1. These writ petitions raise a common question and can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. The petitioner (in both writ petitions) is a Service Co-operative Bank. It has approached this Court being aggrieved by the fact that, at the instance of two of its employees, who are on record as the third respondent in each of the writ petitions, the Co-operative Ombudsman constituted in terms of the provisions contained in Section 69A of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the “1969 Act”) has passed orders produced as Ext.P4 in both the writ petitions, finding that on account of delay on the part of the petitioner in remitting contributions to the Co-operative Employees Pension Board, the party respondents in both writ petitions received a lesser amount of pension for a certain period of time and must, therefore, be adequately compensated.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits, with reference to the provisions of Sections 69 and 69A of the 1969 Act and the Kerala Co-operative Ombudsman Scheme, 2010 that the Co-operative Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain any complaint at the instance of any employee/ex-employee of the petitioner. On the facts of the case, it is submitted that there was no delay on the part of the petitioner in remitting any contribution and that, immediately on the demand being made, the alleged shortfall in contribution was also paid by the petitioner. It is further submitted that the order of the Co-operative Ombudsman directing that the party respondents in both the writ petitions be ‘adequately compensated’ is unworkable and unimplementable.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the third respondent in both the writ petitions would submit that the party respondents have suffered immensely on account of the fact that they were initially paid a lesser amount of pension. It is further asserted that, although the party respondents were entitled to receive a pension within one month from the date of their retirement, they started receiving a pension only much later.

4. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Pension Board would submit that the party respondents were paid a pension proportionate to the amount of contribution, and thereafter, on the shortfall in the contribution being made up, the actual pension due to the party respondents was also disbursed.

5. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I am of the view that there is considerable merit in the contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the orders produced as Ext.P4 in both the writ petitions cannot be sustained.

6. The relevant portion of Section 69 of the 1969 Act is extracted below:

                  “69. Disputes to be decided by Co-operative Arbitration Court and Registrar. –

                  (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if a dispute arises:--

                  xxx

                  (c) between the society or its committee and any past committee, any officer, agent or employee or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society; or

                  xxx

                  (j) between the members of the partnership formed under Section 14B, such dispute shall be referred to the Co-operative Arbitration Court constituted under Section 70A in the case of non-monetary disputes and to the Registrar, in the case of monetary disputes; and the Arbitration Court, or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall decide such dispute and no other court or other authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of such dispute.”

                  It is clear from a reading of Section 69 of the 1969 Act that all disputes between a society and its past officer/past employee have to be adjudicated by the Co-operative Arbitration Court and not by any other authority. The words “no other Court or Authority shall have jurisdiction” in Section 69(1)(j) of the 1969 Act obviously include any other authority constituted under the 1969 Act.

7. There is yet another reason as to why I must hold that the Co-operative Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint at the instance of the party respondents in the matter relating to their claim for compensation on account of the delay in the disbursal of Pensionary Benefits. The relevant portion of Section 69A of the 1969 Act reads thus:

                  “69A. Co-operative Ombudsman:-

                  (1) The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, frame a scheme to be called the “Kerala Co-operative Ombudsman Scheme” with the object of enabling redressal of complaints relating to deficiency in banking or other services rendered by co-operative societies.

                  (2) - (6)  ”

                  It is evident from a reading of Section 69A (1) of the 1969 Act that the Co-operative Ombudsman is authorised only to entertain complaints pertaining to deficiencies in banking or other services provided by Co-operative Societies. Thus, on the terms of Section 69A of the 1969 Act, the Co-operative Ombudsman does not have the jurisdiction to decide on any complaint raised by a past employee regarding any delay in the disbursement of pension/pensionary benefits.

8. There is yet another reason why the impugned orders cannot be sustained. The order of the Ombudsman is unworkable. The operative portion of Ext.P4 order in W.P.(C)No.23824 of 2020 reads as follows:

                  “Hence I direct the 1st respondent adequately compensate the complainant for the aforesaid 2 years, which the respondent failed to remit their proportionate contribution to the pension fund. This shall be done within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order.”

