Raja Vijayaraghavan, J.

1. The above-captioned appeal has been preferred by the appellant, who is the sole accused in S.C.No. 186 of 2012 on the file of the III Additional Sessions Court, Thrissur. In the said case, he was tried for having committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. By the impugned judgment, the appellant was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, and he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- with a default clause.

The Prosecution Case:

2. According to the prosecution, the accused and the deceased, a 19-year-old youth by name Abhilash, were neighbours and were well acquainted with each other. The prosecution case is that the accused had earlier entrusted a memory card to Abhilash, which was allegedly not returned. Owing to the grievance arising from the non-return of the memory card, the accused confronted Abhilash on 13.04.2011 at about 9.30 p.m. and demanded its return. It is alleged that an altercation ensued between the two, and the persons present at the scene intervened and separated them. The prosecution allegation is that immediately thereafter, the accused rushed towards Abhilash and inflicted a stab injury on his chest. The injured was immediately taken to the hospital for treatment. However, he succumbed to the injuries sustained and was declared dead by the attending doctors.

Registration of Crime, Investigation and Trial :

3. On the basis of the information furnished by one Manikuttan (PW1), an alleged eye-witness, at about 10:55 p.m. on 13.04.2011, Ext.P1 FI statement was prepared, and on its basis Ext.P10 FIR was registered at 11:30 p.m. as Crime No. 446 of 2011 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The appellant is shown as the accused in the FIR.

4. On 14.04.2011, the investigation was taken over by PW15, who was then serving as the Circle Inspector of Police, Thrissur West Police Station. PW15 reached West Fort Hospital, Thrissur, at about 2.30 a.m., where he recorded the statement of the first informant as well as those of certain witnesses. Thereafter, he proceeded to the scene of occurrence and recorded the statements of the witnesses present there. He further stated that a police officer was deputed to guard the scene of occurrence and that he thereafter returned to the Police Station at about 3.30 a.m. According to PW15, in the meanwhile, the accused had been apprehended by local residents and brought to the Police Station. After reaching the Station at about 3.30 a.m., he formally arrested the accused and prepared Ext.P15 series Arrest Memo and Arrest Notice. The clothes worn by the accused at the time of arrest were also seized under Ext.P8 seizure mahazar in the presence of witnesses. PW15 further deposed that at about 8.30 a.m., he reached West Fort Hospital, Thrissur, and conducted the inquest over the body of the deceased, preparing Ext.P3 inquest report. Thereafter, the body was forwarded to the Medical College Hospital for post-mortem examination. At about 11.00 a.m., the services of the Scientific Assistant were secured for conducting a scientific inspection of the scene of occurrence. During the inspection, a pair of slippers and a knife found at the scene were seized under Ext.P2 scene mahazar in the presence of witnesses. The articles collected and seized by the Scientific Assistant during the course of inspection were separately incorporated in Ext.P9 mahazar. PW15 further stated that he subsequently submitted Ext.P16 report before the jurisdictional Court furnishing the name, address and other identifying particulars of the accused.

5. Thereafter, the investigation was taken over by PW16, who was then serving as the Circle Inspector of Police, Thrissur West Police Station. PW16 completed the remaining stages of the investigation and, upon being satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against the accused, laid the final report before the jurisdictional Magistrate. The final report was filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Thrissur. Upon taking cognizance of the offences alleged, the learned Magistrate initiated committal proceedings and numbered the case as C.P. No.54 of 2011. After complying with the procedural requirements contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure and finding that the offences alleged were exclusively triable by a Court of Session, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court, Thrissur. Subsequently, the case was made over to the Court of the III Additional Sessions Judge, Thrissur, for trial and disposal in accordance with law.

6. After hearing the prosecution and the accused, charge for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC was framed, and the same was read over and explained to the accused. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed that he be tried in accordance with law.

7. On the side of the prosecution, as many as 16 witnesses were examined as PWs 1 to 16 and through them Exts. P1 to P17 were exhibited and marked. The material objects were produced and identified as MOs 1 to 7. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials arising from the evidence were put to the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant denied all the incriminating materials, and in his statement he stated that he is not responsible for the death of the deceased.

8. According to the accused, he was present at the scene along with his friends at about 7.30 p.m. on the date of the incident. He stated that, since it was an election day, a verbal altercation had arisen between him and certain others while they were engaged in a discussion relating to politics. According to him, local residents intervened and separated the persons involved in the quarrel. He further stated that thereafter he returned to his house and went to sleep. The accused denied having inflicted any injury on the deceased and contended that the injuries sustained by the deceased might have been caused by some other person. In support of the defence case, Ext.D1 contradiction was marked during the course of the trial.

