(Through Video Conferencing)

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by consent of parties.

2. The Revision Applicant is common in both these revisions. Civil Revision Application Nos. 23 of 2021 and 24 of 2021 are filed challenging the Judgment and Decree dated 15.06.2020 passed by the District Judge - 2, Satara in Regular Civil Appeal No. 144 of 2012 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2015, respectively under a common judgment, by which both appeals are dismissed. Revision applications are filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (‘CPC’ for short).

3. The said appeals arise out of a judgment and decree dated 02.03.2012 passed by Civil Judge Junior Division, Mahabaleshwar in Regular Civil Suit No. 69 of 2010 (old Regular Civil Suit No. 187 of 1999) by which eviction suit filed by Respondent No. 1-Trust, is decreed, directing present Revision Applicant and Respondent Nos. 5 to 7 to handover vacant and peaceful possession of suit property to Respondent-Trust Plaintiff. By the same judgment and decree, the Trial Court has dismissed the counter claim of present Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4.

4. Thus, the above Revision Applications are arising out of eviction decree passed in favour of Plaintiff and dismissal of counter claim by Defendant No. 4.

5. A building known as Rajendra Kutir @ Shanti Niketan admeasuring 162 sq. mtr. consisting of 10 rooms on the ground floor and 9 rooms on the first floor (total 19 rooms) along with sanitary block in CTS No. 41 at Mahabaleshwar District-Satara, is the subject matter of present dispute and the same is hereinafter referred to as ‘ the suit property’ for short.

6. In January 1999, the Respondent No. 1-Trust through its Trustees filed the said suit contending inter alia as under. That it is a registered Public Trust being owner of the suit property, which was given on license to Defendant No. 1 on 21.10.1970 and thereafter, given on license to Defendant No. 2 on 06.02.1976 for running hotel business till 30th September of next year (1977). That Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were not supposed to give the suit property on any sub-license or make any permanent alterations/ construction. That since the Plaintiff/Trust has office at Mumbai and Trustees are also residing in Mumbai, there was no day to day vigilance and taking advantage of such situation, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 started putting new construction in and about February 1996. That permanent alterations and construction was carried out without permission of the Plaintiff-Trust or local authority. That on complaint to the local authority, action has been taken and unauthorized construction was removed in March 1997. That in or about 1996, the Plaintiff/Trust came to know that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have inducted Defendant No. 3 illegally as sub-tenant, without permission of the Plaintiff-Trust and Defendant No. 3 is running a hotel business in the name and styled as Dixit Hotels Pvt. Ltd. That by such unlawful induction of Defendant No. 3, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have committed breach of terms. That Plaintiff is a trust running school in CTS No. 41 and requires the suit property bona-fide for giving education facility to more students because it proposes to construct additional building for expansion of school. That the suit notices dated 10.04.1993 and 21.03.1996 have been issued thereby terminating license/ tenancy asking for possession, however Defendants have not complied.

7. Defendant No. 1 filed written statement, admitting inter alia that suit property was given on license and he was conducting hotel business in the name and style as hotel ‘Satkar’. The contentions about unlawful induction of Defendant No. 3 is denied. The case of permanent construction is denied. The requirement pleaded by Plaintiff is also denied. It is contented that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have become irrevocable licensees.

8. Defendant No. 2 filed written statement and in substance admitted the claim of Plaintiff, including that of permanent construction, sub-letting as well as requirement of the Plaintiff. By filing pursis and affidavit-in-support, Defendant No. 2 admitted the whole claim of Plaintiff and waived all his contentions.

9. Defendant No. 3 filed written statement contending inter alia that it is not having any concern with the suit property and Plaintiff-Trust has inducted present Revision Applicant as a ‘tenant’ in the suit property, who happens to be director of Defendant No. 3-company. That she has been inducted in her personal capacity. That Revision Applicant has invested huge amount for alteration and addition in the suit property which is carried out with consent of the Plaintiff. That Revision Applicant has paid deposit and advance rent. That there is no sub-lease or sub-license as alleged. That she is conducting hotel and lodging business in the suit property and is in exclusive possession thereof as tenant since 1986.