                  The operative portion of Ext.P4 order in W.P.(C)No.23884 of 2020 is identically worded. The Ombudsman has not decided the amount of compensation payable to the respective party respondents and has only directed that they should be adequately compensated. In Kiranbala Dandapat v. Secretary, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd., AIR 1998 Ori 159, the word ‘compensation’ in the legal sense was explained thus:-

                  “4. ……..The term ‘compensation’ as stated in the Oxford Dictionary, signifies that which is given in recompence in equivalent rendered. ‘Damages’ on other hand constitute the sum of money claimed or adjudged to be paid in compensation for loss of injury sustained the value estimated in money, or something lost or withheld. The term ‘compensation’ etymologically suggests the image of balancing one thing against another; its primary signification is equivalents, and the secondary and more common meaning is something given or obtained as an equivalent. Pecuniary damages are to be valued on the basis of ‘full compensation’. The concept was first stated by Lord Blackborn in Livingstone v. Rawgarda Coel Co.(1980) AC 25.

                  5. The ‘Rule of Law’ requires that the wrongs should not remain unredressed. All the individuals or persons committing wrongs should be liable in an action for damages for breach of civil law or for criminal punishment. Law of torts is founded on the principle that every injury must have a remedy. ‘Compensation’ means anything given to make things equivalent, a thing given or to make amends for loss, recompense, remuneration or pay; it need not, therefore, necessarily be in terms of money, because law may specify principles on which and manner in which compensation is to be determined as given. Compensation is an act which a Court orders to be done, or money which a Court orders to be paid, by a person whose acts or omissions have caused loss or injury to another in order that thereby the person damified may receive equal value for his loss or be made whole in respect of his injury; something given or obtained as equivalent; rendering of equivalent in value or amount an equivalent given for property taken or for an injury done to another; a recompense in value; a recompense given for a thing received recompense for whole injury suffered, remuneration or satisfaction for injury or damage or every description. The expression ‘compensation’ is not ordinarily used as an equivalent to ‘damage’ although compensation may often have to be measured by the same rule as damages in an action for a breach. The term ‘compensation’ as pointed out in the Oxford Dictionary signifies that which is given in recompense, an equivalent rendered, ‘damages’ on the other hand constitute the sum of money, claimed or adjudged to be paid in compensation for loss or injury sustained. ‘Compensation’ is a return for a loss or damages sustained. Justice requires that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind. ‘Amends’ is return for something that is faulty in ourselves or towards others, ‘satisfaction’ is that which satisfies the individual requiring it, is given for personal injuries, and may be either by a return or otherwise, according to disposition of the person to be satisfied. ‘Recompense’ is a voluntary return for a voluntary service; it is made from generous feeling and derives its value not so much from the magnitude or service or return, as from intention of the parties towards each other; and it is received not so much as a matter of right as of courtesy. ‘Remuneration’ is not voluntary as recompense, but it is equally indefinite, being estimated rather according to condition of the person and dignity of service than its positive worth. ‘Requital’ is the return of a kindness, the making it is an act of gratitude. ‘Reward’ may be a bad return when it is inadequate to the merits of the person. In cases of assessment of damages, pure mathematics cannot be relied on exclusively to arrive at a reasonable estimate of just compensation, for much pertains to the realms of hypothesis, and in that region arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master therefore, an award should be of a round sum rather than one actually computed. (Per Lord Button J. in Bail v. Kraft, 1967 ACJ 235 (Supreme Court of British Columbia, Canada).

It is thus clear that a Court or authority directing the payment of compensation must specify the amount of compensation to be paid. Any order directing the payment of compensation without fixing the amount of compensation cannot be sustained in law.

For all these reasons, these writ petitions will stand allowed, and Ext.P4 order in W.P.(C)No.23824 of 2020 and Ext.P4 order in W.P. (C)No.23884 of 2020 will stand quashed. It is made clear that the setting aside of the order of the Ombudsman will not be treated as a bar to the party respondents from seeking any remedy available to them in accordance with the law.