1. The present Interim Application has been preferred by the Plaintiff viz. Mrs. Nisha Naresh Khilnani (hereinafter, referred to as, the “Applicant”), aged 62 years and a homemaker by occupation, seeking exemption from payment of court fees under the Government Notification dated 1st October 1994 bearing No. STP.1094/CR-859/M-1 (hereinafter, referred to as, the “said Notification”) on the ground that she has been subjected to financial and economic ‘violence’ at the hands of the Defendants and is therefore entitled to the benefit of the exemption contemplated under the said Notification.

2. The Applicant is one of the daughters of late Mr. Manohar Bhojraj Advani (hereinafter, referred to as, the “deceased”), who died intestate on 16th March 2016 at Mumbai. Defendant No.1 is the widow of the deceased and mother of the Applicant, whilst Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 are the other children of the deceased and Defendant No.1, and the siblings of the Applicant, with Defendant No.2 being her elder sister, Defendant No.3 being her elder brother, and Defendant No.4 being her younger brother. The Applicant has instituted the Suit (L) No. 8719 of 2025, (hereinafter, referred to as, “the present suit”) seeking administration of the estate of the deceased, including inter alia, partition thereof, together with rendition of accounts.

3. A perusal of the plaint would reveal that the deceased was a businessman. His estate is stated to include, inter alia, residential premises situated at Khar – Mumbai, immovable properties at Kurla – Mumbai, a vacant plot of land at Adipur – Kutch, residential premises situated at Santacruz – Mumbai, residential premises situated at Virar, Pune and various other movable assets including shares, bank accounts, demat accounts, gold, precious stones, silverware and motor vehicles. The plaint asserts that after the demise of the deceased, his entire estate and affairs relating thereto, came under the control of Defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 with the consent and acquiescence of the remaining heirs including the Applicant.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT

4. The Applicant contends that she is entitled to exemption from payment of court fees under the said Notification which has since, been explained by a subsequent Government Notification dated 23rd March 2000 (hereinafter, referred to as the “Explanatory Notification”), on the ground that she has been subjected to financial and economic violence at the hands of the Defendants.

5. According to the Applicant, after the demise of the deceased, Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 repeatedly assured her that she would receive her due share in his estate, at an appropriate stage. The Applicant states that whenever she sought information regarding the assets forming part of the estate or requested copies of relevant documents, she was asked to repose trust in the Defendants and exercise patience. Despite her repeated demands for distribution of the estate and allocation of her alleged share therein, the Applicant contends that no such distribution was effected in her favour and instead, the Defendants continued to defer the same.

6. The Applicant further alleges that in the course of dealing with Defendant No. 5, in or about June 2024, Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 received substantial consideration for the Kurla property, which forms part of the estate of the deceased whilst she was excluded therefrom. The Applicant contends that upon demanding her share in the estate, the said Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 avoided further communication with her. Thus, the Applicant contends that Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 have not only denied her entitlement in the estate of the deceased but have also failed to furnish the requisite information concerning their dealings therewith. In support she relies on telephonic conversations and contemporaneous notes.

7. It is contended that when the Applicant met Defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4, sometime in or about February 2025 with a view to amicably resolve the dispute, she was verbally threatened with dire consequences in the event she initiated legal proceedings. The Applicant alleges that such conduct has resulted in her being deprived of property to which she claims to be lawfully entitled to and has, in the bargain, caused her financial prejudice, hardship and mental trauma. It is her case that such acts and omissions, constitute financial and economic violence, as also, non-spousal domestic violence and gender-based exploitation, within the meaning of the said Notification and therefore, she is entitled to claim exemption of court fees payable on the present suit.

8. In support, the Applicant relies upon the decisions of this Court in Usha Badri Poonawalla vs. K.Kurian Babu(2002 (2) Mh.L.J 951.) and Pushpalata Yeshwant Chavan vs. Yeshwant Ramchandra Parab(Order dated 4th October 2011 passed in Suit (L) No. 631 of 2011.) to contend that the word, ‘violence’ in the said Notification cannot be restricted to only physical violence but would also include mental violence, sexual violence and social violence. It was held that the intention of the Legislature in exempting women from the payment of court fees in relation to such cases and the object of the said Notification was to remove the impediment in the way of women litigants to seek justice, social, economic and political, as enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution.