Findings of the learned Sessions Judge:

9. The learned Sessions Judge, after a detailed evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly through PW1 and PW2, was cogent, reliable and convincing. The trial court found that their testimony inspired confidence and was sufficient to form the basis of a conviction. The contention raised by the defence regarding an alleged delay in setting the criminal law in motion was considered and rejected by the learned Sessions Judge. The trial court found that the delay, if any, stood satisfactorily explained and did not cast any doubt on the prosecution case. Likewise, the defence contention that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 suffered from material discrepancies and inconsistencies inter se was also repelled. Upon an independent assessment of their evidence, the learned Sessions Judge found that the discrepancies pointed out were neither material nor sufficient to discredit their version. On the basis of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge concluded that it was the accused who had inflicted the fatal injury on the deceased Abhilash with MO1 knife. The court further held that the intention of the accused could be gathered from the nature of the weapon employed, the force with which it was used and, more importantly, the vital part of the body chosen for the attack. The injury having been inflicted on the chest of the deceased with a deadly weapon, the court found that the act was committed with the requisite intention contemplated under law. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge held that the act of the accused squarely fell within the ambit of clause firstly of Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code and consequently amounted to the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The accused was, therefore, found guilty, convicted and sentenced accordingly.

Contentions raised by the Counsel for the Appellant :

10. Sri. Vinay Ramdas, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, assailed the finding of guilt recorded by the learned Sessions Judge and contended that the conviction cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. According to the learned counsel, a careful scrutiny of the evidence of PW1 and PW2 would reveal that their versions regarding the occurrence are neither consistent nor reliable and that the trial court erred in placing implicit reliance upon their testimony.

                  10.1. The learned counsel first contended that there was considerable and unexplained delay in the registration of the First Information Statement and in the forwarding of the First Information Report to the jurisdictional Magistrate. Drawing our attention to the evidence of the Investigating Officer, it was submitted that the police had reached the scene of occurrence almost immediately after the incident. If that be so, there was no plausible reason for not registering the crime forthwith. It was further pointed out that the evidence on record would indicate that information regarding the incident had been conveyed to the police over telephone soon after the occurrence. According to the learned counsel, the failure to register a crime immediately on receipt of such information casts a serious doubt on the prosecution case and creates room for embellishments and improvements. The learned counsel has referred to the law laid down in Shivlal and another v. State of Chhattisgarh ( [ 2011) 9 SCC 561]) to substantiate his contentions.

                  10.2. Elaborating on the above submission, the learned counsel pointed out that, according to the prosecution, the occurrence took place at about 9.35 p.m. on 13.04.2011 and the First Information Statement was allegedly received at the Police Station only at about 11.30 p.m. on the same day. However, PW10 had categorically deposed that he received a telephone call from the Police Station regarding the incident at about 9.45 p.m. This circumstance, according to the learned counsel, clearly indicates that the police had knowledge of the occurrence much earlier and that the prosecution has failed to satisfactorily explain the delay in formally registering the crime. The learned counsel further submitted that the material objects allegedly seized during the course of investigation reached the jurisdictional court only on 27.04.2011. The unexplained delay in producing the material objects before the court, according to him, adversely affects the credibility of the prosecution case and raises doubts regarding the sanctity of the seizure and the chain of custody.

                  10.3. The learned counsel next assailed the scientific evidence relied upon by the prosecution. It was pointed out that blood samples collected by the Scientific Assistant from the tarred road near the scene of occurrence were found, on chemical analysis, to belong to blood Group ‘A’. However, the post-mortem records disclose that the blood group of the deceased was ‘O Positive’. According to the learned counsel, this discrepancy strikes at the very root of the prosecution case regarding the place of occurrence.

                  10.4. It was also pointed out that the faint brown stains allegedly detected on MO1 knife were not conclusively established to be of human origin. According to the learned counsel, these circumstances demonstrate that the scientific evidence does not support the prosecution version and, on the contrary, creates serious doubts regarding the veracity of the case projected before the trial court.

                  10.5. The learned counsel further submitted that the evidence on record would show that a pool of blood was detected at a location considerably distant from the place identified by the prosecution as the scene of occurrence. This circumstance, it was argued, would indicate that the prosecution had conveniently shifted the place of occurrence in order to make it conform to the ocular version given by the witnesses.

