Kalyan Ray Surana, J.

1. Heard Mr. R. Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. G. Bordoloi, learned Standing Counsel for the Cooperation Department for the respondent nos. 1 to 4; Mr. A.R. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. D. Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 7 to 22; and Mr. R.A. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent no. 23. None appears for the other respondents.

2) By filing this intra-court appeal, the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and order dated 12.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C.) No. 3499 of 2023. In the writ petition, the dispute is with regard to the election as well as the holding of the Annual General Meeting of the society under the name and style of ‘Gandhigram Samabai Samittee Ltd.’, which is registered under the Assam Co-operative Societies Act. One shareholder namely, Md. Aklash Uddin (the respondent no. 23), who was aggrieved by the preparation of electoral rolls of the said society, had filed a writ petition which was registered as W.P.(C.) No. 2439/2023. This Court by an order dated 08.05.2023 disposed of the writ petition with an observation that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam along with the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies was directed not to give any approval to the election/AGM to be held on 10.05.2023, prior to deciding of the grievances of respondent no. 23 in terms of Rule 27 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Election Rules, 2019 and the said respondent was allowed to submit a representation along with the copy of the writ petition with regard to his grievances.

3) It is suffice to mention that the election notice dated 25.04.2023, is admittedly not under challenge and in the meantime the election results were declared on 11.05.2025 pursuant to elections which was held on 10.05.2023.

4) The grievance of the appellant is that pursuant to the said election, he along with others had submitted a representation dated 13.05.2023 to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Assam, with copies for information to the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, R.K. Nagar; the Enquiry Officer, C/o. The Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, R.K. Nagar; the Secretary, Gandhigram Cooperative Societies Ltd.; and the Returning Officer, Gandhigram Cooperative Societies Ltd. The said complaint was regarding defective voters’ list illegally prepared for holding the election was received by one Senior Assistant in the Office of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam on 15.05.2023 at 11:40 a.m. The Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, Assam by its order dated 26.05.2023, referred to the writ petition filed by the respondent no. 23 and by referring to the fact that no petition was received between 11.05.2023 to 13.05.2023, took note of the representation of respondent no. 23 filed on 17.05.2023, whereby he had withdrawn the petition filed with reference to W.P. (C.) No. 2439/2023. Accordingly, the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, R.K. Nagar was permitted to accord approval to the proceedings of the AGM as per Section 45 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 2007. Aggrieved by the order dated 26.05.2023, as well as elections held to the Gandhigram Co-operative Society Ltd., the appellant had filed a writ petition which was registered as W.P.(C.) 3499/2023, where amongst others, prayer was made for declaring the election of the said society held on 10.05.2023 as void; for setting aside and quashing the impugned order dated 26.05.2023, passed by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Assam; for setting aside and quashing of the letter dated 29.05.2023 issued by the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Society granting approval to the proceedings of the AGM for the year 2023-24 including formation of Board of Directors of the said society for 2023-24 to 2027-28; setting aside of the Letter dated 01.06.2023, issued by the respondent no. 3 granting approval of the proceedings of the 1st meeting of the said society; and other consequential reliefs.

5) The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment and order dated 12.08.2024, took note of the fact that the appellants in the present writ petition, W.P.(C.) No. 3499/2023 and W.P.(C.) No. 2439/2023 did not challenge the notice dated 25.04.2023 notifying the elections and also took note of the fact that in terms of Rule 13(a) of the Assam Cooperative Societies Election Rules, 2019, if the valid nomination papers are equal to the total numbers of members to be elected to the Board of Directors, the Returning Officer was empowered to declare such candidates to be duly elected and accordingly, the Returning Officer had declared the results of the election on 10.05.2023. Therefore, the submission of representation, which was received only at 11:40 am on 15.05.2023 was held to be delayed and in clear violation of Rule 27 of the Assam Co-operative Societies (Election) Rules, 2019 and as such, the said representation could not have been taken into account and accordingly, it was held that the impugned order dated 26.05.2023 did not call for any interference.

6) In this intra-court appeal, in order to assail the impugned order dated 12.08.2024, the learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which permit exclusion of the first date in the series of days and the extension of time if the Court or Office is closed on the last day of prescribed period of limitation. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that under clause (a) of Rule 27 of the Assam Co-operative Society (Election) Rules, 2019, it is provided that any dispute relating to election of a Co-operative Society may be submitted before the Election Authority within 3 days from the date of declaration of the results. It has been submitted that in this case, the elections were held in the AGM held on 10.05.2023, but intervening dates of 13.05.2023 was second Saturday and 14.05.2023 was Sunday. Therefore, the representation against the election was submitted before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies on 15.05.2019. Referring to the provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it was stated that the submission of representation on 15.05.2019 could not have been held to be beyond the time prescribed under Rule 27(a) of the Assam Cooperative Society (Election) Rules, 2019.

7) Therefore, by an order dated 22.11.2024, this Court took into account the issue in the appeal as to whether the representation against the election, submitted on 15.05.2023, was beyond three days, taking it to be a question of law.

8) In this regard Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as follows:

                   “9. Commencement and termination of time:-

                   (1) In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”.

                   (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”

9) Therefore, by applying the said provision of law, prima facie the first in the series of days from 10.05.2023 is required to be excluded. The provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is quoted below:

                   “10. Computation of time:- (1) Where, by any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open:

                   Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), applies.

                   (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts and Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”

10) Pari materia provisions are also prescribed in Section 9 and 10 of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915, which are quoted below:

                   “9. Commencement and termination of time:- in any Act it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘from’, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word ‘to’.