SUBMISSIONS OF DEFENDANT NO. 1

9. Defendant No. 1 opposes the present Interim Application and submits that the Applicant is not entitled to any exemption from payment of court fees on the present suit, under the said Notification. At the outset, Defendant No. 1 contends that the present suit itself suffers from material suppression inasmuch as, the Applicant has failed to disclose that she had previously released her rights in certain properties forming part of the estate of the deceased in favour of Defendant Nos. 3 and 4. Defendant No. 1 further points out that the Applicant has already received benefits from the estate of the deceased, including a residential flat at Virar which was transferred in her favour in 2019. Additionally, Defendant No. 1 also disputes the inclusion of a few items which are stated to form part of the estate of the deceased.

10. Defendant No. 1 submits that the Applicant has fundamentally misconstrued the scope of the said Notification. She submits that the present proceedings are nothing but a suit which seeks administration, partition and accounts in respect of the estate of the deceased and therefore, constitutes a succession dispute between his legal heirs. Such a dispute, it is submitted, does not fall within the category of ‘property disputes’ contemplated under the said Notification. Reliance is placed upon the Explanatory Notification which clarifies that the expression property disputes referred to in the said Notification related only to property disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. Since the present dispute concerns inheritance rights asserted by a daughter against her mother and siblings, in relation to her deceased father’s estate, Defendant No. 1 submits that the requisite matrimonial nexus is wholly absent.

11. Defendant No. 1 further submits that the Applicant’s attempt to characterise the dispute as one involving financial and economic violence is not only dishonest but entirely misconceived. According to her, the allegations in the plaint merely concern the alleged denial of her share in the estate, the distribution of proceeds derived from estate properties and disputes regarding documents and transactions relating to the estate of the deceased. Such allegations, she contends, even if assumed to be correct, remain incidents of a ‘succession dispute’ and do not convert the proceedings into a case relating to violence.

12. In support, Defendant No. 1 relies upon the decisions of this Court in Prabhakar Dayaram Narkhede vs. Vijaya alias Shakuntala G. Chaudhari(2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1112.), Girish Kanaiyalal Munshi vs. Nil(2008 SCC OnLine Bom 474.), Harsha Pradeep Patil vs. Sayankabai Ragho Patil & Ors.(2016 SCC OnLine Bom 8918.) and Kailash vs. Vijaykumar(2019 (1) Mh.L.J 737.) to contend that inheritance, succession and partition disputes do not qualify for exemption from payment of court fees under the said Notification.

SUBMISSIONS OF DEFENDANT NOS. 2 TO 4

13. Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 have filed a common affidavit in reply dated 20th December 2025 opposing the Interim Application. They substantially adopt the submissions advanced by their mother, Defendant No. 1 and contend that the Applicant is not entitled to exemption from payment of court fees under the said Notification.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE THIRD PARTY / RESPONDENT

14. The State of Maharashtra, through the Revenue and Forest Department, has been impleaded as a Third Party / Respondent to the present Interim Application. They have also opposed the grant of reliefs sought thereunder. The learned AGP who appears for the Respondent submits that the present suit is one, seeking administration and partition of the estate of the deceased and is therefore a mere succession dispute between legal heirs and does not qualify for exemption under the said Notification.

15. The learned AGP further submits that the power to remit court fees is derived from Section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 and points out that the said Notification only grants exemption in specified categories of proceedings, namely, (a) maintenance, (b) property disputes, (c) violence and (d) divorce. He points out that by virtue of the Explanatory Notification, the scope of the expression ‘property disputes’ was expressly restricted only to those property disputes, arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. He is at pains to point out that the present proceedings neither arise out of, nor concern any matrimonial relationship but instead, relate only to the estate of a deceased father and concern competing claims of succession by his daughter against her mother and siblings. It is therefore submitted that the Applicant cannot insist on the benefit of the said Notification.