                  10.6. The learned counsel further contended that motive assumes considerable significance in a case of the present nature. According to him, the prosecution has failed to establish any convincing motive for the accused to commit the crime. Though the prosecution case proceeds on the premise that there was a dispute regarding the return of a memory card, no meaningful investigation was conducted in that direction, and no satisfactory evidence was adduced to substantiate the alleged motive. It was argued that the prosecution has thus failed to establish the genesis of the occurrence.

                  10.7. Lastly, it was submitted that even from the evidence of PW1 and the other prosecution witnesses, it is evident that the knife was found lying on the road near the scene of occurrence. According to the learned counsel, MO1 was subsequently introduced into the prosecution case and falsely projected as the weapon used in the commission of the offence. The learned counsel therefore contended that the recovery and identification of MO1 cannot be relied upon and that the entire prosecution case is liable to be viewed with serious suspicion.

Submissions advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor:

11. In response, the learned Public Prosecutor supported the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and submitted that the conviction is fully justified on the basis of the evidence available on record. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned Sessions Judge had undertaken a meticulous evaluation of both the oral and documentary evidence before arriving at the finding of guilt, and no infirmity whatsoever can be found in the appreciation of evidence undertaken by the trial court.

                  11.1. The learned Public Prosecutor submitted that a careful reading of the testimony of PW1 and PW2 would unmistakably show that they are natural and truthful witnesses who had no reason to falsely implicate the accused. According to him, both witnesses were present at the scene of occurrence and have consistently narrated the material aspects of the incident. It was argued that their evidence inspires confidence and receives corroboration from the surrounding circumstances as well as the medical evidence on record.

                  11.2. The learned Public Prosecutor further contended that the discrepancies highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant are only minor variations which are bound to occur when witnesses depose before the court after a considerable lapse of time. Such minor inconsistencies, according to him, do not affect the core of the prosecution case and, on the contrary, lend assurance to the truthfulness of the witnesses by demonstrating that their evidence is not the result of tutoring or prior deliberation. It was submitted that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 is substantially consistent on all material particulars concerning the occurrence and the role played by the accused.

                  11.3. Insofar as the criticism regarding the recovery and seizure of MO1 knife is concerned, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the said contention was specifically considered by the learned Sessions Judge and rightly rejected. It was pointed out that the Investigating Officer had clearly deposed regarding the seizure of the knife from near the scene of occurrence and that there was no reason to disbelieve his testimony. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the trial court had carefully analysed the evidence relating to the seizure and had found the same to be reliable and trustworthy.

                  11.4. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the defence had not been able to bring out any circumstance suggesting fabrication of evidence or false implication of the accused. The mere fact that certain procedural irregularities or minor discrepancies are alleged by the defence cannot, by themselves, overshadow the otherwise cogent and convincing ocular evidence adduced by the prosecution. According to him, the evidence on record clearly establishes that it was the accused who inflicted the fatal injury on the deceased and that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

12. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by both sides. We have gone through the evidence and also the judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge.

13. The first question for determination is whether the death of Abhilash is homicidal.

Whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature?

14. In the case on hand, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that the death of Abhilash was homicidal in nature. The Investigating Officer prepared Ext.P3 inquest report after conducting the inquest over the body of the deceased. Thereafter, the body was subjected to post-mortem examination. Dr. Umesh A.K. (PW11), Associate Professor of Forensic Medicine and Deputy Police Surgeon, conducted the post-mortem examination on 14.04.2011 and issued Ext.P11 post-mortem certificate. The injuries noted in Ext.P11 are extracted below:

                  1. Incised penetrating wound for 4.2 x 1.6 cm entering into the chest cavity, obliquely placed on left side of the front of chest with its lower inner less sharp end 3.5 c.m. outer midline and 6 cm above the left 5th intercostal space and partially cutting the 6th left costal cartilage; 3.5 cm outer to midline. After entering the chest cavity it was seen piercing the pericardium and the right ventricular chamber. The external wound showed a change in direction at a point 2.5 c.m. above from its lower end. The wound was seen directed backwards, upwards and slightly towards the right side.( The total minium depth of the wound was 4.2cm).There was infiltration of blood in the pericardial tissue and myocardium. THe left chest cavity contained 1100 ml of fluid blood and handful of blood clots. The left lung was pale and was in a partially collapsed state.

