for declaration, nonetheless the said principle squarely applies to the present case as well, since in the instant case, reliance is placed on admissions and disputed entries, despite consistent official records indicating Government ownership of the suit schedule property, mandating a careful scrutiny of evidence when Government property is in dispute, rather than proceeding solely on admissions or presumptions.

73. In Chaturbhuj Panda v.Collector, Raigarh(AIR 1969 SC 255) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

               “It is true that the witnesses examined on behalf the appellants have not been effectively cross-examined. It is also true that the Collector had not adduced any evidence in rebuttal; but that does not mean that the court is bound to accept their evidence. The Judges are not computers. In assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence, they are bound to call into aid their experience of life. As Judges of fact, it was open to the appellate Judges to test the evidence placed before them on the basis of probabilities.”

74. Further, in Rajiv Ghosh v. Satya Naryan Jaiswal(2025 INSC 467) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a decree on admission can be passed only where admissions are clean, unequivocal and legally binding.

75. In the present case, the trial Court appears to have proceeded primarily on admissions without properly evaluating the documentary evidence produced by the defendants or scrutinising the authenticity of Ex.A2 in its proper perspective.

76. The appreciation of evidence, therefore, is incomplete and thus, the findings recorded by the trial Court on the basis of admissions alone, without properly weighing the documentary evidence on record, is legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the point is answered.

CONCLUSION:

77. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the existence of jural relationship may not be completely inferred from admissions of defendants No.1 to 3 and correspondence, as their authenticity is not proved by leading a proper evidence and the foundation of the plaintiff’s claim based on Ex.A2 is not free from doubt, and the Government records produced by the defendants vide Exs.B1 to B9 and evidence of DW1 & DW2 have not been properly appreciated. The trial Court has erred in placing undue reliance on admissions without balancing the evidentiary value of competing records. Thus, the impugned judgment and decree is perverse, unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

78. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dt.30.06.1999 passed in O.S.No.414 of 1988 on the file of the V Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, is set aside. Consequently, the suit stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.