1. Heard Mr. K. Sarma, the learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. P. Deka, the learned counsel for the respondents.

2. This regular second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been filed by Md. Helal Ali, who is the Secretary Incharge of Narayangaon Unnayan Samitee, on death of the original plaintiff, namely, Abdul Kader impugning the judgment and decree dated 23.03.2017, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge, Nalbari, in Title Appeal No. 6/2016, whereby the judgment and decree dated 28.03.2016, passed by the Court of learned Munsiff No. 1, Nalbari, in the Title Suit No. 50/2010 was set aside and reversed and thereby allowing the title appeal filed by the present respondents.

3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant regular second appeal, in brief, are that the predecessor in interest of the present appellant, namely, Abdul Kader had filed a title suit before the Court of learned Munsiff No. 1, Nalbari against the present respondents. The said suit was registered as Title Suit No. 50/2010. It was pleaded in the plaint of the said suit by the plaintiff that he was the Chairman of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti. It was also pleaded therein that the land described in Schedule- “Kha”of the plaint was converted into periodic Patta bearing No. 146 and Dag No. 1001 covering 21B, 3K and 10L of land and another plot of land measuring 14B and 2K of land in Periodic Patta No. 176 covered by Dag No. 1002 was mutated in the name of Narayangaon Sarbodaya Seva Mandir.

4. The aforesaid suit was filed by the predecessor in interest of the present appellant seeking relief of declaration of right, title and interest of the land described in Schedule "Kha" of the plaint in favor of Narayangaon Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, also for declaring the possession of suit land in favour of the plaintiff’s Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner in the aforesaid land. It was pleaded in the plaint that as the Narayangaon Sarbodaya Seva Mandir was earlier situated in village Tinipukhuri, the defendant had started interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs making a claim over the Narayangaon Sarbodaya Seva Mandir. It was also pleaded in the plaint that after bifurcation of the districts of Baksa from Nalbari district, the village Narayangaon fall in Nalbari district, whereas Tinipukhuri falls within Baksa district.

5. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement taking various defences like lack of cause of action as well as non-maintainability of the suit. It was also pleaded in the written statement that the contentions of the plaintiff in their plaint are false and baseless. It was also pleaded in the written statement that the suit land has been mutated in the name of Sarbodaya Seva Mandir. However, erroneously the name of Narayangaon was inserted in the revenue records at the initial stage. Later on, the said error was rectified and the revenue records were corrected by deleting the name of Narayangaon therefrom. It was also pleaded in the written statement that the suit land was under the occupation of Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, Tinipukhuri since the year 1963 and the Narayangaon Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, Tinipukhuri was established and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and was managed by the Assam Bhudan Gramdan Board.

6. Upon pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed following issues:-

                   “1. Whether the suit is maintainable?

                   2. Whether there is cause of action for this suit?

                   3 Whether Narayangaon Unnayan Samitee represented by the plaintiff has right, title and interest and possession over the suit land described in Schedule kha of the plaint?

                   4. Whether Sarvodaya Seva Mandir village Tinpukhuri, managed and represented by the defendants has right, title, interest and possession over the suit land described in schedule kha of the plaint?

                   5. Whether the Sarvodaya Seva Mandir is managed by the plaintiff's organisation Narayangaon Unnayan Samitee or by the defendants under Assam Sarvodaya Seva Mandal?

                   6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for?

                   7. To what other relief/ reliefs the parties are entitled to?”

7. In support of the contention raised in the plaint, the plaintiff examined 3(three) witnesses, however, no documentary evidence was adduced by the plaintiff. Whereas the defendant side examined 6(six) witnesses and exhibited several documents in support of their contention.

8. Ultimately, after considering the materials on record, the trial court (i.e. the Court of learned Munsiff No. 1, Nalbari), by judgment dated 28th of March, 2016, passed in Title Suit No. 50/2010, decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the present respondents preferred an appeal before the Court of learned Civil Judge, Nalbari. The said appeal was registered as Title Appeal No. 6/2016. Thereafter, by the judgment dated 23.03.2017, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court and reversed its finding by dismissing the suit.

10. The aforesaid judgment of the First Appellate Court has been impugned by the appellant in this regular second appeal. This regular second appeal was admitted by this court on 22.12.2017. While admitting the appeal, this court formulated following substantial questions of law.

                   “1. Whether the learned First Appellate Court is correct in holding that the appellant/plaintiff has no right, title, interest and possession over the suit land described in Schedule- Kha of the plaint.

                   2. Whether the learned First Appellate Court is correct in holding that suit is not maintainable while deciding issue No. 1 in view of the provision of Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC.