                  2. Incised penetrating wound 4.5 x 1.3 c.m transversely placed, on inner aspect of back of left forearm. 18 c.m below elbow. THe wound was seen exiting at the inner aspect of front of left forearm after piercing through the muscles of left forearm (2.3 x 0.5 cm ) at the same level. The tissues and vessels in the region were seen cleanly cut. The exit wound (on foot of forearm had two side cuts at its outer ends.

                  xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx

                  OPINION AS TO CAUSE OF DEATH

                  DEATH WAS DUE TO INCISED PENETRATING WOUND SUSTAINED TO LEFT SIDE OF FRONT OF CHEST INVOLVING THE HEART (INJURY NO.1).

15. The post-mortem examination thus revealed that the deceased had sustained two incised penetrating injuries. Injury No.1 was a deep penetrating stab wound to the chest which traversed the chest cavity, pierced the pericardium and penetrated the right ventricle of the heart. The injury was of a grave and fatal nature and had resulted in massive internal bleeding. Injury No.2 was an incised penetrating wound on the left forearm. The categorical opinion of PW11, as reflected in Ext.P11 post-mortem certificate, is that the death was caused by Injury No.1, namely the incised penetrating wound inflicted on the left side of the chest involving the heart. Significantly, no serious challenge was raised by the defence either with respect to the findings in the post-mortem certificate or the cause of death opined by the doctor. PW11 has also opined when MO1 knife weapon was shown to him that the injuries noted in Ext.P11 could have been caused by the said weapon. He explained that Injury No.1 was a directed stab injury involving the heart, one of the most vital organs of the human body. According to him, the nature, location and direction of the injury clearly indicated a forceful and deliberate infliction. PW11 also stated that Injury No.2, found on the forearm of the deceased, was consistent with a defensive wound and was likely sustained when the victim attempted to ward off or resist the attack directed towards his chest. The witness further testified that the injury pattern indicated separate acts of stabbing. During cross-examination, he specifically ruled out the possibility of both injuries having been caused by a single thrust. According to the witness, Injury No.1 exhibited a change in direction within the wound track, whereas Injury No.2 did not display any such characteristic feature. Had both injuries been caused by a single stabbing motion, a corresponding change in direction would have been evident in Injury No.2 as well. The absence of such a feature, according to the doctor, ruled out that possibility. A conjoint reading of Ext.P11 post-mortem certificate and the evidence of PW11 leaves little room for doubt that the death of Abhilash was homicidal in nature. We therefore have no hesitation in holding that the prosecution has successfully established that the death of Abhilash was a case of homicide.

16. Evaluation of Evidence:

                  16.1. PW1 is Manikuttan, an autorickshaw driver by profession and a resident of AKG Nagar. He deposed that he had witnessed the incident which occurred on 13.04.2011 at about 9.30 p.m. According to him, since it was an election day, he, along with Vipin, Vikas, Ranjith, Rajesh, Ratheesh, Manoj and others, was sitting on a compound wall situated near the residence of one Gopi. At that time, the accused was standing nearby. While they were conversing, Abhilash arrived at the place on a bicycle. PW1 stated that the accused had earlier entrusted a memory card to Abhilash and demanded its return. Abhilash replied that the memory card was with one of his friends and that it would be returned once it was returned back. According to PW1, on hearing this, the accused threatened that if the memory card was not returned, he would do away with Abhilash and his father. Abhilash responded that nothing of that sort would happen. Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the accused and Abhilash. PW1 and Vipin intervened and separated them and thereafter made Abhilash sit near them. PW1 further stated that after about two minutes, the accused came running towards Abhilash armed with a knife and inflicted two stab injuries on him. Immediately thereafter, Abhilash cried out, stating that he had been stabbed by the accused, and collapsed to the ground. PW1 noticed a pool of blood at the place of occurrence. According to him, PW2 Manoj, along with Ranjith, took Abhilash to West Fort Hospital, Thrissur, on a motorcycle, while Vipin restrained the accused at the scene itself. By the time PW1 and others reached the hospital at about 10.25 p.m., they were informed that Abhilash had succumbed to the injuries. PW1 further deposed that the place of occurrence was sufficiently illuminated and that both the accused and the deceased were residing in the same colony in neighbouring houses. He identified MO1 knife as the weapon used in the commission of the offence and also identified his signature in the First Information Statement. Though subjected to extensive cross-examination regarding the place of occurrence and surrounding circumstances, nothing material was elicited to discredit his testimony. He remained steadfast in his assertion that he had witnessed the occurrence.