                   10. Computation of time:- where, by any Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open:

                   Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, applies.”

11) From the above, prima facie it is observed that under Sub-Section (1) of Section 10, if the office is closed on the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceedings are required to be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done on the next day afterwards, on which the office is open. The learned counsel for the respondent no.13/caveator has not been able to demonstrate that on 2nd Saturday and Sunday being 13th May, 2023 and 14th May, 2023, were declared as working days for the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam. Therefore, the appellant has been able to make out a prima facie case that the representation submitted on 15th May, 2019, could be within the scope of Section 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 as well as of Section 9 and 10 of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915.

12) The Court takes into account the stand taken by the respondent nos. 1 to 4 in their affidavit-in-opposition filed on 05.02.2026. In paragraph-6 of the affidavit-in-opposition, the said respondents had quoted Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment and order dated 12.08.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C.) no. 2817/2023.

13) The Court takes notices of the fact that in the writ petition no attempt was made on the part of the appellant to make a positive statement that a representation dated 13.05.2023 was submitted before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies (respondent no. 2) at 11:40 a.m. on 15.05.2023. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the fact that a representation was submitted on 15.05.2023 could be culled out from Annexure – G to the writ petition and moreover, the learned Single Judge by referring to Annexure – G to the writ petition, had taken note of the submission of the representation on 15.05.2023 at 11:40 a.m. Therefore, it is submitted that the fact that a representation was submitted on 15.05.2023 at 11:40 a.m. is not a disputed question of fact.

14) Therefore, the point regarding submission of representation on 15.05.2023 at 11:40 a.m. and as to whether the same would be acceptable by applying the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act, apparently is a point raised as an abstract point of law.

15) In the present writ petition, there is no effort on the part of the appellants to substantiate the point by pleading relevant facts referable to the purported endorsement at Annexure – G to the writ petition, being a representation dated 13.05.2023, which was submitted on 15.05.2023 by stating that such a representation was submitted to and accepted by the Senior Assistant in the Office of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam on 15.05.2023 at 11:40 a.m. Therefore, in the absence of any averment made in the writ petition, naturally, there would be no denial of the said facts by any of the respondents.

16) Moreover, the statement which has been made in paragraph – 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent nos. 1 to 4 on 05.02.2026 is clearly a replication of the paragraph nos. 7, 8 and 9 of the impugned order. Therefore, the Court is constrained to hold that the said statement made in Paragraph-6 of the affidavit-in-opposition, cannot be construed as an admission by the respondent nos. 1 to 4 regarding the representation made on 15.05.2023 at 11:40 a.m. In this regard, we may also mention that in the Memo of the present Appeal, there is no statement to the effect that any such representation was submitted by the appellants on 15.05.2023.

17) Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, from a point which is ostensibly a point of law that is raised, the same is required to be substantiated by facts. The party raising in the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed with the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. In this regard, the Court is inclined to quote Paragraph nos. 11 and 13 of the case of Bharat Singh & others vs. State of Haryana & others, [1988] 4 SCC 534 := AIR 1988 SC 2181.

                   11. In the writ petitions, the point was taken as an abstract point of law. There was no attempt on the part of the appellants to substantiate the point by pleading relevant facts and producing relevant evidence. It is apparent that there was no material in the writ petitions in support of the contention of the appellants that the impugned acquisition was nothing but a profiteering venture. The contention was not also advanced before the High Court at the hearing of the writ petitions. The facts stated in the said application of the HSIDC do not, in our opinion, support the contention of the appellants. It is true that, as stated in the said application, HSIDC paid a sum of Rs 1.74 crores to HUDA, but nothing turns on that. The land was acquired by the government for the purpose of development and industrialisation. The government can do it itself or through other agencies. In the instant case, the land was acquired at the instance of HUDA and, thereafter, HUDA had transferred the same to HSIDC. It is not that the land was transferred in the same condition as it was acquired. But, we are told by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of HUDA and HSIDC that before transferring, HUDA had made external developments incurring considerable cost and HSIDC in its turn has made various internal developments and in this way the land has been fully developed and made fit for industrialisation. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for HUDA and HSIDC to the various external developments made by HUDA at a total cost of Rs 1,66,200 per acre before it was transferred to HSIDC and the cost that was incurred for external developments was included in the price. Thus, there was no motive for HUDA to make any profit.

                   13. As has been already noticed, although the point as to profiteering by the State was pleaded in the writ petitions before the High Court as an abstract point of law, there was no reference to any material in support thereof nor was the point argued at the hearing of the writ petitions. Before us also, no particulars and no facts have been given in the special leave petitions or in the writ petitions or in any affidavit, but the point has been sought to be substantiated at the time of hearing by referring to certain facts stated in the said application by HSIDC. In our opinion, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will not entertain the point. In this context, it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counteraffidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. So, the point that has been raised before us by the appellants is not entertainable. But, in spite of that, we have entertained it to show that it is devoid of any merit.

18) Accordingly, in the present case in hand, the Court does not find any factual pleading to be taken into account by the Court for interfering with the finding of the learned Single Judge in the impugned order dated 12.08.2024 whereby it was held that the submission of the representation was in clear violation of Rule 27 of the Rules of 2019. Thus, the Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order under challenge. Accordingly, the issue as to whether the applicability of the provision of Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 during the intervening days where the running of time stops with the holiday, is left open to be decided in a more appropriate case.

19) Accordingly, the intra-court appeal stands dismissed without any interference with the order of the learned Single Judge in the appeal.

20) The parties are left to bear their own cost.