10. Defendant No. 4/present Revision Applicant filed written statement contending inter alia that she is a ‘lawful tenant’ in the suit property since 1986. That suit property was being used for residential purpose which was in dilapidated condition. That it was given to Defendant No.1 for running hotel business. That new construction was carried out with the oral consent of Plaintiff. That Plaintiff with malicious plan to evict these Defendants and as a harassment tactic, has complained to local authority forcing them to take demolition action. That the Plaintiff No.1(Trustee) is elder sister of Defendant No. 1 having full knowledge about construction in suit property. That Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have no concern with suit property since 1986. That she has been inducted as lawful tenant with full knowledge of Plaintiff/Trust. That requirement pleaded is not bona-fide and reasonable. That she will suffer greater hardship in case of eviction. That it was represented to her that Defendant No. 1 is constituted attorney of Plaintiff/Trust and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were looking after management of suit property on behalf of Plaintiff/Trust. That since she has experience of hotel business and came to know that Plaintiff intended to ‘let out’ suit property, she met the Plaintiff Trust and Defendant No. 1 at Mumbai. That on inspection of suit property, it was found that it required renovation, improvement and alterations. That Plaintiff agreed and consented to Revision Applicant carrying out necessary alterations. That Plaintiff insisted that Revision Applicant enters into a written agreement; however, also insisted that being Public Trust, it cannot enter into long lease without permission of the Competent Authority and lot of time will be taken thereby increasing complications. Therefore, the Plaintiff insisted on execution of ‘conducting agreement’. That she was assured that possession will not be demanded as long as she is paying reasonable rent of the suit property. That deposit was paid. That the conducting agreement is nothing but a transaction of lease and exclusive possession. That she is paying electricity bills, water charges etc. That she has taken telephone connection in her name in the suit property. That she has invested huge amounts for carrying out alterations. That full rent is received in advance till the end of year 2006. That in June 1996, at the end of earlier agreement, the Plaintiff insisted on new agreement demanding further advance which was paid. The rent for further period was also increased. That in 1997-98, the Plaintiff again started demanding exorbitant increase in the rent, but Defendant No. 4 refused and therefore, present false suit is filed. That Defendant No. 1 and 2 have colluded with the Plaintiff. That she is added as party Defendant No. 4 in the suit subsequently. That she will suffer irreparable loss in case of eviction. That she has become irrevocable licensee. That even if Court comes to the conclusion that she is not a tenant, she is in lawful exclusive possession because she was inducted with full knowledge of Plaintiff.

11. The Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 also made counter claim seeking declaration that she is a lawful tenant in suit property or that she has become irrevocable licensee in the alternative. Declaration is also sought about lawful possession and permanent injunction against Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 restraining them from interfering with her possession.

12. The Plaintiff-Trust filed written statement to the counter claim, denying the allegations. The claim of tenancy or license agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant No. 4 is denied. It is contented that there is no privity of contract or relation between Plaintiff/ Trust and Defendant No. 4. It is contented that Defendant No. 4 is neither tenant nor licensee of the Plaintiff.

13. Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2 also filed written statements to the counter claim thereby denying the claim of Defendant No. 4. They contended that Defendant No. 1 was conducting hotel business in suit property as licensee and there is no agreement between Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 4.

14. The learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Mahabaleshwar by Judgment and Decree dated 02.03.2012 decreed the suit thereby directing all Defendants to hand over vacant possession of suit property to the Plaintiff/Trust. The counter claim of Revision Applicant was dismissed.

15. The Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 filed two appeals viz. Regular Civil Appeal No. 144 of 2012 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 18 of 2015 challenging decrees of eviction as well as dismissal of counter claim. These two appeals were heard together and by common judgment, the appeals have been dismissed, confirming the decree of eviction and dismissal of counter claim by the District Judge-2, Satara under impugned judgment and decrees dated 15.06.2020.