                  16.2. PW2 is Manoj, who was working as a Marketing Officer at the relevant time. He also claimed to be an eyewitness to the occurrence. His version is substantially in tune with that of PW1. According to him, on 13.04.2011 at about 9.30 p.m., he, along with PW1 Manikuttan, Ratheesh, Rajesh, Ranjith, Vikas and Vipin, was sitting on the compound wall, while the accused was standing at a distance of about two to two-and-a-half metres. He spoke about the altercation that arose between the accused and Abhilash regarding the memory card and stated that PW1 and Vipin intervened and separated them. Thereafter, Vipin advised the accused to leave the place and not create any further issues. According to PW2, immediately thereafter, the accused ran towards Abhilash, took out a knife concealed at his waist and inflicted two stab injuries. PW2 further stated that Vipin immediately caught hold of the accused from behind and, in the process, the accused dropped the knife. Abhilash cried out that he had been stabbed and collapsed. Since no other vehicle was readily available, PW2 took Abhilash to West Fort Hospital, Thrissur, on his motorcycle, accompanied by Ranjith. Within half an hour of reaching the hospital, they were informed by the doctor that Abhilash had passed away. PW2 also identified MO1 as the weapon used in the attack. During cross-examination, suggestions were put to him regarding his friendship with PW1 and others, as well as the circumstances surrounding the occurrence. He withstood the cross-examination and consistently maintained that he had witnessed the incident.

                  16.3. PW3, Sasi K.V., is an attestor to Ext.P2 scene mahazar. PW4, a Councillor of the Thrissur Corporation, is a witness to Ext.P3 inquest report. PW5, the Village Officer, Ayyanthole-Poonkunnam Group Village, prepared Ext.P4 scene plan.

                  16.4. PW6 is the Scientific Assistant attached to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Thrissur. She stated that based on the request of the Investigating Officer, she visited the place of occurrence and collected blood samples and other materials. She submitted Ext.P5 report. She also identified Ext.P6 forwarding letter and Ext.P7 specimen seal handed over to the Investigating Officer.

                  16.5. PW7 is the police officer who was on General Diary charge duty on 13.04.2011. According to him, on the directions of his superior officers, he stood guard at the scene and later received information at the hospital that Abhilash had succumbed to the injuries.

                  16.6. PW8, Sankarankutty, is a witness to the arrest of the accused and the preparation of Ext.P8 seizure mahazar under which the clothes worn by the accused were seized on 14.04.2011.

                  16.7. PW9 is the father of the deceased. He deposed that he received information regarding the incident at about 9.45 p.m. on 13.04.2011 and immediately proceeded to West Fort Hospital, Thrissur, where he was informed of his son's death. He also spoke about the dispute relating to the memory card between the accused and the deceased. Through him, MO4 slippers belonging to the deceased were identified.

                  16.8. PW10, the Sub Inspector of Police, Thrissur West Police Station, recorded the statement of PW1 and registered Ext.P10 First Information Report. During cross-examination, it was brought out that the FIR reached the jurisdictional court only at about 4.00 p.m. on 14.04.2011. He explained that it was only after reaching the place of occurrence and assessing the situation that he realised that a cognizable offence had been committed. He further stated that, when he reached the place of occurrence, the accused had already been apprehended by local residents. It was he who took the accused to the Police Station and arranged for guarding the scene of occurrence.

                  16.9. PW11 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination and PW12 is Dr. Rajalakshmi, Joint Chemical Examiner, who examined the articles forwarded for chemical analysis and issued the relevant report. PW12 explained that, with the passage of time, fungal growth and deterioration of proteins may occur, thereby affecting serological examination. She further stated that the possibility of misinterpretation is greater when samples are taken from material objects rather than directly from blood samples. Her evidence was adduced to explain certain discrepancies noticed in the blood grouping results.

                  16.10. PW13 is the police officer who was entrusted with guarding the scene of occurrence. PW14 is the doctor attached to West Fort Hospital, Thrissur, through whom Ext.P14 certificate was marked. He identified the signature of Dr. M.V. Raveendran, who had issued the said certificate.