16. The learned AGP also relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Girish Kanhaiyalal Munshi (supra) and submits that testamentary and succession proceedings arise upon the death of an individual and not out of matrimony and therefore do not fall within the category of disputes contemplated under the said Notification. Therefore, it is submitted that the present Application is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS, REASONS AND FINDINGS

17. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record with the able assistance of the counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The Applicant seeks exemption from payment of court fees under the said Notification read with the Explanatory Notification by principally contending that she is entitled to such exemption since she is a woman litigant who has instituted the present proceedings to claim her share in the estate of her deceased father, and further, that in the process, she has been subjected to financial and economic violence at the hands of her mother and siblings, viz. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4.

18. At this stage, it would be apposite to consider the decisions relied upon by Defendant Nos. 1 to 4, namely, Prabhakar Dayaram Narkhede vs. Vijaya alias Shakuntala G. Chaudhari (supra), Girish Kanhaiyalal Munshi vs. Nil (supra), Harsha Pradeep Patil vs. Sayankabai Ragho Patil & Ors. (supra), and Kailash vs. Vijaykumar (supra). A perusal thereof would indicate that by virtue of the Explanatory Notification, the expression ‘property disputes’ occurring in the said Notification stands restricted only to disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. Succession and testamentary proceedings arise upon the death of an individual and not out of matrimony. In the present case, the proceedings are founded on rights of succession and inheritance in respect of the estate of the deceased, and do not arise out of nor concern any matrimonial matter, therefore constitute a property dispute simpliciter, falling outside the ambit of the exemption contemplated under the said Notification.

19. The question, therefore, that arises is, whether a woman litigant who institutes such a suit for administration and partition of the estate of her deceased father, which is plainly, not a property dispute arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters within the meaning of the Explanatory Notification, can nonetheless claim an exemption from payment of court fees under the said Notification by additionally asserting, within the same suit, that she was subjected to violence in the process.

20. At the outset, it is necessary to consider the scheme of the said Notification. For the sake of convenience, therefore, the relevant portion of the said Notification is reproduced hereunder:

                   “No. STP. 1094/CR-859/M-1 Whereas, the Government of Maharashtra has recently announced a policy with a view to promote the welfare of the women; And whereas, the same welfare policy for women inter alia, provides for exemption of Court fees for women litigants in cases relating to maintenance, property right, violence and divorce;

                   AND WHEREAS, Section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom. XXXVI of 1959), empowers the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette to reduce or to remit any of the fees mentioned in the First and Second Schedules to that Act;

                   NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom. XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra hereby remits the fees payable by women litigants on any of the plaints, applications, petitions, Memorandum of appeals or any other documents specified in the First and Second Schedules to the said Act, to be filed in any Civil, Family or Criminal Courts in respect of the cases relating to (a) maintenance, (b) property disputes (c) violence and (d) divorce.”

21. It would also be apposite to reproduce the relevant portion of the Explanatory Notification, which reads as under:

                   “No. S. 30/2000/673/CR-199/M-1 - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 46 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (Bom. XXXVI of 1959), the Government of Maharashtra Hereby amends the Government Notification, Revenue and Forests Department No. STP. 1094/CR-859/M-1 dated the 1st October 1994, as follows:-

                   In the said Notification, the following Explanation shall be added at the end, namely:-

                   ‘Explanation- The expression ‘property disputes’ shall mean property disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters.’"

22. The said Notification is not a general exemption from court fees available to all women litigants. It is a limited remission granted in respect of specified classes of proceedings. The language employed is significant. The exemption is available only in respect of “cases relating to (a) maintenance, (b) property disputes, (c) violence and (d) divorce”. The focus of the said Notification is therefore on the nature and character of the case itself. The proceeding must be one that relates to one of these four categories. The said Notification does not provide that exemption becomes available merely because one of these subjects is incidentally pleaded, referred to or narrated in the body of a plaint.

23. Equally significant is the Explanatory Notification which restricts the expression “property disputes” to property disputes arising out of and concerning matrimonial matters. The decisions in Prabhakar Dayaram Narkhede (supra), Girish Kanhaiyalal Munshi (supra), Harsha Pradeep Patil (supra) and Kailash (supra) consistently recognise that succession, inheritance and testamentary disputes stand on a different footing and do not fall within the scope of the exemption. Those authorities proceed on the basis that rights asserted in succession proceedings arise upon the death of an individual and not out of any matrimonial relationship.