16. The Revision Applicant has placed on record compilation of pleadings as well as oral evidence on record and it is considered by consent of learned counsel for parties.

SUBMISSIONS

17. Mr. Anturkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Revision Applicant submitted as under.

                   17.1. That according to Plaintiff, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are licensees and Defendant No. 3 is inducted by them. That since the ground prayed for eviction is unlawful sub-letting, if Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are licensees, such ground is not available, because the person inducting unlawful sub-tenant must be accepted as tenant. That according to Plaintiff, Defendant No. 3 is sub-tenant however, if Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are treated as licensee, Defendant No. 3 can not become sub-tenant.

                   17.2. That even if the contention of Defendant No. 4/Revision Applicant is ignored about tenancy, no decree of possession can be passed against the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Relying upon issues framed by the Trial Court, he submitted that issue Nos. 1 to 4 casts burden upon Applicant/Defendant No. 4 to prove lawful tenancy/ irrevocable license however there is no issue framed about any of the grounds provided under Bombay Rent Act (Section 12 or 13) for getting possession of the suit premises. He submitted that in such circumstances unless a ground under the Bombay Rent Act is considered and proved, eviction cannot be ordered. That breach of terms and conditions of the licensee agreement is not a ground for eviction under the Bombay Rent Act.

                   17.3. That jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (‘Bombay Rent Act, for short) cannot be invoked against a licensee or against persons inducted by a licensee. That Section 28 does not provide for recovery of possession from licensee because the word ‘possession’ is conspicuously absent in Section 28 so far as suit between licensee or licensor is concerned.

                   17.4. That assuming that the Court has jurisdiction against Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the suit is still not maintainable against Defendant No.4 because the landlord’s witness has admitted that Applicant/Defendant No. 4 is treated as ‘trespasser’. That if there is no landlord-tenant relationship with Defendant No. 4, suit invoking jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act could not have been decreed. That only suit in ordinary civil jurisdiction could have been filed against Defendant No. 4.

                   17.5. That Defendant No. 4 claims to be a tenant inducted through the Plaintiff’s Power of Attorney, but there is no prayer/relief sought against Defendant No.4. That the Applicant-Defendant No. 4 was impleaded in the suit under order of this Court in Sumita Pradipkumar Dixit vs. Pushpadevi G. Makharia & Ors [2002 (4) Bom C. R. 249]; however, even after impleadment, the Plaintiff has not amended the plaint and sought any claim/relief against the Applicant.

                   17.6 That the averments in the plaint itself indicates that the alleged unauthorized construction was removed in March-1997 and suit was filed in January-1999 and therefore, in the words of the learned counsel for the Revision Applicant there was not even ‘live cause of action’ on said ground.

                   17.7. That in paragraph No. 4 of the plaint, the Plaintiff has described Defendant No. 3 as sub licensee/sub-tenant which itself indicates that the landlord is not clear about the status of Defendant No. 3.

                   17.8. That requirement pleaded is for construction of additional building and the same is not ground for requirement. That pleading about public at large suffering irreparable loss because large number of students are deprived of their choice of taking education in the school run by Plaintiff-Trust, is not a valid consideration. He relied upon following judgments in support of his case :

                   i. Sumita Pradipkumar Dixit (Supra).

                   ii. Hiralal Vallabhram vs. Sheth Kasturbhai Lalbhai [1967 AIR (SC) 1853].

                   iii. Om Prakash Gupta vs. Rattan Singh & Anr. [AIRONLINE 1962 SC 9].

                   iv. Laxmidas Morarji (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Miss. Behrose Darab Madan [2009 ALL SCR 2456].

18. Per contra, Mr. Killedar learned Counsel for the Respondent-Landlord submitted as under.

                   18.1. That Defendant No. 3 includes Defendant No. 4 because Defendant No. 4 is one of the directors of Defendant No. 3-Company.

                   18.2. That no amendment was required after impleadment of the Applicant/Defendant No. 4 because the landlord has prayed that “responsible defendant” he ordered to handover vacant and peaceful possession, which includes Defendant No. 4.