                  16.11. PW15 is the Investigating Officer who took over the investigation on 14.04.2011. He spoke in detail regarding the various stages of investigation undertaken by him, including the arrest of the accused, preparation of Ext.P3 inquest report, seizure of material objects, collection of scientific evidence and forwarding of articles for chemical analysis. He identified Ext.P15 series arrest memo and arrest notice, Ext.P17 forwarding note and MO1 to MO7 material objects. During cross-examination, he stated that the blood-stained knife was recovered from amidst the grass at the place of occurrence. Though extensive cross-examination was conducted with regard to the seizure of MO1 and the alleged delay in production of records, nothing substantial was elicited to discredit his testimony. He specifically denied the suggestion that MO1 had been fabricated or planted.

                  16.12. PW16, the Circle Inspector of Police who subsequently took over the investigation on 02.09.2011, completed the remaining stages of investigation and laid the final report before the jurisdictional court. He also prepared a sketch of the place of occurrence. During cross-examination, he admitted that there was an error in the directional markings in the sketch and clarified during re-examination that East had been mistakenly shown as West and North as South. According to him, the said error did not affect the physical features or identification of the place of occurrence.

Analysis:

17. The first and foremost contention advanced by the learned counsel is that PWs 1 and 2, the eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove the incident, are planted witnesses. To substantiate the said contention, the learned counsel highlighted several aspects of the evidence. It was pointed out that, in their earlier statements, the witnesses had stated that only a single stab injury had been inflicted. However, after the postmortem certificate revealed the existence of two stab injuries, the prosecution altered their earlier stance and persuaded the witnesses, when they entered the witness box, to depart from their earlier version and bring their testimony in line with the findings in the postmortem certificate. The delay on the part of the Investigating Officer in recording the statement of PW2 promptly was also highlighted. The non examination of the persons whose presence was mentioned in the First Information Statement was yet another ground raised before us to doubt the prosecution version. After carefully taking us through the evidence of PW1, an attempt was made to persuade us to hold that PW1 presence at the scene of crime was unlikely. Being an autorickshaw driver residing in close proximity to the scene of crime, PW1 would have volunteered to transport the injured to the hospital in his autorickshaw rather than allowing him to be taken on PW2's motorcycle was the argument. Based on the report of the scientific expert it was pointed out that the pool of blood was found at a distance of approximately 7.5 metres from the compound wall which was not in tune with the evidence of the witnesses. The detention of the accused by the persons residing near to the scene of crime and his eventual arrest was also the subject matter of great controversy. The delay in preparing the arrest memo was highlighted to support the defence case that the accused had, in fact, been arrested from his residence much later. The failure to recover the memory card to substantiate the prosecution case that there existed a dispute between the deceased and the accused concerning a transaction involving the said memory card was also urged before us.

18. It is by now settled that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross-examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer. (See: State Of U.P v. M.K Anthony ([(1985) 1 SCC 505]) )

19. The learned Sessions Judge has assigned weighty reasons for accepting the testimony of PWs 1 and 2. Having carefully reevaluated the evidence, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the trial court.

20. The presence of PWs 1 and 2 at the scene of occurrence cannot be said to be unnatural or doubtful. On the contrary, their presence stands firmly established by the surrounding circumstances. The deceased was a 19-year-old youth residing in the immediate vicinity of the place of occurrence. The accused was also a resident of the same locality and lived in close proximity to both the residence of the deceased and the scene of crime. The evidence tendered by PWs 1 and 2 mutually corroborate each other on material particulars. Their account of the occurrence, the sequence of events leading to the assault, the position of the persons present at the spot, and even details such as who was sitting on the compound wall and the approximate distance at which the accused was standing, are substantially consistent and lend assurance to the truthfulness of their version.

21. Much emphasis was placed by the learned counsel on the circumstance that the injured was transported to the hospital on PW2's motorcycle and not in the autorickshaw allegedly available with PW1. We are unable to attach any significance to this circumstance. Human conduct in moments of sudden crisis cannot be assessed with mathematical precision or judged in the calm detachment of a courtroom. When confronted with a gruesome and unexpected act of violence, different individuals react differently. Some may momentarily freeze in shock, while others may act instinctively and with presence of mind. If those present felt that the injured could be taken to the hospital more expeditiously on a motorcycle, it is not for a court of law to sit in judgment over such a split-second decision or weigh its propriety on golden scales. The paramount concern at that moment was to save the life of the injured, and the conduct of the witnesses must be viewed in that backdrop.