24. There is no dispute about the nature of the present suit. The Applicant seeks administration of the estate of her deceased father, partition thereof and rendition of accounts. Every substantive relief claimed in the present suit is founded on the Applicant’s alleged rights as an heir and legal representative of the deceased. The source of those rights is the law of succession. The valuation of the suit is linked to the estate claimed by the Applicant. The reliefs sought are succession-related in character. The present suit is therefore, in substance and in law, a succession and partition action.

25. Faced with this difficulty, the Applicant seeks to invoke the “violence” limb of the said Notification. The submission, however, overlooks the distinction between a suit that is about violence and a suit in which allegations of violence are made. The said Notification contemplates the former and not the latter.

26. For a proceeding to qualify as a case relating to violence, the act of violence must constitute the foundation of the cause of action or be so intrinsically and inextricably connected with the relief claimed that the proceeding cannot meaningfully be separated from it. The notified category cannot be attracted merely because allegations of violence are added to a dispute whose essential nature lies elsewhere. Were it otherwise, the applicability of the said Notification would depend not on the true character of the proceeding but on the ingenuity of pleading.

27. In the present case, the allegations relied upon by the Applicant are that Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 withheld information concerning the estate, failed to distribute assets, excluded her from transactions relating to estate property and thereby subjected her to financial and economic violence. These allegations are not supported by any contemporaneous documentary material evidencing an independent act of violence. More importantly, even assuming these allegations to be correct, they remain incidents narrated in support of the Applicant’s claim to a share in the estate. They do not constitute an independent cause of action. The reliefs sought in the present suit neither arise from nor are directed against any alleged act of violence. The present suit would remain perfectly maintainable even if every reference to financial or economic violence were deleted from the plaint.

28. It is therefore impossible to hold that in the present case violence constitutes the gravamen of the lis. The gravamen remains the Applicant’s assertion that she has been denied her alleged share in her father’s estate. The dispute is thus one of inheritance, administration, partition and accounts. To accept the Applicant’s submission would be to hold that every monetary claim, inheritance dispute, commercial claim or property action instituted by a woman litigant could potentially be brought within the said Notification merely by incorporating an allegation that the conduct complained of caused her financial or economic violence. Such an interpretation would substantially enlarge the scope of the said Notification and extend it far beyond what the Government expressly contemplated. Courts are not at liberty to achieve such expansion under the guise of a beneficial construction. More pertinently, I do not seek to import such an interpretation to the said Notification.

29. The decisions relied upon by the Applicant are clearly distinguishable. In Usha Badri Poonawalla (supra), the cause of action itself arose from the alleged defamatory acts constituting mental and social violence against the plaintiff. The relief claimed flowed directly from the alleged violence. Likewise, in Pushpalata Yeshwant Chavan (supra), the plaintiff’s claim arose from forcible dispossession accompanied by physical acts of violence. There too, the violence complained of was not incidental to the dispute, it constituted the very foundation of the cause of action. The ratio of those decisions is therefore entirely inapplicable to a succession suit where allegations of financial or economic violence are merely appended to support a claim for inheritance.

30. I am consequently unable to accept the Applicant’s contention that the present suit falls within the category of a case relating to “violence” under the said Notification. The present suit is, in its pith and substance, a succession and partition action concerning the estate of the deceased. The allegations of financial and economic violence are merely incidental to that dispute and do not alter its essential character. The Applicant is therefore not entitled to remission of court fees under the said Notification.

31. In view of the above, the Interim Application stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

32. After the order was pronounced, Mr. Pai, learned Counsel who appears for the Applicant/Plaintiff, submits that till date, there has been an order operating in favour of the Applicant/Plaintiff extending time for her to pay the requisite Court fees on the present suit. He submits that the protection granted under the said order be extended for a period of one week from today. This request is not opposed by the Defendants. Accordingly, time for the Applicant/Plaintiff to make payment of Court fees is hereby extended and such payment shall be made, on or before 25th June 2026.