                   18.3. That the alleged Power of Attorney of the landlord on the basis of which the Defendant No. 4 claims to have been inducted, is not on record and therefore her case has no basis. That there is no privity.

                   18.4. That the Defendant No. 4 has taken clear stand in written statement that she is ‘a lawful tenant’ of the suit property and therefore the Court clearly has jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. That Plaintiff has mentioned Bombay Rent Act in the plaint and court-fees are also paid accordingly. That the Applicant/Defendant No. 4 has taken a stand in the written statement that since under applicable provisions of law the public trust cannot enter into long lease of the trust property without prior permission of the Charity Commissioner, and since lot of time is required for obtaining such permission and the process is likely to increase complications, a conducting agreement was executed with Defendant No. 4. He submitted that therefore on overall reading of plaint, suit can be treated as the one under under Bombay Rent Act and it is maintainable. He relied on Judgment of Importers And Manufacturers Ltd vs. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala & Ors [1953 SCR (226)] and Sumita Pradipkumar Dixit (supra) to contend that suit against trespasser as unlawful tenant is maintainable under provisions of Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act.

                   18.5. That tenant cannot dictate to the landlord about its bona-fide requirement. That the Appellate Court has considered the ground of ‘unlawful sub-letting’ as ground for ordering eviction. That Defendant No. 2 has taken a clear stand in written statement that Defendant No. 3 is inducted without permission of the Plaintiff and therefore unlawful sub-letting is proved.

                   18.6 That merely admitting that Defendant No. 4 is trespasser will not take away the jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. That illegal sub-tenant or person illegally inducted is nothing but a trespasser and such stand is not new.

                   18.7. That the pleadings will have to be read harmoniously as a whole, and such technical objection can not be entertained at the stage of revision, within limited jurisdiction under section 115 of CPC.

                   18.8. He finally submitted that after so many years, the Respondent landlord Trust should not be driven to file another suit against the Applicant by interfering with concurrent decrees.

REASONS AND CONCLUSIONS

19. I have considered the rival submissions carefully and perused the record produced.

20. It is most important to note here at the beginning that the suit property is situated at Mahabaleshwar, District Satara, where admittedly, there is no Court of Small Causes. Admittedly, the dispute regarding landlord tenant or licensor or licensee at Mahabaleshwar are decided by the Court of Civil Judge Junior Division having jurisdiction in the area in which suit property is situated under Section 28 (1) (b) of Bombay Rent Act. In the present case, therefore, the Trial Court is Civil Judge Junior Division, Mahabaleshwar, which is Rent Court and also has an ordinary jurisdiction over the area where suit property is situated. Therefore this is a case of a Court having concurrent jurisdiction.

21. The first argument of Learned Senior Advocate for the Revision Applicant is that the Plaintiff treated Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 as licensees who have inducted Defendant No. 3 by way of unlawful sub-letting and therefore, such ground cannot be made out under Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act because for unlawful sub-tenancy, initially it must be accepted that Defendant No. 1 or 2 are tenants. The connected argument is that Section 28 of Bombay Rent Act does not provide for recovery of possession from licensee as it only provides for jurisdiction to entertain a suit between the licensor or licensee relating to recovery of license fees or charge. So far as this argument is concerned, let us see the pleadings of the plaint, as a whole.

22. It is settled law that plaint can not be read in isolated sentences. It has to be read and construed by the Court as a whole. Though it is true that Defendant No. 3 has been referred to as ‘sub-licensee’ and breach of license conditions are mentioned in paragraph no. 4 of the plaint, it is equally true that in same paragraph, it is clearly stated that Defendant No. 3 has been inducted as ‘unlawful sub-tenant’ and it is in breach of ‘provisions of Bombay Rent Act’. Therefore, it can not be said that case of unlawful sub-tenancy under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act is not made out. In this respect it is material to note that case of Defendant being licensees is limited to two agreements viz. 21.10.1970 and 06.02.1976 between the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 & 2 respectively, as can be seen from paragraph No. 2 of the plaint. It is specifically pleaded that ‘year of license’ was from 1st October to 30th September of next calender year. This means that last license was till September of 1977. The capacity of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (as parties) thereafter, is not specifically limited to being licensees. It is seen from paragraph No. 6 of the plaint that prior to filing of the suit, two notices were issued asking for possession. It is clearly pleaded that under advocate’s notice dated 21.03.1996, license/tenancy was terminated. From paragraph No. 8 of the plaint, it is clearly seen that suit has been valued at ‘rent-rack’ i.e. yearly rent (for 12 months), in tune with section 6(xii)(d) of the then Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Now Maharashtra Court fees Act).