22. Equally untenable is the contention that the witnesses have materially improved their version merely because the postmortem certificate disclosed two stab injuries. The statements given by the eye-witnesses to the police clearly indicated that the victim had been stabbed with a knife and had immediately collapsed after sustaining the injury. The essence of the occurrence, namely, that the accused inflicted a stab injury with a knife upon the victim at about 9.30 p.m., was consistently disclosed from the very inception. Merely because the witnesses did not specify the exact number of stab injuries in their initial statement cannot lead to the conclusion that their testimony before the Court was an afterthought or a deliberate improvement. It must be remembered that the purpose of a First Information Statement is not to furnish an exhaustive chronicle of every minute detail connected with the occurrence. Its object is merely to set the criminal law in motion. To expect a first informant, who is often narrating events in a state of anxiety, confusion, or emotional distress, to provide a complete and flawless account of every aspect of the incident would be unrealistic. Likewise, the officer recording the information is expected to capture the essential features of the occurrence and not to extract every conceivable detail at that stage. Further particulars can always emerge during the course of investigation.

23. The witnesses have also furnished a plausible and natural explanation as to why they were sitting on the compound wall and conversing with each other on the day of the election. We find no reason to disbelieve their explanation. Their presence at the place of occurrence, therefore, stands satisfactorily established.

24. The criticism directed against the prosecution on the basis of the location of the bloodstains is equally devoid of merit. Merely because blood was noticed at a point approximately seven metres away from the wall does not render the ocular evidence doubtful. The occurrence took place in a village setting, and the topography and condition of the terrain could reasonably account for the manner in which blood became visible at a particular location. Unless the discrepancy is of such magnitude as to completely discredit the prosecution version, minor variations of this nature cannot outweigh the direct testimony of natural eye-witnesses.

25. The non-seizure of the knife immediately after the occurrence has also been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The evidence reveals that the police officer who first reached the scene ensured that adequate personnel were posted to guard the scene of occurrence and thereafter proceeded to the hospital with a view to recording, if possible, the statement of the injured. In the circumstances of the case, the course adopted by the officer was both prudent and reasonable. His immediate concern was to ascertain the condition of the victim and secure relevant evidence before it was lost. We find no infirmity in the conduct of the officer in that regard.

26. Similarly, we find no substance in the challenge relating to the arrest of the accused. The evidence indicates that immediately after the occurrence the accused was restrained by local residents and subsequently handed over to the police. PW10 thereafter took the accused to the police station and awaited the arrival of PW15, the Investigating Officer. PW15, on receiving information regarding the incident, first proceeded to West Fort Hospital at about 2.30 a.m., where he recorded the statements of the material witnesses. He thereafter visited the scene of occurrence, issued necessary instructions to the officers engaged in scene-guard duty, and only thereafter proceeded to the police station, where the formal arrest of the accused was recorded. The sequence of events, as spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, appears entirely natural and consistent with the responsibilities expected of an Investigating Officer faced with a serious offence. We find no reason to doubt the course adopted by PW15.

27. Another contention raised relates to the discrepancy between the blood group detected in the sample collected from the scene and the blood group of the deceased. The blood sample collected from the road was reported to be of Group 'A', whereas the blood group of the deceased was found to be 'O Positive'. It was also pointed out that there was no evidence to show whether blood grouping had been conducted in respect of the stains found on MO1. In this regard, it is relevant to note that the blood samples were collected by PW6 from the scene of occurrence on 14.04.2011. The samples were thereafter forwarded through the Court to the Forensic Science Laboratory and reached the laboratory only on 17.06.2011. Ext. P13 report was ultimately issued on 04.12.2014, about 3 years after the despatch of the samples. Significantly, PW11, the doctor who conducted the postmortem examination, categorically deposed that prolonged delay in examination could result in deterioration and loss of antibodies in blood samples, thereby leading to erroneous blood grouping results. The very same opinion was expressed by PW12, the Chemical Examiner. In the light of this scientific evidence, the discrepancy in blood grouping, viewed in isolation, cannot be treated as a circumstance sufficient to discredit the otherwise cogent and reliable prosecution case.

28. So far as the issue of motive is concerned, it is a settled legal proposition that motive has great significance in a case involving circumstantial evidence, but where direct evidence is available, which is worth relying upon, motive loses its significance. Under no circumstances, can motive take the place of the direct evidence available as proof, and in a case like this, proof of motive is not relevant at all.