                   3. Whether the impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court suffers from perversity and infirmities?”

11. Mr. K Sarma, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the First Appellate Court had erred and committed perversity in ignoring the evidence which was on record in arriving at a finding that the plaintiff's organization does not have any right, title and interest and possession over the scheduled- “Kha” land. He submits that the Trial Court was right in relying on the report of the commission which was issued by the trial court during the trial. He submits that the commission report was submitted by the Circle Officer, Ghograpar Revenue Circle, who has categorically stated in his report that the suit land was situated in village Narayan Gaon of Paschim Banbhag, Mouza under Ghograpar Revenue Circle. He further submits that the trial court was also correct in relying on the aforesaid report, wherein it was categorically mentioned that the public institutions like Sarbodaya Seva Mandir situated in Narayan Gaon was managed and looked after by the people of Narayan Gaon.He submits that the First Appellate Court committed perversity in ignoring the aforementioned commission report and thereafter arriving at a conclusion that the appellant has failed to prove its right, title, and interest over the suit land.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the First Appellate Court also committed perversity in holding that the suit filed by the plaintiff was a representative suit and, therefore, compliance of the mandate of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was necessary. He submits that the present appellant is the President of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti situated at Narayangaon and as such his predecessor, Abdul Kader had filed the suit in his capacity as President of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti and, therefore, it is not a representative suit.

13. He also submits that the Appellate Court also erred in not considering the fact that while raising the question of maintainability in the written statement, the present respondents have not specifically stated as to on what ground the objection as regards maintainability was raised. He submits that in their written statement, it was nowhere stated by the present respondents that the suit is barred by Order 1, Rule 8(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for want of taking leave to file the suit in representative capacity. He submits that in a civil suit, the parties cannot go beyond pleading and same is applicable to the appellate court also. He submits that the First Appellate Court erred in deciding the question of maintainability on a point which was never agitated by the respondents in their written statement.

14. On the other hand, Mr. P. Deka, the learned counsel for respondents has submitted that the First Appellate Court has correctly decided the appeal after considering the materials available on record and the impugned judgment and decree does not warrant any interference by this court at this stage of second appeal. He submits that there is no perversity on the part of the First Appellate Court in passing the impugned judgment and decree as it arrived at its conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record.

15. He submits that the trial court had erred in concluding that merely because of the fact that Sarbodaya Seva Mandir is situated in Narayangaon, the Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, Tinipukhuri does not have any right, title, and interest over the same. He submits that merely because after bifurcation of the district of Baksa and Nalbari, the Tinipukhuri village fell within the jurisdiction of Baksa village and the Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, Tinipukhuri which is a registered society, cannot possess land in another village i.e., Narayangaon. He submits that the reasoning of the trial court that as the Sarbodaya Seva Mandir is situated in Narayangaon under Paschim Banbhag Mouza which is not a Gramdan village, the defendants who are resident of Tinipukhuri village may not have any authority over institutions situated in Narayangaon village was a fallacious reasoning, which was ultimately rectified in the impugned judgment by the First Appellate Court on the basis of documentary as well as oral evidence on record.

16. He further submits that the trial court, while decreeing the suit in favor of the present appellant, has also erroneously observed in its judgment that the plaintiff has adduced oral and documentary evidence. However, no document was ever exhibited by the plaintiff in the trial and said fact has been correctly reflected by the First Appellate Court in the impugned judgment.

17. The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the commission report of the Circle Officer of Ghograpar Revenue Circle, which was relied upon by the trial court, never stated that the Narayan Seva Mandir is in possession of the plaintiff's organization, though the commission was issued only to ascertain the possession. It has only stated that the Narayan Seva Mandir was situated in Narayangaon, a fact which the present respondents are also not denying. He further submits that even the report of the commissioner mentioned that the public institutions including the Sarbodaya Seva Mandir was looked after and managed by the people of Narayangaon, Namati, Baralkuchi and Tinipukhuri village together from which it cannot be inferred that the suit land was in exclusive possession of the plaintiff's organization.

18. He submits that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to adduce evidence to show their right, title and interest as well as possession over the suit land. Whereas the respondents had exhibited the documents like registration certificate, Khiraj Miyadi Patta, premium payment receipt and mutation order have clearly shown that the Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, Tinipukhuri is having the title and possession over the suit land. He submits that hence the finding arrived at by the First Appellate Court cannot be regarded as a perverse finding.

19. He also submits that the First Appellate Court was correct in holding that the suit filed by the present appellant before the trial court was not maintainable as no permission was obtained under Order 1 Rule 8(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as was required in case of a representative suit. He submits that a bare perusal of the cause title of the plaint as well as the memo of appeal, in the instant appeal, would indicate that the organization which the appellant is claiming to be the President, i.e., Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti is not a registered organization and the appellant has claimed himself to be the President of said organization. He submits that whenever a Secretary or President or any other office bearer of a unregistered society intends to sue someone, he has to sue in a representative capacity on behalf of the said organization and for suing so, prior permission of the court under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be taken, which the present appellant failed to take and the First Appellate Court correctly decided that the suit is barred by the provision of Order 1 Rule 8(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondents has cited following rulings:-

                   (1) “Sri Biraj Bhattacharya Vs. Indian Culture Center and others ” reported in “2018 0 Supreme (Cal) 474”

                   (2) “Illachi Devi (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors. Vs. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India and others ” reported in “(2003) 8 SCC 413”

                   (3) “S. Nesamony Nadar Vs. Nidalam Government High School ” reported in “1978 0 AIR (Mad) 383”.

20. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited by learned counsel for both sides in support of their respective submissions.

21. Let us first of all consider and decide the substantial question of law No. 1 and No. 3 as to whether the First Appellate Court committed perversity in arriving at a finding that the appellant/plaintiff has no right, title and interest and possession over suit land described in Schedule “Kha” of the plaint.

22. The Apex Court in the case of “Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority” reported in “(2015) 3 SCC 49” has observed as follows:-

                   “32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two judgments. In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , it was held : (SCC p. 317, para 7)

                   “7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.”

                   In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , it was held : (SCC p. 14, para 10)

                   “10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.”

23. Thus, from above, it appears that there is a broad distinction between decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. However, if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever, compendious it may be, the conclusion would not be treated as perverse and the finding would not be interfered with.

24. In the instant case, the trial court had decreed the title suit in favor of the present appellant without there being any document of title. Though, the trial court had held that the plaintiff adduced oral and documentary evidence, however, in fact, no document has been exhibited by the plaintiff before the trial court. Hence, the observation of the trial court in that respect is perverse and the said perversity is taken note of by the First Appellate Court, which has held that the plaintiff has failed to adduce any document in support of their contention regarding right, title and interest and possession over the suit land.

25. Further, though the trial court relied on the report of the commissioner in decreeing the suit, however, the report of the commissioner mentions that Sarbodaya Seva Mandir was looked after and managed by the people of Narayangaon, Namati, Baralkuchi and Tinipukhuri village together and no mention about the plaintiff's samiti is there in the commission report. Hence, the appellate court was right in holding that the trial court erred in relying upon the report of the commissioner, which mainly say that the Narayan Seva Mandir is situated in Narayangaon. The said fact was also not disputed by the respondent side as after bifurcation of Nalbari and Baksa District, the Narayan Seva Mandir fell within the territorial jurisdiction of Baksa District. However, the trial court holding that since it fell in the Baksa District, the defendants who are from Tinipukhuri village, which fell in Baksa District, does not have right, title and interest over the suit land has erred and this error has been rightly rectified by the appellate court by holding that merely because the suit land is situated in the territorial jurisdiction of Nalbari District, it does not create any bar for the defendant society, i.e, Sarbodaya Seva Mandir, Tinipukhuri, which is a registered society in holding property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the district in which the said society is situated.

26. The First Appellate Court, while coming to the conclusion that it is the defendant's society which has right, title and interest and possession over the suit land relied upon the documents exhibited by the defendants, namely, registration certificate of their society, Khiraj Miyadi Patta, payment receipt, premium payment receipt and mutation orders and as such, it cannot be said that the First Appellate Court arrived at its finding without there being any evidence on record or the evidence on which it relied was thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would have acted on it. Rather, the First Appellate Court has come to its finding on the basis of evidence on record and has stated reasons for arriving at its finding. Hence, the conclusion arrived at by the First Appellate Court cannot be regarded as perverse. As such, the first substantial question of law is answered in affirmative and the third question of law is answered in negative.

27. Let us now consider the second substantial question of law as to whether the First Appellate Court is correct in holding that suit is not maintainable in view of provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It appears from record that though the predecessor-ininterest of the present appellant claims himself to be the president of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti and the present appellant claims himself to be the In-charge Secretary of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti. However, fact remains that the said Samiti is not a registered society as no certificate of registration could be produced by the plaintiff before the trial court or even before the First Appellate Court.

28. Under Section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, every society registered under the said Act may sue or be sued in the name of president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustee, as shall be determined by the rules and regulation of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as may be appointed by the governing body for the occasion. Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or trustee thereof, if on application to governing body, some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.

29. Thus, for suing by a registered society, the statutory provision contained in Section 6 clarifies as to in whose name it may so. In the instant case, the plaintiff claimed to be chairman of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti. However, said Samiti is not a registered Samiti. Hence, this court is of considered opinion that the First Appellate Court was right in holding that the plaintiff has failed to furnish any documents to show that he is the president of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti nor he has produced any document to show that the said Samiti has authorized him to file suit on their behalf.

30. This court is of the considered opinion that the First Appellate Court was correct in holding that the plaintiff has filed the suit in a representative capacity as president of Narayangaon Unnayan Samiti. This court is also of the considered opinion that when a person claiming to be office bearer of an unregistered society files suit on behalf of the said society, the compliance of provisions contained in Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is mandatory as such a suit takes the color of a representative suit.

31. However, in the instant case, no such compliance of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been made by the plaintiff while filing this suit. As such, the First Appellate Court is right in holding that the suit is not maintainable for non-compliance of the provision of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the second substantial question of law is also accordingly decided in affirmative.

32. Thus, there is no perversity in the judgment of the First Appellate Court justifying any interference by this court in exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

33. In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this appeal is dismissed with cost.

34. Send back the records of the First Appellate Court as well as the trial court to the respective courts with a copy of this judgment.