23. These pleadings and case of Plaintiff is admitted by Defendant No. 2. The stand of Defendant No. 3 company is that it has no concern with the suit property and Defendant No. 4 is inducted as ‘a tenant’ in her personal capacity from 1986. It is admitted by Defendant No. 3 that Defendant No. 4 is its director.

24. Defendant No. 4 has taken a clear stand that it is ‘a lawful tenant’ since 1986 and has sought declaration of tenancy by way of counter-claim.

25. A ‘license’ is defined under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, to mean a personal right granted to a person in or upon an immovable property, of which revocation can be express or implied under section 61 thereof. License is deemed to be revoked by efflux of time under section 62(c) thereof. In the facts of this case, initial licenses of the year 1970 and 1976 are long revoked by efflux of time. Therefore on the date of suit, it can not be said that the Plaintiff Trust was treating the Defendant Nos. 1 & 2 as licensees. Thereafter by last notice dated 21.03.1996, even tenancy is terminated.

26. One more reason is that the Revision Applicant/ Defendant No. 4 has taken clear stand that she is a lawful tenant inducted by Plaintiff/Trust through its power of attorney in favour of Defendant No. 1. For deciding such claim of tenancy, the Court has to exercise rent jurisdiction as provided under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act.

27. Therefore from overall reading of the plaint and written statement in this case, it can not be said that the Court (faced with such peculiar rival claims) did not have jurisdiction under section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, especially when the Court admittedly exercised concurrent jurisdiction and there is no Small Causes Court at the relevant place. A litigant cannot be left without remedy. Hence the said argument has no merit.

28. Next argument of the learned Senior Advocate for Revision Applicant is that assuming that the Court had jurisdiction, the suit is still not maintainable because the Plaintiff is treating Defendant No. 4 as a trespasser and therefore it cannot be tried under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. In this respect, the judgment relied upon by the Respondent / Plaintiff Trust in Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. vs. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala (Supra) assumes importance. In this judgment, three Judges' Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a sub-tenant who is inducted unlawfully and therefore referred to as a trespasser, impleaded as ‘a proper party’ will not render the suit any less a suit between landlord and tenant or take it out of section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act and to hold otherwise will encourage multiplicity of proceedings. This squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Therefore the suit is maintainable against the Defendant No. 4. In fact, relying on this judgment, this Court had made Revision-Applicant / Defendant No. 4 party to the suit under Sumita Pradipkumar Dixit (supra).

29. In this respect, it is important to note that by the very nature of the ground of unlawful sub-letting, it is the case of the Plaintiff that Defendant Nos. 3 and its director Defendant No. 4 are illegally inducted without permission of the Plaintiff. If such ground is held to be proved, then obviously the person who is illegally inducted becomes a trespasser. Therefore, for that reason alone, it cannot be said that the Rent Court does not have jurisdiction under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act.

30. The next argument of the learned Senior Advocate appearing for Revision Applicant is that there is no prayer or relief against the Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 even after impleading her under the order of this Court. In this respect, it is rightly submitted by learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff Trust that the prayer in the plaint is directed against ‘responsible Defendant’ who is sought to be evicted and therefore, such argument is highly technical and amounts to hair-splitting and therefore, has no merit. The concerned prayer in the plaint is reproduced below.

                   “a) The responsible defendant be ordered to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff trust.”