29. In Sheo Shankar Singh v State of Jharkhand ([(2011) 3 SCC 654]) , while dealing with the issue of motive, this Court held as under:

                  15. … Proof of motive, however, recedes into the background in cases where the prosecution relies upon an eyewitness account of the occurrence. That is because if the court upon a proper appraisal of the deposition of the eyewitnesses comes to the conclusion that the version given by them is credible, absence of evidence to prove the motive is rendered inconsequential. Conversely, even if the prosecution succeeds in establishing a strong motive for the commission of the offence, but the evidence of the eyewitnesses is found unreliable or unworthy of credit, existence of a motive does not by itself provide a safe basis for convicting the accused. That does not, however, mean that proof of motive even in a case which rests on an eyewitness account does not lend strength to the prosecution case or fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. Proof of motive in such a situation certainly helps the prosecution and supports the eyewitnesses. See Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State Of Maharashtra (1973) 3 SCC 219, Hari Shanker v. State Of U.P . (1996) 9 SCC 40 and State of U.P v. Kishanpal (2008) 16 SCC 73.”

30. The learned counsel took considerable pains to persuade us to hold that the offence committed would attract punishment under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and not murder as defined under Section 300 of the IPC.

31. We are unable to accept the said submission. Having carefully gone through the postmortem certificate and the evidence of the forensic surgeon, we find that the injury inflicted by the appellant was a deep penetrating stab wound on the chest which traversed the chest cavity, pierced the pericardium, and entered the right ventricular chamber of the heart, resulting in massive internal haemorrhage. The injury was inflicted on a vital part of the body with a sharp-edged weapon and with sufficient force to cut through the costal cartilage and penetrate the heart itself. The accused must, therefore, be attributed with the intention of inflicting the particular injury that was found on the body of the deceased.

32. The Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another ( (1976) 4 SCC 382) has laid down the principles to be borne in mind when the court is confronted with the question of whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. After referring to Virsa Singh v State of Punjab ([AIR 1958 SC 465]) , the locus classicus, it was held as follows:

                  “21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such a causal connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder” contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the first part of Section 304, of the Penal Code.”

33. In Anbazhagan v State Represented by the Inspector of Police ([2023 SCC OnLine SC 857]) , the Apex Court, after surveying the precedents on the subject, summed up the principles as under:

                  66.1. When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bedroom of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.

                  66.2. Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five Exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those Exceptions the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within the 3rd part of Section 299IPC.

                  66.3. To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is “guilty intention,” whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is “guilty knowledge”.

                  66.4. Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of clause Thirdly to Section 300IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

                  66.5. Section 304IPC will apply to the following classes of cases:

                  (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the Exceptions to that section,

                  (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300IPC,

                  (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.

                  66.6. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the Exceptions to Section 300IPC.

                  66.7. The word “likely” means probably and it is distinguished from more “possibly”. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will “probably happen”. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.

                  66.8. The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 IPC) and murder (Section 300 IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five Exceptions to Section 300IPC. But, even though none of the said five Exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300IPC, namely, Firstly to Fourthly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299IPC.

                  66.9. The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If clause Thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

                  66.10. Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

                  66.11. When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

                  66.12. Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under clause Thirdly of Section 300IPC unless one of the Exceptions applies.

                  66.13. In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II IPC.

34. In the case at hand, the nature, situs, and extent of the injury leave little room for doubt that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The forensic surgeon has categorically deposed to the said effect. In such circumstances, the requirements of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC stand fully satisfied. It is trite that where the accused intentionally inflicts a particular bodily injury and that injury is proved to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence would amount to murder notwithstanding the fact that only a single injury was inflicted. As held in Anbazhagan (supra) where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

35. The surrounding circumstances also do not assist the appellant. The evidence on record reveals that there was a wordy altercation between the accused and the deceased when the accused demanded the return of a memory card. The persons present at the spot intervened and separated the accused and the deceased. Significantly, the incident did not occur in the course of any continuing struggle or sudden fight. On the contrary, after the parties had been separated and a few minutes had elapsed, the accused rushed towards the deceased with a knife in his hand and inflicted the stab injury which ultimately proved fatal. The evidence available on record does not disclose the existence of any sudden fight, grave and sudden provocation, or any other circumstance capable of bringing the case within any of the exceptions to Section 300 IPC. Nor can it be said that the accused merely possessed the knowledge that death was likely to ensue. The act of deliberately thrusting a knife into the chest of the deceased with such force as to pierce the heart unmistakably demonstrates an intention to inflict an injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

36. In view of the discussion above, we have no hesitation in holding that the offence squarely falls within Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC and is punishable under Section 302 IPC. The contention that the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC is wholly devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected. We find no reason to interfere with the judgment rendered by the learned Sessions Judge.

This Appeal is dismissed.