31. The next argument is that the suit has been decreed by the Trial Court only on finding that Defendant No. 4 did not prove that she is a lawful tenant/irrevocable licensee and no ground provided under Bombay Rent Act under Section 12 or 13 is considered and therefore, decree of eviction cannot be sustained. In this respect, it is material to note that the Appeal Court, which is last fact finding Court, on re-appreciation of evidence, has held that the plaintiff-Trust has proved that Defendant No. 1 and 2 have inducted Defendant No. 4 without permission of the Plaintiff/Trust. This is under section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act. Therefore on facts, it cannot be said that the ground for eviction under Bombay Rent Act is not made out.

32. The next argument that when the suit was filed in January 1999, the alleged unauthorized construction was already removed in March 1997 and therefore, there was no cause of action on the date of filing of the suit. This is also without merit, because the ground on which decree is passed is not illegal construction but unlawful sub-letting. Therefore, removal of unauthorized construction in March 1997 and filing of suit in January 1999 will have no material bearing on the decree passed.

33. The last argument is that the requirement pleaded by the Plaintiff-Trust for construction of additional building is not a valid ground because the pleading is about public at large or about large number of students being deprived of their choice of taking education in the school run by Plaintiff-Trust. Once again, at the cost of repetition, it is noted that the ground on which eviction is ordered is not requirement of the Plaintiff and therefore whether the requirement as pleaded is a valid ground or not, it does not have material bearing on the outcome of the suit.

34. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that the alleged Power of Attorney on the basis of which Defendant No. 4 claims to have been inducted, is not produced on record and therefore, it cannot be said that Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 was lawfully inducted. The genesis of Revision Applicant's entry in the suit property remains without permission of the Plaintiff-Trust. Defendant No. 4 has admitted that she herself has not seen said Power of Attorney. Deposit receipts, stamp paper and alleged conducting agreements, relied upon by Defendant No. 4, are signed by Defendant No. 1 without any authority. Both the Courts have concurrently held that Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 has failed to prove that she was lawful tenant or irrevocable licensee in the suit property. When the very induction of Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 is on the basis of document of Power of Attorney which is not proved or produced on record, it cannot be said that Defendant No. 4 has any right to continue in occupation of the suit property. Since, the Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 herself has come with a case that the ‘conducting agreements’ were not in fact conducting agreements, but were executed to avoid permission of the Charity Commissioner required to be taken by Plaintiff/Trust, it can be safely said that Revision Applicant/Defendant No. 4 herself accepts that she has not entered the suit properly under genuinely intended documents. In that view of the matter, the Revision Applicant cannot be even considered as a person in possession for conducting the business of hotel.

35. So far as judgment of Hiralal Vallabhram (Supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the eviction of sub-tenant, had found on facts that when tenants-in-chief have not been ejected, the Appellate Court did not have jurisdiction to eject merely the sub-tenant by holding him as trespasser. The facts of the present case are completely different, because in the present case the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have also been directed to vacate the suit property.

36. In Laxmidas Morarji (Supra), it was held that the suit under Bombay Rent Act is maintainable provided that the landlord-tenant relationship is established. Since it was found that the Small Causes Court at Bombay had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the view taken that suit was not maintainable, was confirmed. However in the present case at hand, for reasons indicated above, it is already held that the Court had jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. Therefore this judgment will not advance the case of the Revision-Applicant. For the same reason, the judgment of Om Prakash Gupta (supra) will also not help the Revision-Applicant.

37. The concurrent findings of fact are found to be based on material available on record. There is no perversity or jurisdictional error. Therefore in the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC, it is not possible to re-appreciate the evidence and come to a contrary conclusion. There is no reason to interfere.

38. The Civil Revision Application is dismissed. No order as to costs.

39. The Revision Applicant is granted 8 weeks’ time to vacate the suit property subject to the Revision Applicant and all adult members of her family filing undertaking in this Court, within a period of 2 weeks from today, stating that the suit property will be vacated within 8 weeks from today and no third party will be inducted till then.

40. All concerned to act on duly authenticated or digitally signed copy of this order.